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Mrs. Subhash Lata v. Sh. V.N Khanna. .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the judgment dated 4-6-1988 of the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, who dismissed a petition filed under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act by the appellant alongside her divorce petition. The divorce was granted despite the dismissal of the Section 27 petition. The appellant claimed that certain articles, including several gold sets, golden churies, golden ornaments, and silver and brass utensils, were presented to her by her parents or other relations at the time of her marriage. The Additional District Judge held that since there was no averment that the property was jointly presented to both the appellant and her husband, the petition under Section 27 was not maintainable.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a petition under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act is maintainable when the property alleged to have been presented at or about the time of marriage belongs solely to one spouse and not jointly to both.
- Whether the appellant is entitled to relief under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act for property claimed to be presented exclusively to her at the time of marriage.
- The applicability of precedent authorities interpreting the scope of Section 27 regarding jointly held property presented at marriage.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant asserted that various valuable articles were presented to her at the time of marriage by her parents and relatives, implying ownership of these articles.
- Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the case of Anju Bhargava v. Rajesh Bhargava to argue that the words "may belong jointly" in Section 27 could be interpreted flexibly.
- The appellant’s counsel also cited Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another to support the claim that remedies exist for recovery of stridhan property.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Anju Bhargava v. Rajesh Bhargava, II (1986) DMC 467 | Interpretation of "may belong jointly" in Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act | The court viewed the observations on the phrase "may belong jointly" as obiter dicta and not binding ratio decidendi; the case involved a settlement and is not directly applicable. |
| Smt. Shukla v. Brij Bhushan Makkar, 223 | Section 27 empowers the court only over property belonging jointly to both spouses presented at or about the time of marriage | Applied to hold that property exclusively belonging to one spouse is outside the jurisdiction of Section 27 and must be pursued in civil courts. |
| Mr. Ashok Kumar Kad v. Smt. Usha Rani Kad, FAO No. 111 of 1983, 1985 MLR 21 | Scope of Section 27 limited to jointly owned property presented at or about the time of marriage | Followed the principle that Section 27 applies only if property is jointly owned by both spouses. |
| Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, AIR 1985 SC 628 | Recovery of stridhan property and the non-abolition of remedies under Hindu Marriage and Succession Acts | Held that the remedy for recovery of stridhan is by civil suit and not by criminal proceedings; this authority was found not applicable to the facts of the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, emphasizing that the provision applies only to property presented at or about the time of marriage which belongs jointly to both spouses. The learned Additional District Judge's conclusion that the petition was not maintainable due to absence of any claim of joint ownership was affirmed. The court distinguished the appellant’s reliance on the Anju Bhargava case, noting that its relevant observations were obiter and not binding. Further, the court relied on the consistent view from Smt. Shukla v. Brij Bhushan Makkar and Mr. Ashok Kumar Kad v. Smt. Usha Rani Kad that Section 27 does not empower courts to deal with property exclusively belonging to one spouse. The appellant’s claim that the property was solely presented to her meant that her remedy lay in civil courts, not under Section 27. The appellant’s reliance on Pratibha Rani was also rejected as inapplicable since that case dealt with criminal proceedings for recovery of stridhan property, whereas the present case concerns a civil petition under Section 27.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court upheld the dismissal of the petition under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground that the property claimed was not jointly owned by the spouses but presented solely to the appellant. Consequently, the appellant’s claim for relief under Section 27 was not maintainable, and she must seek remedy through civil courts. This decision does not set any new precedent but reinforces the established principle limiting Section 27’s application to jointly owned property presented at or about the time of marriage.
R.L Gupta, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 4-6-1988 of the learned Addl District Judge, Delhi by which she dismissed a petition under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by the appellant alongwith her divorce petition. The divorce, however, was granted
2. By this application the appellant stated that her parents/other relations had presented to her the following articles at the time of her marriage.
(i) One golden set (Jaru) comprising of gulubind for neck, two karas, earrings.
(ii) One another golden set called Makhi set comprising of neckles, two punches, earrings and three rings.
(iii) One golden set of small weight consisting of Kanti for the neck, karas for hand and three rings.
(iv) golden churies 20.
(v) One Nath golden, one tika, one sangarpari nath.
(vi) 31 utensils of silver consisting of thals katcoas etc.
(vii) Utensils of brass (make Muradabadi) comprised in one bucket.
3. Learned ADJ held that since there was no averment in the application that the property was jointly presented to the appellant as well as her husband at the time of the marriage so it was not maintainable under Section 27 of the Act.
4. I have heard arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to some authorities. The first case is that of Anju Bhargava… v. Rajesh Bhargava… II (1986) DMC 467. A perusal of this authority shows that both the parties came to a settlement in that case. The husband agreed to pay Rs. 20,000/- in instalments of Rs. 2000/- to the wife. The agreement was accepted by this Court and the case disposed off. I am of the view that the other observations made in this authority holding that the words, “May belong jointly” may also mean, “may not belong jointly” in Section 27 of the Act are in the nature of obiter and cannot be called ratio decidendi. This court held in the case of Smt. Shukla… v. Brij Bhushan Makkar…. 223:
“Section 27, Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is a substantive provision empowering the Court in any proceeding under the said Act to make a just and proper order regarding property presented at or about the time of the marriage of the parties and belonging jointly to both of them. The Court exercising the jurisdiction under the Act is powerless to deal with properties exclusively belonging to one or the other spouse”.
In the above case the wife who pleaded that the properties were presented to her and, therefore, belonged to her was held not entitled to the relief of their recovery under Section 27 of the Act. Her remedy lay before the Civil Courts. Neither could such an order be based on Order 7 Rule 7 read with Section 151, Civil Procedure Code. The aforesaid view was followed by this Court in Mr. Ashok Kumar Kad… v. Smt. Usha Rani Kad…., FAO No. 111 of 1983 reported in 1985 MLR. 21. The Court said:
“It is no doubt true that the operation of the provision embodied in Section 27 of the Act is confined only to property presented to the parties at or about the time of the marriage which belongs jointly to both of them,”
Therefore, in matters which were contested by the parties before this Court the consistent view is that Section 27 of the Act is attracted when the property presented at or about the time of the marriage is alleged to being jointly to both the spouses. In the present case, the allegation is that all the aforesaid articles were presented to her at the time of marriage by her parents/other relations, meaning there by that the same belonged to her. Learned counsel for the appellant also drew my attention to the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, AIR 1985 SC 628 After going through the aforesaid authority, I am of the view that the same as not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case the wife had filed a criminal complaint against the husband alleging misappropriation of the property absolutely owned by her. The Court of first instance summoned the husband as an accused. But the High Court quashed the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the wife to file to file a civil suit. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in para 15:
“We are of the opinion that this view of the High Court is not legally sustainable because neither of the two Acts, (Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act), referred to above, go to the extent, of providing that the claim of a woman on the basis of stridhani is completely abolished All that the two Sections mentioned above, provide is that if the husband refuses to return the stridhan property of his wife, it will be open to the wife to recover the same by a properly constituted suit. The Sections nowhere provide that the concept of stridhan is abolished or that a remedy under the criminal law for breach of trust is taken away.”
5. Therefore, I am of the view that the appellant does not seem to derive any strength for her case from the aforesaid ruling. I am, therefore of the view that the conclusion of the learned Addl. District Judge is correct. This appeal has no merit and the same is hereby dismissed.
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