- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Prakash Kaur v. Everest Construction Co.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant on 13.10.1981 in Bombay for the sale of a flat in a proposed building to be constructed at Prabha Devi, Bombay. At the time of the agreement, the building did not exist, and the plaintiff had paid Rs. 12,875 to the defendant. The defendant denies the existence of this agreement and refuses to specifically perform it. The plaintiff seeks a declaration that the agreement continues to exist. The defendant raised a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Court, asserting that since the agreement was executed in Bombay and the immovable property is located there, the courts at Delhi lack jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit despite the agreement being executed in Bombay and the immovable property situated there.
- Whether Section 16(d) of the Civil Procedure Code bars the suit in this Court given the nature of the agreement.
- Whether Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the agreement and affects jurisdiction.
- The applicability of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act regarding the suit for declaration of legal character.
- Whether the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act bars the suit due to omission to seek further relief.
- Whether the suit is maintainable under Order 2 Rule 2 and Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Whether Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to confer jurisdiction on this Court based on cause of action arising in Delhi.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The agreement dated 13.10.1981 is covered by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, which does not create any interest in immovable property; hence Section 16(d) of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar jurisdiction.
- The plaintiff seeks only a declaration of legal character as purchaser, not specific performance at this stage, which is permissible under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
- The plaintiff deliberately chose not to seek further relief in this suit and will seek such relief in an appropriate forum later.
- Part of the cause of action arose in Delhi because the denial of the agreement was received there, thus conferring jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Defendant's Arguments
- The Court at Delhi has no jurisdiction as the agreement was executed in Bombay and the immovable property is situated there, invoking Section 16(d) of the Civil Procedure Code.
- The suit is not maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act since the plaintiff omitted to seek further relief beyond declaration.
- The suit is not maintainable under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- The plaint does not disclose a cause of action as per Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code does not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi Court as the entire cause of action arose in Bombay.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Prakash Kaur vs. K.G. Ringshia (LA. No. 7322 of 1984 in Suit No. 1979 of 1984) | Jurisdictional principles regarding suits relating to immovable property | The Court noted this precedent but did not rely on it due to additional contentions raised before it. |
| Ram Baran Prasad vs. Ram Mohit (1967 SC 744) and Bai Dosabai vs. Mathuradas | Interpretation of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act: An agreement to sell does not create interest in immovable property | Reiterated that the agreement does not create interest in immovable property, negating the application of Section 16(d) of the Civil Procedure Code. |
| Raja Brothers vs. Chanrai Uttam Chand (I.L.R. 1969 Delhi 931) | Jurisdiction based on part of cause of action arising within the Court's territorial limits | Held that since the denial of the agreement was received in Delhi, part of the cause of action arose there, conferring jurisdiction on the Delhi Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first examined the defendant's preliminary objection on jurisdiction, focusing on Section 16(d) of the Civil Procedure Code which bars courts other than the one where immovable property is situated from entertaining suits relating to that property. The Court held that since Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act states that an agreement to sell does not create any interest in immovable property, the term "interest" in both statutes must be given the same meaning. Therefore, Section 16(d) does not apply to the present suit, and jurisdiction is not barred on this ground.
Regarding Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court found that the plaintiff's suit for declaration of the existence of the agreement and legal character as purchaser is maintainable. Although the defendant argued that the plaintiff should have sought further relief beyond declaration per the proviso to Section 34, the Court accepted the plaintiff's position that no further relief is sought at this stage and that specific performance cannot be granted without first establishing the agreement's existence.
The Court rejected the defendant's contentions under Order 2 Rule 2 and Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Civil Procedure Code, finding that the plaint discloses a cause of action and that the relief sought is within the Court's power.
On the issue of territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court accepted the plaintiff's argument, supported by the precedent in Raja Brothers vs. Chanrai Uttam Chand, that since the denial of the agreement was communicated and received in Delhi, part of the cause of action arose there. This suffices to confer jurisdiction on the Delhi Court.
Consequently, the Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that it has jurisdiction to try the suit.
Holding and Implications
The Court holds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit despite the agreement and immovable property being connected to Bombay.
The defendant's preliminary objection based on jurisdiction under Section 16(d) of the Civil Procedure Code and other procedural provisions is rejected. The Court's decision allows the suit for declaration of the existence of the agreement and the plaintiff's legal character as purchaser to proceed in Delhi. No new precedent is established; the ruling applies directly to the parties by confirming the Court's jurisdiction in this matter.
(1) By this order, I propose to deal with the preliminary objection which has been taken by the defendant that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
(2) The plaintiff asserts that an agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant. This agreement was entered into at Bombay on 13 10.1981. This postulated that defendant will sell a flat in a proposed building which was to be constructed at Prabha Devi, Bombay. It is not disputed between the parties that on 13.10.1981 when the agreement was entered into the building was not in existence. At the time of entering into that agreement, plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs. 12,875.00 to the defendant.
(3) The pff. asserts that the deft. is denying the existence of the aforesaid agreement, and that the deft. is refusing to specifically perform that agreement, illegally, and the pff. seeks a declaration only that the agreement dated 13.10.1981 continues to exist.
(4) The preliminary objection which has been taken is because it is stated that the agreement between the parties was executed at Bombay ; that the immovable property which was proposed to be constructed, was to be constructed at Bombay, and for both the aforesaid reasons, the courts at Delhi have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
(5) In order to deal with the objection relating to jurisdiction, Counsel for pff. has cited a judgment by B.N. Kirpal, J. in Prakash Kaur vs. K.G. Ringshia, (LA. No. 7322 of 1984 in Suit No. 1979 of 1984). This judgment need not be dealt with in view of the contentions raised by the counsel for the pff. before me, which were not raised before Kirpal, J. Before me, he has contended that in view of S. 54, Transfer of Property Act, inasmuch as the agreement between the parties dated 13.10.1981 is an agreement covered by that section, it creates no interest in any immovable property, and, therefore, S. 16(d) of the Civil Procedure Code . does not come in operation, and does not bar jurisdiction of this Court.
(6) Section 54 of T.P.A. is : --A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.
(7) Mr. P.C. Khanna has also cited 1967 Scr 293= 1967 Sc 744 (Ram Baran Prasad vs. Ram Mohit) and (Bai Dosabai vs. Mathuradas). In both these cases, the Supreme Court has considered S. 54, T.P.A., and has reiterated that what the section states, namely, that an agreement to sell does not create any interest in any immovable property.
(8) In this view of the matter, the plea taken by the deft. that S. 16(d), Civil Procedure Code ., which bars the cognizance of suits relating to immovable property by courts other than the one in which the immovable property situates, is of no force, inasmuch as the words in S. 16(d), C P.C. and the words in S. 54, T.P.A. are "interest" in immovable property. In my view, same words being used in two different statutes, must be given same meaning, and for this reason, the contention of the deft. that this Court has no jurisdiction on account of S. 16(d), Civil Procedure Code ., must be rejected.
(9) It is contended by Mr. P.B. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the deft. that considering the provisions of S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act, this suit is not maintainable. Sec. 34 of Specific Relief Act reads :- "34.Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right. Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
(10) In this case, what the pff. seeks is a declaration that an agreement dated 13.10.1981 subsists, and that by virtue of that agreement between the parties, the pff. has a legal character of a purchaser, and the deft. has a legal character of a seller. It is also noted above, the deft. is denying that legal character of seller and purchaser, for whatever reasons, which are to be adjudicated upon between the parties.
(11) The first part of S. 34, Specific Relief Act, therefore, is not a bar to this Court entertaining the suit.
(12) Mr. P.B. Aggarwal then says that the proviso to that section requires that wherever the plaintiff can seek a further relief, a mere declaration of title, ought not to be given, inasmuch as the plaintiff has omitted to seek the further declaration.
(13) Mr. P.C (Channa, on the other hand, contends that he does not seek any further declaration in these proceedings as he only wants to have the plaintiff's legal character determined, and upon determination, whatever further reliefs are available, he will seek that in an appropriate forum. In any case, it appears to me that the pff has deliberately chosen not to ask for any further relief. Further relief for specific performance of the agreement, if it exists, cannot be granted by this Court. In any case, the very existence of, or non-existence of the agreement to sell, has first to be established before specific performance can be granted, and that the plaintiff has, in my opinion, entitled to do in view of the first part of S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
(14) The contention of Mr. P.B. Aggarwal that because of the proviso to S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the suit cannot be tried by this Court, must also be rejected.
(15) Mr. P.B. Aggarwal then contends that because of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2, C.P.C. this suit is not maintainable. He has done so half-heartedly, and as he should have, because the entirety of the relief which can be granted by this Court, namely, determination of existence or non-existence of the agreement to sell, is within the power of this Court, as that is the only relief claimed in this suit, and the only relief which the plaintiff is entitled to.
(16) Mr. P B. Aggarwal also called in the aid of Order 7 Rulell(a), Civil Procedure Code . that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action. In view of what is stated in the plaint, declaration sought, and what is stated above, the plaint does disclose cause of action which may be adjudicated upon by this Court.
(17) The next contention raised by Mr. P.B. Aggarwal is regarding S. 20, C P.C., which reads :
"20.Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction--. (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises......."
(18) Mr. P.B. Aggarwal says that inasmuch S. 16(d), Civil Procedure Code . does not apply, S. 20, Civil Procedure Code . is applicable, and because the entirety of the cause of action has arisen at Bombay, and because denial of the agreement was made by letter dt. 24/28.12.1987 at Bombay, by delivery thereof to the Post Office by the deft. on instructions of the pff. the entirety of cause of action has arisen at Bombay. In this view, this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit, (19) Mr. P.C. Khanna meets this contention of Mr. P.B. Aggarwal by citing I.L.R. 1969 Delhi 931 (Raja Brothers vs. Chanrai Uttam Chand), according to which judgment, if the revocation letter has been received at Delhi, part of cause of action arises at Delhi, and this Court gets jurisdiction to try the suit.
(20) I am in respectful agreement with I.L.R. 1969 Delhi 931 (supra), and 1 hold that the denial of the agreement, and putting that denial into the hands of the Post Office, which denial has been received by the pff. at Delhi, creates a part of cause of action in favor of the plaintiff at Delhi. Part of cause of action having arisen at Delhi, this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit.
(21) In this view of the matter, I decide the preliminary objection against the deft. and in favor of the plaintiff, and hold that this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit.
Alert