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Seetha Lakshmi Krishnan v. Gian Parkash Etc. .

Delhi High Court

Sep 18, 1990

Judgment

Subsequent
References

CaseIQ

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Structured Summary of the Opinion by M.L. Varma, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a first appeal against the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi's order dated 20.5.1975 (Suit No. 234/70) under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appellants (legal representatives of the deceased S. Krishnan) originally claimed Rs. 2,00,000 as compensation for his death. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 37,950 and interest at 6% p.a. The appeal was filed on 18.10.1975.

Relevant facts established by the record (not in dispute): the deceased, Shri S. Krishnan, was an Investigator in the Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Government of India. On 1.4.1970, while riding a scooter, he met with a fatal accident. He was born on 22.3.1939 and was 34 years old at death. He left behind his widow (appellant No.1), a minor son (appellant No.2), two minor daughters (appellants 3 and 4) and a dependent widowed mother (appellant No.5), who died during the pendency of the appeal.

The Tribunal found the deceased not at fault and attributed liability to Jeep No. DLE 4174 belonging to respondent No.2 (Union of India). The Tribunal recorded the deceased's monthly salary as Rs. 583.25, took dependency as Rs. 300 per month, used a multiplier of 24 (based on retirement at age 58), computed Rs. 86,400 and after various deductions arrived at Rs. 37,950.

During the appeal an application (CM 1374/87), filed 20.4.1987 under Order 41 Rule 33 and Section 151 CPC, sought recognition of subsequent pay increases (Third Pay Commission and other rises) and a corresponding enhancement of compensation (the appellants sought to raise the claim to Rs. 5,00,000). That application was ordered to be considered with the main appeal on 17.8.1987. An earlier oral judgment by S.B. Wad, J. on 10.1.1989 had enhanced compensation in arithmetic to Rs. 2,59,200 but restricted it to Rs. 2,00,000 (the original claim); that order was set aside on application by respondent No.2 under Section 151 CPC read with Order 9 Rule 13 and the appeal was re-heard by M.L. Varma, J.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal (Rs. 37,950) was adequate and whether the compensation should be increased (including whether subsequent pay increases and future earning capacity should be taken into account).
The appropriate rate of interest to be awarded on the compensation and the date from which interest should run.
Whether the deductions made by the Tribunal (pension, insurance proceeds, gratuity, bank balance, a 15% deduction for lump-sum/uncertainties) were permissible in law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Mr. Goyal)

The Tribunal failed to consider increases in the deceased's salary and allowances which would have occurred in the normal course (including revision of pay-scales pursuant to pay commissions) and hence understated future pecuniary loss.
The Tribunal ignored the deceased's post-retirement earning capacity and life expectancy when computing dependency.
The Tribunal's dependency figure (Rs. 300 p.m.) was unrealistically low given five dependants; the deceased would not have spent nearly half his salary on himself.
Deductions for pension, insurance proceeds, gratuity and bank balance were unwarranted; these items should not be deducted from compensation (relying on precedents such as Delhi Transport Corporation v. Harbans Kaur).
On the basis of figures in CM 1374/87, the appellants argued for enhancement (as high as Rs. 5,00,000 by their arithmetical calculation, or at least to Rs. 2,00,000 as a fair estimate).
The appellants claimed interest at 9% p.a. (as per original claim) and relied on authorities which have awarded interest up to 12% p.a. in some cases.

Respondent No.2's Arguments (Mr. V.K. Makhija)

Future promotions, higher salaries or allowances are speculative; there was no evidence or original pleading to support computation on that basis.
No specific claim/evidence was made in the original application for future promotions or higher pay; therefore, the Tribunal should not base compensation on speculative future increases.
Relied on the decision in Kamlesh Arora to argue that additional payments/allowances and increases in salary cannot be presumed without evidence (the Kamlesh Arora case itself involved supporting material such as a letter from an employer).
Pointed out a sum of Rs. 62,050 had been deposited in Court on 21.5.1990 and submitted that interest should not run on that deposited amount after deposit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court in this Opinion
Rom Sahai v. Rabia Begum, 1969 ACJ 56	That Order 22 CPC and the provisions regarding abatement are not applicable to proceedings for compensation for fatal accidents.	Cited to justify that the claim by the legal representatives does not abate on the death of one of the L.Rs. and that representative proceedings continue.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. Harbans Kaur, 1983 ACJ 110 (Sultan Singh, J.)	No amount should be deducted from the quantum of compensation on account of pension, gratuity, insurance or lump-sum payments; such deductions are impermissible.	Relied on by the appellants' counsel; the court accepted the thrust of this principle and held that the Tribunal's deductions (pension, insurance, gratuity, bank balance and a lump-sum 15% deduction) were not justified in law.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. Kamlesh Arora, 1989 (2) ACJ 1034	Reiterated that no deduction should be made for uncertainties or lump-sum payments; also illustrates that additional pay/allowances may be considered only where evidential support exists.	Referenced both by respondent's counsel (to caution against speculative projections) and by the court as part of the jurisprudence discouraging inappropriate deductions; court noted the need for evidence where future rises or promotions are asserted.
Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, (1979) 4 SCC 365 (AIR 1979 SC 1666)	Determination of compensation in motor accident cases must be liberal and not niggardly.	Invoked to criticize the Tribunal's narrow approach to quantum; the court contrasted the Tribunal's conservative deductions with the liberal approach mandated by the Supreme Court.
Satyuwati Pathak v. Hari Ram, 1983 ACJ 424	Subsequent events (such as revision of pay) may be taken into account but the final compensation is often limited to the amount originally claimed; courts may limit awards to original claims in practice.	Examined by the court; used to support the proposition that even when subsequent events are considered, the award may be limited to the original claim. The court treated Satyuwati as not favoring enlargement beyond original claim absent appropriate procedure/evidence.
Mrs. Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupta, 1977 ACJ 134	Recognizes that courts should take into account salary the deceased would have earned upon reaching maximum grade when appropriate evidence exists.	Considered by the court but found not directly helpful in CM 1374/87 because that application did not specify when or what the deceased would have earned on reaching top of grade; therefore it did not authorise an expanded award here.
AIR 1968 SC 1047	Authority relied upon for awarding interest on amounts deposited in Court where claimants have not been able to withdraw/use the deposit.	Cited in support of awarding interest even on the Rs. 62,050 deposited in Court, because claimants could not withdraw or make use of that amount.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the questions that survived for consideration as: (i) adequacy of compensation; (ii) rate of interest; and (iii) date from which interest should be paid. The court accepted the primary factual findings of the Tribunal (liability, non-fault of the deceased, salary recorded) but critically examined the methodology the Tribunal adopted to compute dependency and deductions.

Key strands of the court's reasoning:

The Tribunal's dependency figure (Rs. 300 per month) was unduly low in light of the deceased's salary (Rs. 583.25) and the fact of five dependants. The court found the Tribunal's approach wrong-headed and its arithmetic led to injustice.
Deductions made by the Tribunal — pension expected to be received (Rs. 24,924), insurance proceeds (Rs. 11,000), gratuity (Rs. 560), bank balance (Rs. 230) and a 15% deduction for lump-sum/uncertainties — were not legally justified. The court accepted the authorities (e.g., Delhi Transport Corporation v. Harbans Kaur and Kamlesh Arora) that discourages such deductions from pecuniary loss.
The appellants' contention that subsequent increases in pay (Third Pay Commission and other revisions) should be taken into account was considered. The court noted:
- Evidence and pleading are critical: increases or promotions cannot be allowed on speculative bases without evidence.
- CM 1374/87 sought to rely on such increases, and arithmetic in that application produced higher figures, but the application did not specify certain essential data (for instance when the deceased would have reached the top of his grade).
- Precedents (Satyuwati Pathak, Manjushri Raha) indicate subsequent events can be considered, but courts have often limited awards to original claims where appropriate procedure or evidence to enlarge claims was lacking.
The court placed significant weight on the procedural reality that the appellants had originally claimed Rs. 2,00,000 in the petition and had reiterated that claim on appeal. Wad, J.'s earlier restriction to Rs. 2,00,000 (though based on larger arithmetic) was not appealed by the appellants; the court treated this as indicia that Rs. 2,00,000 was an amount the appellants themselves considered fair.
Balancing the need for a liberal approach in assessing compensation (per Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi) against the requirement to avoid speculative enhancement, the court concluded that Rs. 2,00,000 constituted a fair and just award in this case. The court retained the multiplier of 24 (consistent with age at death and expected retirement age of 58) and observed that taking 24 as the multiplier yields an acceptable dependency measure corresponding to the awarded sum.
On interest, the court noted that the claimants had specifically claimed 9% p.a. in their original claim and under "Section HOC interest is to be awarded from the date of application making the claim." Given that the original claim sought 9% p.a., and although some higher authorities had awarded 12% p.a., the court awarded 9% p.a. from the date of the claim application until payment. Interest computation was directed first on the full Rs. 2,00,000 until the date when Rs. 37,950 (already paid) was satisfied, and thereafter on the remaining balance (Rs. 1,62,050) until paid.
Regarding the deposit of Rs. 62,050 in Court, the court rejected respondent's contention that interest should cease after deposit because the claimants could not withdraw or use that sum. Relying on Satyuwati Pathak and AIR 1968 SC 1047, the court held interest should be awarded on deposited amounts where claimants remain deprived of use. The court ordered the Rs. 62,050 be immediately withdrawn by the appellants and directed payment of the full balance within one month; if payment is further delayed then interest at 12% p.a. on the balance would apply as a penal rate until complete payment.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The appeal is allowed. The appellants (legal representatives of Shri S. Krishnan) are awarded compensation of Rs. 2,00,000. They are also awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the claim application until payment.

Specific payment and interest directions given by the court:

Interest at 9% p.a. is to be paid on Rs. 2,00,000 from the date of the claim application until payment of Rs. 37,950 (an amount already paid as per the record).
Thereafter, interest at 9% p.a. is to be paid on the balance sum of Rs. 1,62,050 until full payment of that balance (including interest) is made.
The Rs. 62,050 deposited in Court can be withdrawn by the appellants immediately.
The respondent No.2 is directed to pay the compensation and interest in full to the appellants within one month from the date of the judgment. If payment is not made within one month, interest at the enhanced rate of 12% p.a. will run on the balance of the amount due until full payment is made (this is a penal rate to deter further delay given the long deprivation of the claimants).
There will be no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision reverses the Tribunal's low award and rejects the Tribunal's deductions (pension, insurance proceeds, gratuity, bank balance and a 15% lump-sum deduction) as unjustified in the circumstances. The court affirmed the need for a liberal approach to compensation assessment but constrained by evidential limits and the procedural fact of the original claim amount. The opinion applies existing precedents to the facts and does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying established authorities.

Disposition

Appeal allowed and disposed of.

Show all summary ...

M.L Varma, J.— This is a regular First Appeal against the order dated 20.5.75 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) on an application under Section 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This application had been made by the appellants herein claiming compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- in all on account of the death of one Shri S. Krishnan. It was registered as suit No. 234/70. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 37,950/- only as compensation. The Tribunal also ordered payment of interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the award till the date of realisation.

2. In this appeal filed on 18.10.75 the award has been challenged on various grounds by the appellants. It is worth-noting that in ground No. 5 of the Grounds of Appeal the appellants took the stand that the compensation payable to them comes to more than Rs. 2,50,000/- and have claimed that therefore the Tribunal ought to have awarded the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- to them as compensation. The appellants therefore restricted their claim for compensation in the appeal also to Rs. 2,00,000/- in all. There is no cross appeal filed by respondent No. 2, Union of India.

3. During the pendency of this appeal an application under Order 41 Rule 33 and Section 151 of the CPC was filed on 20.4.87 on behalf of the appellants. This application was registered as CM 1374/87. The prayer in this application was that the increase in the pay and allowances of government servants may be taken note of while allowing the compensation since the deceased was also a government servant. It was contended in this application that the subsequent events such as the rise in salary and allowances due to the recommendations of the various Pay Commissions should be taken into account while awarding the compensation. Notice of this application was issued to the respondents Union of India, respondent No. 2, was served with the notice of the application. However, no counter affidavit reply to this application was filed on its behalf. On 17.8.87 it was ordered that this application be taken up for consideration along with the main appeal.

4. A rather tall claim had been made in this application and the initial sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- was sought to be raised to Rs. 5,00,000/-. Accor-dins to the appellants this was on account of the normal increases which the deceased would have got as a result of the upward revision of pay-scales with effect from 1.1.73 and on various other dates as mentioned in the application. By a process of arithmetical calculations a figure of Rs. 5;00,000/- was arrived at.

5. This appeal was earlier disposed of by an oral judgment dated 10.1.89 passed by S.B Wad, J. On that date no one had appeared for the respondents. The amount of compensation was enhanced and restricted to Rs. 2,00,000, by Wad, J. This was because the initial claim made by the claimants was only Rs. 2,00,000/-. The enhancement was made on the basis of certain figures mentioned in the CM 1374/87. On that basis Wad, J. had held that the compensation would work out to Rs. 2,59,200/- but finally ordered the enhancement of compensation to Rs. 2,00,000/- in all. The claim of the appellants herein made in that application for enhancing the compensation to Rs. 5,00,000/- was not accepted. It may be noticed that the appellants herein had not appealed against the said judgment and order of Wad; J.

6. Since the aforesaid judgment of Wad, J. was delivered when no one had appeared on behalf of respondent No. 2; an application was moved on behalf of the said respondent under Section 151 CPC read with Order 9 Rule 13 praying for “setting aside the order dated 10.1.89″ and for re-hearing the matter “on merits”. This application was allowed after notice to the non-applicants/appellants herein. Consequently the appeal was re-heard by me.

7. In the appeal the questions ‘which survive for consideration are the questions regarding the adequacy of the amount of compensation to be paid to the appellants/claimants; the rate of interest payable on the compensation amount as well as the date from which such interest should be paid.

8. The facts of the case are simple. Most of the relevant facts are not in dispute. The husband of appellant No. 1, namely, the said Shri S. Krishnan was working as an Investigator in the office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Ministry of Foregin Trade, Government of India, New Delhi. On 1.4.70, while he was driving a scooter No. DLJ 6474, he met with an accident which proved fatal. The deceased was born on 22.3.39 and was just over 34 years old on the fateful day when he died as a result of the fatal injuries suffered by him because of the accident. He left behind his widow viz. appellant No. 1, a minor son viz. appellant No. 2. two minor daughters viz. appellants 3 and 4 and a widowed and dependent mother viz. appellant No. 5.

9. Unfortunately the mother died during the pendency of this appeal. However, her death is of no consequence as the claim and the appeal are by the L. Rs. of the deceased and the appeal does not abate. The claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act is in a representative capacity and the other L.Rs are there to pursue the claim. It has been held that Order 22 CPC and the provisions regarding abatement are not applicable to the proceedings for compensation for fatal accidents. Reference may be made in this regard to the judgment of this Court in the case of Rom Sahai v. Rabia Begum, 1969 ACJ 56.

10. As noticed above an application was filed by the aforesaid persons under Section 110A of the Act in their capacity as the legal representatives of the deceased S. Krishnan. As also noticed, Rs. 2,00,000/- were claimed as compensation on account Of the death of S. Krishnan as a result of the fatal accident. The fact of accident and the liability, of the offending vehicle is not in dispute. The Tribunal found that the deceased was not at fault and that the offending vehicle involved in the accident causing the death of S. Krishnan was Jeep No. DLE 4174 belonging to respondent No. 2. The Tribunal has also held that the claimants/appellants herein are the legal representatives of the deceased his monthly salary was Rs. 583.25 p. On this, the Tribunal worked out a sum of Rs. 300/- only per month as the ‘dependency’ of the family. This is almost half of the salary. The Tribuual took 24 as the multiplier factor on the basis that the deceased, being 34 years old, would have retired at the age of 58 years on 22.3.1994 On the basis of the dependency and the multiplier factor the Tribunal worked out a figure of Rs. 86,400/-.

11. The sum of Rs. 86,400/- was reduced to Rs. 37,950/- by making various deductions totalling Rs. 48,450/-. A sum of Rs. 24,924/- was deducted on account of the pension that the petitioners would get during the course of 24 years from 2.4.70 Rs. 11.000/- was deducted on account of this amount having been received on the insurance policy of the deceased. Further sums of Rs. 560/- and Rs. 230/- which had been received by the appellants herein as gratuity and bank balance of the deceased were also deducted. The aforesaid amounts worked out to Rs. 41,754/- and after deducting this sum from Rs. 86,400/- a figure of Rs. 44,646/- was arrived at. From the figure of Rs. 44,646/- a further sum at the rate of 15% was deducted for lump sum payment and uncertainties of life! By this process the Tribunal came to the figure of Rs. 37,950/- and awarded this amount as compensation.

12. Mr. Goyal learned Counsel for the appellants rightly made a grievance of the facts that the Tribunal has neither awarded nor even considered the earnings that the deceased may have made on account of the increase in his salary in his scale of pay which he would have got in the normal course. The Tribunal has also not considered the earning capacity of the deceased after his retirement keeping in mind the life expectency. The economic value of the deprivation of the husband, father and son respectively of the claimants, the loss of affection, the shock, pain and suffering because of the death of the death of the only male member in the family has not been taken into account by the Tribunal. Mr. Goyal rightly contended that the deduction made by the Tribunal on account of pension that would be received by the appellants herein over the period of 24 years is unwarranted particularly when the Tribunal has ignored that after retirement the deceased would have been entitled to much more pension if he had been alive. Similarly, no deduction should have been made for lump sum payment or for gratutity or for insurance, as has been held by Sultan Singh, J. in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. Harbans Kaur, 1983 ACJ 110. In this judgment the learned Judge has noticed various judgments of this Court (most of them being of Division Bench's) wherein it has consistently been held that no amount should be deducted from the quantum of compensation on account of any of the aforesaid items or under any of the aforesaid heads.

13. The Tribunal overlooked the fact that insurance was paid because of the provision already made by the deceased for his family. This could not have been deducted from the pecuniary loss of the appellants on account of the untimely and unnatural death of the deceased. The deduction on account of the gratuity is even more unintelligible since the deceased would have got a much higher amount as gratuity if he had been alive and continued to be in service and had retired in the normal course. There is much less justification for deducting Rs. 230/- as bank balance of the deceased. In a recent judgment of this Court delivered by S.B Wad, J., in the case of Delhi Transport Cor-poration v. Kamlesh Arora, 1989 (2) ACJ page 1034 it has again been laid down that no deduction should be made for uncertainties or lump sum payments.

14. Learned Counsel for the appellants urged that the whole approach of the Tribunal was wrong. He contended that whereas it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Concord of India Insurance Company Limited v. Nirmala Devi, (1979) 4 SCC 365 : AIR 1979 SC 1666 : (1979) 4 SCC 365 1980 ACJ page 55 that in motor accident cases determination of compensation must be liberal and not niggard; the Tribunal has adopted the converse and narrow minded approach in fixing the quantum of compensation. Apart from the deductions which had wrongly been made by the Tribunal, Mr. Goyal pointed out that the amount of dependency worked out by the Tribunal at a sum of Rs. 300/- per month is not a fair estimate since the deceased bad five dependants viz. the claimants, and therefore, Mr. Goyal pointed out that it was not possible that the deceased would have spent nearly one-half the amount of his salary on himself or otherwise than on his dear and near ones being his five dependants. Mr. Goyal contended that the Tribunal should have awarded Rs. 2,00,000/- claimed as compensation being a fair estimate of the pecuniary loss. He further contended that in view of CM. 1374/87 the compensation to be awarded to the appellants should be increased to Rs. 5,00.000/-.

15. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the increased pay and allowances which the deceased would have got in the normal course. According to Shri Goyal the future probable pecuniary loss suffered by the family had to be arrived at for computing and awarding the compensation. He submitted that subsequent events should be taken into account for calculating the quantum of compensation. In support of this contention Shri Goyal relied upon the judgment of Sultan Singh, J. of this Court in the case of Satyuwati Pathak v. Hari Ram, 1983 ACJ page 424 as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Manjushri Raha v. B.L Gupta,, 1977 ACJ page 134.

16. Shri V.K Makhija learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 contended that the amount of compensation could not and should be calculated on the basis of higher salary which the deceased may have got on promotions if he had been alive. This, according to him, would be speculative. Since it could not be said whether the deceased would have got promotions if he had been alive. Besides, according to him, there was no such claim made in the original application nor is there any evidence on record on this point. In support of his contention Shri Makhija relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kamlesh Arora (supra) where it was held that the question of additional payments for allowances and increase in salary in future would be the correct position as regards dependency of the family. In that case the contention on behalf of the claimants was that the deceased would have risen to the position of Manager in the company earning a salary of Rs. 3,000/- per month. This contention was supported by a letter written by the employer company in which the deceased was working which was produced in the Tribunal.

17. The upward revision of pay-scale pursuant to the recommendation of the Third Pay Commission was made effective from 1.1.1973 as stated in C.M 1374/87. The appeal was filed on 18.10.1975 In this appeal also the grievance was that the compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- as claimed should have been awarded by the Tribunal. No reason has been given why the claim for higher or larger amount of compensation was not made at the time of filing of the appeal. No reason has been given why an application seeking to increase the original claim was not made soon after 1.5.1982 on which date, as per CM. 1374/87 an award is supposed to have been given by some Board of Arbitration. It is now well settled that in motor accident claim cases claimants should not try to make a fortune out of mis-fortune.

18. Reliances placed by Shri Goyal on the judgments in the cases of Satyawati Pathak (supra) and Manjushri Raha (supra) are not very helpful to the appellants. In Satyawati Pathak's case although subsequent events for determination of emoluments were taken into account the amount of compensation awarded was limited to the claim originally made. In that case also it appears that a higher claim had been made on the basis of the increase in the scales of pay by making an application for taking into consideration the revised pay-scales as recommended by the Third Pay Commission. It was, however, held in that case that if alive the deceased would have opted to draw the emoluments under the revised pay-scales instead of the old pay-scales. In the case of Manjushri Raha also it has been observed in paragraph 7 of the judgment that the Courts below had not taken into account the salary which the deceased would have earned while reaching the maximum of his grade. In the application being CM. 1374/87 it is not stated as to what the deceased would have earned as his pay and allowance if he had reached the top of his grade and as to when he would have reached the top of his grade.

19. It may be noticed here that no authority was cited before me on behalf of the appellants for awarding a higher amount than originally claimed. As observed above in this very case Wad, J. had restricted the amount of compensation to Rs. 2,00,000/- which was the claim originally made. The appellants herein had not filed any appeal against this. In Satyawati Pathak's case also the amount of compensation ultimately awarded was limited to the claim originally made. In Manjushri Ratio's case the amount awarded by the Tribunal was increased but was much below the original claim made in that case.

20. Compensation to be awarded must be just and fair to all. It is arrived at on the basis of data which cannot be ascertained accurately and must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. Arithmetical process may not always result in arriving at the amount of fair compensation and it may actually lead to injustice sometimes. The measure of fair compensation is a matter of fair estimate on generalisation. The fact that the original claim was for Rs. 2,00,000/- that in this appeal again this claim was reiterated, that when Wad, J., enhanced the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.but restricted it to the original claim of Rs. 2,00,000/- no appeal was filed; would lend credence to the fact that the appellants themselves considered and regarded the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- as fair and just compensation to them for the future pecuniary loss suffered by them on account of untimely death of S. Krishnan. Neither Counsel was able to show why the amount of compensation should either be less than or more than Rs. 2,00,000/-.

21. Mr. Makhija, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, could not convince me as to why the compensation to be awarded should be less than Rs. 2,00,000/-. In fairness, it may be noticed that he did not seriously challenge the contention of Mr. Goyal on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunal should have awarded Rs. 2,00,000/- which was originally claimed as compensation. Mr. Makhija very vehemently submitted that the compensation amount should be restricted to the claim originally made. Since no reply or counter-affidavit had been filed to C.M 1374/87, Mr. Makhija could not traverse the figures mentioned in this application. He did not seriously dispute that the petitioner would have earned an average of about Rs. 200/- p.m and in that event the dependency of about Rs. 800/- p.m would be a reasonable estimate. On this basis the amount of compensation would work out to over Rs. 2,30,000/- with 24 being the multiplier factor. While disposing of this matter earlier also Wad, J., had taken 24 as the multiplier factor and the average salary of the deceased at Rs. 1,280/- p.m on the basis of the figures given in CM. 1374/87. On that basis the compensation worked out to Rs. 2,59,200/- but it was restricted to Rs. 2,00,000/- as originally claimed.

22. In my view also the appellants should get Rs. 2,00,000/- as compensation. To my mind, this would be a fair and just amount of compensation. I would also take 24 as the multiplier factor. Taking that multiplier the dependency would work out to approximately Rs. 680/- p.m on Rs. 2,00,000/-. As noticed above, S.B Wad, J. had also 1 taken 24 as the multiplier factor which is what the Tribunal had also done. This multiplier factor was arrived at in view of the age of the deceased at the time of his death and the age of retirement of Government servant being 58 years in normal circumstances. The dependency worked out by the Tribunal was too low. As already held above, the deductions made by the Tribunal are not justified in law. I am of the opinion that since the earning capacity of the deceased after retirement, keeping in view the life expectancy, was not taken into consideration, no deduction should be made from the amount of compensation. Besides, deduction is also not warranted for the reason that no monetary value for the deprivation of the husband, father and son respectively of the claimants is being worked out while awarding compensation nor has anything been awarded for the loss of affection, shock and pain suffered at the death of the only male member in the family.

23. Coming now to the question of the awarding of interest, it may be noticed that the claimants had claimed 9% (nine per cent) p.a in the original claim as also in this appeal. Under Section HOC interest is to be awarded from the date of application making the claim. In some of the cases interest has been awarded from the date of death i.e even prior to the date of the claim application. In my view, the claimants are entitled to 9% (nine per cent) p.a as interest on the amount of compensation from the date of claim application till the date of payment. Mr. Goyal cited various authorities, some of which were of the Supreme Court where interest of 12% p.a had been awarded. However, since in the original claim only 9% p.a had been claimed as interest, therefore, I am awarding the same. The claimants/appellants herein should get 9% (nine per cent) p.a as interest on the compensation from the date of the claim application. However, since Rs. 27,950/- as awarded by the Tribunal had been paid to the appellants, interest of 9% would be paid on Rs. 2,00,000/- from the date of claim application till the date of payment of Rs. 37,950/- and thereafter on the balance of the amount viz. Rs. 1,62,050/-.

24. Mr. Makhija pointed out that a sum of Rs. 62,050/- had been deposited in Court pursuant to an order dated 21.5.1990, therefore, the respondent No. 2 should not be burdened with interest on this amount after the date of deposit in this Court. I am unable to agree with this contention for the reason that the appellants herein could not withdraw this amount nor have use of the same. Under similar circumstances this Court had awarded interest on such a deposited amount also in the case of Satyawati Pathak (supra) wherein Sultan Singh, J., relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court AIR 1968 SC 1047 for awarding interest on the deposited amount also since the claimants had not been able to withdraw the same.

25. In conclusion I hold that the appellants are entitled to compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/-. They are also entitled to interest at the rate of 9% (nine per cent) p.a from the date of application till the date of payment. This 9% is to be paid on Rs. 2,00,000/- from the date of application till the payment of Rs. 37,950/- and thereafter on the sum of Rs. 1,62,050/- till the date of payment of this amount along with full interest. The amount of Rs. 62,050/- deposited in this Court can be withdrawn by the appellants herein immediately. I further direct that the full amount payable to the appellants by respondent No. 2 viz. the compensation and the interest thereon should be paid to the appellants within one month from today. If there is any further delay in making the payments as directed herein then the appellants would be entitled to 12% p.a as interest on the balance of the amount due to the appellants, that is to say; the appellants would then be entitled to an interest of 12% p.a on the balance amount of compensation till the date they are paid their full dues by respondent No. 2, if full payment is not made to the appellants within one month from the date of this judgment. This direction is being issued for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of this amount for nearly 15 (fifteen) years during which period they must have had very hard times. Therefore, there should be no delay in payments being made to them now.

26. The appeal is allowed and disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.