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Harish Kumar v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, employed as a sweeper in the Delhi High Court, challenged an order dated 31 March 1987 which terminated his service under rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The petitioner was first appointed in November 1972 and had his appointment extended every three months until his termination on 1 December 1978. He was reappointed on 3 November 1979 and again had his service continued by three-month extensions until the impugned termination in 1987. The petitioner contends that despite roughly 15 years of service in the High Court he was never confirmed to a permanent post and that he cannot be treated as a temporary employee; he also asserts that termination required a proper enquiry and an opportunity to be heard. The High Court responded that the petitioner was never confirmed and remained a temporary servant removable under rule 5(1), that no reasons need be assigned for such termination, and that confirmation of temporary employees is discretionary and requires assessment by the appointing authority. A factual dispute also exists about alleged absences without leave: respondents produced a chart alleging recurrent unauthorised absences, while the petitioner and his counsel maintain that absences were sanctioned.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner, after long and repeated periods of service (including service prior to 1978 and after reappointment in 1979), can be treated as a temporary employee whose service may be terminated under rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
- Whether termination under rule 5(1) in the circumstances of extended, repeated short-term appointments (three-month renewals over many years) is lawful, especially where permanent posts were available.
- Whether, if termination is said to be on account of alleged misconduct (absence without leave), the respondent was required to initiate regular departmental proceedings affording the petitioner a full hearing before removal.
- Whether the High Court's administrative practice of short-term, ad hoc appointments for Class IV employees violates principles of equality and public employment fairness (as reflected in Arts. 14 and 16) and related Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner had been working in the High Court for about 15 years and was never confirmed despite the availability of permanent posts.
- He cannot be treated as a temporary employee given the duration and continuity of his service; therefore termination under rule 5(1) is illegal.
- If the respondents considered his absences as misconduct or unsatisfactory service, a regular departmental proceeding with an opportunity to be heard was required before termination.
- Because he had long service (including continuous service since 1979) he should be treated as permanent and be entitled to confirmation.
Respondents' (High Court) Arguments
- The petitioner was never confirmed and remained a temporary servant; removal under rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 is permissible and does not require reasons to be assigned.
- The staff of the High Court are governed by rules framed under Art. 229 of the Constitution and the Delhi High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1972 do not obligate confirmation of a temporary employee after any fixed period of service.
- A temporary employee can be made permanent only by the appointing authority against a permanent post after assessing the service record; therefore there was no automatic entitlement to confirmation.
- In response to allegations of absence without leave, respondents produced a chart asserting long-standing absenteeism from the petitioner's initial appointment and oral warnings; respondents contend petitioner previously had his services terminated in 1978 for the same reason.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana [1985-II L.L.N. 828] | Short-term ad hoc appointments and repeated renewals (the "hiring and firing" policy) lead to arbitrary conditions and breach Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution; ad hocism is not a sound personnel policy. | The Court applied these observations to the High Court's practice for Class IV employees, treating the practice as arbitrary and violating principles of fair and stable employment; this supported the conclusion that long-serving ad hoc employees should not be treated as merely temporary. |
| Narender Chadha v. Union of India [1986-I L.L.N. 665] | Persons occupying posts in violation of rules for prolonged periods (15–20 years) raise equitable considerations; while not regular appointments, it may be unjust to revert or treat them as having no claim and the power to relax rules exists to avoid unjust results. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that sweepers and Class IV employees who have worked long periods cannot be summarily ejected under rule 5(1); long service generates a legitimate claim not to be treated as mere temporary appointees without relief. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds from established facts and a review of the applicable rules and administrative practices:
- Factual matrix and rule references: The petitioner had recurrent three-month appointments beginning in 1972, a termination in 1978, reappointment in 1979 and continuations by three-month renewals until 1987. Rule 9 and Schedule II of the Delhi High Court Establishment Rules, 1972 do not prescribe qualifications or a mode of appointment for sweepers and other Class IV posts; there is no probationary framework for these posts comparable to Class I–III where probation rules exist.
- Administrative practice and arbitrariness: The Court observed that appointments and confirmations for Class IV employees were left to the ad hoc discretion of the Registrar (or the Chief Justice), with no uniform rules for appointment, seniority, or confirmation. The practice of three-month temporary renewals without objective selection criteria was characterised as arbitrary and irrational, producing anomalous situations where individuals perform services for many years without confirmation.
- Administrative Committee direction and non-implementation: The Administrative Committee in 1977 recommended confirmation after seven years' service, but the Court found that this direction was not implemented; multiple Class IV employees had completed seven years yet remained temporary despite available permanent vacancies.
- Application of Supreme Court authorities: The Court relied on Rattan Lal to condemn the ad hoc short-term appointment system as violative of Arts. 14 and 16 and invoked Narender Chadha to emphasise equitable considerations where long service has been allowed to continue—that it would be unjust to treat long-serving employees as having no claim to posts or to remove them summarily under rule 5(1).
- On break in service and continuity: The Court held that, given the High Court's ad hoc practice, the normal concept of break in service is inapplicable; even assuming a break, reappointment and continuous service thereafter meant the petitioner had completed the seven-year threshold preceding his termination.
- On alleged misconduct (absence without leave): While respondents asserted recurrent unauthorised absences and produced a chart, the Court noted that if the asserted misconduct was the true cause of removal, then regular departmental proceedings with full hearing were required (a major-penalty-type procedure), whether the petitioner was temporary or permanent.
- Conclusion from law and fact: Considering the absence of applicable service rules, the unimplemented Administrative Committee direction, the existence of permanent vacancies, and the Supreme Court authorities, the Court concluded the petitioner could not be treated merely as temporary and was entitled to confirmation against a permanent post; consequently, invoking rule 5(1) to terminate his service was unlawful.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Writ petition allowed; the termination order dated 31 March 1987 is quashed. The petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits, including confirmation against a permanent post where applicable. The Court awarded costs and counsel fee (Rs. 1,000).
Direct consequences for the parties
- The petitioner is to be confirmed and given consequential benefits arising from the quashing of the termination order.
- The Registrar (respondent 1) was directed to pass immediate orders confirming the petitioner and all other Class IV employees who have completed seven years of service, on the basis that their continued service for seven years or more demonstrates satisfactory service.
- If respondents rely on allegations of misconduct (such as unauthorised absence) to justify removal, they must initiate formal departmental proceedings affording the petitioner full opportunity to be heard before imposing major penalties or termination.
Broader implications and administrative directions
The Court used this writ petition to address systemic administrative defects affecting over 220 Class IV employees. The Court did not merely resolve the individual dispute but issued administrative recommendations to remedy structural unfairness. The recommendations directed to put the High Court's administration in order include:
- Framing statutory rules governing appointment (including qualifications and mode of appointment), confirmation, seniority and promotion for Class IV employees.
- Transfer of appointment power from the Registrar to the Chief Justice, with appointments and confirmations to be made by the Chief Justice on the recommendation of three Judges.
- Recruitment through the Employment Exchange to ensure an independent and merit-based channel of entry.
- Placing the matter before the Administrative Committee (or Full Court, if necessary) to address the widespread administrative issues.
The Court observed that the current ad hoc practice violated principles enunciated by the Supreme Court (cited precedents) and that the High Court, as a judicial body, has an elevated duty to maintain fair administrative standards in its employment practices.
Costs: The writ petition was allowed with costs; counsel fee awarded: Rs. 1,000.
1. The petitioner, who was working as a sweeper in the Delhi High Court, has, through this writ petition, challenged the order, dated 31 March 1987, terminating his service under rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
2. The petitioner was appointed as a sweeper in November 1972. His appointment was extended each time for every three months till his services were terminated on 1 December 1978. He was reappointed on 3 November 1979. His services were continued each time for a period of three months till he was removed from service by the impugned order.
3. The petitioner's submission is that although he was working in the High Court for the last 15 years, he was not confirmed even though the permanent regular posts were available. He further submits that his termination of service under rule 5(1) of the said rules is illegal as he cannot be treated as a temporary employee. He also submits that since he was working for 15 years in the High Court his services could be terminated only on a proper enquiry, with an opportunity of being heard given to him.
4. In the counter-affidavit filed by the High Court, it is submitted that the petitioner was never confirmed by the High Court and was still only a temporary servant, who could be removed under rule 5(1) of the said rules. Since it is termination under the said rules, no reason need be assigned for such termination. It is submitted in the counter-affidavit that the staff of the High Court is governed by rules framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of powers conferred by Art. 229 of the Constitution of India and there is nothing in the Delhi High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1972, so framed, that casts an obligation on respondent 2 of compulsorily confirming a temporary employee after a fixed period of continuous service. A temporary employee can only be made permanent by the appointing authority against a permanent post after making an assessment of the service record of the employee. In order to counter the allegation of the petitioner that his services were terminated because of his absence from duty without leave, it is submitted in the counter-affidavit that the said fact has no relevance as the said absence was regularised by the competent authority by granting leave to the petitioner for the said period of absence. However, at the time of the arguments, the respondents submitted a detailed chart in support of their submission that the petitioner was absenting without leave right from his initial appointment and was orally warned for the same. His services were terminated in 1978 precisely for the same reason. In reply, counsel for the petitioner submits that in every case of the absence from duty, the same had been sanctioned by the respondents. The further submission is that if the alleged absence has been treated by the respondents as unsatisfactory service or misconduct, it was necessary to hold a regular departmental proceeding even if it is assumed that the petitioner was a temporary employee. The counsel reiterates the submission that the petitioner has to be treated as a permanent employee since he has put in more than 15 years' service and had in any case put in continuous service since 1979.
5. Rule 9 of the Establishment Rules, 1972, provides that appointments to the posts in Class IV, mentioned in Sch. I shall be made by the Registrar of the High Court unless the Chief Justice otherwise directs. Schedule II of the said rules provides for the minimum qualifications prescribed for appointment to the posts and their mode of appointment. Sweepers and other Class IV employees are not included in the Second Schedule. Thus, there are no minimum qualifications prescribed for the post of sweeper nor the mode of appointment prescribed by the rules. In case of Class I, Class II and Class III employees, who are referred to in Sch. II, rule 8 prescribes the nature of appointment. This rule prescribes that the appointment shall be initially on probation, ordinarily for a duration of one year. The expiry of the period of probation shall not result in automatic confirmation. The rule also lays down that any appointment, other than substantive appointment, may be terminated at any time without assigning reasons.
6. It is, thus, seen that the appointment, confirmation and removal from service is entirely within the discretion of the Registrar (unless the Chief Justice himself makes an order). It is quite strange that there are no service rules uniformly regulating the conditions of service of sweepers (and the Class IV employees) in regard to appointment, seniority and confirmation. I am told by the counsel for the respondents that the appointments are made on the recommendations of the Chief Justice and the Judges of this Court and the higher officers in the Registry. There is no standard procedure for selection. The question of appointment is, thus, left to the ad hoc decision of the Registrar. The appointment of the petitioner is termed in the impugned order as a “temporary appointment.” Temporary appointment with three months' extension every time is unknown to any service law. Even in industrial and labour law such short-term appointments are frowned at and are treated as an “unfair labour practice.” In Government service and in public undertakings the appointments, even of Class IV employees, are made through the Employment Exchange. This provides for an independent channel of recruitment, based on merit and qualification. The manner of appointment and the short duration of appointment are not objective or rational and are, thus, open to the criticism of arbitrariness. Short-term appointments have resulted into strange phenomenon of a person continuing in service for 15 years only on short appointments of three months at a time without confirmation.
7. In 1977, the then Chief Justice placed the question of confirmation of Class IV employees before the Administrative Committee. At that time confirmation of 30 Class IV employees was pending. In its meeting, dated 8 November 1977, the Administrative Committee decided that the case of confirmation of a Class IV employee may be taken up after he has completed seven years of service. Since the appointments are made as officiating or temporary appointments without a probation, and are made only for three months at a time, it is difficult to understand as to when an employee can be said to have completed seven years of service. There are no rules of seniority nor any seniority list is maintained for the sweepers (and for other Class IV employees). On inquiring from the counsel for the respondents whether any confirmation of the sweepers/Class IV employees were made after the decision of the Administrative Committee, dated 8 November 1977, the counsel stated that the question of confirmation was never taken up. We have, thus, 15 sweepers who are recruited from 1977 to 1982, who although have completed seven years of service are not yet confirmed. As a matter of fact, the case of their confirmation was not even taken up once by the administration. Even assuming that there was a break in service of the petitioner, he was appointed again in 1979 and had, thus, completed seven years' fresh service in 1986, i.e, one year prior to the termination of his service. Admittedly, on the date of the termination of the service of the petitioner there were 20 permanent posts still vacant. There are no special qualifications prescribed for the appointment to the post of sweeper, except that he should be an Indian citizen and be medically fit. The appointment is also made by the competent authority, viz., the Registrar. Considering these facts, it cannot be said that the petitioner is a temporary employee, as is normally understood in Government service where there are regular rules in regard to appointments with provision for the period of probation and confirmation regulated by the rules. Where the service rules and the appointment order provide for a period of probation, the law is that there is no automatic confirmation on the completion of the probation period. A specific order is required to be issued for that purpose. But whereas in case of the Class IV employees of the Delhi High Court the appointment is not on any probation, it cannot be said that there is no automatic confirmation after seven years period, as prescribed by the Administrative Committee.
8. Such short term appointments resulting into break of service and denial of other service benefits has been declared by the Supreme Court as being violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana [1985-II L.L.N 828], the Supreme Court found that the State of Haryana was appointing teachers for quite some time on ad hoc basis for short periods such as six months and renew them after a break of service. The Supreme Court held in Para. 1, at page 829:
“… These ad hoc teachers are unnecessarily subjected to an arbitrary ‘hiring and firing’ policy. These teachers who constitute the bulk of the educated unemployed are compelled to accept these jobs on an ad hoc basis with miserable conditions of service. The Government appears to be exploiting this situation. This is not a sound personnel policy… The policy of ad hocism followed by the State Government for a long period has led to the breach of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a situation cannot be permitted to last any longer. It is needless to say that the State Government is expected to function as a model employer.”
The said observations of the Supreme Court apply with equal vigour to the sorry state of affairs in regard to the Class IV employees of the High Court. If the State Government is expected to be a model employer, so is the High Court. But it has a still higher duty. The judicial standards which are applied by the Court while exercising judicial function should not be given a go-bye while acting in administrative capacity.
9. In Narender Chadha v. Union of India [1986-I L.L.N 665], certain persons were promoted in violation of the rules, but continued in such posts for more than 15 years. The Supreme Court held that such persons cannot be treated as being regularly appointed to that post and can be reverted. But in a case where persons have been allowed to function in higher posts for 15 to 20 years with due deliberation, it would be certainly unjust to hold that they have no sort of a claim to such post and could be reverted unceremoniously or treated as persons not belonging to the service, particularly where the Government is endowed with the power to relax the rules to avoid unjust results. In case of sweepers (and other Class IV employees) of this Court, who are working for long periods of more than 10 years, it would be unjust to hold that they have no claim to such posts or could be thrown out under rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
10. The petitioner was appointed in 1972 and his services were terminated in 1978, but he was reappointed in 1979. In the light of the practice of appointing employees for three months at a time, without support of any statutory rules, absence of any rational method of selection and termination of service and absence of any seniority list maintained for the Class IV employees for the purposes of promotion, the normal concept of break in service is completely out of place and the employees like petitioner cannot be deprived of the benefit of long service like six years prior to 1978. As the Supreme Court has observed, power of relaxation of rules is available only to get over the unjust results and I am sure no specific direction would be necessary to be given to the respondents for correcting the wrong done.
11. From the discussion above, it is clear that the petitioner cannot be treated merely as a temporary employee and invoking rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, as also the consequent termination of service is illegal. As a matter of law, the petitioner was and is entitled to be confirmed against the permanent post available.
12. In the counter-affidavit the respondents have tried to describe the termination of the petitioner as a discharge simpliciter. But, when the persons subsequently appointed as sweepers are still continuing in the service, the termination of the services of the petitioner cannot be described as discharge simpliciter. In case of dischage simpliciter the rule is that the last employee goes first.
13. In the counter-affidavit it is asserted that the petitioner used to frequently absent himself from service without permission. As stated above, a detailed chart was presented at the time of arguments. If the respondents are serious about this assertion, it would mean that the petitioner is being removed for the misconduct of absenting himself without leave or permission. In such a case, a regular departmental proceeding will have to be initiated against the petitioner, with full right of hearing, as in the case of major penalty. It would not make much of a difference if the petitioner is a permanent or a temporary employee if any misconduct is alleged against him.
14. For the reasons stated above the writ petition is allowed. The termination order, dated 31 March 1987, is quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to all the consequential benefits.
15. This writ petition serves almost like a “public interest litigation” to bring to light certain disturbing aspects of the High Court's administration, particularly in regard to Class IV employees. There are over 220 employees falling under this category, totalling about one-third of the High Court's administrative strength. There are 24 permanent posts of sweepers (frash) and only four are confirmed. There are at least 15 sweepers (frash) who have completed seven years' service who should have been made permanent, but are still temporary. Similarly, there are 22 permanent posts of sweepers (who are not called “frash”) and six temporary posts. As against this only six are confirmed, although there are still 16 permanent vacancies. Sweepers are appointed only temporarily although 13 of them have completed seven years of service. Ten of them have been appointed on ad hoc basis although some of these posts are permanent and some are temporary. There is one permanent post of gestetner operator and one temporary post. Although the incumbent has completed more than seven years' service, he is still kept as temporary and the other person is appointed on ad hoc basis. There are 11 permanent posts of “daftari.” Only one of them is confirmed. Six of them have already completed seven years' service, but are still kept on temporary basis. There are 27 posts of “ushers.” Only 16 are confirmed. There are six of them who have completed seven years service but are still kept temporary. Against three posts ad hoc appointments are made. Out of 105 permanent posts of “peons” only 41 are confirmed. There are about 40 peons who have completed seven years' service, but are still working in temporary capacity. Although permanent posts are available about 20 persons are working on ad hoc basis. Although a permanent post is available and one “mali” has completed seven years' service, he is still kept temporary. So also is the “chowkidhar.”
16. During the course of the arguments the respondents also submitted that there are 47 peons working on “daily wages.” So also, two Class III employees are working on daily wages. Their appointments and removal are also done on ad hoc basis, without any rules. There is no sanction from the Delhi Administration for making any daily-wage appointments. Naturally the funds meant for other purposes are diverted for payment of salary to them. According to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, any person working in a position for more than 240 days has to be treated as a person regularly appointed. This practice of appointing daily wagers is bound to create number of administrative problems.
17. This is a most depressing state of affairs. In 1977 the Administrative Committee had recommended that the confirmations should be done after seven years' service. Although it is not clear as to what is the basis for laying down seven years' service as the minimum period for confirmation, even the said administrative direction has not been implemented. I, therefore, direct the Registrar, respondent 1, to pass immediate orders confirming the petitioner and all other Class IV employees who have completed seven years' service. Since their services have been continued for seven years and more, it must be assumed that their services are satisfactory.
18. As stated above, the conditions of service of over 200 employees of the High Court are governed not by any statutory rules, but by sheer administrative discretion. There are no rules regarding appointment, confirmation, seniority or promotion. The result is that ad hocism is writ large in this regard. There are complaints of favouritism also. The grievance is not only at the level of Class IV employees. There is a grievance of the Judges of this Court that only the recommendations of the Chief Justice and influential Judges are respected by the Registrar. This state of affairs is not only harmful to the administration of this Court, but to the judicial comity between the Judges of this Court. I would suggest the following steps for putting the house in order:
(i) Statutory rules should be framed for appointment (including qualification and mode of appointment), confirmation, seniority and promotion of Class IV employees;
(ii) the power of appointment should be taken away from the Registrar. Appointments, confirmations, etc., should be made by the Chief Justice on the recommendation of three Judges of this Court;
(iii) the recruitment should be done through the Employment Exchange; and
(iv) since it is a very important matter, generally affecting the administration of this Court, it may be placed before the Administrative Committee, as was done in 1977 by the then Chief Justice. If need be, the Full Court may also be summoned for this purpose.
19. The writ petition is allowed with costs. Rule is made absolute. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000.
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