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Oriental Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Smt. Hasmat Khatoon And Others

Delhi High Court
Mar 1, 1989
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns an appeal by an insurance company against an award made by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The factual nucleus is that a workman employed as a loader on Truck No. DEG-3809, owned by Competent Construction Company, suffered a fatal accident when the truck overturned on 21 May 1985. The widow and a child applied for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The Commissioner awarded compensation, imposed interest for delayed payment and assessed a penalty. The Commissioner recorded that although primary liability was that of the management (Competent Construction Company), because the employer had insured the vehicle the insurance company should satisfy the entire award; both employer and insurer were held jointly and severally liable. The award included a penalty of Rs. 25,000, specified interest amounts at 6% per annum on particular sums and a counsel fee of Rs. 1,000, with recovery as arrears of land revenue if not paid within the stipulated time.

The insurance company challenged the award on the ground that the special interest and penalty under S.4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be recovered from the insurer and that the insurer's liability is limited to the compensation amount. The employer contested, arguing the liability is indivisible and the word "liability" in S.95 of the Motor Vehicles Act includes interest and penalty.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the word "liability" in the proviso to S.95(1B) and Sub-section 2(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act is sufficiently wide to include liability for payment of interest for default in payment of compensation and the penalty imposed under S.4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
  2. On the facts of this case, given the timing of notification of the accident to the insurer, whether the insurance company can be held responsible for the interest and penalty awarded by the Commissioner.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurance Company)

  • The insurer submitted that the special interest and penalty imposed under S.4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be recovered from the insurance company; the insurer's liability is limited to the compensation amount only.
  • The insurer relied on earlier authorities (noted in the opinion as including 1986 A.C.J 732 and 1988 A.C.J 677 (D.B)) in support of its position.

Respondent (Competent Construction Company / Employer)

  • The employer contended that the liability under the award is indivisible: the insurance company should not be made to pay only the compensation while the employer pays the special interest and penalty. The employer argued the word "liability" in S.95 is deliberately wide and includes special interest and penalty under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • The employer relied upon a Single Judge decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, reported at 1987 A.C.J 803, in support of its contention that "liability" covers interest and penalty and that the burden to exclude such liability lies on the insurer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1983 A.C.J 601 (M.F.) One of several authorities relied on before the Commissioner (as cited in the Commissioner's order). The Commissioner considered this authority when holding both respondents jointly and severally liable; the appellate court noted it was among the citations considered by the Commissioner.
1973 A.C.J 428 One of several authorities relied on before the Commissioner (as cited in the Commissioner's order). Referenced by the Commissioner; the appellate court recorded that the Commissioner had considered it in reaching the joint-liability conclusion.
1984 A.C.J 591 One of several authorities relied on before the Commissioner (as cited in the Commissioner's order). Referenced by the Commissioner; the appellate court noted it among the citations informing the Commissioner's decision.
1986 A.C.J 732 (M.P.) Authority cited in support of the proposition that insurer's liability does not extend to interest and penalty (as relied upon by the insurer and noted in the opinion). The appellate court observed that its construction (limiting insurer liability to compensation) was apparently supported by this decision.
1988 A.C.J 677 (D.B.) Authority cited in support of the proposition that insurer does not bear liability for interest and penalty under S.4-A(3) (as relied upon by the insurer). The appellate court noted that this decision appeared to support the construction that insurer liability is limited to compensation.
1987 A.C.J 803 (Single Judge, M.P. High Court) Held that the word "liability" in S.95 covers liability to pay special interest and penalty; placed burden on insurer to show exclusion in the insurance contract. The appellate court treated this decision as a discordant view, criticised its analysis for not examining the differing natures of liabilities under the two Acts and declined to follow its reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a statutory and contextual analysis of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ("the WCA") and the Motor Vehicles Act ("the MVA"), focusing on the meaning of "liability" in S.95 of the MVA when that term is used in relation to liabilities arising under the WCA.

Key points of the court's reasoning:

  • Nature and purpose of the WCA: The WCA creates a statutory, largely absolute liability on employers for compensation where injury or death arises out of and in the course of employment (S.3 and S.4). The statute provides for quick and mandatory relief mechanisms (including provisional payments under S.4-A) and special enforcement remedies (compensation recoverable as arrears of land revenue; exemptions from assignment and attachment). These features show the special and exhaustive remedial code for workmen's compensation.
  • S.4-A regime: S.4-A requires payment of compensation as soon as it falls due, mandates provisional payments even where employer disputes liability, prescribes a one-month period for payment, authorises simple interest (6% p.a.) for default, and permits imposition of a penalty up to 50% of the compensation where delay is unjustified. The object and machinery of S.4-A are specific to industrial security and employer obligations.
  • Nature of MVA insurance liability: Liability under the MVA is primarily contractual (insurance policy), except where minimum statutory liabilities are created by Ss.95 and 96. Beyond the minimum, the insurer's obligation is governed by contract terms and statutory caps where applicable. The MVA framework does not incorporate statutory concepts of provisional payment within a fixed period or a statutory penalty for delay akin to S.4-A.
  • Overlap and interpretation of "liability" in S.95: The court recognised limited overlapping fields—insurance policies may cover liabilities arising under the WCA in respect of employees carried in or driving the vehicle and certain goods-vehicle limits that expressly include "liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act." However, given the different settings and purposes of the two Acts, the court concluded that the word "liability" in S.95 must be read as referring to the normal compensatory liability (the principal compensation sum) and not the special statutory interest and penalty under S.4-A(3).
  • Treatment of contrary authority: The court acknowledged a contrary Single Judge decision (1987 A.C.J 803) which found that "liability" covers interest and penalty and placed the onus on the insurer to exclude such liability contractually. The court disagreed, criticising that decision for not analysing the differing natures and enforcement machinery of the two statutes and for unfairly shifting a negative burden onto insurers.
  • Alternative and factual reasoning: The court further reasoned that, even if an insurer could be held liable for interest and penalty, the operational mechanics of S.4-A show that the employer is the only party positioned to know when compensation falls due and to justify any delay (and thus to avoid penalty). Hence, the employer is the natural party to bear penalty and interest. On the facts, the insurer in this case only received information of the accident on 26 August 1985, after the accident on 21 May 1985; therefore the insurer lacked timely knowledge of when payment became due and had a valid justification for initial non-payment. Once informed, the insurer deposited the compensation amount.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is allowed. The court held that an insurance company is not liable to pay the interest and penalty imposed under S.4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act; the insurer's liability is confined to payment of the compensation amount itself.

Consequential operative relief on the facts:

  • The impugned order of the Commissioner is set aside to the extent that it cast upon the appellant-insurance company the responsibility for payment of interest, penalty and costs assessed under the award.
  • It is clarified that the interest for default in payment of compensation, the penalty, and the costs as awarded by the Commissioner are payable only by Competent Construction Company (the employer/respondent).
  • The award is modified accordingly and the appeal is allowed with costs.

Implications beyond the parties: The court based its ruling on the distinct statutory schemes and enforcement mechanisms of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act, limiting the ordinary meaning of "liability" in S.95 to compensation proper and excluding statutory interest and penalty under S.4-A(3). The opinion does not announce a broader departure from existing law beyond this interpretation; it primarily addresses the direct effect on the parties in this matter.

Show all summary ...

1. An important question of law arising for decision in this appeal is whether the insurance company with which the offending vehicle is insured is liable to pay penalty and additional interest awarded and the penalty imposed by the Commissioner under S. 4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. To be more specific, the question is whether the word “liability” mentioned in proviso to S. 95(1B) and Sub-sec. 2(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act is so wide as to include liability for payment of interest in default of payment of compensation and the penalty imposed under S. 4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act?

2. The petitioner was working as a workman/loader of Truck No. DEG-3809, owned by Competent Construction Company. On 21 May, 1985, when the workman, along with the other workmen, was proceeding to unload the truck after loading the same with loose earth, the truck overturned and the workman sustained grievous injuries and succumbed to them. There is no dispute that the workman died on account of the accident during the course and arising out of the employment under Competent Construction Company. The widow and the child made an application for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The Commissioner under the Act recorded the following findings while imposing compensation, interest and penalty:

“It is highly deplorable that the management did not care to deposit the amount of compensation within prescribed time even though the poor widow with her minor children including a child aged 13 days continued to run from pillar to post for compensation. The management/insurance company continued to shift the blame for delay to each other instead of deposting the admitted compensation in time.

Accordingly, I hold and hereby award Rs. 25,000 as penalty and interest of Rs. 3,197 at 6 per cent per annum from the date of accident till 3 January, 1986, on the entire amount of Rs. 87,388 and 6 per cent interest per annum on the balance amount of Rs. 30,360 (unpaid) from 3 January, 1986, till the date of realisation. The primary liability for payment of the entire amount is that of the management, but since respondent 1 has taken insurance cover from respondent 2, therefore, the entire amount under this award shall be satisfied by the insurance company. I have considered the authorities submitted by respondent 1, viz., 1983 A.C.J 601 (M.F) : 1973 A.C.J 428 : 1984 A.C.J 591 and 1986 A.C.J 732 (M.P). In view of these citations, I further hold that both respondents 1 and 2 are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the applicants. The counsel fee is allowed Rs. 1,000 which will be paid by the respondents jointly and severally. The award will be satisfied within 15 days of this order, failing which the same will be recovered as arrears of land revenue.”

3. The award is challenged by the insurance company submitting that special interest and penalty imposed under S. 4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be recovered from the insurance company and their liability is limited only to the amount of compensation. Counsel for the insurance company has relied upon 1986 A.C.J 732 and 1988 A.C.J 677 (D.B). On the other hand, counsel for the respondent construction company has submitted that the liability under the award is indivisible. It cannot be held that compensation is payable by the insurance company and special interest and penalty should be paid by the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act. His submission is that the use of the word “liability” in S. 95 is a deliberate innovation by the amending Act of 1956 and the word is wide enough to include not only the compensation but special interest and penalty awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act. He has relied upon the judgment of a Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court, reported at 1987 A.C.J 803.

4. Before going into the question as to who is liable to pay penalty and special interest on the interpretation of the provisions of the two statutes, it is necessary to note some relevant dates of occurrence. The accident took place on 21 May, 1985. The respondent-company who had insured the offending vehicles with the insurance company sent the information regarding the accident to insurance company, which was received on 26 August, 1985. Thereafter, the insurance company deposited the amount of compensation payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The submission on behalf of the appellant-insurance company is that the owner of the truck informed the insurance company after three months of the date of the accident. The question is whether on facts of this case the insurance company can be held responsible for the said payments, apart from the legal interpretations of the relevant provisions.

5. The Workmen's Compensation Act was passed in 1923, with the following object:

“The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves renders it advisable that they should be protected as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents. A legislation of this kind helps to reduce the number of accidents in a manner that cannot be achieved by official inspection, and to mitigate the effect of accidents by provision for suitable medical treatment, thereby making industry more attractive to labour and increasing its efficiency. The Act provides for cheaper and quicker disposal of disputes relating to compensation through special Tribunals than possible under the civil law.”

6. Section 3 of the Act makes it mandatory for the employer to pay compensation in accordance with the Act if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. In other words, the liability of the employer is not required to be proved if the two conditions mentioned in S. 3(1) are satisfied. The amount of compensation payable is prescribed by S. 4 and Sch I. Thus, the Act does not require that the quantum of compensation should be worked out on the basis of the evidence. Reading Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act together it is clear that this is a category of liability in the nature of absolute liability created by the statute. The object of these mandatory provisions is clear. The workmen are exposed to dangers to life with increased industrialisation. A victim of an industrial accident cannot be subjected to the civil trials under the Law of Torts. The victims need quick, cheap and effective machinery for immediate relief both in case of death and bodily injury. To make these provisions more effective S. 4-A provides that compensation shall be paid as soon as it falls due. An employer is liable to make a provisional payment even if he does not accept the liability. The compensation has to be paid within one month from the date it fell due. If the employer is in default, the Commissioner may direct simple interest at 6 per cent per annum to be paid over and above the compensation. If the delay over the above one month is caused by the employer in making the payment of compensation and there is no justification for the delay, the Commissioner is empowered to impose a penalty in the sum not exceeding 50 per cent of the compensation amount. The compensation received under the Act is not liable to any assessment, charge or attachment. The amount awarded under the Act is recoverable as arrears of land revenue. The Act prohibits any contract or agreement whereby the workman relinquishes any right of compensation from the employer for personal injury in so far as it purports to remove or reduce the liability of any person to pay compensation under the Act. Any such contract is null and void under S. 17 of the Act. Thus, it may be seen that although the genesis of the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act is in the Law of Torts, very substantial and novel improvements are made by the various provisions stated above in regard to statutory liability created by the Act.

7. On the other hand the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act in regard to insurance of the vehicles for the benefit of third party, for the passengers, for the employees and for damage to property/vehicle are mostly in realm of contract, except where the liability is created by Ss. 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Even there the principle recognised is that of the minimum liability created by the statute, which cannot be contracted out. But, beyond the principal liability matter is left to the contract between the insurance company and the owner of the vehicle. Liability of the insurance company is regulated by S. 96 which purports to lay down that the insurance company will answer the liability under the, judgment pronounced against the owner/wrong doer. The liability of the owner of the vehicle is required to be established by means of evidence, oral and circumstantial. The Court/Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is required to work out as to what is the just compensation in a given case depending on the monetary loss caused to the dependants due to the death or injury caused to the victim. The liability of the insurance company can be limited either by the statute or by the contract of insurance. The amount of compensation is recoverable by the normal process of law. There is no concept nor provision of making payment within a statutory period and imposition of penalty for not making the payment within the statutory period. The concept of liability in an industrial accident is, thus, quite different from the normal concept of the accident caused by the motor vehicles.

8. There is only one area creating overlapping fields of liability. An insurance policy can cover liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of death or bodily injury to any employee engaged in driving the vehicle or being carried in the vehicle. If the goods vehicle is carrying not less than six employees, the liability of the insurance company for any one accident can be limited up to Rs. 50,000, “including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923”. These two cases of overlapping are mentioned in S. 95 of the Act. Thus, considering the scheme and scope of the relevant provisions of the two enactments it is evident that it is the normal compensation payable in case of death or bodily injury to an employee, which is subject to the provisions of the statute or contract as mentioned in S. 95. The provision for special interest or penalty under the Workmen's Compensation Act has an entirely different setting and purpose unknown to normal insurance law embodied in the contract between the parties. Limits of liability in certain cases can be limited by a contract between the parties under the Motor Vehicles Act, but any such contract is null and void under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In view of the divergent setting and the provisions under the said enactments, the word “liability” occurring in S. 95 in the context of Workmen's Compensation Act has to be understood only as normal compensation and not to include special interest and penalty awarded under S. 4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

9. The construction of the two sections commented by me is apparently supported by 1986 A.C.J 732 and 1988 A.C.J 677. However, a discordant view is taken by the Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in 1987 A.C.J 803. The learned Judge has held that the word “liability” used in S. 95 covers liability to pay special interest and penalty and if the insurance company wants to avoid such liability, it should provide for such a term in the contract of insurance. The burden is on the insurance company to show that it has not taken upon itself the liability to pay special interest and penalty. The learned Judge has referred to and distinguished several decisions of Madhya Pradesh High Court and other High Courts. However, with respect, it has to be noted that the learned Judge has not analysed the nature of liability and the kinds of liability under Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. So also, the object and the machinery for mandatory payment of the statutory amount under Workmen's Compensation Act has not been brought to the notice of the learned Judge. When the Workmen's Compensation Act has expressly provided for an exhaustive remedy of recovery of compensation by way of arrears of land revenue, when the Workmen's Compensation Act has expressly exempted the compensation amount from being assigned or being subjected to any charge, when the minimum compensation is assured by the statute itself, I do not find any necessity of very widely interpreting the word “liability” in S. 95, as done by the learned Judge. Casting a negative burden on the insurance company to exclude itself from liability to pay interest and penalty is not warranted by the provisions of insurance of vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act or under the general law of insurance. With respect, I am not persuaded by the reasoning of the learned Judge, reported in 1987 A.C.J 803.

10. For the reasons stated above, I hold that an insurance company is not liable to pay interest and penalty under S. 4-A(3). Its liability is only to pay compensation.

11. But, even assuming that an insurance company which is liable to pay interest as well as penalty, the requirements of S. 4-A itself would show that the obligation imposed by that section can be answered only to pay compensation by the employer. The compensation under the said section has to be paid as so on as it falls due. The date when the payment has become due can be known only by the owner/employer because he alone would know the date of the accident causing death or injury. Since he would alone know the date when the amount is payable, he would also be the only person who would know that within one month from the due date compensation must be paid. He is liable to pay simple interest at 6 per cent per annum on the delay, but if he fails to show justification for delay, penalty shall be recovered from the employer. Thus, if the employer wants to avoid penalty, he must show justification for the delay. Since the causes and justification for the delay is within the knowledge of the employer, nobody else can provide a justification for the delay. The provisons of S. 4-A of Workmen's Compensation Act, being mandatory and being made with specific object of industrial security, they will prevail over the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

12. On the facts of this case, the insurance company can, by no stretch of imagination, be held to be liable to pay the interest and penalty as awarded by the Commissioner. The insurance company got the knowledge of the accident which had taken place on 21 May, 1985 only on 26 August, 1985. They did not know as to when payment of compensation had fallen due. They did not know the date of accident in time. They did not know when one month would elapse. Thus, they had a valid justification for not making the payment within one month from the date of the accident. As soon as the insurance company got the information they deposited the compensation amount, as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act.

13. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order of the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is set aside in so far as it puts the responsibility of the payment of interest and penalty and casts on the appellant-insurance company. It is hereby clarified that the amount of interest for the default in payment of compensation, the penalty and the costs under the award made by the Commissioner shall be payable only by Competent Construction Company/the respondent. The impugned award stands modified to that extent. The appeal is allowed with costs.