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Indian Turpentine And Rosin Company Limited v. Pioneer Consolidated Company Of India Limited
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a petition for winding up under section 433, clauses (e) and (f), read with section 439 of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner is Indian Turpentine and Rosin Co. Ltd. (ITR), in which the Government of India holds about 80% of the shares, and the respondent is M/s. Pioneer Consolidated Co. of India Ltd. (PCC). By an agency agreement dated 1 March 1974 (initially for five years and later extended to 31 August 1979), PCC acted as the petitioner’s sole selling agent in certain territories. Under the agreement PCC was responsible for remitting sale proceeds to ITR within 45 days and to indemnify ITR for losses caused by breach or non-performance; interest at 18% p.a. (or prevailing bank rate, if higher) was payable on overdue sums.
ITR claimed that as on 31 August 1980 PCC owed Rs. 43,57,198.31 (made up of principal and interest items, incidental charges and small adjustments). After negotiations and registered notices produced no payment, ITR filed the winding-up petition on 18 December 1981. The petition was admitted, a citation was ordered and the matter passed through interlocutory litigation including a Division Bench remand and directions, an appeal to the Supreme Court which required deposits, and rehearing before the company judge. Citations were published and various creditors, workmen and others filed affidavits in opposition. The court ultimately heard the matter on affidavits and documents and delivered the order winding up PCC and appointing the official liquidator.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there was a clear and undisputed debt owing from PCC to ITR sufficient to justify presentation and continuation of a winding-up petition under the Companies Act.
- Whether PCC was insolvent or had lost its substratum such that a winding-up order was justified.
- Whether the existence or pendency of arbitration proceedings between the parties (and related interlocutory orders) barred continuation of the winding-up petition.
- Whether the petitioner’s claim was time-barred by limitation as on the date the winding-up order could be made, and if so whether the plea of limitation could defeat a petition already admitted.
- Whether admissions or acknowledgments by PCC in affidavits and statements operated to extend limitation under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (ITR) Arguments
- ITR claimed that PCC owed Rs. 43,57,198.31 as on 31 August 1980, comprising debit balances of branch accounts, interest, small debits during 1980–81 and incidental charges collected by PCC in excess of authorised rates.
- ITR relied on correspondence, account statements and admissions by PCC in the parties’ filings (including affidavits of 7 Oct 1982 and 28 Feb 1984) to show that a substantial undisputed liability existed — in excess of Rs. 20 lakhs on ITR’s case and a material admitted liability even on PCC’s best case.
- ITR submitted that PCC had become defunct, had insufficient assets to meet liabilities, and had lost its substratum, thus justifying winding up.
- ITR argued that arbitration proceedings were not effectively pending (civil court orders of 23 Mar 1982 and 25 Oct 1983 stayed/concluded and not challenged) and that PCC had not sought stay under section 34 of the Arbitration Act or leave under section 446 of the Companies Act to continue arbitration.
- On limitation, ITR contended that limitation is relevant at the date of presentation of the winding-up petition and that PCC’s acknowledgments in its affidavits/statements extended limitation under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Respondent's (PCC) Arguments
- PCC contended that substantial parts of ITR’s claim were genuinely disputed — in particular (a) the incidental charges claimed by ITR and (b) interest claimed — and relied on correspondence (including a 26 Sep 1979 letter from ITR) and minutes to contend that no undisputed large debt remained.
- PCC argued that arbitration proceedings were initiated (Original Suit under section 20 of the Arbitration Act in 1980) and that the pendency of arbitration should prevent or delay winding up.
- PCC raised a limitation defence for the first time on 5 Mar 1985, asserting that any suit for recovery must have been brought within three years of the termination of the agency (31 Aug 1979) and therefore any subsisting claim was now barred; accordingly, a winding-up order should not be made if, by the date on which the order would be made, the claim was barred.
- PCC advanced various contentions aimed at showing inconsistencies in ITR’s figures and suggested that many items in PCC’s balance-sheet might be inflated or otherwise not recoverable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Diwan Chand Kapoor v. New Rialto Cinema P. Ltd. (Anand J., 16 May 1985) | Held that a winding-up order cannot be made if the debt is barred by limitation on the date the order is sought to be made (i.e. limitation at the date of the order is material). | The court observed Anand J.'s conclusion but noted it was followed by a later Division Bench decision of this court which reversed Anand J.'s view. The judge initially found the issue difficult but then followed the Division Bench and overruled PCC's plea of limitation. |
| Diwan Chand Kapoor v. New Rialto Cinema P. Ltd. (Division Bench, 2 Dec 1985) [Co. A.13 of 1985] | Division Bench reversed the view of Anand J. and thereby supported the proposition that limitation should be judged by reference to date of presentation of the petition (as applied in this court). | The judge expressly followed the Division Bench decision and, on that basis, overruled the respondent's limitation plea. |
| J.A. (A.) Dixit v. Official Liquidator, AIR 1963 All 284 | Part of a line of Allahabad High Court decisions supporting the view that a debt barred at the date of the winding-up order cannot be entertained. | Placed by the court among authorities forming the “first line” of cases that Anand J. relied on; the court discussed this line but ultimately followed the Division Bench decision of this court instead of the first line. |
| Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. v. Sulbha Devi Gupta, [1985] 3 Comp LJ 319; [1986] 60 Comp Cas 639 (All) | Another Allahabad decision cited in support of the principle that a debt barred at the date of the winding-up order may not be entertained; discussed in context of the conflicting lines of authority. | The court noted this case as forming part of the first line of authority but concluded that the Division Bench decision of this court took precedence for present purposes. |
| Lahore Enamelling & Stamping Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Bhalla, [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj); AIR 1958 Punj 341 | Support for the view that a debt not recoverable at date of winding-up order should not sustain a winding-up (first line). | Noted by the court as part of earlier decisions supporting the first line; the judge recorded that this view has been questioned and in one instance reversed on appeal. |
| Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling & Stamping Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515 (Punj) | Reported reversal on appeal of the decision in Lahore Enamelling; illustrates conflicting appellate authority on the point. | Referenced to show divergence in judicial authority on the limitation issue; the court set the conflicting precedents out before following the Division Bench of this court. |
| Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd., In re, AIR 1959 Cal 646; [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal) | Observations supportive of the first line of authority (that limitation at the date of winding-up order matters). | Noted as part of the first line of cases; ultimately the judge preferred the Division Bench ruling of this court. |
| General Rolling Stock Co., In re, [1872] 7 Ch App 646 | Older authority cited in support of the view that limitation at the date of the winding-up order matters (doctrinal support). | Referred to among doctrinal and textual authorities cited by those who take the first-line view; the court surveyed these authorities but followed the Division Bench decision. |
| Authoritative texts: Palmer's, Buckley, Halsbury (citations as in the opinion) | Textual/doctrinal support for the first-line position on limitation and winding-up. | Mentioned as supportive material for the first line of authority; the judge recorded these references in surveying the conflict of authority. |
| S. Abdul Muthalibu v. K.M. Mohammed Abdul Khader, [1962] 32 Comp Cas 1102 (Madras) | A case in the contrary line: that debts not barred at presentation are provable even if time-barred by the date of the winding-up order. | Included among authorities on the contrary line; the court noted such contrary decisions and weighed them in the survey of precedent before following the Division Bench. |
| Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd. (referred again), [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515 (Punj) | Part of the contrary line in some courts' understanding (reversal of earlier position). | Noted by the court as evidence of divergent authority on the point; not followed because the Division Bench decision of this court was treated as authoritative on the matter. |
| Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All); AIR 1957 All 143 | Referred to as having been understood in some cases as supporting the contrary view (that a debt provable if not barred at presentation). | Mentioned by the judge in the review of authorities; the judge did not adopt it as conclusive because of the Division Bench ruling in this court. |
| Modern Dehor Painting Contract P. Ltd. v. Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd., [1985] 58 Comp Cas 255 (Bombay) | Bombay High Court decision relied upon by petitioner; directly on the point and supportive of the view that limitation should be measured from date of presentation. | The judge noted this Bombay decision as directly on point and part of the contrary line; the judge surveyed it but ultimately followed the Division Bench of this court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a step-by-step assessment of whether there was a clear and undisputed debt and whether winding up was appropriate:
- Existence and composition of the debt: the petition's total claim (Rs. 43,57,198.31) was broken into four components (branch debit balances/net principal, interest for a specified period, small debits for 1980–81, and incidental charges allegedly collected in excess). The judge examined each component against the documentary record and correspondence between the parties.
- Incidental charges (item 4): the court found a reasonable basis for dispute because a letter of 26 September 1979 from ITR appeared to accept revised incidental charge rates (7 paise, 8 paise, 9 paise for certain years) and asked PCC to confirm; there was no further contemporaneous reassertion by ITR that PCC had collected in excess at other stations. On this basis the court was inclined to give PCC the benefit of doubt on the full incidental-charge claim and found there was a reasonable dispute on that item.
- Principal and interest (other items): the judge reviewed balance-sheets, auditors’ reports, minutes and statements filed by PCC. Though some documents showed provisions for doubtful debts and minor inconsistencies, the court concluded these did not negate the genuineness of the debit balances shown in ITR’s accounts. Importantly, PCC itself had made entries and statements acknowledging substantial indebtedness (figures such as Rs. 29.08 lakhs and Rs. 21.83 lakhs toward ITR were shown in PCC filings), which supported ITR's contention that a substantial undisputed liability existed.
- PCC’s best-case admissions: even accepting PCC’s own calculation of sales and remittances, PCC admitted a debit balance of Rs. 6,69,607 (later reduced by security and deposits to a small sum), and the court held that PCC had not given a plausible explanation for non-payment of the admitted smaller sums (for example, ~Rs. 1.24 lakhs net after adjustments and deposits). The agency contract’s del credere character imposed on PCC the obligation to pay ITR regardless of PCC’s recoveries from customers, and ITR was within rights to sell directly in certain circumstances; these contractual features negated PCC’s explanations that direct ITR supplies prevented remittances.
- Interest claim: under the contract interest was payable where sale proceeds were not deposited within 45 days, and the minutes and statements did not establish a bona fide entitlement by PCC to avoid interest altogether. The court found that only a portion of interest (about Rs. 8.52 lakhs) might be in dispute; a very substantial portion of the claim (principal or interest) was not meaningfully contested.
- Arbitration: the court reviewed the history of arbitration proceedings and interlocutory orders (including an order under section 20 of the Arbitration Act and subsequent civil court orders of 23 March 1982 and 25 October 1983). The court concluded that, in view of the civil court orders (which PCC had not challenged), there were no effective arbitration proceedings pending and PCC had not sought a stay under section 34 or leave under section 446. Therefore, pendency of arbitration did not bar the winding-up petition.
- Opposition affidavits and workers' claims: creditors and interested parties filed opposition affidavits asserting possible rehabilitation prospects. The court found these affidavits to be from interested persons, lacking concrete proposals or financial detail to justify rehabilitation; worker numbers were small and the company had been unable to meet staff expenses. These oppositions were given little weight.
- Limitation: the court extensively surveyed conflicting judicial authorities on whether limitation should be tested as of the date of presentation of the winding-up petition or as of the date of the winding-up order. While noting the earlier line of cases (which would favour PCC’s late-raised plea that a time-bar at the date of order is decisive), the judge observed that a Division Bench of this court had reversed Anand J.'s contrary view and decided that limitation should be measured at the date of presentation of the petition. Following that Division Bench, the court overruled the respondent’s limitation plea. Independently, the court also found that PCC had acknowledged indebtedness in affidavits/statements filed on 7 Oct 1982 and 28 Feb 1984, and that such acknowledgments, within the meaning of section 18 of the Limitation Act, operated to extend the period of limitation in favour of the petitioner.
- Conclusion on insolvency and substratum: weighing the admitted liabilities, PCC’s inability to comply with deposit and guarantee directions given earlier by courts, the paucity of assets and the lack of credible revival proposals, the court concluded PCC was insolvent and had lost the substratum required to continue business, thus justifying winding up.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The court ordered that the respondent company (PCC) be wound up by the court and appointed the official liquidator to take charge of its assets, books and documents and to wind up its affairs in accordance with law.
Implications:
- The official liquidator was appointed as liquidator and directed to take charge of PCC's assets, books and documents and to proceed with winding up under the Companies Act.
- Notices and certified copies of the winding-up order were to be communicated immediately to the Registrar of Companies, Delhi, as required by rules.
- The court overruled PCC's limitation plea by following a Division Bench decision of this court and also found that PCC's own acknowledgments under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, extended limitation, thereby permitting the petitioner's claims to be entertained.
- The decision resolved the parties’ dispute for the purposes of this petition but the opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle; it applied existing precedent (and followed the Division Bench ruling of this court) to the facts and procedural history of this case.
Ranganathan, J.:— This is a petition for winding up under section 433, clauses (e) and (f), read with section 439, of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner is the Indian Turpentine and Rosin Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the ITR”) in which about 80 per cent, of the shares are held by the Government of India. The ITR seeks the winding up of the respondent, M/s. Pioneer Consolidated Co. of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the PCC”). It may be mentioned here that at one time both the ITR and PCC belonged to the same group of persons but subsequently ITR has been taken over by the Government of India.
2. The petitioner's case is this: By an agreement dated March 1, 1974, the petitioner company appointed the PCC as its sole selling agents for the sale of its products in certain territories in India. This agreement was for a period of 5 years but subsequently it was extended till August 31, 1979. It is common ground that the agreement came to an end on August 31, 1979. Under the terms of the agreement, the PCC was responsible for the payment to the petitioner of all dues connected with the sales made by it and to indemnify the petitioner against all losses caused by any breach or non-performance of any contract entered into between the PCC and any person in respect of the sale of the petitioner's goods. PCC was liable to pay all the amounts of sale proceeds within 45 days of the date of sale whether or not it had been able to realise the proceeds from its customers and if default was made, it was liable to pay interest at 18 per cent, per annum or the prevailing bank rate, whichever was higher, on the amounts outstanding for the period during which they remained unpaid. The petitioner company claimed that as on August 31, 1980, a sum of Rs. 43,57,198-31 including interest was due to it from the PCC. This, according to a statement annexed to the petition, comprised princi pal amount of Rs. 28,41,571.70 which was the aggregate of the debit balances of the three branches of ‘the PCC at Kanpur, Calcutta and Delhi outstanding in the books of the petitioner company. This sum of Rs. 28,41,571.70 was said to have been arrived at after adjusting a security deposit of Rs. 2,00,000 which had been made by the PCC initially. In addition to the above sum of Rs. 28,41,571.70, the petitioner company claims : (a) interest on the above amount from September 1, 1979, to August 31, 1980, at 15½ per cent, amounting Rs. 4,40,443.61; (b) an amount of Rs. 5,183 debited to the PCC during 1980-81; and (c) incidental charges claimed to have been realised by the PCC from the customers which it was bound to make over to the petitioner company amounting to Rs. 10,70,000. Thus, the petitioner claims, a sum of Rs. 43,57,198.31 was due to it from the PCC as on August 31, 1980.
3. According to the petitioner, there were mutual discussions, negotiations and correspondence between the ITR and the PCC in the course of which the PCC substantially admitted the petitioner's claim save and except for some small discrepancies. Nevertheless, no amount was paid to the ITR in respect of the amounts due to it in spite of several reminders. A registered notice dated July 30, 1981, did not also lead to any payment.- The petitioner submits that, after the termination of the agency by the ITR, PCC had become defunct without any worthwhile business activities and lost its substratum. The balance-sheet of the PCC for the year ending March 31, 1979, shows a share capital of Rs. 1,34,800 and practically no fixed assets or investments as against current liabilities to the tune of Rs. 50,00,000. The stock-in-trade and the cash balance aggregate to about Rs. 2,00,000 and though a huge amount of Rs. 40,00,000 is shown as due to the respondent company on account of sundry debts and advances, these items, according to the petitioner, are bogus and are either inflated or included with a fraudulent motive to mislead the public and also its creditors. In the above circumstances, ITR submits that the PCC is insolvent and unable to pay its debts and has also lost its substratum. It is, therefore, prayed that an order should be passed winding up the company and appointing the official liquidator to take charge of its assets.
4. Before proceeding to deal with the arguments addressed before me, a brief narration of the earlier proceedings in the case is necessary. This order may also be read in continuation of the earlier orders referred to below.
5. When the winding-up petition first came up, notice was issued to the respondent company and to the Central Government. The respondent company filed a reply to the show-cause notice. When the matter next came up, it was suggested that if the PCC would pay Rs. 5,00,000 and give a bank guarantee for Rs. 10,00,000, the petition could be admitted without citation and a chartered accountant be appointed to find out the exact amount due to the petitioner company. PCC was, however, unable to raise funds to the extent suggested. After hearing both the parties, Wad J. admitted the petition and ordered citation by his order dated May 6, 1982. PCC went in appeal (Co. A. No. 11 of 1982). The controversy in appeal mainly related to the order of citation made by the learned judge and certain interim orders passed by him. The Division Bench, by its order dated November 26, 1982, gave certain directions and was of opinion that before citation was issued, the matter needed to be examined in greater detail and remanded the case to the company judge. It had earlier, by an interim order, stayed the citation subject to PCC depositing a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 in court. The petitioner company was aggrieved by the order of the Bench and went in appeal to the Supreme Court (CA No. 3031 of 1983). The Supreme Court left the order of the Division Bench undisturbed except to direct that the respondent company should deposit a further sum of Rs. 3,00,000. PCC, it seems, deposited Rs. 3,00,000 in all but has been unable to deposit the balance of the amount directed by the Supreme Court. The matter thus stood remanded to the company judge for reconsideration.
6. The company petition was heard again by Khanna J. in the light of the orders of the Division Bench. After an elaborate discussion, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the winding-up petition should be admitted and that citation should be published unless the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 10,00,000 in court and furnished a bank guarantee for Rs. 12,00,000 within a period of ten days. This order was dated March 15, 1984.
7. Citations have since been published. The company, its workmen and certain other persons claiming to be the creditors of the PCC have filed affidavits in opposition. The petitioner's affidavit in reply has been filed and the winding-up petition has now come up for hearing on the basis of the affidavits filed and the documents filed therewith. It may be mentioned that, in the course of the various proceedings heretofore, the parties have filed a large number of statements, calculations and correspondence which it is impossible and unnecessary to refer to in full detail. I proceed to dispose of this matter on the basis of such of those documents as have been specifically relied upon by learned counsel in the arguments before me.
8. The ‘first question that arises for consideration is whether there is a clear and undisputed debt owing to the petitioner company from the respondent company. The petitioner's claim of Rs. 43,57,198.31 is made up as follows:
Rs. 1. Debit balances of the Kanpur, Calcutta and New Delhi branches of the PCC including interest up to 31-8-79 less adjustment of a security deposit of Rs. 2,00,000. 28,41,571.70 2. Interest from 1-9-79 to 31-8-80 at 15½. 4,40,443.61 3. Debited during the year 1980-81. 5,18300 4. Incidental charges realised by PCC from customers in excess of authorised charges. 10,70,000 00 43,57,198.31
9. No arguments were urged about the third item which is very small but counsel for the respondent sought to make out that there was a genuine dispute over the other three items between the parties and his contentions in this regard may now be considered.
10. To take up item 4 first, the petitioner's claim in this regard is contained in a letter addressed by it to PCC on February 15, 1979. It is common ground that, under the agreements between the two companies, PCC was entitled to collect from its customers incidental charges at specified rates. By this letter, the charge of the PCC was that the various branches of the PCC had recovered incidental charges in excess of the specified rates and that the amounts thus realised by the PCC during the years 1973-74 to 1977-78 amounted to Rs. 8,27,398 as per the details furnished in the letter. PCC, according to the petitioner, was not only liable to make over these amounts to the ITR but was also liable to pay interest thereon amounting to Rs. 2,52,947. The total claim on this account was thus Rs. 10,80,345 as against which only Rs. 10,70,000 is claimed in the petition. The respondent's counsel submits that this claim of the petitioner was discussed between the parties and it has been eventually accepted by the petitioner that there is no amount payable under this head. In support of this contention, he relies upon the letter dated September 26, 1979, addressed by ITR to PCC. By this letter, the ITR agreed, in view of the evidence furnished by the PCC and test-checked by themselves, that PCC be allowed incidental charges (recovered by you from customers)” at the rate of seven paise per kg. for 1973-74, eight paise for 1974-75 and nine paise for 1975-76 to 1978-79. The words in parenthesis seem to suggest that the PCC had made recoveries only at these rates and the letter asks the PCC to confirm this and also states that “in case it is found that excess money is collected by you under the above head, the same shall be recoverable from you and shall be payable by you to us.” Counsel for the petitioner was not able to draw our attention to any subsequent letter or intimation or computation by the petitioner to show that the PCC had collected incidental charges at rates in excess of those referred to above. He only urged that the letter dated September 26, 1979, was restricted, as the subject mentioned in the letter shows, to “freight charges including octroi and incidental charges, etc., from Bareilly to Delhi” and that no such relaxation was made in respect of goods consigned to other places. I am inclined to give the benefit of doubt to the respondent in this regard. Having regard to the nature of the charges in question, it is possible that though the letter only refers to Delhi it may have been considered applicable to incidental charges at all stations. It is also not the case of the petitioner that it had reworked on this basis, its earlier claims in its letter of February, 1979, vis-a-vis the Delhi office alone and reiterated its claim in respect of other places. I think, therefore, that the letter of September, 1979, may have outlined a general upward revision of the incidental charges allowed to the PCC. There is, therefore, reasonable basis for some dispute on this account and some doubts as to whether a sum of Rs. 10,70,000 or even any smaller sum remained undisputedly due to the petitioner company from the PCC on this account after the agreement between the parties referred to in the letter of September 26, 1979.
11. The other amounts claimed by the petitioner from the respondent represent the value of goods supplied and interest thereon. The statements of account filed with the petition do not contain a clear break-up as to the exact composition of the amount of Rs. 28,41,571.70 though it is clear that the item of Rs. 4,40,443,61 represents the claim on account of interest. Counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner's figures in this regard have been different at different times and thoroughly inconsistent. He points out that:
(a) The auditors’ report attached to the balance-sheet of the ITR for the year 1979-80 claims that the debt due from the PCC on March 31, 1980, was Rs. 28,41,571.70 against which a provision for bad and doubtful debts was made to the extent of Rs. 7,52,000 which was considered inadequate by the auditors. The corresponding figures for the year 1980-81 were Rs. 28,46,755 and Rs. 7,52,000.
(b) As per minutes recorded by the ITR on September 6, 1979, the total due from PCC as on August 31, 1979, including incidental charges of Rs. 10.81 lakhs was only Rs. 38.72 lakhs. The principal due as on March 31, 1979, was Rs. 25.45 lakhs to which an amount of Rs. 3.34 lakhs was added as interest and from which Rs. 0.88 lakhs was deducted as commission due to PCC. Out of this, a sum of Rs. 18.33 lakhs under nine heads was shown as disputed by the PCC.
12. These documents do not, however, help the respondent. On the other hand, the balance-sheet as on March 31, 1980, confirms the figure of Rs. 28,41,571.70 mentioned in the petition and the figure for March 31, 1981, is seen to be arrived at by the adjustments of Rs. 5.83 lakhs referred to in the petition as having been made during 1980-81. It is difficult to agree with counsel for the respondent that the mere fact that a sum of Rs. 7.52 lakhs was considered bad and doubtful by the company and even more by the auditors casts a doubt on the genuineness of the debit balance shown in the balance-sheet. The estimate of bad and doubtful debts is made on the financial position of the debtor and this only shows that the company and its auditors were not optimistic about the recovery of a good portion of the amounts due from PCC. So far as the recorded minutes are concerned, it is seen that the figure shown therein is only insignificantly different from the figure mentioned in the petition before taking into account the amount of interest from September 1, 1979, to August 31, 1980, and the adjustments effected in 1980-81. On the other hand, they show that most of the concessions sought for by the PCC were rejected and that even according to the PCC, a sum of Rs. 20.39 lakhs was due to the ITR.
13. As against this, learned counsel for the petitioner points out that there are on record clear admissions by the respondent itself that a very substantial liability remains outstanding from the PCC to the ITR. On October 7, 1982, the respondent filed an affidavit along with certain enclosures before the Division Bench. The enclosures furnished a breakup of Rs. 29,08,84031 out of the total liabilities shown in the balance-sheet at Rs. 43,33,204 as on March 31, 1981. In these statements, the debt due to ITR (and a subsidiary, TSI) was shown at Rs. 21,83,162.50. Again the PCC filed on February 28, 1984, before the company judge a statement according to which “details of sundry creditors and other liabilities as on March 31, 1981” of PCC included, inter alia, the following:
Rs. P. “Creditors Delhi Branch 3,98,821.61 „Kanpur„ 22,43,392.68 (as already filed) „Calcutta„ 2,66,626.02 Interest claim disputed (contingent) 8,51,748.55”
14. In other words, the PCC acknowledged once again that the indebtedness of the company was of Rs. 29.08 lakhs (which includes Rs. 21.83 lakhs due to the ITR) and also stated that the interest amount in dispute was Rs. 8.52 lakhs. It is not quite clear that the interest here referred to is the interest claim of the ITR, but if it is, this indicates that, according to the PCC, the interest claim was only to the extent of Rs. 8.52 lakhs. It seems, however, likely that the interest claim referred to is that of the ITR for the figure of interest has been set out separately in this statement and since the PCC was disputing the claim of interest made by the ITR, it is extremely unlikely that the sum of Rs. 29.08 lakhs which was acknowledged as a clear liability included any interest element. It may also be pointed out that if the liability of Rs. 21.83 lakhs shown in the statement filed on October 7, 1982, and the interest amount of Rs. 8.52 lakhs shown in the statement filed on February 28, 1984, are taken together, the total liability including interest, even according to the PCC, will be Rs. 30.35 lakhs, which differs marginally from the figure of Rs. 30.41 lakhs mentioned in the petition as due to the petitioner before the adjustment of the security deposit of Rs. 2,00,000. These two “admissions” of the PCC are strongly relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. Relying on these statements, the petitioner contends, it appears to me with force, that, even assuming that there is some genuine dispute about the interest, a sum of more than Rs. 20,00,000 was due to ITR as on March 31, 1981.
15. Even leaving out of account the above computation and proceeding on the version put forward by the PCC itself, the position emerges thus. In one of the statements filed along with the affidavit dated October 7, 1982, before the Division Bench, PCC has worked out its total sales on behalf of the ITR since 1972-73, when the agency originally commenced, till 1980 and the total remittances made by it to the ITR till 1980. The former has been worked out at Rs. 5,31,38,676 and the latter at Rs. 5,24,69,069 resulting in a debit balance of Rs. 6,69,607, thus admitting that a sum of Rs. 6,69,607 was due to the ITR in 1980. It is then said that if Rs. 2,00,000 by way of security deposit and Rs. 2,00,000 deposited in court are adjusted there will be a balance only of Rs. 2,69,607. It may be added that since subsequently the PCC appears to have deposited a sum of Rs. 1,20,000 (on June 19, 1983, and January 2, 1984); the net amount admitted as due to ITR as on March 31, 1980, gets reduced to Rs. 1,24,607. Assuming the correctness of these calculations, the question will still be whether (a) the PCC has any reasonable explanation for its inability to pay the above sum of Rs. 1,24,607; and (b) whether the PCC can plausibly deny altogether any liability to pay interest to the ITR. I am afraid these two questions have to be answered in the negative.
16. So far as the former is concerned, the PCC’ s contention is that it has still about Rs. 4,00,000. outstanding from parties to whom it had supplied goods and that these recoveries have not been possible because ITR started also supplying goods directly to them during the subsistency of the agency agreement and further appointed some of them as its agents after the termination of the agency agreement. But this is no answer at all to the ITR’ s claim. Under the agreement, PCC was a del credere agent for ITR. It had to make good the full amount of the sale proceeds to the ITR within a stipulated period (on pain of paying interest thereafter) and this had to be done irrespective of whether it was able to recover the sale price from the customers or not. Moreover, the proviso to clause 18A of the contract which stipulated that no commission was payable to the PCC on the direct sales made by the ITR in or outside the area of agency clearly implies that ITR was within its rights in making direct sales to customers and its doing so did not affect its right to receive from the PCC the sale proceeds of goods sold through the latter. There was equally nothing objectionable or, indeed, wrong in the ITR appointing anyone as its agent after its contract with the PCC came to an end. There is, therefore, no real or plausible answer at all on the part of PCC for not paying up the balance of the principal amount of Rs. 1,24,607 which is due to the ITR even on the best case pleaded by it.
17. On the question of interest also, it is clear that the PCC cannot bona fide or legitimately plead that no interest at all is payable to the ITR. Under the agency agreement, ITR is entitled to interest in respect of sale proceeds not deposited within 45 days. The statement of total sale proceeds and total remittances does not disclose the interval between a sale and the remittance of its proceeds to the ITR and it is quite conceivable that though the net principal amount due is only Rs. 6.69 lakhs, the balance of the claim of the ITR could legitimately be on account of interest. In fact, the statement filed by the PCC along with the affidavit of February 28, 1984, shows that the PCC had a liability of Rs. 37.60 lakhs. Whether, as ITR says, this all represents principal or, as the PCC contends, it represents a principal of Rs. 6.69 lakhs and the balance of interest, there is no reason to deny liability. That apart, the statement also clearly implies that only interest corresponding to the extent of Rs. 8.52 lakhs is in dispute. In other words, a very substantial part of the ITR's claim—be it principal or interest—is not disputed and it is not a bona fide defence now to suggest that only Rs. 6.69 lakhs and no interest at all is payable to ITR. On this aspect, the only point made by counsel for the respondent was that, with effect from December 1, 1977, no credit sales were allowed by the PCC and, therefore, no question of any payment of interest arose after that date. This point is sought to be made on the basis of the minutes recorded by both parties on a discussion between them held on September 23, 1978, but it proceeds on a misapprehension. Actually, the minutes show that the PCC claimed that interest should be charged at 15% instead of 18% for the period April 1, 1974, to March 31, 1975, but this claim was not accepted by the ITR. It also shows that, for the period from December 1, 1977, to March 31, 1978, PCC claimed 60 days’ credit facility instead of 45 days mentioned in the contract, i.e, it wanted that it should be permitted to deposit the sale proceeds, without interest, within 60 days instead of 45 days of the sale. ITR did not agree to this. They pointed out that earlier PCC was allowed to sell goods on credit and so a cushioning period for deposit was necessary; but, with effect from December 1, 1977, PCC was allowed to make only cash sales. In this situation, ITR was unable to see why the PCC which was collecting the sale proceeds simultaneously with the sale should be allowed a credit facility of 60 days for calculation of interest. Properly understood, therefore, the minutes, far from helping the respondent, only establishe that interest was payable to ITR and its request to allow larger credit facility than was provided in the agreement had not been accepted. I am, therefore, of the opinion that in addition to the admitted balance of sale proceeds, PCC was liable to pay interest to ITR and it has not been shown to me in what way the claim of the ITR is disputed. Even the statements of the PCC only show some dispute, if at all, in respect of Rs. 8.52 lakhs out of the interest claim of the. ITR. Even leaving out of account the incidental charges of Rs. 10.70 lakhs and this “disputed” interest of Rs. 8.52 lakhs, there is no satisfactory answer at all in respect of the balance claim of the ITR to the extent of Rs. 24.35 lakhs. The respondent company's inability, in the face of this huge liability, to comply with the directions of the courts in the first instance to pay Rs. 5,00,000 and give a bank guarantee for Rs. 10,00,000 and later on to deposit at least a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 only shows that the company is in financial straits and unable to pay its clear and undisputed debts.
18. It was then urged for the respondent that the petitioner's own conduct shows that there were genuine disputes between the parties and for this purpose relianee is placed on the fact that ITR filed Original Suit No. 237 of 1980 under section 20 of the Arbitration Act in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge at Bareilly. On behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that though this suit was filed in 1980, the PCC did not file any written statement therein and went on stalling the proceedings to gain time. So the petitioner was constrained to file this winding-up petition in December, 1981, and it was only subsequently On February 18, 1982, that the Additional District Judge passed an order under section 20 directing the ITR to file the arbitration agreement and both the parties to give the name of the arbitrator appointed by each of them under the agreement within a period of one month. Since, by this time, the present petition had been filed, ITR moved the court on February 23, 1982, to stay the proceedings. On March 23, 1982, an order was passed by the court consigning the proceedings to record. On May 29, 1982, PCC purported to appoint a sole arbitrator but this attempt was resisted by the ITR by its letter of June 22, 1982. PCC, thereafter, moved the court for a review of the said order and on October 25, 1983, the civil court stayed the proceedings before it under section 446 of the Act. It is, therefore, contended that there are no effective arbitration proceedings currently going on and it was not open to the respondents, after stalling the arbitration proceedings for nearly two years, to oppose the winding-up petition on the ground now sought to be urged. Counsel for the respondent, in reply, urged that the delay in the making of the order under section 20 was due to the lawyers’ strikes in Western U.P and also contested the validity of the orders of the civil court dated March 23, 1982, and October 25, 1983. It was urged that the civil judge become functus officio after passing the order dated February 18, 1982, under section 20 of the Arbitration Act and he had, at any rate, no jurisdiction to exercise powers under section 446 of the Act. I do not think it is necessary to enter into a discussion of these contentions in detail. Suffice it to say that in view of the orders of the civil court of March 23, 1982, and October 25, 1983, which the PCC has not challenged in appropriate proceedings and which have, therefore, become final, there are no effective arbitration proceedings pending as on date between the parties. The respondent has also not sought for stay of this petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act or for leave under section 446 of the Act to continue the arbitration. Even if PCC had so applied, it would have been for this court to consider whether this petition should go on or whether the arbitration proceedings should continue. I am of the opinion, for the reasons already discussed, that there is a clear and substantial debt owing to the ITR from the PCC and that even on the PCC's best case, there is an outstanding debt due to the ITR of more than a lakh of rupees. I am, therefore, unable to accept the PCC's contention that a winding-up order should be held up because of the pendency of arbitration proceedings.
19. In response to the publication of citation, certain parties have filed affidavits opposing the winding-up of the company. They are the Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd., Sri Vikram Srivastava, Raza Textiles Ltd., Jwala Fabrics Ltd. and Sir J.P Srivastava and Sons (MP) P. Ltd. claiming to be creditors of the PCC to the extent respectively, of Rs. 5,09,162-84, Rs. 10,100, Rs. 9,43,161.39, Rs. 35,000 and Rs. 42,210. Broadly summarised, these affidavits concede that the current assets of the PCC are meagre and are not sufficient to enable the payment of even a fractional share of the amounts due to various creditors. However, winding up is opposed on the ground that the claims of the ITR are inflated and unreasonable and that the only salvation for the creditors is to give the PCC an opportunity to revive and restabilise itself so that, from the monies earned, the creditors’ claims can be satisfied. The most detailed of these affidavits is that of Gwalior Sugar Co. and its contents may be briefly referred to. The major part of the affidavit is devoted to a criticism of the ITR’ s accounts, claim and stand in the present proceedings and the only indication given of the respondent's potentiality for future development is that the respondent company “has an extremely valuable asset in the form of a special custom house agent's licence “for clearing goods at the Bombay and Calcutta docks and also possesses a valuable asset in the form of tenancy rights at a low rent of three premises, one in Delhi, one in Bombay and one in Calcutta. It is suggested that “with better management and utilisation of internal and external resources”, the company “can very easily rehabilitate itself and thereafter run efficiently and profitably”. The other affidavits are not so detailed but, more or less, toe the same line.
20. The record does not contain the details of the debt alleged to be due from PCC to Gwalior Sugar Co. as annexure “A” to the affidavit filed by this party is not on record. So also, the reply to this affidavit said to have been filed by the petitioner company is also not on record. But, from para 18 of the affidavit, it is seen that the PCC has not been able to meet its staff and running expenses and a substantial part thereof since 1980 is being met by the Gwalior Sugar Co. So far as Vikram Srivastava is concerned, the debt alleged to be due to him is a sum of Rs. 10,000 claimed to have been advanced by him in cash since June, 1984, i.e, after the date of appointment of the provisional liquidator. Similar is the position in the case of Shrivastava and Sons Ltd. The affidavit on behalf of the Raza Textile Co. has been filed by one of the Shrivastavas and it is seen that this company has been defraying the expenses of PCC towards staff and running expenses. It also claims a sum of Rs. 25,000 said to have been advanced towards allocation of shares. Jwala Fabrics has also filed likewise an affidavit of opposition through Sri V.K Srivastava and its claim is for a sum of Rs. 35,000 said to have been advanced towards purchase of equity shares. But these two advances have been made after and with the knowledge of the filing of the present winding-up petition. A perusal of these affidavits confirms the fact that the PCC has been in a bad financial position since 1980. The opposition is coming from persons belonging to the group of management of the PCC and are clearly motivated. Their desire to help the PCC is no doubt understandable but they do not come forward with any concrete proposal for the revival of the company and its financial reconstruction, particularly after the termination of its agency for the ITR. It rather seems to be an attempt on their part, as alleged by the petitioner, to utilise the staff and tenanted premises available to PCC at various places to their own advantage as they seem to have been doing for the past few years. The agency business said to have been started is of a very small magnitude and has resulted in loss, the accumulated amount of which as at the end of 1980-81 was Rs. 9.55 lakhs. No balance-sheet in respect of this business has been filed after 1980-81. Indeed, the affidavits in opposition do not give any figures or details to substantiate the confidence that the company's prospects are bright or brilliant. These are merely affidavits by interested persons and their opposition to the winding-up cannot be given any weight.
21. An affidavit in opposition has also been filed by seven of the workers. It is no doubt true that the workers are also entitled to a hearing before a winding-up order is made. In a case where the winding up of the company will throw a large number of workmen out of employment, the court will be very reluctant to order a winding up and will explore all possibilities to keep the company going, if possible. But here the total number of workers involved is very small; the company as referred to earlier has not even been able to meet the expenditure on its staff out of its own resources. It has also been pointed out by the petitioner that, earlier, three applications filed by persons, purporting to be workmen, have been rejected or not pursued. In these circumstances, the application of a few individual workmen to the winding up cannot stand in the way of a winding up order if otherwise justified.
22. I have left till the last a rather fundamental objection raised by the respondent company which is that no winding-up order can be passed because, as on date, the petitioner's claim is barred by limitation and the petitioner today cannot maintain a suit for the recovery of the amount. It may be mentioned that this plea, which was not available to the respondent company earlier, was raised for the first time only on March 5, 1985. The point made on behalf of the respondent is that the sales agency agreement had come to an end on August 31, 1979, and that any suit for the recovery of dues under the agreement had to be filed before the expiration of three years thereafter. It is submitted that the filing of this winding-up petition on December 18, 1981, cannot save the bar of limitation for the filing of a suit. Relying on the decision of Anand J. dated May 16, 1985, in Diwan Chand Kapoor v. New Rialto Cinema P. Ltd. (CP No. 60 of 1981) [1986] 60 Comp Cas 276 (Delhi) and of the Allahabad High Court in. A. Dixit v. Official Liquidator, AIR 1963 All 284, it is contended that, whatever may have been the position in 1981 when the present petition was filed, the winding-up of the respondent company cannot be ordered now, since today, on the date on which the winding-up order is asked for or can be made, there is no subsisting claim of debt which can be got decreed by the institution of a suit therefor.
23. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that the plea of limitation for a suit having expired will be relevant only at the date of presentation of a winding up petition, and that it will be anomalous to hold that such a plea could be raised to defeat the maintainability of a petition that has already been admitted. The decision of Anand J. (which, I was told, is under appeal) is sought to be distinguished and that of the Bombay High Court in Modern Dehor Painting Contract P. Ltd. v. Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd., [1985] 58 Comp Cas 255, strongly relied upon. It is also submitted that, in this case, this plea is not available to the respondent as it had acknowledged its liability to the petitioner company in its balance-sheets, in the course of negotiations and discussions between the parties and in the affidavits filed on October 7, 1982, and February 28, 1984.
24. The plea of the respondent that a winding-up order cannot he made if the debt is barred by limitation on its date, is directly covered by the judgment of Anand J. The conclusion of Anand J. is also supported by the reasoning in a line of cases on an allied point as to whether a debt of the company not barred by limitation on the date of presentation of a winding-up but which gets barred by the date of the winding-up order could be entertained or allowed by the official liquidator. On this issue, there has been a difference of judicial opinion. Some courts have answered this question in the negative. The decisions of the Allahabad High Court in J.A Dixit v. Official Liquidator, AIR 1963 All 284 (referred to but not discussed in detail by Anand J.) and in Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. v. Sulbha Devi Gupta, [1985] 3 Comp LJ 319; [1986] 60 Comp Cas 639 (All) the decision of the Punjab High Court in Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd. v. A.K Bhalla, [1958] 28 Comp Cas 216 (Punj); AIR 1958 Punj 341 (which was, however, reversed in appeal in Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515 (Punj), the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Chandbali Steamer Service Co. Ltd. In Liquidation), In re, AIR 1959 Cal 646; [1960] 30 Comp Cas 61 (Cal) the observations in General Rolling Stock Co., In re, [1872] 7 Ch App 646; the passages in Palmer's (volume 1, page 1168, para 85.53) Buckley (13th edition, page 630, section 316) and Halsbury (4th edition, volume 1, para 1273) all support this view.
25. There is, however, a contrary line of cases. The Bombay decision relied upon by the petitioner is directly on the point in issue in the present case. On the allied question referred to above, the Madras High Court in S. Abdul Muthalibu v. K.M Mohammed Abdul Khader, [1962] 32 Comp Cas 1102, and the Punjab High Court in Ram Chand Puri v. Lahore Enamelling and Stamping Co. Ltd., [1960] 30 Comp Cas 515 (Punj) have taken the view that a debt, not barred at the time of presentation of the winding-up petition, is provable in liquidation though it gets time-barred by the time the winding-up order is passed. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 310 (All); AIR 1957 All 143, has been understood in some cases as leading to the same view though it has been explained differently in the recent case of Benares Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. v. Sulbha Devi Gupta, [1985] 3 Comp LJ 318; [1986] 60 Comp Cas 639 (All). On a slightly different point, it will be appreciated that these decisions have a bearing on the present issue. For, if the first line of cases were correct and if it were also to be held that the petitioner's contention is to be upheld, the result would be that the petitioner can get a winding-up order but cannot prove his debt in the winding-up. It would be indeed an odd result to say that the company can be wound up at the instance of a creditor who will not be able to get anything out of the winding-up. The view taken by Anand J. is thus quite inconsistent with the above line of decisions. Had the matter been res Integra, I may have been inclined to hold that, both for purposes of passing a winding-up order as well as for purposes of proof of claims, the relevant date should be taken as the date of presentation of the petition for winding up and not the date of the winding-up order. I experienced some difficulty, however, as the issue is covered by a direct decision of a learned judge of this court in a batch of cases but I now find that the view of Anand J. has been reversed by a Division Bench of this court (Sachar C.J and Leila Seth J.) dated December 2, 1985, in Co. A. 13 of 1985. (Diwan Chand Kapoor v. New Rialto Cinema P. Ltd., [1987] 62 Comp Cas 810 (Delhi)). Following the decision of the Division Bench, I overrule the plea of limitation.
26. I may also deal with the question whether the petitioner's claim is time-barred as on date as alleged by the respondents though it may not be necessary to do so in view of the ruling of the Division Bench.
27. If one were to go by the date of the last transaction or the end of the accounting year or the dates of discussions between the parties or even the affidavit dated October 7, 1982, the debt will be barred as on date. The petitioner, however, strongly relies also on the affidavit dated February 28, 1984, as constituting an acknowledgment which extends limitation by a further period of three years within section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In this context, it may be mentioned, as pointed out earlier, that in the enclosure to the affidavit dated October 7, 1982, filed before the Division Bench, PCC has clearly acknowledged (i) in the statements that a sum of Rs. 21.83 lakhs was due to ITR, and (ii) in the notes set out in annexure II that Rs. 2.69 lakhs were due to ITR. The company had also filed annexures III to VIII giving details of Rs. 29,08, 840.31 out of the total liabilities of Rs. 43,33,204 shown in the balance-sheet as on March 31, 1981. The Division Bench had directed that the matter be firstly looked into for ascertaining the overall amount due to the petitioner. On this, the parties were heard and after the hearing was over, the respondent company wanted ta file certain additional documents. These documents were allowed to be placed on record and leave was also given to file such other documents as may throw light on the additional evidence now on record. The court also pointed out that only Rs. 29 lakhs out of Rs. 43 lakhs of liabilities had been explained and that no light had been thrown on the remaining Rs. 14 lakhs. It was in compliance with these observations that statements were filed on February 28, 1984, by counsel for the respondent which were duly signed by the accounts officer of the company. In this statement, it was reiterated that the creditors at the Delhi, Kanpur and Calcutta branches, respectively, were to the extent of Rs. 3,98,821.61, Rs. 22,43,392.68 and Rs. 2,66,628.02 as per details already filed in court. As has been pointed out earlier, this list filed on October 7, 1982, showed the amount due to ITR at Rs. 21,83,162.50. In other words, in reply to specific queries by the court, the respondent company specifically admitted or acknowledged indebtedness to the petitioner to the extent of Rs. 21.83 lakhs. It is true that the affidavit filed on October 7, 1982, was accompanied by a computation by which certain claims which the PCC had against the ITR are put forward as a justification for not paying the amounts claimed by the ITR. But that this will not derogate from the effect of the acknowledgment is clear from the language of section 18 of the Limitation Act itself. Under clause (a) of the Explanation, even a set-off effected, or claim to set off made, by the debtor will not detract from an acknowledgment. Much less will a counter-claim or a vague allegation that the ITR has not acted properly towards the agent avail against the above acknowledgment. By the affidavit and statements of October 7, 1982, and February 28, 1984, the PCC has clearly acknowledged its liability to pay amounts to the ITR and these, in my opinion, will clearly enable the petitioner to claim further extension of the period of limitation. The petitioner's claim is, therefore, within time now so as to justify a winding-up order.
28. For the reasons discussed above, I have come to the conclusion that the respondent company (PCC) should be wound up by court. I order accordingly. The official liquidator is appointed as the liquidator of the company. He will take charge of the assets and account books and documents of the company and proceed to wind up its affairs in accordance with the law. Nofices and certified copies of this order of winding up shall be immediately communicated to the Registrar of Companies, Delhi, as required by the rules.
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