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Parameet Singh Sawney v. Dinesh Verma & Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment disposes of seven petitions: Cr. M(M) No. 711/85, Cr. M(M) 1041/85, Cr. M(M) 1043/85 (titled Parmeet Singh Sawney v. Dinesh Verma, I.T.O. and others) and Cr. M(M) 1363/85, Cr. M(M) 1364/85, Cr. M(M) 1365/85 and Cr. M(M) 1366/85 (titled Paramjeet Kaur v. Dinesh Verma, I.T.O.).
The petitions fall in two sets: one set challenges prosecutions under section 276-B of the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1971–1972 (accounting year 1970–1971); the other set challenges prosecutions under section 276-B for the assessment year 1974–1975 (accounting year 1973–1974).
The prosecuted persons include Harjeet Kaur, Veera Wali, Jaspal Singh, Inderjit Singh, Amrik Singh and Parmeet Singh (among others). The prosecutions allege that the petitioners, as partners of M/s. Eagle Instalments, were "incharge and responsible" for the conduct of the firm's business and therefore vicariously liable for the firm's failure to deduct income-tax on interest paid and to deposit it in time. The common allegation is that tax due has ultimately been paid on assessment, and that the State has not suffered loss.
Although the alleged offences relate to accounting years 1970–1971 and 1973–1974, prosecutions were instituted on 29 March 1984 (approximately a decade and up to 14 years after the alleged offences). The petitioners sought quashing of the prosecutions by invoking the inherent powers of the court under section 482 Cr.P.C.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this court should exercise its powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash prosecutions when a complaint's allegations, though taken cognizance of by a trial court, result in palpable and grave injustice or abuse of the court's process.
- Whether partners of a firm could be prosecuted for offences committed in accounting years 1970–1971 and 1973–1974 in the absence of section 278-B of the Income-tax Act (which was enacted with effect from 1 October 1975).
- Whether section 278-B of the Income-tax Act has retrospective effect in respect of offences alleged to have been committed prior to 1 October 1975.
- Whether a specific petitioner (Parmeet Singh) could properly be alleged to have been "incharge and responsible" for the firm's business when, according to dates in the complaint, he was a minor at the relevant accounting years.
- Whether delay in initiating prosecution after many years and the absence of a show-cause notice to partners before prosecution are fatal to the prosecutions (raised but not decided in view of earlier findings).
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments (as represented by Mr. Jolly)
- Contended that the petitions are not maintainable because the complaint's contents make out a case against the petitioners and the trial court had taken cognizance; therefore this court should not interfere under section 482 Cr.P.C.
- Implied position that, if on the facts the court has taken cognizance, the inherent jurisdiction's scope is limited and should not be used to halt prosecutions merely because they may cause hardship.
Petitioners' Arguments (as represented by Mr. D.R. Sethi)
- Submitted that section 278-B of the Income-tax Act came into force on 1 October 1975 and cannot be used to prosecute partners for offences allegedly committed in accounting years 1970–1971 and 1973–1974.
- Argued that prior to section 278-B the law permitted prosecution of the firm alone and not the individual partners; thus partners could not be lawfully prosecuted for those earlier accounting years.
- Contended that the legislature's enactment of section 278-B demonstrates that partners were not liable previously and that the provision does not apply retrospectively.
- Pointed out that some partners might be "sleeping partners" not connected with the firm's running, and that the legislature intentionally limited who could be prosecuted under the post‑1975 provision.
- Argued specifically that Parmeet Singh was a minor during the accounting years in question (born 2 November 1965) and therefore could not have been "incharge and responsible" for the firm's business.
- Also raised procedural/contentions about the absence of a show-cause notice and the long delay in instituting prosecution (relying on case-law he cited), though the court did not decide those points after its primary findings.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the objection that section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be used to interfere where a complaint makes out a case and the trial court has taken cognizance. The court rejected the restrictive view of section 482 urged by the respondent's counsel (Mr. Jolly), holding that when a prosecution "degenerates into oppression" or is a palpable and grave injustice and an abuse of the process of the court, this court has a duty to intervene.
The court then examined the statutory position regarding liability of firms and partners. It noted that section 278-B of the Income-tax Act was first brought into force on 1 October 1975 and that prior to that enactment a firm alone could be proceeded against. The court considered Mr. Jolly's suggestion (that partners could be prosecuted under the Partnership Act concept) to be a misconception in the relevant statutory field. The court emphasized that section 278-B was not in existence during the assessment years/ accounting years when the alleged offences occurred (1970–1971 and 1973–1974).
Applying those legal principles to the facts, the court concluded that the petitioners (who are partners, not the firm) could not, on the facts alleged in the complaint, have been lawfully prosecuted for offences committed in those accounting years because there was no statutory authority to prosecute partners at that time. Therefore prosecution of the partners lacked the authority of law.
The court further found that the initiation of prosecution against the petitioners reflected a failure of the concerned authority to apply its mind. It observed that the complaint mechanically reproduced the words of section 278-B without providing the necessary factual indication of how a particular partner was "incharge and responsible" for the conduct of the business.
A concrete illustration of this failure was the allegation against Parmeet Singh: the court recorded Mr. Sethi's submission (accepted by the court) that Parmeet was born on 2 November 1965 and was therefore under six years of age during the accounting year 1970–1971 and about nine years in 1973–1974. The court held that it was a manifest mis-statement to claim he was "incharge and responsible" for the firm's business and that such a mis-statement showed mechanical and irresponsible drafting of the complaint by tax authorities.
Because of these two grounds — (1) lack of statutory authority to prosecute partners for offences alleged to have been committed prior to 1 October 1975, and (2) the authorities' failure to apply their mind and the false/misleading allegation concerning a minor partner — the court determined that this was a fit case for interference and quashing of the prosecutions.
The court noted additional points raised by Mr. Sethi relating to failure to issue show-cause notices and delay in initiating prosecutions, but in view of its primary findings on legality and mis-statement it declined to decide those additional contentions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court allowed the petitions and quashed the complaints filed against the petitioners. The court's operative disposition is captured in the short form Petitions allowed.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the prosecutions against the named partners for the alleged offences in the accounting years 1970–1971 and 1973–1974 were quashed for lack of statutory authority to prosecute partners at the time and because of the abuse/misuse of prosecutorial process (including the erroneous allegation that a minor partner was "incharge and responsible"). The opinion does not explicitly state any broader binding precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts of these petitions; accordingly, no broader precedent-creating implication is described in the provided text.
Petitions allowed.
Malik Sharief-Ud-Din, J.—This judgment will dispose of seven more petitions Cr. M(M) No. 711/85, Cr. M(M) 1041/85 Cr. M(M) 1043/85 all titled as Parmeet Singh Sawney v. Dinesh Verma, I.T.O and others as also Cr. M(M) 1363/85, Cr. M(M) 1364/85, Cr. M(M) 1365/85 and Cr. M(M) 1366/85 all titled as Paramjeet Kaur v. Dinesh Verma, ITO.
2. The petitions are in two sets: one set pertaining to the prosecution of the petitioners under section 276-B of Income-tax Act relating to the assessment year 1971-1972 (Accounting year 1970-1971). The other set of petitions is in respect of the prosecutions initiated against the petitioners under section 276(B) of the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1974-1975 (Accounting year 1973-1974). The persons who are being prosecuted in the aforesaid prosecution are petitioners Harjeet Kaur, Smt. Veera Wali, Jaspal Singh, Inderjit Singh. Amrik Singh and Parmeet Singh.
3. The brief allegations on the basis of which prosecutions have been initiated are that the petitioners are partners of firm M/s. Eagle Instalments and at the time of commission of the offence they were Incharge and responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business. Apparently, the petitioners are made vicariously liable for the act of commission of the firm. The case against the petitioners is that they failed to deduct income-tax on the interest paid to certain parties and deposit the same in the Income-tax Department within time. It may be noticed that the common case of the parties is that the State has not suffered any loss as the tax due has been paid on assessment.
4. I may further notice that even though the prosecution relates to the commission of offence for the accounting years 1970-1971 and 1973-1974, the prosecutions were actually initiated on 29th March 1984, i.e in the first case about a decade after the alleged commisssion of offence and in the second case almost 14 years from the date of alleged offence. The petitioners have challenged the prosecution and have prayed that the prosecution may be quashed in exercise of the powers of this court under section 482 Cr. P.C
5. Mr. D.R Sethi has urged a number of contentions but before. I deal with those contentions. I must take up for consideration the objection of Mr. Jolly that these petitions are not maintainable in view of the fact that contents of the complaint makes out a case against the petitioners. The contention of Mr. Jolly is that if on the facts mentioned in the complaint the court has taken cognizance, then this court should not interfere in exercise of its powers under section 482 Cr.P.C Mr. Jolly seems to suggest that the scope of section 482 in that view of the matter is limited and even if carrying on with the complaint results in grave injustice and abuse of the process of the court, the court should refrain from interfering. There is no need for me to refer to a catena of case-law on the subject. But the fact remains that if the prosecution degenerates into prosecution, this court cannot sit as a helpless spectator. It is the bounden duty of this court to interfere if there is a palpable and grave injustice and if it finds that the process of the court is being abused.
6. Adverting to the first contention of Mr. D.R Sethi, it may be stated that section 278-B of Income-tax Act came into existence for the first time on 1st October 1975. This section stipulates that every person who at the time of commission of offence was incharge and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, shall be liable to be proceeded against. Before the introduction of this section (Sec. 278-B) a firm alone could have been proceeded against. Mr. Jolly states that ‘firm’ includes its partners and they as well could be prosecuted. I must at once point out that Mr. Jolly is labouring under misconception. Under Partnership Act, partners of course will be liable for all the liabilities but we are in a different field. section 278-B, which was brought into existence on 1st Octocer 1975 for the first time, made every person connected with the affairs of the company liable for prosecution. The fact of the matter is that earlier to the introduction of section 278 B the partners could not be prosecuted and the firm along could be prosecuted. The person referred to in section 276-B is in the context of the definition of ‘person’ as contained in section 2(31) of the Income-tax Act. Otherwise also, Mr. Sethi's contention seems to be strong that in case the partners were to be proceeded against in the absence of section 278-B, there was no need for the legislature to introduce section 278-B ashas been done in the year 1975. Mr. Sethi further contends that even here the legislature has in its wisdom not allowed the prosecution of the partners who may be ‘sleeping partners’ and may not be in any way connected with the running of the business of the firm. To me that appears to be a very reasonable approach. It is thus clear that the partners of firm who at the time of commission of offence were responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm could alone be prosecuted. section 278-B of the Income-Tax Act has no retrospective effect. It will be operative from the date it came into force. In any case, this section was not in existence during the assessment year 1971-1972 or 1974-1975 muchless during the accounting year 1970-1971 or 1973-1974 when the alleged offence is said to be committed. The petitioners before me are the partners and not the firm. The firm, of course, cannot challenge the prosecution.
7. The position thus is that this prosecution is being lodged against the petitioners without an authority of law. On the facts mentioned in the complaint the petitioners could not be prosecuted along with the firm for the offence alleged to have been committed in 1970-1971 or 1973-1974 as they were not liable to be prosecuted along with the firm under the law as it was in existence then. As already stated, the firm has thrown no challenge to the prosecution and, perhaps, rightly so. In the light of this legal position, could there be a better case for interference by this court?
8. To me it appears that this prosecution has been initiated due to a total failure of the concerned authority to apply its mind. If the petitioners could not be legally prosecuted as has been pointed above, then this court is justified in coming to the conclusion that the authority concerned has not at all applied its mind to the case before permitting prosecution of the petitioners.
9. There is one more aspect which to me appears to be important. It is that the petitioner Parmeet Singh Sawney, as alleged by Mr. Sethi, was a little less than six years during the accounting year 1970-1971 as he was born on 2nd November 1965 and in the accounting year 1973-1974 he was about 9 years old. Obviously, he was a minor and could only share the profits of the firm. It cannot be said that this Parmeet Singh was incharge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. Despite that the respondent have claimed in the complaint that Parmeet Singh Petitioner was incharge and responsible for the conduct of business of the firm at the time of commission of offence. This is absolutely a mis-statement of fact and that clearly goes to show that the respondents have mechanically reproduced in the complaint the wordings of section 278 B with a view to meet the requirement of law but without caring to find out whether this statement is true or not. That shows that the petitioner Parmeet Singh is being prosecuted on a false allegation and this is because of this mis-statement that at the time of commission of offence he was incharge and responsible for the conduct of business of the firm. Even otherwise, were reproduction of the expression used in section 278-B in the complaint does not meet the requirement of law. The complaint is bound to provide indication though not evidence, as to in what manner a particular partner of the firm is supposed to be incharge and responsible for the conduct of business. Were reproduction of the words used in the section are not sufficient. Income-tax Officers and their higher officers ase essentially the creatures of statute and they are exepected to behave in a little more responsible manner than an ordinary lay-man. Creatures of statutes are vested with powers to prosecute citizens but they have responsibility to thoroughly apply their mind to the facts of a case before initiating prosecution. In the present case the application of mind by the concerned authorities has fallen a casualty inasmch as even the six years old boy is, according to them, incharge and responsible for the conduct of business of the firm and on the basis of that mis-statement he too is being prosecuted. There cannot be a worst case than the one with which. I am dealing and there is hardly any scope for suggesting under the circumstances of this case that this court should refrain from interfering. On these two grounds alone. I am of the view that is a fit case where this court must interfere and quash the prosecution.
10. Mr. Sethi has raised some more points. According to him the partners of the firm ought to have been given a show-cause notice before initiating prosecution, particularly when, the respondents work up very late in the day i.e almost after 14 years to initiate prosecution. According to Mr. Sethi if that had been done, he would have shown to the respondents that Parmeet Singh is a minor. In the circumstances of this case Mr. Sethi further urged that delay in initiating prosecution also is fatal. Mr. Sethi has relied on some case-law also in this regard. In view of my findings on the first two contentions of Mr. Sethi. I am not inclined to go into the last contention. To me it appears that there is no justification for these prosecution to survive. The petitions are accordingly allowed and the complaints filed against the petitioners are quashed.
Petitions allowed.
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