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Delhi State Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. R.C Yaduvanshi & Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion by P.K. Bahri, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition challenges an order dated December 6, 1986 of Shri R.C. Yaduwanshi, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, which had granted interim relief directing the petitioner to pay the Workman (Mehar Singh, Respondent No. 2) full wages from the date of the application (October 10, 1985) until final adjudication of the reference pending before the Labour Court.
Relevant factual timeline (as set out in the opinion): On January 24, 1975 respondent No. 2 was appointed as a temporary clerk; his services were terminated on July 15, 1976; he was re-appointed on May 11, 1977. Allegations of misconduct led the Management to form a committee and appoint an Inquiry Officer (Shri C.L. Sehgal). A charge-sheet was issued and, based on the Inquiry Officer's report, respondent No. 2 was dismissed. An internal appeal was dismissed. On August 10, 1982 a reference was made to the Labour Court to decide the legality of the dismissal. Proceedings before the Labour Court remain pending with some evidence recorded. On October 10, 1985 the Workman applied for interim relief; the Labour Court granted relief (impugned order) after finding prima facie that the disciplinary inquiry was vitiated because witnesses were examined in the Workman's absence and by expressing views about the competency of the Establishment Committee. This writ of certiorari seeks quashing of that Labour Court order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Workman was entitled to interim relief during the pendency of the reference before the Labour Court, given the Labour Court's prima facie conclusion that the disciplinary inquiry was vitiated (breach of natural justice: witnesses examined in the Workman's absence).
- Whether the Labour Court was justified in awarding full wages as interim relief to the Workman while he was not rendering services to the Management, or whether a reduced interim payment (customarily 50%) was appropriate.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner challenged the Labour Court's prima facie conclusion that out of 16 directors of Management, 12 were disqualified and that consequently the Establishment Committee lacked power to institute disciplinary proceedings.
- The petitioner contended that even if there were irregularities in the appointment of certain directors, acts of those directors should be validated by the doctrine of de facto, making the disciplinary proceedings valid.
- Counsel for the petitioner advanced propositions (not challenged by respondent's counsel) that:
- If there has been no inquiry at all, the Labour Court may itself decide on the question of misconduct on the evidence before it and, in that event, any penalty would be imposed from the date of the Labour Court's finding.
- If the disciplinary inquiry is held defective but the Labour Court, on evidence, finds the Workman guilty, the Labour Court's approval could relate back to the original date of dismissal (doctrine of relation back), subject to legal limits discussed in case law.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that if interim relief in the form of 50% wages were to be granted, the Workman should also receive full allowances available to a suspended employee.
- Respondent relied on the Delhi State Co-operative Bank (Service Rules) Rule 18(viii), which provides that during suspension an employee shall be paid suspension allowance equal to 50% of salary along with full usual allowances; respondent argued this supports granting allowances in addition to 50% salary.
The court noted the respondent's allowance argument but observed the Workman in this matter could not be treated as under suspension and that the service rule cited was therefore not applicable in this interim-relief context.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ranjtt Singh Tomar v. M/s. Hindustan Export & Import Etc., ILR (1983) I Delhi 802 | Employer can justify termination by leading evidence before the Tribunal; doctrine of relation back where tribunal upholds termination based on evidence. | The court noted this authority for the proposition that defective or absent inquiry does not bar the employer from justifying dismissal before the Tribunal; but the judge also observed that some broad statements in that judgment may be too widely stated in light of other authorities. |
| P.H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta, (1964) 2 SCR 104 | Doctrine of relating back: where inquiry is defective, the Tribunal must appraise the evidence itself and, if satisfied, its approval of dismissal can relate back to the date of the original order. | Used to support the legal proposition that a Tribunal's independent appraisal can validate a prior dismissal and cause the effect to relate back, subject to the Tribunal's findings. |
| Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R 836 | Distinguished instances where no inquiry was held; Tribunal's approval in such case may have effect from the date of the award rather than the original dismissal. | The court cited this case to qualify the breadth of the statements in Ranjtt Singh Tomar and to show limits to the relation-back doctrine where no inquiry at all was held. |
| Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & Others v. Hotel Workers' Union, (1959) 2 L.L.J 544 | Interim relief ordinarily should not be the whole relief; Supreme Court granted half the amount as interim relief. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that ordinarily interim relief should be restricted (commonly to 50% of wages) rather than full wages. |
| Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar Dayal & Another, (1960-1961) 19 F.J.R 315 | Similar principle: reinstatement or full relief should not ordinarily be granted as interim relief; Supreme Court indicated caution in directing reinstatement interim. | Referenced to support limitation of interim relief (against awarding full wages/reinstatement as an interim measure). |
| Delhi State Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Others v. Jagdish Singh (Civil Writ No. 2686/86, order dated February 24, 1987) | Practice of granting 50% of wages plus allowances as interim relief in analogous bank-service writs. | The court cited this Division Bench order as persuasive support for awarding 50% of wages plus allowances in a similar context; the judge used it in reasoning to modify the impugned order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two principal stages corresponding to the questions before it.
First, on entitlement to interim relief: the court accepted that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to grant interim relief if it reached a prima facie conclusion that the Workman did not deserve the extreme penalty of dismissal and that the disciplinary inquiry was prima facie defective. The judge identified a clear breach of natural justice on the record: admittedly witnesses had been examined by the Inquiry Officer in the Workman's absence. On that basis the court agreed with the Labour Court's prima facie conclusion that the inquiry was vitiated.
The court then balanced that prima facie finding against the petitioner's right to prove misconduct before the Labour Court. It noted established legal propositions (from cited case law) that an employer may justify dismissal by leading independent evidence before the Tribunal, and that, depending on circumstances, a Tribunal's approval may relate back to the original date of dismissal. The judge observed certain limitations and distinctions in the authorities (noting that some statements in Ranjtt Singh Tomar were broadly stated and required qualification by earlier decisions such as Sasa Musa). Nonetheless, because the Labour Court's prima facie view found the inquiry defective and because the charges, even if proved, appeared prima facie insufficient to justify the extreme penalty of dismissal, the Workman was entitled to interim relief.
Second, on the quantum of interim relief: the court considered precedent and practice that ordinarily interim relief should not amount to the whole relief ultimately available. The opinion referred to Supreme Court authorities (Hotel Imperial; Delhi Cloth & General Mills) where half the wages were granted as interim relief, and to a Division Bench order in a similar bank-service matter (Delhi State Co-op Bank v. Jagdish Singh) granting 50% of wages plus allowances. The court examined the respondent's contention for full allowances on the basis of the Bank's service rule for suspension (Rule 18(viii) providing 50% suspension allowance plus full usual allowances). The judge held that the Workman here could not be treated as under suspension for the purpose of that service rule; therefore full allowances could not be granted as part of interim relief.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that while interim relief was merited, full wages were not appropriate. The court therefore modified the impugned order to award 50% of salary and allowances during the pendency of the reference, with arrears to be paid within one month and each party bearing its own costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed in part. The impugned order was modified so that the Workman is entitled to receive 50% of his salary and allowances during the pendency of the reference before the Labour Court, and arrears were directed to be paid within one month. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to reduce the Labour Court's interim award of full wages to 50% of salary plus allowances during the pendency of the proceedings, while leaving the substantive reference for final determination by the Labour Court. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new binding precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; it follows the established approach that interim relief should ordinarily be limited (commonly to 50%) and that employers remain entitled to prove misconduct before the tribunal.
P.K Bahri, J.:— A writ of certiorari has been sought by the petitioner for [quashing the order dated December 6, 1986, passed by Shri R.C Yaduwanshi, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, by which he had granted an interim relief requiring the petitioner to pay to the Workman, namely, Mehar Singh-Tespondent No. 2 the full wages with effect from the date of the application i.e October 10, 1985, till the final adjudication of the reference pending before him.
2. Facts, in brief, are that on January 24, 1975, respondent No. 2 was appointed as a temporary clerk when his services were terminated on July 15, 1976 and on May 11, 1977, he was re-appointed as a temporary clerk. On the basis of certain allegations of misconduct a committee was formed by the Management of the petitioner and the said committee submitted its report to the Establishment Committee of the petitioner-Bank which then appointed one Shri C.L Sehgal, an Inquiry Officer. A charge sheet was issued and on the basis of the report of the Inquiry Officer, respondent No. 2 was dismissed. An appeal was filed which was also dismissed. On August 10, 1982, a reference was made to the Labour Court to determine the legality or otherwise of the dismissal of the Workman. The proceedings are still pending before the Labour Court and some evidence has been already recorded. On October 10, 1985, the Workman moved an application for grant of interim relief which was opposed by the petitioner and vide the impugned order the Labour Court has given prima facie conclusion that the inquiry held against the Workman was vitiated as admittedly the witnesses have been examined by the Inquiry Officer in the absence of the Workman. The Labour Court has also given certain views regarding the power of the Establishment Committee to institute the disciplinary proceedings inasmuch as certain directors of the petitioner-Bank have been found to be not legally entitled to continue as directors. Elaborate arguments have been addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show that the opinion of the Labour Court that out of the 16 directors of the Management 12 have been disqualified and thus the Establishment Committee had no power to institute disciplinary proceedings, is not correct. He has argued that even if there was some illegality in the appointment of certain directors even then by virtue of doctrine of defacto, any act done by the said directors would be valid in the proceedings of the nature being gone into by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has to yet give the final findings with regard to the reference which is still pending before it. So it would not be useful to go into detailed arguments advanced before me as to whether the disciplinary proceedings had been validly instituted against the Workman and inquiry proceedings are valid and the punishment proposed is justified or not. The fact remains that prima facie the Labour Court, in my opinion, has rightly come to the conclusion that the inquiry proceedings were vitiated for the simple reason that there was breach of rules of natural justice inasmuch as admittedly the witnesses were examined by the Inquiry Officer in the absence of the delinquent Workman. The matter, however, does not end with this prima facie view of the inquiry proceedings because the petitioner is not debarred in law from proving as a fact before the Labour Court that the Workman was guilty of misconduct and he deserved the penalty of dismissal. Counsel for the petitioner has rightly pointed out that if there has been no inquiry at all then the Labour Court could go into the question whether the Workman was guilty of misconduct and in that case if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the penalty of dismissal is to be imposed and then the said penalty can be imposed from the date of such finding of the Labour Court but if the disciplinary inquiry is held to be defective and the Labour Court comes to the conclusion on merits from the evidence to be led before the Inquiry Officer that the Workman is guilty of misconduct and deserves to be dismissed, then the said dismissal could relate back to the date when the Workman was actually dismissed by the Management. As a matter of fact, these legal propositions enunciated by the learned counsel for the petitioner were not challenged by the learned counsel for the respondent.
3. I may refer to the case law on this point as cited before me. In Ranjtt Singh Tomar…Petitioner v. M/S. Hindustan Export & Import Etc.…S, ILR (1983) I Delhi 802, it has been held by Avadh Behari, J. that it is now settled by a series of decisions that the employer can justify its action of terminating services of his employee by leading evidence before the Tribunal. This applies equally to cases of total absence of inquiry and defective inquiry. It was also laid down in this very judgment that the principle of doctrine of relation back is that where the employer passes an order of termination whether without holding an enquiry or after holding an enquiry which is found to be defective, the order of termination would be effective from the date it was passed by the employer if it is held to be justified by the Tribunal on the evidence before it. The observations of the learned Judge that the orders of termination, which may be justified before the Labour Court by leading independent evidence, would relate back even in cases where no inquiry had been held, have been vehemently challenged by the learned counsel for the respondent. In P.H.Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta, Calcutta, (1964) 2 SCR 104, the doctrine of relating back was discussed and it has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the inquiry is defective for any reason the Labour Court would also have to consider for itself on the evidence adduced before it whether the dismissal was justified. However, on coming to the conclusion on its own appraisal of evidence adduced before it that the dismissal was justified its approval of the order of dismissal made by the employer in a defective inquiry would still relate back to the date when the order was made. The observations made in Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R 836, were explained by the Supreme Court with the remarks that in the cited case the Management had held no inquiry and thus the dismissal of the employee approved by the Tribunal could have taken effect from the date of the award. So the observations made by Avadh Behari, J. that even if no inquiry had been made and still if the Management is able to prove before the Labour Court that the Workman is guilty of misconduct and deserves dismissal and the Labour Court approves the same and even then the dismissal would relate back to the original order of dismissal passed by the Management, appears to have been too broadly stated. However, I need not consider this aspect of the case in any large detail because the question which arises in this matter is very short one; whether the Workman was entitled to have an interim relief during the pendency of the reference before the Labour Court? It is not disputed before me that Labour Court had the jurisdiction to grant interim relief, in case the Labour Court was to come to a prima facie conclusion that perhaps the Workman did not deserve punishment of dismissal in view of the facts disclosed before the Labour Court alleging misconduct against the Workman, and that the inquiry held against the Workman was prima facie defective. On this aspect of the case, the Labour Court was right in coming to the conclusion prima facie that the inquiry was defective. The Management is yet to lead evidence before the Inquiry Officer to prove that the Workman was guilty of misconduct. I have gone through the charge sheet and I find that even if those charges are proved before the Labour Court by leading evidence even then prima facie these charges may not persuade the Lab our Court to approve the extreme penalty of dismissal of the Workman. So, in the facts and circumstances, the Workman was entitled to have the interim relief.
4. The remaining question which is to be decided by me is whether the Labour Court was justified in granting full wages to the Workman when Workman is not rendering any services to the Management. In such like cases 50% of the wages ought to have been granted as is the norm. In Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & Others and Hotel Workers' Union, (1959) 2 L.L.J 544, it was observed by the highest court that ordinarily the interim relief should not be the whole relief that the Workmen would get if they succeed finally. The Supreme Court granted half the amount. Similar was the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar Dayal & Another, (1960-1961) 19 F.J.R 315. But in this case the Tribunal had passed the order of reinstatement or payment of full wages as interim relief. It was held by the Supreme Court that till the matter is finally decided the Workman should not be directed to be reinstated as an interim relief because that would amount to giving the Workman at the outset the relief to which he would be entitled only if the employer failed in the proceedings.
5. Counsel for the petitioner has also drawn my attention to the order made by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ No. 2686/86, Delhi State Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Others v. Jagdish Singh, made on February 24, 1987, in which again 50% of the wages plus allowances have been allowed as the interim relief. Counsel for the respondent has, however, argued that if 50% of the wages are to be allowed as interim relief then the Workman should be allowed in addition full allowances as are available to Workman who is suspended. He has drawn my attention to Delhi State Co-operative Bank Limited (Service Rules) which lays down in Rule 18 Subclause (viii) that during the period of suspension an employee shall be paid suspension allowance equal to 50% of his salary alongwith full usual allowances. The Workman in the present case cannot be deemed to be under suspension. So, the aforesaid rule is not applicable. In the case of Delhi State Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra) 50% of the salary plus allowances have been granted as interim relief, so full allowances cannot be granted to the Workman as an interim relief. I, hence, allow the writ petition partly and modify the impugned order to the extent that the Workman shall be entitled to have 50% of the salary and allowances during the pendency of the reference before the Labour Court. The arrears shall be paid to the Workman within one month from today. The parties are left to bear their own costs in this writ petition.
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