1. On 6-4-1976 at about 1.45 p.m. a scooter was being driven by Sh. Krishan Lal Sawhney, along the Netaji Subhash Marg. He was proceeding from Darya Ganj side towards the Red Fort, the appellant Mohinder Singh was driving a Mini bus DLP 5724 in the same direction as the scooter driven by Sh. K.L. Sawhney. The Mini bus DLP 5724 hit the scooter driven by Shri K.L. Sawhney from behind. After hitting the scooter the Mini bus driven by the appellant Mahinder Singh, dragged the scooter for a distance of about 50 to 70 feet.

2. As a result of this collision, K.L. Sawhney died on the spot. K.L. Sawhney was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. He was a M.A. LL.B. and, was, at the date of the collision, 47 years of age. A claim petition, under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act was filed against the appellant Mahinder Singh, the driver of the Mini bus DLP 5724; M/s Upkar Singh and Sons, the owners of the vehicles; and M/s New India Assurance Co. Ltd., the insurer of the vehicles.

3. As regards M/s Upkar Singh and Sons, two addresses were given. One address was: 1488, Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Marg behind Novelty Cinema, Delhi; and the other was a house address : C-453, defense Colony, New Delhi.

4. In the claim petition it was asserted that the Mini Bus DLP 5724 was rashly and negligently driven at a high speed along the Netaji Subhash Marg, when it hit the back of the scooter being driven by Shri K.L. Sawhney, that the front of the Mini bus hit the rear of the scooter. It was further asserted in the claim petition that as a result of the collision Mr. K.L. Sawhney suffered multiple fractures on the body and he died on the spot.

5. The New India Assurance Company, respondent No. 3 filed a written statement on 27th February, 1978.

6. A joint written statement was filed on behalf of the driver of the Mini bus and the owner of the Mini bus.

7. The following Vakalatnamas have been filed as per record:

1. One Vakalatnama was filed by Mahinder Singh dated 29th November, 1976, appointing Shri S.M. Suri and Shri Karan Bal, Advocates (at page 227).

2. Another Vakalatnama was filed by the New India Assurance Co. appointing Shri S.M. Suri and Shri Karan Bal, Advocates dated 29th November, 1976 (at page 229).

3. One Vakalatnama was filed on 31st May, 1977 by Shri Sukhdarshan Singh, appointing Shri K.K. Sood, Advocate (at page 231).

4. Another Vakalatnama was filed on 31st May, 1977, by Shri Mahinder Singh, appointing Shri K.K. Sood, Advocate (at page 233).

5. Yet another Vakalatnama was filed by Shri Mahinder Singh on 22nd February, 1980, appointing Shri S.M. Suri, Advocate (at page 237).

8. On the pleading of parties, the following issues were framed:

1. Whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1 ? OPP.

2. To what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled and from whom ? OPP.

3. Whether respondent No. 3 is not liable to pay the compensation amount on account of defenses raised in the written statement ? OPR.

4. Relief.

9. Regarding issue No. 1, I agree with the finding of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') that the bus DLP 5724 was being rashly and negligently driven for the reasons stated by him.

10. As regards the issue of rash and negligent driving, I would like to mention that the photographs which show that part of Netaji Subhash Marg on which the two vehicles involved in the accident being Ex. PW 8/1 to Ex. PW 8/5, show the first point of impact between the scooter and the Mini Bus to be on one of the two white lines which divide this part of the Netaji Subhash Marg into three traffic lanes. The photographs indicate that after the impact with the scooter the bus swerved further towards the right and finally came to rest very near the central dividing verge. At the place where the accident took place, Netaji Subhash Marg is a two way road, divided by a central verge.

11. The driver of the Mini Bus asserted that the Mini bus was being driven at a slow speed, carefully, in accordance with the traffic rules, He has also asserted that it was the scooter driver who was driving the scooter at a high speed; that the scooter driver lost his control; that the scooter driver first struck against the central verge; that the scooter driver appears to have been intoxicated, and that after having struck central verge, the scooter fell down in front of the Mini bus. It is not possible for me to believe these assertions of the Mini bus driver because if the Mini bus was being driven slower than the speed of the scooter, then the front of the Mini bus could not have hit the rear of the scooter if it was moving away from it at a faster speed. Besides this, if K.L. Sawhney, the scooter driver, had been intoxicated then the post-mortem report would have surely mentioned the fact that he was intoxicated. It has not been urged before me that the post-mortem report of K.L. Sawhney is that he had consumed any liquor or that at the time of the accident he was intoxicated. There is another reason for my disbelieving what the driver of the Mini bus asserts. The photographs show that the collision between the scooter and the Mini bus took place on one of the white lines of Netaji Subhash Marg. Thereafter the scooter was dragged for 50 to 70 feet. Every impact between two motor vehicles would create a loud noise. The driver of the Mini bus was driving the vehicle so fast that it took him 50 to 70 feet to bring the Mini bus to a stop. If the Mini bus was being driven slowly, it would not have dragged the scooter for a distance of 50 to 70 feet after it had hit the scooter. For these reasons I do not think there is any reason to interfere with the finding of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal regarding issue No. 1. I also hold that the driver Mahinder Singh, the appellant before me, drove the Mini bus DLP 5724 rashly, negligently and caused the accident.

Issue No. 2 reads as under:

To what amount of compensation the petitioners are entitled and from whom ? OPP

12. Learned Tribunal has dealt with the matter in detail and only criticism which could be levelled against the determination of the quantum awarded, by Mr. Goyel in support of his plea for enhancement of compensation, was that certain deductions which have been made by the Tribunal from the amount of salary and allowances received by the deceased, to arrive at the figure of annual dependency of the claimants ought not to have been deducted. These deductions relate to the amount of Provident Fund paid per month in the sum of Rs. 68/- C.D.S. payment amounting to Rs. 155/-. In support of his contention, he relies upon the judgment of this Court in 1975 ACJ 56. If these two amounts are not deducted from the amount arrived at by the Tribunal then the net amount available to K.L. Sawhney per month would come to Rs. 1893.40, and not Rs. 1671.00. From the amount of Rs. 1893.40, the personal expenses shall have to be deducted and the multiplier will have to be applied to the resultant amount, after multiplying it by 12 to arrive at annual dependency.

13. Mr. Goyel's submission is that the trial court has erred in deducting 1/3rd from the net income of the deceased towards personal expense of the deceased. 1 do not think that the deduction of 1/3rd amount from the net monthly salary is excessive deduction. Deducting 1/3rd of the net monthly income of Rs. 1893.40, i.e. Rs. 631.13, from the net monthly income, the annual dependency would work out to be Rs. 1261.27 or say Rs. 1262.00 12=Rs. 15,144/-.

14. The next question to be determined is what is the multiplier which is to be applied to this case. Mr. Goyel asserts that the longevity in the family be taken into account and as the deceased was M.A., LL.B. after his death he would have practiced as a lawyer and would have continued to work and earn money more or less at the same rate and therefore higher multiplier of 23 years should have been applied. This means that Mr. Goyel wants us to assume that Mr. Sawhney would have achieved success as a lawyer after his retirement and would have lived to the age of 70 years, while practicing as a lawyer. Both these assumptions depend upon conjectures and, I would not like to act upon such conjectures.

15. In support of his submission of taking the natural age of deceased to be 70 years, he relied upon a judgment of Sultan Singh J. of this Court reported as 1983 ACJ 424. That case was a case of a teacher and the Hon'ble Judge came to the conclusion that it should be taken that the teacher could have lived up to the age of 75 years and would have continued ' to function as a teacher. The facts of that case are not comparable to the present one. Continuation as a teacher is not the same thing as adopting the profession of a practicing lawyer after retirement with assured success.

16. As against the contention of Mr. Goyel it is stated by Mr. Sarin, appearing for the Assurance Co. that the judgment of Sultan Singh J. has been overrules in 1975 ACJ 266, by a D.B. consisting of Justice Avadh Behari and Justice G.C. Jain.

17. In this case as the deceased was an employee of Life Insurance Co., the safe-guide would be to take the age of retirement as the basis on which the multiplier should be determined. This multiplier would be 11 years as the deceased was 47 years old, and would have retired at the age of 58 years. In this view of the matter I would take the annual dependency to which the multiplier is to be applied as Rs. 15,144/- and multiplying this by 11, the total amount of compensation payable to claimant would become Rs. 1,66,584.

18. In view of the judgment of this Court (Anand, J.) in 1975 ACJ 56, I do not think, in this case the deductions which have been made by the Tribunal in para 21 ought to be made. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal is Rs. 1,66,490/-, and according to the calculation made by me the compensation would come to Rs. 1,66,584/-. There cannot be any great accuracy in determination of the quantum of compensation payable in accident cases, and I find no reason to alter the amount awarded. Accordingly I maintain the amount of compensation which has been awarded by the Tribunal.

19. This brings us to issue No. 3, which reads as under:

Whether respondent No. 3 is not liable to pay the compensation amount on account of defenses raised in the written statement ? OPR.

20. Learned Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the liability of Insurance Company is limited to Rs. 50,000/-. There is a serious contention regarding this between the parties. It is not disputed by Mr. Sarin who appears for the Insurance Co. that according to the view which has been taken in 1983 ACJ 424; 1985 FLR 470 & 475; 1985 PLR 585; and 1985 498, that in case of failure of Insurance Company to produce and prove the policy of insurance then the courts have taken the view that the liability of the insurer is unlimited, in the cases, where a comprehensive insurance policy has been issued.

21. What Mr. Sarin contends is that in this case a policy has been produced by the Insurance Company which on its face shows that the liability of Insurance Company is limited to Rs. 50,000/- and so, the Tribunal is right in limiting the liability of Insurance Company to Rs. 50,000/-.

22. As regards the insurance policy which covered the Mini bus DLP 5724 at the time of accident, the same is stated to be a renewal policy. It is asserted by the Insurance Company that the Mini bus was subject to hire and purchase agreement and that the person who paid the premium was the Motor General Finance Pvt. Ltd. There was no evidence led to this effect before the Tribunal. The order sheet of the Tribunal dated 2-7-80 on which date the insurance policy was purported to be proved reads as under:

2-7-80 : Present : Shrimati Manju Sahani Petitioner in person.

Shri Karan Bal for the respondents. Petitioner has filed Photostat copy of the Estate Duty Certificate and break up of emoluments being drawn by the deceased before his death. Since these documents are being produced at the request of the respondents they are exhibited as Ex.R/1 and Ex.R/2.

One witness on behalf of the respondents is present. Let his statement be recorded.

Although driver of the offending bus to whom the respondents counsel wants to examine is present, is not examined as the learned Counsel submits that he has not brought the brief today and has come to the courts straight from the Aerodrome. Request seems to be genuine. Accordingly case is adjourned to 7-7-80 for respondents evidence. No further opp. shall be given at any costs.

Sd/- MACT

24. From the proceedings which are reproduced hereinabove, it is clear that on the day when the Insurance policy No. 4575630125 was sought to be proved, the only person present in the court from the side of the claimants as the widow of K.L. Sawhney. Her counsel was apparently absent on that date. The counsel for the Insurance Co. was Mr. Karan Bal. The document exhibited by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal as R 3 W 1/1 on 2-7-1980 is an attested copy of an alleged carbon copy. This alleged true copy of the alleged insurance policy is written up on a paper which was printed some time in the year 1979, as is clear from what is stated at the top of that paper that is to say Ipr 20000-6-79. This indicate that the form on which the policy was written, was printed some time in June 1979. The actual policy is stated to have been issued more than two years earlier on 17-5-1975. What is marked as R3W/1 cannot be treated as a true or attested copy.

25. Another thing which is to be noticed is that the policy which is produced is certified to be true copy by some person who claims to be duly constituted attorney of New India Assurance Company. It is stated before me that this person is one Mr. Din Bandhu. This is not the same person who appeared before the Tribunal to prove the alleged policy. Din Bandhu is stated to be alive. He has not been examined. The person who appeared in the witness box was Mr. V.K. Kapur. How can his statement reproduced above, be said to prove the Insurance Policy?

26. Besides this, the number of the policy which is to be found in the policy register, which has been shown to me (as was stated to have been shown to the Tribunal) is smudged and contains some over-writing. This is not even noticed by the Tribunal.

27. Besides this, the register which was produced before me has only one single sheet with reference to Mini bus DLP 5724. This is form No. An-1. The policy register attached to form An-1 does not have the terms which are relied upon by the Insurance Company whereas these have been attached to Ex. R3W1/1. How can it be said that Ex.R3W1/1 is the attested copy, when all that is to be found on the Policy Register is form An-1? It is stated before me that the terms of Insurance Policy for Mini bus have remained unchanged since long and the form An-1 has to be received along with these unchanged terms which was produced by Shri V.N. Kapur. In these circumstances, how can it be said that terms of the policy stand proved? Should it not be held that the Insurance Company has prepared a document convenient for themselves and got it exhibit marked?

28. Mr. Goyel asserts on behalf of the claimant that the insurance policy produced was not the original policy. There is nothing on the record as regards whereabouts of the original policy. It may be that the original policy is with the Motor General Finance Ltd. who are stated to be the persons who took out the policy. No attempt has been made as far as I see, of getting the original policy produced on record before the Tribunal. The copy which is produced in court is obviously not a true copy as per Policy Register, nor is it the carbon copy of original policy, as the carbon copy of form An-1 is stated to be in the Policy Register produced before me. The alleged carbon copy has been added to, and then the same has been got exhibit marked.

29. The claimant asserted in the claim petition that he policy in respect of bus accident is comprehensive insurance policy. This assertion that the policy was a comprehensive insurance policy, was not disputed in the written statement. What was pleaded in addition in the additional pleas, was that the comprehensive policy had limited liability clause which limited the liability of the Insurance Company to Rs. 50,000/-.

30. As noted above, in evidence given by the Insurance Company regarding the policy, almost nothing is said. It is an admitted fact that on the day when the policy register was produced before the Tribunal counsel for the claimant was not present. Surprisingly the Tribunal recorded that an opportunity was given to the parties for cross examination but there was no cross-examination. The Insurance Company naturally relies upon the fact that the Tribunal has exhibited the copy which was produced by the Insurance Company. The Insurance Company has further, naturally, relies upon the fact that the attested copy of the carbon copy of the form An-1 in the appropriate column states that the liability is limited to Rs. 50,000/-.

31. I am of the view that in view of the assertions which have been made in the claim petition, and the stand taken by the Insurance Company, in its written statement, it was proper that rules of evidence for the purpose of proving the documents ought to have been applied somewhat more vigilantly, before the form An-1 was marked as Exhibit R3W1/1. It is not disputed that no attempt was made by the Insurance Company, on whom I think onus lay to prove that the liability is limited, to get produced the original policy of insurance, either from the owner or from the Motor General Finance Company who are supposed to have paid the premium for the policy.

32. In these circumstances I hold that the Insurer has failed to prove the insurance policy in accordance with law. The Tribunal was in error in marking the attested copy of the typed copy as Annexure R3W 1/1. In the facts and circumstances of this case it must be held that the Insurance Company has failed to prove the Insurance Policy in accordance with law. The effect of this finding is that limited liability policy does not stand proved, and it has to be held that the liability of the Insurance Company is unlimited. There is yet another reason why in this case the liability of the Insurance Company must be held to be unlimited. Contacts of insurance are Ubrima Fides. The Insurer must also show Ubrima Fides. The reason why I say that the insurer must give full information to the person who seeks to take out an insurance policy is because various types of policies can be taken out. Before me it is stated that there are three types of policies which are available. These are:

1. Act Policy.

2. Public Risk Policy.

3. Comprehensive Policy.

33. In view of this I had asked the counsel for the Insurance Company whether the Insurance Company had in its records the proposal form which was executed for issuance of the policy which covered the Mini Bus DLP 5724. It was conceded that in this case there was no proposal form. The relevance of the proposal form is that, it can show what kind of insurance policy was sought from the insurance company. On my query, a blank proposal form was brought to court and put on record. This proposal form is with reference to commercial vehicles, and item 16 thereof reads as under:

16. Do you wish limits of Indemnity in respect of claims by Public to be increased beyond the limit prescribed by the M.V. Act, 1939? If so, state amount.

34. If this proposal form is read by, or read over, or explained to person who is taking out the insurance, the obvious question which will arise is: "What is meant by 'limit prescribed by the M.V. Act' and if the agent of the insurance company answers the query by saying that the insurance taken out would limit the liability of the Insurance Company to Rs. 50,000/- only and that the balance of the claim, if decreed would be borne by the person seeking insurance, he would naturally ask how much extra I have to pay so that I am fully indemnified to the maximum extent.

35. In response to the question which I put to the counsel for Insurance Company, it was stated that the basic premium which is payable for a commercial vehicle having a passenger capacity of 30 to 35 passengers is Rs. 351/-. By payment of additional premium of Rs. 4/- the indemnity given would not be restricted by the amount mentioned in the Motor Vehicle Act, and that the liability to pay the amount to a claimant would be to the fullest extent. I cannot imagine any person of ordinary prudence who is willing to pay Rs. 351/- would hesitate to pay Rs. 4/- more so as to enjoy the benefit of full indemnity.

36. I put the questions regarding proposal form to counsel for the Insurance Company for the reason that I wanted to satisfy myself; that the insurance cover given was in accordance with what was desired by the person who sought insurance. Counsel for the Insurance Co. fairly conceded before me that in their records there was no proposal form from the side of the beneficiary of the insurance policy. In other words no proposal form had been submitted by M/s Upkar Singh and Sons or anyone else. I say 'or anyone else' because it was stated before me that the premium for the policy of insurance was paid by the Motor General Finance Ltd. who were the financiers of vehicle DLP 5724.

37. In view of the absence of the proposal form also it cannot be said that the Insurance Company, respondent No. 6 herein, had issued form An-1 in accordance with the proposal form which had limited the liability of the Insurance Company to Rs. 50,000/-. In view of the above said discussion also I am satisfied that the Insurance Co. has not proved the contract of, or the policy of insurance in accordance with law. In view of the fact that there had been an admission in the written statement that the policy of insurance was comprehensive policy of insurance, respondent No. 6 has to beheld bound by that admission, and it has to be held further that they are liable to pay the entire amount of compensation which has been ordered to be paid, and that their liability is not confined to Rs. 50,000/- as held by the Tribunal.

38. Mr. Sarin, counsel for the Insurance Company says no objections were taken to exhibit marking of the insurance policy before the Tribunal and as such no objection can be taken at any subsequent stage. He relies upon Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana for this preposition. In that case the document which was exhibit marked was a document which was required to be stamped under the Stamp Act, and no objection was taken to it being exhibit marked and received in evidence. The principles laid down in the case cited above, in my view, are not applicable to the exhibit marking of the document like Ex. R3W1/1, which I have held above, to be a document which has been made up, and is different from its carbon copy, which is purported to has been used as a basis for attesting Ex. R3W1/1 as a true copy of the form An-1 in the policy register produced by the Insurance Company. Mr. Sarin relies upon K. Gopalakrishanan v. Sankara Narayanan , which was followed in Dharam Vir v. State AIR H. P. 98, to the effect that principles and rules of evidence as contained in the Evidence Act are not applicable to the Tribunal. None of the aforesaid judgments had before them what was stated by the Supreme Court in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal . The Supreme Court had observed that

"Accident Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there"

. To this I may add that Insurance Company should also not escape liability merely because no effective representation is available to the claimant before the Tribunal regarding the manner in which the document is required to be proved. I think that the Tribunal must strike a balance between the strict rule of evidence, the need to dispose of matters and to do justice to the claimants before it. It would not be permissible for the Tribunals to ignore the principles regarding admissibility of documents to such an extent that it would amount to a denial of justice to the claimants.

39. There is yet another matter which needs to be adverted to.

40. Before me it was urged by Mr. Rakesh Tikku on behalf of the owner of the vehicle, M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons that they have had no notice of the proceedings before the Tribunals, and that they are entitled to have the case retried.

41. The contentions raised by Mr. Tikku are based upon an application which had been filed by the owners of the vehicle before the Tribunal. That application has a number of annexures thereto also. The contents of the application and the annexures of their application show that there has been a flagrant violation of the rules relating to grant of permits for plying Mini bus under Delhi Transport Corporation. Before me it was admitted that the permits to ply Mini buses on D.T.C. routes are non-transferable. This violation has been done by M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons. The violation is that M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons have transferred all their rights with respect to plying of Mini bus DLP 5724 to Mr Sukhdarshan Singh. The agreement between M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons and Mr. Sukhdarshan Singh is an agreement dated 24th December, 1974. This agreement on its face is an authorisation to ply the vehicle between Inter State Bus Terminus, Delhi to Greater Kailash Part-II, but in effect it is an agreement of sale of bus and the permit to ply the vehicle on the above said route. This agreement is marked as R-11 in the annexure to the aforesaid application of M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons.

42. Apart from this agreement dated 24-12-1974 there is also a document which is marked as R-10 in the annexures to the aforesaid application. Clause (3) of this document marked as Annexure R-10 reads as under:

(3) Shri Sukhdarshan Singh has agreed that from 14th December, 1974 (from 7 A.M. onwards) the Bus No. DLP 5724 will run on his sole risk and responsibility and all challans, taxes, accidents, claims, repairs and other expenses for running the bus as aforesaid will be paid entirely by S. Sukhdarshan Singh.

43. The document marked as Annexure R-11 states inter alia

"And whereas the vehicle is not transfer at present has been agreed that party No. 1 shall appoint party No. 2 as his General Attorney to represent him in all matters relating to the above vehicle"

.

44. Party No. 1 to Annexure R-11 is M/s. Upkar Singh s/o S. Bishan Singh, Partner of M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons, C-453 defense Colony, New Delhi and party No. 2 is Shri Sukh Darshan Singh son of S. Jag Dev Singh, 111, Seelam Pur Phase III, Shahdara Delhi.

45. Reading the above said two clauses, it is quite clear to me that at least from 7.00 a.m. on 14th December, 1974 the possession of the bus DLP 5724 was transferred to Sukhdarshan Singh by Upkar Singh, karta of M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons and in any case by virtue of agreement dated 24-12-1974 Sukhdarshan Singh has been acting like a general attorney for Upkar Singh and Sons and in any case the relationship between the two, in law, has to be assumed to b3 that of an agent of each other, if not two persons who had embarked upon a joint venture to carry on the business of plying the Mini bus DLP 5724 for mutual benefit, the permit for plying the bus between Inter State Bus Terminus and Greater Kailash Part II haying continued to be in the name of M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons. Before the Tribunal, it is stated by Mr. Tikku that M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons never put in appearance. He boldly states that no vakalatnama was signed on behalf of M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons by any person authorised to do so. The general power of attorney postulated by agreement dated 24-12-1974 has not been placed on record by M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons. It is apparent from the record that joint written statement was filed on behalf of driver Mahinder Singh and M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons. The vakalatnamas that have been filed in the case had been mentioned above. Mahinder Singh, driver/appellant signed three vakalatnamas, one dated 29th November, 1976 in favor of S.M. Suri and Karan Bal, Advocate, one dated 31st May, 1977 in favor of K.K. Sood, Advocate and another on 22nd February, 1980 in favor of S.M. Suri, Advocate. Mr. Sukhdarshan Singh filed the vakalatnama dated 31st May, 1977 appointing K.K. Sood, Advocate as his counsel. In view of the aforesaid documents, coupled by the fact that joint written statement was filed, it must be found that Sukhdarshan Singh was acting for M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons and it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Rakesh Tikku counsel for M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons that there is no connection between Upkar Singh & Sons and Sukhdarshan Singh and Mahinder Singh. It is also difficult for me to accept that Upkar Singh was unaware of the involvement of the vehicle in accident on 6-4-1976. It is also difficult for me to accept that Upkar Singh was unaware of the claim having been decreed by the Tribunal. It is also difficult for me to accept that for the first time M/s Upkar Singh and Sons came to aware of the order of the Tribunal when the property of Upkar Singh and Sons was sought to be attached by the Collector of Delhi. I am of the view that Upkar Singh, as karta of M/s. Upkar Singh and Sons, was at all time aware of the proceedings before the Tribunal, and if it is accepted which I do not, that he was not aware of the proceedings, it must beheld that he ignored the proceedings which are being conducted before the Tribunal by and through his general attorney/agent or representative who had engaged various Advocates mentioned above through various vakalatnamas which are on record. In any case Upkar Singh took a chance of no award being enforced against him and he cannot be permitted to assert that he was unaware of the proceedings before the Tribunal. He has come to court only for having the matter re-tried. Having the matter re-tried, will in my view, be not right because the Supreme Court in Advocate General, Bihar v. M.P. Khair, Industries reported as has shown its approval to the words of Judge Curtis Raleigh, which has been set out in Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 All E.R. 997 at p. 1006 that "the law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope". Allowing the application of Upkar Singh & Sons to have the matter re-tried would enable a person who has defied the rules relating to issuance of non-transferable permits of plying the vehicle, by defying the law, will "go free" and the claimants who started the action in the year 1976 would 'lose hope'.

46. For these reasons, the application filed by Upkar Singh for having the matter re-tried must be dismissed and I dismiss the same while holding that he would be equally liable to make good the claim, of the claimants, decreed against him by the Tribunal.

47. In the circumstances the appeal filed by the driver that he was not rash and negligent in driving the vehicle and therefore not liable for the amount of claim decreed against him, is dismissed.

48. The cross-objection which were filed by the claimants for enhancement are also disposed of by stating that this is not a fit case for enhancement of compensation amount for the reasons stated in this judgment.

49. In view of the judgment of Supreme Court in Chameli Wati and Anr. v. Delhi Municipal Corporation and Ors. 1985 ACJ 645, the interest which is payable on the amount which has been ordered to be paid by the Tribunal would not be six per cent, as ordered, but shall be twelve per cent per annum. The interest at the rate of twelve per cent shall be payable to the claimants, on the amount awarded, from two months after the date of the award.

50. The appeal is disposed of with no orders as to costs.