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Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Apollo Tyres Limited

Delhi High Court
Sep 2, 1986
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Mahesh Chandra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, M/s. Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. (IJT), sued the defendant, M/s. Apollo Tyres Limited (ATL), for recovery of Rs. 1,60,633.83 as the remaining principal and Rs. 3,87,592.34 as interest. The dispute arose from an agreement dated 11 February 1975 for supply, erection and commissioning of two boilers. Differences emerged over amounts payable, and on 25 February 1982 the parties recorded minutes of a meeting (referred to in the plaint as the "Settlement") in which ATL acknowledged dues totaling Rs. 3,21,267.66 and agreed to pay in two instalments; interest was to be decided by the managing directors of the parties. ATL paid Rs. 1,60,633.83 by cheque dated 13 May 1982 but did not pay the remaining Rs. 1,60,633.83, prompting the present suit for recovery.

The defendant filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act seeking a stay of the suit on the basis of clause 9.05 of the 1975 agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. The defendant claimed differences (including alleged defects in the boiler) were referable to arbitration and asserted readiness to arbitrate; it also alleged coercion in signing the 25 February 1982 minutes. The plaintiff contested the application, asserting the settlement was voluntary, had been acted upon (part payment made), that the defendant had not been ready and willing to arbitrate at the appropriate time and had repudiated the arbitration agreement, and therefore the application was misconceived and should be dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, there existed a subsisting arbitration agreement between the parties that would require a stay of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
  2. Whether the defendant was, at all material times (including at commencement of proceedings), unconditionally ready and willing to do everything necessary for the proper conduct of arbitration, such that a stay under Section 34 should be granted.
  3. What effect, if any, the settlement/minutes dated 25 February 1982 had on the arbitration clause in the original agreement.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The agreement dated 11 February 1975 contained clause 9.05 providing for adjudication by two arbitrators and, if necessary, an umpire; disputes should therefore be referred to arbitration.
  • By a legal notice dated 30 August 1982 the defendant maintained that the boiler supplied was defective and substandard, making the differences referable to arbitration.
  • The defendant asserted it had been and was still ready and willing to have disputes adjudicated by arbitrators and therefore the suit proceedings should be stayed under Section 34.
  • The defendant alleged in its application that it had been "compelled and coerced" to sign the minutes of 25 February 1982 (the settlement).

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The application under Section 34 was misconceived and not maintainable.
  • The settlement dated 25 February 1982 was arrived at voluntarily and there was no compulsion or coercion on the defendant to sign the minutes; this denial was made in the plaintiff's reply.
  • The settlement had been acted upon by the defendant (a payment of Rs. 1,60,633.83 was made), showing the parties accepted the settlement.
  • The defendant was not ready and willing at the appropriate time to refer the dispute to arbitration and had, in effect, repudiated the arbitration agreement; the Section 34 application was an afterthought.
  • Because the settlement resolved the disputes, the arbitration clause could not now be invoked to stay the suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Food Corporation of India & Another v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor, AIR 1982 SC 1302 “When in breach of an arbitration agreement a party to the agreement rushes to the Court, unless a clear case to the contrary is made out the approach of the Court should be to hold parties to their bargain provided necessary conditions for invoking Section 34 are satisfied.” The court acknowledged the principle that parties should generally be held to arbitration agreements, but found that the settlement between the parties abrogated the arbitration agreement and therefore the principle did not entitle the defendant to a stay in this case.
Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Thakur Shipping Co. Ltd. & Others, 1975 (3) SCR 146 Under Section 34, an applicant for a stay must show that he was, at the commencement of proceedings, ready and willing to do everything necessary for proper conduct of the arbitration. The court relied on this principle to assess whether the defendant had been unconditionally ready and willing. It found letters on record showing the defendant had denied the right to refer to arbitration and had raised conditions, indicating a lack of unconditional readiness.
M/s. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. M/s. Punjab Tin Printing & Metal Industries, AIR 1979 Delhi 59 “To stay a suit, there must be an existing dispute between the parties. If there was no dispute, there is nothing to arbitrate.” The court used this principle to support the conclusion that because the parties had mutually settled their disputes by the 25 February 1982 minutes (and acted on it), there was no longer a dispute referable to arbitration, and thus no basis for a stay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the threshold for granting a stay under Section 34: the defendant must establish (inter alia) that a subsisting arbitration agreement existed and that the defendant was unconditionally ready and willing to do everything necessary for proper conduct of arbitration (para 4).

The court examined the arbitration clause (clause 9.05) of the 11 February 1975 agreement, which required parties to try amicable settlement by negotiation and, failing agreement, to refer disputes to two arbitrators, with the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, incorporated (paras 6 and 31-32).

The court then scrutinized the settlement/minutes dated 25 February 1982 in detail (paras 7, 19–30). The defendant had alleged coercion in signing those minutes; the plaintiff denied coercion and the court observed there was no other record evidence supporting the coercion allegation. The court noted that the defendant had acted upon the settlement (payment of Rs. 1,60,633.83 by cheque dated 13 May 1982) and that correspondence on record corroborated that payment (paras 8 and 31).

From these facts the court concluded that the parties had mutually arrived at and acted upon the settlement, thereby resolving their differences in accordance with the first part of clause 9.05 (which calls for amicable settlement by negotiation). The court held that where parties mutually settle disputes and act on that settlement, the original arbitration agreement is effectively given a "go by" — it is abrogated, abandoned, discharged and waived, and cannot thereafter be revived by any party (paras 31–35).

The court further addressed the defendant's contention of operational difficulties with the boiler and noted those matters were specifically contemplated and dealt with in the settlement (para 36).

Independently, the court considered whether the defendant had been unconditionally ready and willing to arbitrate. It relied on letters on record (plaintiff's letter dated 27 April 1984 and defendant's reply dated 12 May 1984) which, the court found, showed the defendant had denied the plaintiff's right to refer matters to arbitration and had imposed conditions (e.g., asserting arbitration should be held at Cochin rather than, as the court inferred from clause 9.06, New Delhi). The court held such conditional readiness did not satisfy the strict requirement of unconditional readiness at the relevant time (para 12).

Because the settlement had resolved the disputes and because the defendant was not shown to have been unconditionally ready and willing to arbitrate at the relevant time, the court concluded the defendant was not entitled to a stay under Section 34 (paras 33–40).

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties: The defendant's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for a stay of the suit is dismissed. The court held that the settlement dated 25 February 1982 was mutually arrived at and acted upon, thereby abrogating and discharging the arbitration agreement; alternatively, the defendant failed to demonstrate unconditional readiness to arbitrate at the relevant time. Consequently, the plaintiff may proceed with the suit for recovery based on the settlement.

The opinion does not articulate any broader or novel precedent; it applies established principles to the facts of this case and records the dismissal of the Section 34 application.

Date of Order: September 2, 1986.

Result recorded in the file: Application dismissed.

Show all summary ...

Mahesh Chandra, J.:— This, order disposes of defendant's application under Section 34, Arbitration Act.

1. The facts giving rise to this application are that the plaintiff — M/s. Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,60,633.83P as principal and Rs. 3,87,592.34P as interest against defendant — M/s. Apollo Tyres Limited on the ground that on 11th February 1975 the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the defendant for supply/erection and commissioning of two coal fired/water tube boilers and after the said job was completed by the plaintiff some differences arose between the parties on the question of amounts due to the plaintiff and vide settlement dated 25th February 1982 between the parties it was agreed that the defendant would in all pay a sum of Rs. 3,21,267.66P apart from interest which was to be decided by the managing directors of the plaintiff and defendant and in pursuance of the said settlement dated 25th February, 1982 a sum of Rs. 1,60,633.83P was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff by means of cheque No. 240650 dated 13th May 1982 and the remaining amount of Rs. 1,60,633.83P due in pursuance of the said settlement had not been paid and as such this suit for recovery of the said amount together with interest.
2. The defendant has filed this application under Section 34, Arbitration Act, on the ground that the agreement dated 11th February 1975, inter alia, provided vide clause 9.05 thereof that disputes or differences of opinion between the parties arising out of or in connection with the said agreement would be referred to adjudication of two arbitrators, one each to be nominated by the parties and that the defendant had by a legal notice on 30th August 1982 maintained that the supply of coa1.oil fired water boiler was defective and substandard and as such the said differences were liable to be referred to arbitration and the defendant has been and was still ready and willing to have the disputes between the parties adjudicated by the arbitrators and as such the proceedings in the suit should be stayed. With regard to the settlement dated 25th February 1982, it was submitted on behalf of the defendant in para 4 of the application that “defendants were compelled and coerced to sign minutes which in the plaint are referred to as “Settlement”. The said application of the defendant has been contested on behalf of the plaintiff on the plea that it was misconceived and not maintainable; that there was no compulsion or coercion brought upon the defendant to sign the minutes of the meeting held at Calcutta on 25th February 1982 and the said settlement was arrived at between the parties voluntarily with free will and was even acted upon by the defendant as certain payment was made in pursuance thereto; that the defendant was not at appropriate time ready and willing to refer the dispute to arbitration; that the defendant had, in fact, repudiated the arbitration agreement; that the application, was only an after thought on the part of the defendant; that the settlement dated 25th February 1982 has already been arrived at between the parties and the same is binding upon the defendant and the defendant cannot repudiate the same and as such the present application be dismissed.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the file and after giving my considered thought to the matter before me I have come to the following findings.
4. To entitle it a stay of further proceedings in the suit it is necessary for the defendant to, inter alia, establish that there was a subsisting arbitration agreement between the parties to the suit and that the defendant was at all material times unconditionally ready and willing to do everything necessary for the proper conduct of arbitration.
5. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the defendant has referred to clause 9.05 of the agreement dated 11th February 1975 as also to plaintiff's letter No. E-220/1061 dated 27th April 1984 and defendant's reply thereto No. ATL/LMC/623 dated 12th May 1984. He has also drawn my attention to Food Corporation of India & Another v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor, AIR 1982 SC 1302, (1) in which it was held that:
“When in breach of an arbitration agreement a party to the agreement rushes to the Court, unless a clear case to the contrary is made out the approach of the Court should be to hold parties to their bargain provided necessary conditions for invoking Section 34 are satisfied.”
6. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has not disputed the principle of law enunciated in Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor (supra) but has further submitted that even though agreement dated 11th February 1975 did contain clause 9.05 but the parties had by a settlement dated 25th February 1982 resolved, their disputes and differences and the defendant had acted upon the said settlement and as such recourse cannot be had to the arbitration clause now. It would be appropriate to first reproduce the arbitration clause in the instant case. Clause 9.05 of agreement dated 11th February 1975 provides as under:
“9.05 — Arbitration: In the event of any disputes or differences of opinion between the parties hereto arising out of or in connection with this agreement or with regard to performance of any obligation hereunder by either party, the parties hereto shall use their best efforts to settle such dispute or difference of opinion amicably by mutual negotiations. Should agreement not be reached, either party may forthwith give to the other notice in writing of the existence of such question, dispute or difference and the same shall be referred to the adjudication of two arbitrators one to be nominated by the PURCHASER and the other to be nominated by the CONTRACTOR or in the case the said arbitrators not agreeing then the adjudication of an umpire appointed by the arbitrators in writing before proceeding with the reference and the award of the arbitrators or the umpire as the case may be shall be final and binding on the parties hereto. The provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and of the Rules thereunder or any statutory modifications thereof for the time being in force shall be deemed to be applied to and be incorporated in this agreement.”
7. I have been taken through the settlement dated 25th February 1982. The said settlement provides as under:
“Minutes of the meeting held at Calcutta between ISGEC John Thompson and Apollo Tyres Limited on 25th February 1982.”
“. . . PRESENT:
ISGEC John Thompson (IJT) — 1. Mr. R. K. Sundaram, Chief Accountant.
Apollo Tyres Ltd. (ATL). — 1. Mr. P. K. Chowdhary.
Matter relating to the following subjects were discussed: —
1. Outstanding dues:
ATL has confirmed that the following dues are payable by them to IJT:
(i) for supply and erection of the Boiler — Rs. 2,00,000.00
(ii) escalation charges on the Boiler — Rs. 1,21,267.66

Total: Rs. 3,21,267.66.

ATL has requested IJT to give them some more time to clear the above dues and ATL has assured that they will be paying off the above dues in two equal instalments; the first by 31st May 1982 and the second by 30th June 1982. ATL has further stated that they would endeavour to clear the above dues earlier than the above dates.
2. Interest Charges: IJT has raised interest claims at the rate of 18 per cent annum on the outstanding dues starting from 1976 and the total claim so far received by ATL upto 30th April 1980 amounts to Rs. 2,05,694.27 and further interest charges from 1-5-80 has already accrued. ATL has however not accounted for these interest claims in their books. ATL has requested IJT to waive the interest charges which request IJT has not yet considered. ATL has requested that the matter relating to the interest charges may be left to be decided by Mr. D. D. Puri, Managing Director of IJT and Mr. Raunaq Singh, Managing Director of ATL.
3. Spares for Boiler: ATL has been writing to IJT for supply of Spares to ensure smooth operation of the Boiler. IJT has not been responding to the letters of ATL in view of pending settlement of outstanding dues. It is hereby agreed that IJT will send quotation in response to the enquiries of ATL. Execution of purchase orders, however, will be after IJT has received the dues amounting to Rs. 3,21,267.66 payable by ATL. In the event of ATL clearing the dues of Rs. 3,21,267.66 earlier than the stipulated schedule, the supply of Spares will be executed by IJT earlier. Such Spares order will be executed on mutually acceptable terms.
4. Mechanical coal stoker: ATL has already requested AJT to help in the disposal of the Coal Stoker for the Boiler, which, according to ATL, has never been used by them. IJT agrees to render assistance to ATL in the disposal of this Coal Stoker.
“. . . Performance of Boiler: ATL is experiencing certain difficulties for the last few years in the operation of the Boiler. The details are given hereunder in brief:
(a) The Oil Heater cannot raise a temperature sufficient to atomise Oil. The temperature should be atleast 110° C.
(b) Slug formation and Clinker formation at Burner core and flame fouling with the adjacent tubes near the Burner has reduced, which needs to be eliminated completely.
(c) Flame sweeping to the rear wall tubes (opposite to the Burner) at peak level.
(d) Remote water level controller zero suppression is yet to be supplied.
(e) All electrical starters need to be replaced as present starters do not have auxiliary contact.
(f) Steam flow meter integrator is reading higher compared to water flow.
ATL at present is operating at almost 90 per cent capacity utilisation and therefore it is necessary for them to have trouble free operation of the Boiler. In this context ATL requests IJT to attend to these difficulties at the earliest. IJT has agreed to look into this matter at the earliest and immediately on receipt of remittance from ATL, IJT will render assistance in this behalf.”
8. The most important question to be considered in this case is the effect of this settlement dated 25th February 1982. The settlement is not disputed on behalf of the defendant, rather what is stated by the defendant in para 4 of the application is that “defendants were compelled and coerced to sign minutes which in the plaint are referred to as ‘Settlement’. This fact, however, has been denied by the plaintiff in its reply wherein it has been denied by the plaintiff that “there was any compulsion or coercion brought upon the defendant to sign the minutes of the meeting held at Calcutta on 25th February 1982. The settlement was arrived at between the parties and the minutes were signed voluntarily with free will and. . . . .”. There is nothing else on record to suggest that any compulsion or coercion was, in fact, brought upon the defendant to sign the above mentioned settlement, rather my attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the plaintiff to the fact that this settlement was, in fact, acted upon by the defendant in so far as a sum of Rs. 1,60,633/83P was actually paid by the defendant vide cheque No. 240650 dated 13th May 1982 to the plaintiff and in this behalf my attention has also been drawn to letter No. CON/74/325 & FIN/131.RKS dated 21st May 1982 from Shri R. K. Sundaram, Chief Accountant of the plaintiff, to Shri P. K. Chowdhary of the defendant. The contents of this letter also have not been disputed on behalf of the defendant and on the other hand this fact of payment is admitted in copy of notice dated 30th August, 1982 served by defendant upon the plaintiff in para 3 whereof it was mentioned that “our clients have also paid certain amount which was not lawfully payable by our clients. . . . . . . “. Copy of the settlement and the letters above referred have been placed on record by the plaintiff. A perusal of these documents does go to show that settlement dated 25th February 1982 was actually arrived at without any compulsion or coercion between the parties and it was also acted upon by the parties. This would show that whatever differences had arisen between the parties had been settled by the parties through their representatives mutually and consequently it would follow that the arbitration agreement incorporated in clause 9.05 of the original agreement dated 11th February 1975 was given a go by the parties themselves. It would also be appropriate to mention here that this was done by the parties in pursuance of the first part of clause 9.05 which lays down that:
“In the event of any disputes or differences of opinion between the parties hereto, arising out of or in connection with this agreement or with regard to performance of any obligation hereunder by either party, the parties hereto shall use their best efforts to settle such dispute or difference of opinion amicably by mutual understandings.”
In the face of this conclusion it would be difficult to accept that it would be now open to the defendant to have recourse to Section 34 on the force of clause 9.05 of the original agreement between the parties. Once the arbitration agreement has been given a go by and the parties arrived at some mutual settlement the arbitration agreement would be deemed to have been abrogated and abandoned by the parties and would stand discharged and cannot be thereafter revived by any of the parties and consequently provisions thereof cannot be invoked by the parties any longer. The disputes and differences between the parties would merge into the new settlement and thereafter the parties cannot revert back to the original arbitration agreement.
9. There could be no doubt that where the parties agreed to refer their disputes and differences to arbitration but subsequently ignoring the arbitration agreement the parties mutually through their representatives agree and arrive at a settlement and that settlement is acted upon as well in part, then only the subsequently arrived at settlement would govern the relations of the parties thereafter and the parties cannot be permitted to ignore such a settlement so as to have recourse to the original arbitration agreement. In these circumstances, the arbitration agreement stands discharged, abrogated and abandoned and the same becomes infructuous and cannot be revived by any of the parties. Such is the position in the instant case and in these circumstances the defendant would be estopped from invoking the pro vision of arbitration agreement and cannot be permitted to have recourse to it through the instrumentality of Section 34, Arbitration Act.
10. It is always open to a party to waive its right under the arbitration agreement. Suppose the defendant had chosen not to file this application under Section 34, Arbitration Act and had rather filed its written statement, the arbitration agreement would have stood waived. Such is precisely the position even now since the parties have mutually settled their disputes and differences by settlement dated 25th February 1982 and thereby abrogated and waived the said arbitration agreement. What the law requires is a subsisting arbitration agreement and not an arbitration agreement which has been abrogated, abandoned or waived. In view thereof, an abrogated, abandoned and waived arbitration agreement would not be of any consequence so as to help the defendant.
11. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant that the defendant is experiencing certain difficulties in the operation of the boiler and as such recourse can be had to the arbitration agreement. However, reference to para 5 of the settlement dated 25th February 1982 reproduced above would show that even this aspect of the matter has been looked after in the said settlement.
12. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has further submitted that even assuming, though not conceding, that the arbitration agreement still subsists between the parties, even then the defendant is not entitled to stay of the suit under Section 34 inasmuch the defendant was not prepared unconditionally to refer the matter in dispute to arbitration at appropriate time and in this behalf my attention has been drawn to letter No. E-220/1061 dated 27th April, 1984 sent by the plaintiff to the defendant and the reply No. ATL/LMC/623 dated May 12, 1984, received from the defendant, copies whereof have been filed by the parties on record. A perusal of these letters does go to show that the defendant was not unconditionally prepared to refer the matter in dispute to arbitration. In para 3 of this letter dated 12th May, 1984, the defendant had categorically stated that “we also deny that you are entitled to refer the matter to adjudication by arbitration”. Similarly in para 5 thereof, the defendant had stated that “please note that the arbitration proceedings are required to be held at Cochin” which shows that it is not strictly in accordance with clause 9.06 of the original agreement dated 11th February 1975 which provides that “all suits arising out of this agreement shall be instituted in a competent New Delhi Court” which implies that even the arbitration proceedings would be held in New Delhi rather than at Cochin as suggested by the defendant in its reply. On facts of this case, therefore, it is difficult to accept that the defendant was prepared at relevant time to refer the matter in dispute to adjudication by arbitration unconditionally and consequently readiness of the defendant at this stage when the suit has been filed by the plaintiff could be of no help to the defendant inasmuch as law envisages the unconditional readiness on the part of defendant to refer the dispute to arbitration and does not admit of readiness which is subject to any condition as in the instant case. Thus, where a party invoking the arbitration clause had not only denied the right of the other party to refer the matter to adjudication by arbitration but also was not ready and willing to refer the disputes and differences to arbitration unconditionally, it cannot be permitted to take an about turn later on when a suit is filed by the other party so as to get a stay of that suit by wrongly representing that it was prepared to refer the disputes and differences to arbitration while it was not actually so prepared. The preparedness of the parties has to be seen all throughout rather than merely at the time of filing of the application under Section 34, Arbitration Act.
13. My attention has been drawn in this context to Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Thakur Shipping Co. Ltd. & Others, 1975 (3) SCR 146 (2), wherein it was held that: —
“Under Section 34, one of the conditions that the applicant for stay should satisfy the court is that not only he is but also was, at the commencement of the proceedings, ready and willing to do everything necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration. . . . . .”
Reliance has also been placed on behalf of the plaintiff upon M/s. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., New Delhi v. M/s. Punjab Tin Printing & Metal Industries, Ajraunda, Faridabad (Haryana) & Others, AIR 1979 Delhi 59 (3), in which it was held that “to stay a suit, there must be an existing dispute between the parties. If there was no dispute, there is nothing to arbitrate. . . . . . . .”. It has been submitted that whatever disputes or differences had arisen between the parties stood resolved by settlement dated 25th February 1982. I find force in this submission of the plaintiffs counsel. A reading of the plaint would show that the entire claim of the plaintiff is based upon the settlement incorporated in the minutes dated 25th February, 1982 reproduced above. The claim of the plaintiff is only for recovery of the balance amount due thereunder together with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum and in view thereof also the defendant is not entitled to stay of suit.
14. For my discussion and findings above, I find no force in this application and the same is dismissed.
September 2, 1986.
I. A. dismissed.