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Survir Enterprises v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Central Range-I, New Delhi, And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.K. Kapur, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
These four writ petitions (Nos. 1898, 1899, 1900 and 1934 of 1984) arise from a search conducted on May 14, 1981, in Delhi and Chandigarh under section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the consequent seizure and detention of books of account, documents, fixed deposit receipts and related items. The seized material could be retained initially for 180 days under section 132; further retention required the authorised officer to record reasons and obtain the Commissioner’s approval under section 132(8).
The petitioners repeatedly sought return of the seized materials after the 180-day period. The Commissioner issued an order dated October 5, 1983 (annexure I to the writ petition) which on its face referred to section 131(3), though respondents later asserted it was an order under section 132(8). The respondents filed counter-affidavits asserting that extensions of retention had been sought and granted, with documentary material showing retention permitted up to June 30, 1982. No order on record was available for the period between June 30, 1982 and October 5, 1983; respondents later produced an order purportedly allowing retention until September 30, 1984 but signed on October 5, 1983.
The court issued Rule D.B. on September 26, 1984, heard the matter partly, permitted further affidavits, and subsequently examined the records and affidavits, including an affidavit by the Officer-in-charge (Shri Durgesh Shankar) stating a proposal had been presented to the then Commissioner but the file or folder containing that proposal could not be traced after a change of officers.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Commissioner’s approval required by section 132(8) for retention of books and documents beyond 180 days must be taken before the expiry of the initial 180-day period.
- Whether an approval (or purported approval) that was not communicated to the assessee or is not on record for an intervening period (here, between June 30, 1982 and October 5, 1983) can validate continued retention during that period.
- Whether the order dated October 5, 1983 (which referred to section 131(3) but was said to operate as an approval under section 132(8)) can validate retention that had, according to the record, already lapsed due to an absence of approved retention between June 30, 1982 and October 5, 1983.
- Whether a purported lost or unsigned/misplaced approval within departmental files can substantiate lawful detention of seized books for a period exceeding 180 days.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The books and documents were seized as a result of a search under section 132(1) and therefore section 131(3) was not applicable — the approval for further retention had to be under section 132(8).
- The petitioners repeatedly requested return after the initial 180 days elapsed; an extension (if any) had to be granted before the end of the 180-day period (i.e., before November 14, 1981, counting from the May 14, 1981 search).
- Even assuming an order under section 132(8) had been passed, it was never communicated to the petitioners.
Respondents' Arguments
- The order dated October 5, 1983 was not passed under section 131(3) but under section 132(8) and was legal and valid; copies of documents showed the Income-tax Officer had sought extension under section 132(8).
- The proper remedy for the petitioner, if aggrieved by an approval under section 132(8), was to move the Board under section 132(10).
- Records indicated that retention had been permitted up to June 30, 1982. The apparent gap thereafter was explained as a result of departmental misfiling: the Officer-in-charge asserted that a proposal had been presented to the then Commissioner but the folder containing the proposal had not been traced when charges were handed over to a successor.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Metal Fittings Pvt. Ltd. … Petitioner v. Union of India, [1983] 141 ITR 758 (Delhi) | Held that retention beyond 180 days requires: (a) reasons recorded by the authorised officer and (b) approval of the Commissioner; approval must be obtained before the 180-day period expires. | The court accepted and applied this reasoning to conclude that any extension of retention must be authorised before the expiry of the initial 180 days; absence of such timely approval rendered retention invalid beyond the approved period. |
| CIT v. Oriental Rubber Works, [1984] 145 ITR 477 (SC) | Held that reasons must be recorded, approved by the Commissioner and communicated to the assessee; without communication the order of approval is invalid. | The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold that, even if an approval had been passed but not communicated (or not available on record for the critical period), the approval was invalid and could not sustain retention beyond the valid period on file. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the statutory scheme in section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with particular reference to sub-section (8) (which limits retention to 180 days unless reasons are recorded and the Commissioner approves further retention), sub-section (10) (which provides the remedy to the person legally entitled to the books to object to the Commissioner’s approval and apply to the Board), and sub-section (12) (which contemplates a hearing by the Board and orders it may pass).
Key steps in the court’s reasoning were:
- The court accepted that initial retention for 180 days from the date of seizure (May 14, 1981) was lawful and that the records showed an order permitting retention up to June 30, 1982; thus, retention up to that date was not invalid.
- The court emphasised the statutory pre-condition that an authorised officer must record reasons and the Commissioner must approve further retention under section 132(8), and that such approval must be obtained before the 180-day period (or any current authorised period) expires. The court treated this as a condition precedent to lawful continued detention.
- The court examined the record and found no Commissioner’s approval on file for the period between June 30, 1982 and October 5, 1983. The respondents’ claim that an order had been passed but was subsequently lost or misfiled was considered: the Officer-in-charge asserted a proposal was presented to the Commissioner but the folder could not be traced after a change of officers.
- The court held that an order which is signed and subsequently lost or not communicated to the assessee is of little or no legal value for sustaining retention: communication to the assessee is required (as confirmed by Oriental Rubber Works) and a mere internal, uncommunicated departmental approval cannot validate detention.
- The court reasoned that section 132(8) allows for extension of detention but not for a fresh or retroactive retention which would create a gap; therefore a gap in valid approval (here, a long gap from June 30, 1982 to October 5, 1983) meant that detention during that gap was unlawful.
- Even though an order dated October 5, 1983 appeared to purport to grant approval (and referred to section 131(3) on its face), the court treated that order as one intended to operate under section 132(8) but concluded it could not validate the intervening period of unlawful detention because the intervening period exceeded the statutory permissible interval and no valid, communicated approval existed for it.
- The court noted the petitioner’s delay in moving the writ but found that the books were still in the Department and therefore delay did not materially affect the right to relief; accordingly, the petition was entertained on merits.
Holding and Implications
The court held that the retention of the seized books and documents beyond June 30, 1982 (and up to October 5, 1983) was not in accordance with law and therefore was invalid.
Direct consequences ordered by the court:
- The seized books of account and documents must be returned to the petitioner on or before December 12, 1984.
- The petitioner was awarded costs of the writ petition, with counsel’s fee fixed at Rs. 500.
The opinion applies settled principles from the cited authorities concerning the necessity of recorded reasons, Commissioner’s timely approval under section 132(8) and communication of approval to the assessee. The court confined itself to the statutory requirements and the documentary record; it did not purport to lay down any broader novel rule beyond applying the cited precedents to the specific facts. No additional broader legal implications were discussed in the opinion beyond the direct effect on the parties.
D.K Kapur, J.:— These four writ petitions (Nos. 1898, 1899, 1900 and 1934 of 1984) are concerned with the seizure and retention of certain books of account, documents, fixed deposit receipts, etc., which were detained by the Income-tax Department as a result of a search under section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The search was conducted in Delhi and Chandigarh as per the facts stated in the writ petitions. It was also claimed that certain other assets not belonging to the petitioner were also seized, but nothing much turns on that, as far as this petition is concerned. The search took place on May 14, 1981, and hence the books of account and other assets could be retained for 180 days under section 132 of the Act. After that, the period of retention could be extended with the approval of the Commissioner under the provisions of section 132(8) of the Act.
2. According to the petitioner, they had been asking for the return of the seized assets because 180 days had passed, but the same were not returned. Eventually, an order dated October 5, 1983, was passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, annexure I to the writ petition, which states that approval had been granted under section 131(3) for the continued retention of the books of account and documents. The petitioner claims that section 131(3) was not applicable to his case, as the books, etc., were seized as a result of the search and were not produced before any income-tax authority under section 131.
3. A show-cause notice was issued as to why the writ petition should not be admitted. We issued Rule D.B on September 26, 1984, and partly heard the petition, but then permitted the respondents to file some further affidavits and adjourned for further hearing.
4. In reply to the petition, the counter-affidavit stated that the order passed on October 5, 1983, was not passed under section 131(3), but under section 132(8) and was legal and valid. Copies of various documents accompanied this affidavit showing that the Income-tax Officer had sought an extension of the retention period under section 132(8). It was claimed that the proper remedy was to move the Board against the order of the Commissioner passed under section 132(8). Various other facts have also been mentioned showing why the further retention of the books was necessary.
5. A rejoinder was filed Stating that even if assuming that an order was passed under section 132(S), it wis never communicated to the petitioner. Various other grounds were mentioned to show that an order could not be passed under section 132(8). Amongst other points, it was mentioned that as the search and seizure took place on May 14, 1981, the extension of the time of 180 days had to take place before that period expired. In other words, it was claimed that the extension had to be granted before November 14, 1981.
6. As a result of this rejoinder, yet another counter-affidavit was filed by the Income-tax Officer showing how the retention had been made for more than 180 days. It was also brought to the notice of the court at the hearing on September 26, 1984, that there were some orders passed under section 132(8). Those orders showed that the retention beyond 180 days was permitted up to June 30, 1982. But, there was no order available on the file after June 30, 1982. The last order allowed extension up to September 30, 1984, though it was passed on October 5, 1983.
7. The new affidavit just referred to states that an effort was made to find out the position subsisting between June 30, 1982, and October 5, 1983. The Officer-in-charge of Central Circle VI was Shri Durgesh Shankar who claimed that there was a proposal which he got signed by the then Commissioner, Shri Kanwal Krishan. It is now necessary to turn to the affidavit of Shri Durgesh Shankar. It states that he was in charge of Central Circle VI and there were a number of groups which were being assessed in that Circle. According to him, he had personally taken the proposal to Shri Kanwal Krishan for further approval, but the folder containing the proposal had not been traced out. In other words, the affidavit claims that when this officer handed over charge to Mrs. Divjot Kohli, his successor, he had handed over all the documents and probably this folder containing the proposal got mixed up with some other documents.
8. We think this matter does not only turn on the question of whether the Commissioner gave approval or not, but turns on as to whether the approval subsisted right from the date of the search to the present day. We had been shown the records-file containing the approval and had ourselves seen that there was no approval on record after June 30, 1982, but there was an approval after October 5, 1983, though it might have inadvertently been made under section 131(3). We are only concerned with whether the retention of the assets is valid and not with whether there are good grounds for retaining the books.
9. The scheme for searches and seizures contained in section 132 visualises initially a search of certain premises with a view to seize books of account or other relevant documents or to take into possession money, bullion, jewellery, etc. The purpose of these searches is to locate either documents showing that the assessee has evaded tax, or to take into possession money, bullion, jewellery, etc., which appears to have been acquired from undisclosed income. In the present case, the search and seizure was conducted on May 14, 1981. The next relevant provision, as far as we are concerned, is section 132(8), which is as follows:
“The books of account or other documents seized under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) shall not be retained by the authorised officer for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the seizure: unless the reasons for retaining the same are recorded by him in writing and the approval of the Commissioner for such retention is obtained:
Provided that the Commissioner shall not authorise the retention of the books of account and other documents for a period exceeding thirty days after all the proceedings under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or this Act in respect of the years for which the books of account or other documents are relevant are completed.”
10. This provision visualises that the books of account and other documents seized as a result of the search are to be returned within 180 days unless an order is passed by the authorised officer which is approved by the Commissioner for further retention. As pointed out above, we have ourselves seen that the retention was permitted by an order up to June 30, 1982. We may, therefore, take it that the retention up to that date is not invalid.
11. It is here necessary to refer also to sub-section (10) of section 132, which reads as follows:
“If a person legally entitled to the books of account or other documents seized under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) objects for any reason to the approval given by the Commissioner under sub-section (8), he may make an application to the Board stating therein the reasons for such objection, and requesting for the return of the books of account or other documents.”
12. Sub-section (12) visualises a hearing by the Board which may pass any order it deems fit on such an application.
13. The procedure, therefore, can be summarised as follows. The documents can be retained for 180 days unless an order is passed by the authorised officer which is approved by the Commissioner. This order can allow for detention of the seized books, of account and other documents beyond 180 days. If this approval is objected to by the person concerned, he may apply to the Board, who after hearing can pass such orders as it deems fit either upholding the further retention or directing the return. If no order is passed, then the person concerned cannot apply to the Board nor can he be heard.
14. In this case, there is absence of an order beyond June 30, 1982. We have been told that an order was passed but the same, has not been found.
15. In any event, that order was never communicated to the petitioner and an order which is signed and lost in the Department does not seem, in our opinion, to be of much value. We, therefore, find that the retention beyond June 30, 1982, and up to October 5, 1983, is not valid. Even if an order was passed which is lost, we do not know for what period that order was to continue. It may be for a short period, it may be for a long period. But, the period for which the orders are said to be missing is from June 30, 1982, to October 5, 1983, which is a long period far in excess of 180 days. The order purported to have been made on October 5, 1983, has been communicated to the petitioner, but does not give any reasons. The order states:
“Approval is hereby accorded under section 131(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle VI, New Delhi, for continued retention of books of account and documents of M/s. Survir Enterprises, 8-9-10, Nehru Place, New Delhi, as specified in Income-tax Officer's proposal referred to above till September 30, 1984.”
16. It has been stated before us and this appears from the record also that this order was really passed under section 132(8), i.e, this is an order purporting to extend the period of retention. The question of extending the period of retention would arise only if the period had already been extended up to October 5, 1983. There cannot be a gap of a single day because section 132(8) only allows extension of the time and not a fresh retention. This means that on a plain reading of the section, the retention is invalid.
17. If the order had been a valid order in the sense of being merely an extension of period, the assessee could have moved the Board. But, in this case, there seems to be no valid order after June 30, 1982, and, therefore, the petitioner has rightly moved this court.
18. Though several points have been argued before us, we think the present case is covered by the two reported cases cited before us, namely, Metal Fittings Pvt. Ltd.…Petitioner v. Union Of India…, [1983] 141 ITR 758 (Delhi) and CIT v. Oriental Rubber Works, [1984] 145 ITR 477 (SC). In the first case, this court held that the pre-condition for retention beyond 180 days required that reasons for retaining the books should be recorded by the authorised officer and the approval of the Commissioner obtained. It was also held that the approval had to be taken before 180 days expired as otherwise the retention would become invalid. We, respectively, agree with this reasoning.
19. In the case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that the reasons had to be recorded, approved by the Commissioner and communicated to the assessee. It was held that without communication, the order would be invalid. The view of the Division Bench of this court has, therefore, been upheld. It has also been held that without communication, the approval itself would become invalid.
20. Applying these two decisions to the facts of this case, we have no hesitation in holding that whatever the position may be up to June 30, 1982, thereafter, the retention was not in accordance with law. In this case, not only is the order for retention after June 30, 1982, said to be lost, but we do not even know for what period it was recorded. Furthermore, there is little doubt that it was not communicated to the petitioner, even if it was passed. It, therefore, became invalid.
21. It was submitted that the petitioner had delayed this writ petition. Nevertheless, the books are still with the Income-tax Department though they had to be returned long ago. So, the delay in filing the writ petition, if any, is not very relevant. Taking up the position now from October 5, 1983, when the order under section 131(3) was passed, we may say that this order can be read as an order under section 132(8), and the files which were shown to us, which we never showed to the assessee, seem to confirm the fact that the Income-tax Officer was wanting a further extension under section 132(8). Nevertheless, once the retention of the books beyond June 30, 1982, became invalid, it could not be validated by a new order passed on October 5, 1983. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the present retention of the books is totally invalid and the books have got to be returned to the assessee.
22. It is indeed unfortunate that we have to reach this conclusion in a case in which these books have been retained by the Department for taking some action which was stated to be pending before various authorities. Learned counsel for the respondent stated that even if we order the return of the books, we should give directions to the petitioner to keep them intact and direct that they may be produced before the Department as and when required. We find ourselves unable to give such a direction. Once the bar set out in section 132(8) operates, the Department has got to return the books of account and other seized documents to the person concerned. However, in order to facilitate the return, we would direct that these documents and books be returned on or before December 12, 1984. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this writ petition. Counsel's fee Rs. 500.
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