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Suresh Kumar v. Baldev Raj .

Delhi High Court
May 24, 1984
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Judgment Summary — J.D. Jain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an eviction application against the respondent-tenant in respect of a portion of property No. C-II/146, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, describing himself as a co-owner/landlord and a legal representative of his mother Smt. Parvati, who allegedly held title under a conveyance and a lease-deed executed by the President of India.

Photostat copies of the certified lease-deed and conveyance deed were filed with the eviction application and were tendered in evidence by the petitioner (marked 'B' & 'C') when he was examined as AW 4. The petitioner also called AW 2 (Shri Jang Bahadur Singh, a U.D.C. in the office of the Land & Development Office) to prove that the property belonged to Smt. Parvati and that an application for mutation had been made by her heirs; AW 2 was examined on 20 October 1982.

During AW 2's examination, photostat copies 'B' & 'C' were apparently not put to him, and the witness left without furnishing photostat copies of two letters that the respondent's counsel relied on; the court directed those letters to be exhibited as RWx 1 and RWx 2. Later, when the petitioner gave evidence, he tendered a photostat copy of a communication dated 1 March 1983 from the Land & Development Office (marked 'A'); it was admitted subject to costs which the respondent's counsel declined to accept.

After close of evidence and before judgment, the petitioner filed an application under Order XVII Rule 1 read with Order XVIII Rules 3, 17 & 17A and section 151 CPC seeking to recall AW 2 to prove documents 'A', 'B' and 'C' and to obtain the two letters to be exhibited as RWx 1 and RWx 2. The trial court rejected that application by order dated 4 January 1984. The petitioner sought revision of that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court should exercise its discretion under Order XVIII Rule 17 (Code of Civil Procedure) to recall a witness who has already been examined, for the purpose of proving documents (photostat copies and originals/certified copies) offered in evidence.
  2. Whether permitting recall in these circumstances would amount to permitting a party to "fill up the lacuna" in evidence and thereby unfairly prejudice the opposite party, or whether it would be a permissible rectification of an omission.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The documents marked 'A', 'B' and 'C' had to be proved by the concerned official of the Land & Development Office (AW 2), making it necessary to recall AW 2.
  • The photostat copies and the original letter dated 1 March 1983 had been placed on the record; the omission to have originals or certified copies placed or to have AW 2 prove them was inadvertent and capable of rectification.
  • Allowing recall would not amount to filling a lacuna in the evidence but would only permit admission of proper admissible evidence that had been left out.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The petitioner was aware of the existence of the documents when the eviction petition was instituted yet chose to file only photostat copies and failed to have them proved when AW 2 was examined.
  • Recalling AW 2 would amount to filling up the lacuna in evidence, which would prejudice the respondent; consequently, the application to recall should be refused.
  • The respondent had no objection to the photostat copies of the two letters being placed on record as RWx 1 and RWx 2 but opposed recalling AW 2 to prove the other documents.
  • The respondent relied on precedents (T. Ramachandra Murthy v. K. Rama Murthy and Altaf Hussain v. Nasreen Zahra) to support the proposition that Rule 17 should not be used to permit filling gaps in evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T. Ramachandra Murthy v. K. Rama Murthy and others, AIR 1980 Andhra Pradesh 265 Supports the proposition that the power under Order XVIII Rule 17 should not be exercised to recall a witness after the hearing is over (the cited instance concerned an application made after judgment had been reserved). The court distinguished this case on its facts: the cited application there was made after judgment had been reserved, and the present court held that the mere stage of the case should not be the sole controlling factor; discretion may be exercised before judgment is pronounced.
Altaf Hussain v. Nasreen Zahra, AIR 1978 Allahabad 515 States that the power under Rule 17 should not be exercised lightly but sparingly and in exceptional cases. The court expressed respectful agreement with this principle but held that the present matter was an appropriate exceptional case in which the interests of justice required allowing recall, subject to safeguards (costs and opportunity to rebut).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reproducing Order XVIII Rule 17: “The Court may at any stage of the suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit.”

From a plain reading the court found that Rule 17 vests a discretion in the trial court to recall a witness at any stage prior to pronouncement of judgment; the discretion can therefore be exercised even after the parties' evidence has concluded. However, the court emphasised that the discretion must be exercised judicially and according to well-accepted principles, not arbitrarily or capriciously.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court noted: (1) the petitioner had filed photostat copies of documents ('A', 'B' & 'C') but had not tendered originals or certified copies that alone could constitute proper secondary evidence; (2) AW 2 — the official witness who could properly prove the deeds and related documents — had been examined but the relevant photostat copies were not put to him and he left without furnishing copies of two letters; (3) the petitioner had been indiscreet in not filing originals or certified copies or getting AW 2 to prove them at the time, but the documents (or photostats) had been on the record and the respondent was aware of them.

The court addressed the respondent's contention that allowing recall would be tantamount to permitting the petitioner to "fill up the lacuna" in the evidence. The court distinguished such an impermissible filling of lacuna from rectifying an omission where admissible evidence that should have been placed on record was inadvertently omitted. On the facts, the court regarded the matter as rectification of an omission rather than filling a deliberate lacuna.

Regarding the precedents relied upon by the respondent, the court observed that the first precedent involved recall sought after judgment was reserved, and therefore the stage of the case was material in that instance; the present circumstances were different. The court agreed with the principle from the second precedent that Rule 17 should be used sparingly and in exceptional cases, but concluded that the present case was such an exceptional case where the interests of justice favored allowing recall, provided safeguards (costs and opportunity to rebut) were imposed to protect the respondent from prejudice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the revision petition. It set aside the impugned order of 4 January 1984 and directed the trial court to recall AW 2 and allow the documents mentioned in the petitioner's application to be proved in accordance with law.

Terms and immediate consequences:

  • The recall and proof of documents are to be permitted subject to payment of Rs. 200 as costs by the petitioner.
  • The respondent is to be afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence in rebuttal, if any.

The decision is limited to the parties and facts before the court: it allowed recall as a rectification of an omission and emphasised that Rule 17 confers discretionary power to recall witnesses before judgment, to be exercised judicially and sparingly. No broader novel precedent beyond these concretely stated principles is articulated in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

J.D Jain, J.:— This revision petition is directed against order dated 4th January, 1984 of an Additional Rent Controller rejecting the application of the petitioner dated 25th August 1983 made under order xvii rule 1 read with order xvii rules 3, 17 & 17a read with section 151 of the code of civil procedure (for short the code) for recalling a witness to prove certain documents.

2. The facts germane to the decision of this revision petition succinctly are that the petitioner filed an application for eviction of the respondent-tenant from the premises in question viz., portion of property No. C-II/146, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, which is a Govt. built property. His contention was that he was a co-owner/landlord of the premises in question being one of the legal representatives of his mother Smt. Parvati who was the owner of the said property under a conveyance and a lease-deed executed by the President of India in her favour. He filed photostat copies of the certified copies of the lease-deed and the conveyance deed alongwith the application. These documents were marked ‘B’ & ‘C’ when he tendered the same in evidence during the course of his own examination as AW 4. He also examined Shri Jang Bahadur Singh, a U.D.C in the office of the Land & Development Office, as AW 2 to prove that the property in question belonged to Smt. Parvati and that an application for mutation had been made by her legal heirs which was pending at that time. This witness was examined on 20th October 1982. It would, however, appear that the photostat copies marked ‘B’ & ‘C’ were somehow not put to this witness although he was generally examined with respect to the title of Smt. Parvati to the property in question. During cross-examination the learned counsel for the respondent elicited same information from him which was based on a couple of letters. A direction was made by the Court to the witness to file photostat copies of those letters and the same were then to be exhibited as RWx 1 and RWx 2. However, it would appear that the witness went away without furnishing photostat copies of the two documents. When the petitioner stepped into witness-box himself, he deposed that he had received a communication dated Ist March 1983 from the Land & Development Office stating that the mutation of succession had since been sanctioned in their favour and he filed a photostat copy thereof which was marked ‘A’. It was allowed to be tendered subject to payment of costs but the costs were not accepted by learned counsel for the respondent.

3. After the close of evidence by both the parties, the matter came up for hearing of arguments before the trial Court. Wisdom then downed on the petitioner that he had not filed the original documents and the photostat copies filed by him were not admissible as secondary evidence. So, realising this lapse on his part he moved the aforesaid application for recalling AW 2 to prove the documents marked ‘A’, ‘B’, & ‘C’ and also to supply photostat copies of the documents which were to be exhibited as RWx 1 and RWx 2.

4. The application was opposed by the respondent tooth and nail on the ground that the petitioner was well aware of the existence of these documents even when he instituted the eviction petition but he chose to file only photostat copies. Moreover, he failed to get them proved from AW 2 when he was under examination. So, he opposed the prayer for recalling AW 2 although he had no objection to photostat copies of letters to be exhibited as RWx 1 and RWx 2 being placed on the record. His primary objection was that giving an opportunity to the petitioner to recall the witness would be tantamount to filling up the lacuna in evidence and he would be highly prejudiced thereby. This argument found favour with the learned trial Court and his application for recalling the witness to prove the aforesaid documents was dismissed. It may also be mentioned here that the petitioner had placed certified copies of the conveyance deed and lease-deed which had been obtained by him as far back as 1981 and also the original letter dated 1st March 1983 received from the Land & Development Officer, alongwith his aforesaid application.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Order XVIII Rule 17 runs as under:

“The Court may at any stage of the suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit.”

On a plain reading of this provision it is obvious that discretion vests in the Court to recall a witness who has been examined earlier at any stage of the suit which would evidently mean any stage before the judgment is pronounced. So, the discretion vesting in the Court under this Rule can be exercised even after evidence of the parties has concluded, of course, it mist be exercised judicially and on well accepted judicial principles and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The question which falls for consideration, therefore, is whether the circumstances of this case warrant that the discretion should have been exercised in favour of the petitioner or not.

6. As stated above, the photostat copies of all the documents excepting Ex. RWx 1 & RWx 2 had been filed by the petitioner. Somehow or the other it did not occur to him that he ought to file the original documents or at least certified copies of the conveyance deed and the lease-deed which alone could constitute legally admissible secondary evidence. As for the other two documents they were to be produced by AW 2 at the instance of the respondent himself. The original letter of the Land & Development Officer dated 1st March 1983 ought to have been produced when AW 4 was in the witness-box but he withheld the same due to inadvertence or otherwise. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner precisely is that documents marked ‘A’, ‘B’ & ‘C’ have to be proved by the concerned official of the Land & Development Office, viz., AW 2, and, therefore, it has become necessary to recall him. There is no doubt that the petitioner has been indiscreet in this respect but having regard to the fact that these documents have all along been on the record and that the respondent was fully aware of the same it cannot be said by any stretch of reasoning that instant is a case of filling up the lacuna. At best, it is a case of rectifying an omission which was somehow allowed to persist. It will not fling any surprise on the opposite side.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent has adverted to a couple of reported decisions, viz, T. Ramachandra Murthy v. K. Rama Murthy and others, AIR 1980 Andhra Pradesh 265 and Altaf Hussain v. Nasreen Zahra, AIR 1978 Allahabad 515, in support of his contention that the power vesting under Rule 17 cannot be exercised so as to enable a party to fill up the lacuna in evidence. In the former case, there is no doubt, an observation to this effect. In the said case an application for recalling a witness was made after the judgment had been reserved. The learned Judge, therefore, observed that “the jurisdiction of the Court was sought to be invoked for recalling the witness at the time when the hearing of the case was over”. With great respect I do not agree that the stage of the case alone should weigh with the Court to an extent as to over-shadow the other aspects of the matter. As observed by me above and also in Altaf Hussain's case (supra), the power under this rule can be exercised even of the stage of writing a judgment. It bears repetition that the object in the instant case is not to fill up the lacuna by adducing any fresh evidence but it is only to bring the proper admissible evidence on record which was somehow left out and instead photostat copies had been filed.

8. In the second case, it was observed by a learned Judge of Allahabad High Court that the power under Rule 17 should not be exercised lightly and it should be used sparingly and in exceptional cases only. I am in respectful agreement with this view and I feel that the instant is a case in which the interests of justice demand that the petitioner should be permitted to bring proper documents on the record rather than be punished for certain lapses on his part which may well be attributed to inadvertence or lack of proper advice. Certainly the respondent can be compensated by awarding costs and also by affording an opportunity to adduce any evidence in rebuttal, if he so wishes.

9. Under the circumstances, I allow this petition, set aside the impugned order and direct the trial Court to recall AW 2 and allow the documents mentioned in the aforesaid application to be proved in accordance with law. It shall be, however, subject to payment of Rs. 200/- as costs and the respondent shall also have opportunity to adduce evidence in rebuttal, if any.