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Prahlad Rai Dalmia v. Union Of India .
Factual and Procedural Background
M/s. Prahlad Rai Dalmia filed a suit against the Union of India seeking a declaration that Acceptance of Tender No. BTX-7/62707/364.PACD was not a valid and concluded contract. In paragraph 24 of the plaint jurisdiction was alleged to lie in the Delhi courts by averring that the Union of India has its principal office at New Delhi. The single judge tried jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, held that Delhi courts lacked jurisdiction and ordered the plaint returned for presentation to the proper court. Dalmia appealed against the single judge's order to the Division Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the courts at Delhi have jurisdiction to try the suit filed by M/s. Prahlad Rai Dalmia against the Union of India.
- Whether the Union of India can be sued at Delhi merely on the ground that it "carries on business" or has its office at New Delhi (i.e., interpretation and application of the expression in Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, to the Union).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The plaint averred that the Union of India has its principal office at New Delhi, conferring jurisdiction on Delhi courts (para. 24).
- Counsel for Dalmia (Mr. Sayal) relied on Union of India v. Ladulal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1681, to support jurisdiction in Delhi.
Respondent's Position
- The Union of India alleged breach of the contract and claimed damages of Rs. 4,13,225/-. The contract's arbitration clause was invoked; the arbitrator sat at Bombay and made the award there (indicating no part of the cause of action arose at Delhi).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Bakhtawar Singh Bal Krishan, (1984) Delhi Law Times 153 | Held that the Union of India is not a natural person; the phrase in Section 20 CPC "voluntarily resides, carries on business and personally works for gain" refers to natural persons, not legal entities. | The court followed this decision and applied its rule to hold that Delhi courts do not obtain jurisdiction over the Union merely because it carries on business at New Delhi. |
| Binani Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, ILR (1975) II Delhi 196 | Adopted the view that the Union of India cannot be treated as a natural person for the purposes of Section 20 CPC. | The court relied on the same view in concluding that the Union cannot be sued at Delhi simply because it carries on business there. |
| Union of India v. Ladulal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1681 | Recognized that in the case of the railways (a commercial activity) the Government could be sued at its headquarters; treated railway activity as business. | The court distinguished this authority as limited to railway commercial activity and declined to extend its principle to all governmental activities; Dalmia's reliance on this case was rejected. |
| Director of Rationing & Distribution v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1960 Cal. 1335 | Illustrated that rationing of food is a sovereign function (not a commercial one). | The court cited this case to support the distinction between commercial and sovereign functions when determining whether government activity renders it suable at its headquarters. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed jurisdiction by reference to precedent and the nature of the Government's activity. It accepted the view in Bakhtawar Singh and Binani Bros. that the Union of India is a legal entity (not a natural person) and that the wording of Section 20 CPC referring to "voluntarily resides, carries on business and personally works for gain" applies to natural persons. The court distinguished Ladulal Jain as confined to the commercial activity of the railways and therefore not a general rule for all government contracts. It emphasized the distinction between commercial activities (where suits at headquarters may be appropriate) and sovereign functions (where they are not). Applying these principles to the present facts, the contract here concerned supply under a tender invited by the Director General of Civil Supplies, disputes were referred to arbitration which sat in Bombay and made the award there, and no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi. Dalmia's sole ground for suing in Delhi was that the Union carries on business at New Delhi; the court found that insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Direct consequences: the appeal is dismissed; the parties are directed to bear their own costs; the plaint will be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court.
No broader new precedent was announced; the decision applies existing authorities and distinguishes Ladulal Jain on its facts.
Avadh Behari, J.:— This is an appeal from the order of a learned single judge of this court dated March 31, 1981.
2. The short question in this appeal is whether Delhi courts have jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the appellant, M/s. Prahlad Rai Dalmia, against the respondent, Union of India, Dalmia filed a suit against the Union of India seeking declaration that the contract, namely, the Acceptance of Tender No. BTX-7/62707/364.PACD entered into between the parties was not a valid and a concluded contract. In paragraph 24 of the plaint the jurisdiction was sought to be conferred on the courts in Delhi by making the following averments:
“24. That the Defendant Union of India have its principal office at the functions at New Delhi within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court………”
3. This was tried as a preliminary issue. It was decided by the learned judge against Dalmia. He hold that Delhi courts have no jurisdiction to try this suit. Consequently he ordered the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. From his order Dalmia appeals to this Court.
4. This question of jurisdiction came before a division bench of this court in similar circumstances in the case of Union of India v. Bakhtawar Singh Bal Krishan, (1984) Delhi Law Times 153. A division bench of this court (D.K Kapur and S. Ranganathan JJ) held that the Union of India is riot a natural person. Nor a corporation. It is legal entity. Therefore, the expression used in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, “voluntarily resides, carries on business and personally works for gain” refers to natural persons and not legal entities. In Binani Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, ILR (1975) II Delhi 196, the same view was taken. The learned judges in Bakhtawar Singh's case followed Binani Bros. (P) Ltd. and held that Union of India cannot be sued at Delhi simply on the ground that it carries on business and works for gain at New Delhi.
5. Mr. Sayal, on behalf of Dalmia, has strongly relied on Union of India v. Ladulal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1681. This decision was cited before the judges in Binani Bros. They distinguished the case and said:
“We do not read the cited case, therefore, to be lying down the rule that the courts at Delhi will have jurisdiction in regard to all disputes relating to all contracts executed by Union of India simply because the Union has its ‘office’ at Delhi”.
As we read Ladulal Jain's case we think that this case was limited to the commercial activity of the railways. Railway was held to be a business. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that in case of railway you can sue the Government at its headquarters. The principle of that case cannot be extended to all other activities of the Government. The commercial activity is to be distinguished from the sovereign functions of the Government. Rationing of food is a sovereign function. (See Director of Rationing & Distribution v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1960 Cal. 1335.) But running of railways is a business, it is the nature of activity which defines its character.
6. The Railway is a business. But not the present contract which was entered into by Dalmia with the Director General of Civil Supplies. In this case the Director General invited by tender quotations for supply of certain articles. Dalmia submitted a tender. A contract was formed. The Union of India alleged breach of the contract. They claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 4,13,225/-. In terms of the arbitration clause in the contract the disputes between the parties were referred to arbitration. The arbitrator held his sittings at Bombay. He made his award there. So no part of the cause of action arose at Delhi. Only on the ground that the Union of India carries on business at Delhi, Dalmia brought the present suit in Delhi. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Bakhtawar Singh's case and hold, in agreement with the learned single judge, that Delhi courts have no jurisdiction to try the suit.
7. For these reasons the appeal is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
8. The plaint will be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court.
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