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Suraj Mal & Others v. Babu Lal And Another S

Delhi High Court
Nov 28, 1984
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Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns members of an Oswal Jain family in Delhi whose common ancestor Lotan Mal died in 1928 leaving his widow Lad Bai, sons Kastur Chand and Suraj Mal, and two daughters. Kastur Chand died in 1936 leaving his widow Tara Bai (respondent No. 2). Tara Bai purportedly adopted Babu Lal (respondent No. 1) as her son on February 3, 1949.

On May 21, 1949 Suraj Mal sued for partition claiming one-third shares for himself, Lad Bai and Tara Bai, denied the adoption, but impleaded Babu Lal. That suit was withdrawn on November 4, 1949 with permission to sue again. On July 19, 1965 Babu Lal and Tara Bai instituted the suit that produced the present appeal, claiming partition of a one-third share and rendition of accounts. The defendants (Suraj Mal and Lad Bai) challenged the validity of the adoption, asserted that Tara Bai had no inheritance right on Kastur Chand's death, alleged absence of any custom permitting such adoption and asserted adverse possession/time-bar and management rights as Karta.

The learned single judge (judgment dated January 23, 1973) found, inter alia, that (1) Babu Lal was adopted by Tara Bai on February 3, 1949; (2) a Jain widow of Oswal sect is competent to adopt a son of any age (including a married man); (3) on Kastur Chand's death his undivided interest devolved by survivorship on his coparcener and not on his widow; (4) no ouster or adverse possession was proved and the suit was not barred by limitation; and (5) only certain immoveable properties (para 11 items (i) to (iii) of the plaint) existed at suit date and Babu Lal was entitled to a decree of one-third partition in respect of those and to accounts only for the period after the suit was filed. A preliminary decree and appointment of a commissioner followed.

The defendants appealed against the single judge's findings (except finding No. 3 which they accepted). Tara Bai filed cross-objections attacking finding No. 3. The present judgment disposes of the appeal and cross-objections.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the adoption of Babu Lal by Tara Bai (February 3, 1949) was valid in law, in particular given that Babu Lal was alleged to be older than or equal in age to the adopter.
  2. Whether the appellants (Suraj Mal and Lad Bai) had acquired ownership of the joint family properties by adverse possession.
  3. Whether, as a matter raised in cross-objections, the undivided interest of Kastur Chand in coparcenary property devolved by survivorship on his coparcener (Suraj Mal) rather than on his widow Tara Bai, and the related effect of statutory changes (e.g., Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937) given the dates involved.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The adoption was invalid because Babu Lal was older than or equal in age to the adopter Tara Bai, and Tara Bai was not competent to adopt such a person under any controlling custom or law.
  • There was no custom in Delhi permitting Tara Bai to adopt Babu Lal; such a custom would be unnatural and against public policy.
  • Tara Bai's signatures on the adoption deed were obtained by misrepresentation and the deed purported to include terms (retention of her share for life and obedience by the adoptee) which were not actually incorporated; she repudiated the deed.
  • Babu Lal lacked free consent to the adoption.
  • The appellants had managed the properties as Karta and had, in effect, ousted the respondents; the suit was barred by limitation and the defendants had acted in a manner equivalent to taking adverse possession or asserting hostile title (including sale of a property in 1951 and retaining proceeds).
  • Where the widow had no right in coparcenary property at the time of her husband's death (1936), later statutes (e.g., Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937) did not operate retrospectively to give her such rights.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The adoption took place and was proved by unimpeachable eyewitnesses and documentary evidence (adoption deed Ex. P-1 and photograph Ex. P-3).
  • Among Jains (including Oswal sect) adoption is essentially a secular institution to secure a heir, and there is no restriction as to the age or marital status of the adoptee; therefore a widow could validly adopt a man even if he were older or married.
  • Tara Bai had not validly repudiated the adoption; the written statement relied upon by the appellants was prepared under instructions and her other explanations indicated the deed was not cancelled by her act; she had no right to cancel the adoption unilaterally.
  • The appellants' management of the properties and realisation of rents was in the capacity of Karta or manager of joint family properties and did not constitute ouster or adverse possession.
  • There was insufficient evidence to show any hostile or adverse possession or a clear denial of respondents' title prior to institution of suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad, 32 Allahabad 247 That Jains were governed by Hindu Law in matters of adoption except where custom varied the law; adoption among Jains had secular aspects. Used to support proposition that Jains follow Hindu law broadly but customs can vary rules of adoption; cited as authority for understanding adoption among Jains.
Chottay Lal v. Chunno Lall and Others, 6 IA 15 Earlier authority on adoption/custom and Hindu law interaction. Cited as part of the body of authorities showing how adoption among Jains relates to Hindu law and custom.
Parshotam Ganpat Gujar v. Veni and Ganpat Gujar, AIR 1921 Bombay 147 Custom and law as applied to adoption among Jains. Relied upon in the survey of authorities supporting the secular nature of adoption among Jains and the absence of strict age restrictions under certain customs.
Hira Chand Gangji v. Bowji Sojpal and Another, AIR 1939 Bombay 377 Authority on adoption/custom among Jains. Included in the list of cases establishing how adoption is treated in Jain community customs.
Sundar Lal v. Baldeo Singh & Others, AIR 1932 Lahore 426 Authority relevant to adoption and customs. Part of the judicial material the court relied on to explain the law applicable to Jains in adoption matters.
Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj, (XXV Calcutta Weekly Notes 273) Held that in the Sitambari sect of Jains the adopted son may be a grown up and married man at time of adoption. Relied upon to show that certain Jain sects permit adoption of grown up or married persons.
Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Dass, 29 Allahabad 495 Held that a married man may lawfully be adopted by a widow among Jains. Used to support the conclusion that among Jains a widow can adopt a married man; cited as persuasive precedent.
Manak Chand v. Munna Lal, 1909 Punjab Records 95 Among Oswal Jains adoption is a secular transaction; no restriction of age; widow may adopt without husband's authorisation; a married man with children may be adopted. Applied directly: parties were Oswal Jains of Delhi; the authority supports the proposition that age or marital status does not invalidate adoption among Oswal Jains.
Chandreswar Prosad Narain Singh v. Bisheshwar Pratap Narain Singh, 1927 Indian Cases 289 (Patna) Held that Hindu law imposed no restriction as to age provided adoption was before upanayana or before marriage in certain classes; adoption of a boy older than adopter not necessarily void. Referenced to show that even under Hindu law there was not an absolute age restriction and thus supported the general proposition on age not invalidating adoption.
Balabai Tukaram Babar v. Mahadu Krishna Babar, AIR 1924 Bombay 349 Adoption of a boy older than the adoptive father in Bombay Presidency was held valid. Cited for the principle that an adoptee older than adopter does not necessarily invalidate adoption under the relevant regional rules/customs.
Punjabai v. Shamrao, AIR 1955 Nagpur 293 Held that even a minor widow could validly adopt a person older in age than herself provided she had attained age of discretion. Relied upon to reject the argument that age inequality alone renders an adoption invalid and to show judicial recognition of such adoptions.
Hardit Singh & others v. Gurmukh Singh and others, AIR 1918 Privy Council 1 Exclusive possession by one joint family member does not by itself establish ouster or adverse possession against other joint members. Applied to hold that Suraj Mal's exclusive management/collection of rents did not amount to ouster or adverse possession of other coparceners.
Gajapati Narasimbha Deo Garu and another v. Gajapati Krishnachandra Deo Guru and Anr, AIR 1920 Madras 793 Possession by one co-parcener is deemed possession on behalf of all; lack of enjoyment by other co-parceners does not deprive them of rights. Relied upon to reject contention that long non-enjoyment by respondents amounted to loss of rights by adverse possession.
Chhotelal Babu Lal v. Premlal Girdhari Lal, AIR 1977 MP 34 Case dealing with adverse possession principles (noted as fact-specific). Distinguished on facts; court held it turned on peculiar facts and was of no help to appellants' case.
Smt. Samundra Devi v. Chand Singh, AIR 1979 HP 24 Decision on adverse possession (fact-specific). Distinguished on facts and not helpful to appellants' case.
Moni Devi v. Hadibandhu, AIR 1955 Orissa 73 Discusses non-retrospective operation of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. Applied to conclude the 1937 Act did not affect rights in respect of a death occurring prior to its commencement (Kastur Chand died in 1936).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands: validity of the adoption, and whether the defendants had acquired adverse possession.

Adoption — factual proof and legal character:

  • The court found the fact of adoption conclusively proved by eyewitness testimony (Sumer Chand, Chuttan Lal, Kundan Lal, Bahadur Singh, Tara Bai and Babu Lal) and corroborated by the adoption deed (Ex. P-1) and a photograph (Ex. P-3).
  • The principal legal objection — that Babu Lal was older or equal in age to Tara Bai and therefore the adoption was invalid — was addressed through doctrinal and precedential analysis: the court noted that Jains, while differing from orthodox Hindus in some religious practices, have followed broadly the features of Hindu law; but in matters of adoption Jains' customs might vary the general Hindu rules.
  • The court reviewed legal authorities and recognized that among many Jain communities (including Oswal Jains) the object of adoption is secular — to secure an heir and perpetuate the family name — and so age and marital status restrictions applicable in certain Hindu schools are not necessarily operative among Jains. The court cited textual material (Mulla's Hindu Law) and multiple judicial decisions (including Manak Chand v. Munna Lal and Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Dass) to support the proposition that among Jains there was no restriction of age and even a married man could be adopted.
  • The court rejected the appellants' contention that pleadings established that custom alone governed the parties, noting inconsistent averments in the pleadings and the lack of legal authority to back the contention that custom (to the exclusion of Hindu law or established precedent) forbade such adoption.
  • Allegations of want of consent, fraud or repudiation were considered and rejected on the evidence: the circumstances (e.g., the photograph showing the parties at the ceremony, the witnesses' testimony, and Tara Bai's cross-examination explanations) did not establish lack of consent or effective repudiation; nor did they establish that the deed had been validly cancelled by Tara Bai.
  • Accordingly, the court concluded the adoption was legally valid in the circumstances of the Oswal Jain community and on the evidence before it.

Adverse possession and possession by co-parceners:

  • The court recalled the legal definition and requirements of adverse possession: possession hostile to the true owner, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and under colour of title for the requisite period.
  • It emphasized the settled principle that possession by a co-parcener is presumed to be for the benefit of all co-parceners and cannot, by itself, be treated as adverse unless there is evidence of ouster — mere management or receipt of rents by a Karta does not establish hostile possession.
  • The court applied Privy Council and High Court authorities (Hardit Singh and Gajapati Narasimbha Deo Garu cases) to hold that Suraj Mal's exclusive management and rent recovery were consistent with his role as Karta and did not amount to an assertion of hostile title or ouster of the respondents.
  • The court examined alleged acts (withdrawal of the 1949 suit, sale of one property in 1951 and retention of sale proceeds) and found no evidentiary foundation for an assertion that appellants had denied the respondents' title or had asserted a hostile claim prior to 1950 or thereafter; in particular, the withdrawal of the earlier suit was explained as being on advice and did not amount to a plea of hostile title.
  • On the evidence, there was "not a scintilla" to support adverse possession: respondents' oral demands for rent and appellants' alleged refusals were insufficient to demonstrate an adverse claim.
  • The court therefore ruled that the appellants had not acquired ownership by adverse possession.

Limitation and statutory points:

  • The court noted Article 57 of the Indian Limitation Act provides three years for a suit seeking declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, commencing when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff, but observed that Article 57 applies to declaration suits specifically and not to suits for possession (noting the court might still have to decide on validity in possession suits).
  • On the cross-objections concerning the rule of devolution and the effect of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (1937), the court held that the 1937 Act came into force on April 14, 1937 — after Kastur Chand's death in 1936 — and thus had no retrospective operation; accordingly the widow had no coparcenary interest at the time of his death under the law then prevailing.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Appeal and cross-objections dismissed.

Direct consequences and immediate implications as set out in the opinion:

  • The adoption of Babu Lal by Tara Bai (February 3, 1949) was declared valid by the court.
  • The appellants (Suraj Mal and Lad Bai) were held not to have acquired the suit properties by adverse possession; the suit was not barred by limitation in that respect.
  • The earlier findings of the learned single judge (including entitlement of Babu Lal to one-third share in the immoveable properties specified in para 11 items (i)–(iii) of the plaint and entitlement to accounts only for the period subsequent to the date of suit) stand; a preliminary decree and appointment of a commissioner for partition and accounting as ordered below remain operative.
  • Cross-objections attacking the single judge's finding on devolution (finding No. 3) failed; the court reiterated that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 did not operate retrospectively to affect the position at Kastur Chand's death in 1936, and thus the cross-objections were dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs on that aspect.
  • No wider change in law beyond application of existing case law and statutory interpretation was announced; the judgment applies established principles to the facts and relies on existing authorities regarding adoption among Jains and rules on adverse possession and survivorship.

Costs: The appeal was dismissed with costs; in respect of the cross-objections the court ordered that parties bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

G.C Jain, J.:— The parties to this appeal are Jains of Oswal sect resident in Delhi. Lotan Mal, the common ancestor died on November, 3, 1928 leaving behind a widow Lad Bai, two sons Kastur Chand and Suraj Mal, and two daughters. Kastur Chand was married to Tara Bai (respondent No. 2). Soon after his marriage he died on March 23, 1936 without leaving any issue. His widow adopted Babu Lal (responded No. 1) as a son on February 3, 1949.

2. On May 21, 1949 Suraj Mal brought a suit against his mother Lad Bai, Tara Bai and Babu Lal claiming 1/3rd share in the joint family property by partition. According to the averments in the plaint he, Lad Bai, and Tara Bai had 1/3rd share each in the joint family properties in suit. He denied the adoption of Babu Lal but impleaded him as a party for getting all the disputes settled. Lad Bai in her written statement disputed the factum as well as validity of the adoption. She however, had no objection to the partition. Tara Bai alleged that her signatures on the adoption deed were obtained by misrepresentation. The deed was to provide that she would continue to be the owner of her share till her life and Babu Lal would remain obedient to her and in case of violation of these terms she will have the right to repudiate the adoption deed. However, no such term was incorporated. When she came to know of this fact she tore away the deed. She asserted that the adoption could be made in law. Babu Lal averred that he was validly adopted by Tara Bai. Disputes raised in this case were however not decided because on the request of Suraj Mal he was allowed to withdraw the suit with permission to file another suit on the same cause of action by order dated November 4, 1949 (Ex. P-24).
3. On July 19, 1965 Babu Lal and Tara Bai, respondents herein, brought a suit (out of which the present appeal has arisen) against the appellants, Suraj Mal and Lad Bai (since deceased), claiming partition of their 1/3rd share in the joint family properties and rendition of accounts etc. for a period of 6 years prior to the institution of the suit. The details of the properties have been given in para 11 of the plaint. According to the averments in the plaint Lotan Mal was a Jain and governed by Hindu Law and custom in the matters of succession and adoption. Babu Lal was adopted by Tara Bai on February 3, 1949 in accordance with the custom prevalent in Jains and acquired all the rights of his adopted father Kastur Chand in the joint family along with Suraj Mal, Lad Bai and Tara Bai. Suraj Mal and Lad Bai have been managing the family properties and realising rents from the tenants since the death of Kastur Chand in 1936. Suraj Mal had sold two joint family properties and kept sale proceeds with him.
4. This suit was resisted by Suraj Mal and Lad Bai. According to their pleas Lotan Mal was governed by Hindu Law and not by custom. Tara Bai was the widow of Kastur Chand but she did not inherit his properties on his death in 1936. Babu Lal was not adopted by Tara Bai. She was not competent to adopt a son and in any case Babu Lal being older or equal in age to Tara Bai could not be lawfully adopted. There was no custom recognising such an adoption. Suraj Mal bad sold the two properties to pay off the antecedent debts. Neither Babu Lal nor Tara Bai had any interest or right in the properties in suit. In any case Suraj Mal had managed the properties as manager and KARTA and no suit for rendition of accounts was competent against him. They were in possession of the properties in dispute for more than 20 years openly without any obstruction and the suit was barred by time.
5. The learned single Judge vide his judgement dated January 23, 1973 recorded the following findings: —
(1) Babu Lal was adopted by Tara Bai on February 3, 1949.
(2) A Jain widow of Oswal sect was competent to adopt a son of any age and even married and the adoption was valid.
(3) On the death of Kastur Chand in 1936 his undivided interest in the coparcenery properties devalued on his coparcener by survivalship and not on his widow Tara Bai.
(4) The defendants (the present appellants) had failed to prove ouster of the plaintiffs (the present respondents) from the joint family properties for a period of 12 years and the suit was not barred by limitation.
(5) Immoveable properties mentioned in para 11 items (i) to (iii) of the plaint only existed on the date of suit. Babu Lal was entitled to a decree of 1/3rd share in these properties by partition and also to accounts for the period subsequent to the date of suit only.
6. A preliminary decree was passed accordingly and a local commissioner was appointed to partition the properties in terms of the judgment and also to examine the accounts.
7. Assailing the findings of the learned single judge accept the finding No. 3, the defendants (the appellants) have filed the present appeal.
8. Tara Bai plaintiff No. 2.respondent No. 2 has preferred cross-objections (C. M. 312/73). By way of these cross-objections she assails finding No. 3 of the learned single judge. This judgment will dispose of both the appeal and the cross-objections.
9. That the adoption took place as a fact is no longer in dispute. This is proved by unimpeachable evidence of Sumer Chand, Chuttan Lal, Kundan Lal, Bahadur Singh, Tara Bai and Babu Lal, who were all present at the time of the adoption ceremony and have stated in unequivocal terms that Babu Lal was taken in adoption by Tara Bai. Their evidence stands corroborated from the adoption deed (Ex. P-1) and the photograph (Ex. P-3) taken on that occasion.
10. The main question which has been seriously argued is whether the adoption is valid in law, the principal objection to adoption being based upon the fact that Babu Lal, the adopted son, was older or equal in age to Tara Bai, the adopter.
11. The parties are Jains. The Jains, no doubt, do not believe that a son, natural or adopted, confers any spiritual benefit on the father. The dead are forgotten soon after they are cremated. The living do not perform Sharadhs or religious ceremonies for the dead. They, however retain many of the customs of orthodox Hindus and have followed substantially the broad features of Hindu Law. They do not cease to be governed by Hindu Law, by lapses from orthodox Hindu practice or by deviation or dissent from orthodox Hindu doctrines. It is now settled law that in matters of adoption, (prior to the enactment of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act) they were governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is varied by custom. (See para 613 of Mulla's Hindu Law 15th edition; Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad 32 Allahabad 247 (1); Chottay Lal v. Chunno Lall and Others 6 IA 15; Parshotam Ganpat Gujar v. Veni and Ganpat Gujar, AIR 1921 Bombay 147 (2) (3); Hira Chand Gangji v. Bowji Sojpal and Another AIR 1939 Bombay 377 (4); and Sundar Lal v. Baldeo Singh & Others, AIR 1932 Lahore 426 (5).
12. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that the parties were governed by custom and custom only. Learned counsel could not show any Law in support of this contention. He relied on pleadings. In para 5 of the plaint it was averred that Babu Lal was adopted ‘according to custom prevailing in Delhi in Jain community’. In para 5 of the written statement it was averred that there was no custom prevalent in Delhi permitting Tara Bai to adopt Babu Lal. In any case Tara Bai could not adopt Babu Lal who was older or equal to her age. Such a custom was unnatural and against public policy. Learned counsel however conveniently forgot to refer to para 3 of the plaint where it was pleaded that Lotan Mal was a Jain and governed by the Hindu Law and custom in matters of succession and adoption. Appellants in para 3 of their written statement averred that he was governed by Hindu Law only. Pleadings, therefore, do not help the appellants. This contention has no merit.
13. In Mulla's Hindu Law 15th edition para 480 the law on the requirement of age of the adopted person is stated in these words: —
“ (4) there is a difference of opinion between the schools as to the age when a boy may be adopted: —
(i) in Bengal, Benares, Bihar and Orissa, the adoption must be before upanayana that is before the boy is invested with the sacred thread; it is immaterial that the adopted boy is older than the adopter
(ii) the above rule applies also in the Madras State; but if the person to be adopted is of the same gotra as the adopter, the adoption may be made even after, upanayana, provided it is made before marriage —
(iii) in the Bombay State, a person may be adopted at any age, though he may be older than the adopter and though he may be married and have children. The adoption is not invalid although it took place after the thread ceremony of the boy was performed.”
14. Thus in Bengal, Benaras, Bihar and Orissa a person can be adopted before he is invested with a sacred thread. According to all the schools (except Bombay school) he must not be married at the time of adoption. The object of adoption among Jains, however, is purely secular, i.e to secure a heir and perpetuate the adoption's name. It has no religious significance whatsoever. There is, therefore no restriction of age or marriage and a married man could be adopted among Jains.
15. In Lala Rup Chand v. Jambu Prasad (supra) the finding of the High Court that “among the Jains adoption is no religious ceremony, and that under the law or custom there is no restriction of age or marriage among them” was confirmed. In Sheokuarbai v. Jeoraj, (XXV Calcutta Weekly Notes, 273) (6) the Privy Council held that in Sitambari sect of Jains the adopted son may, at the time of his adoption, be a grown up and a married man. In Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Dass (29 Allahabad 495) (7) the High Court of Allahabad held that according to the law and custom prevailing amongst the Jain community a married man may lawfully be adopted by a widow.
16. The evidence of Muna Lal (PW-2) and Chuttan Lal (PW-4) disclosed that they both belonged to Oswal Jains and were married the time of their adoption. DW-5 Megh Raj admitted that one Panna Lal at the time of his adoption was married and had children. It was thus clear that amongst Jains there was no restriction as to age and even a married man could be adopted.
17. There being no restriction as to age amongst the Jains, it was immaterial if the adopted person was older or equal in age to the adopter. In Manak Chand v. Munna Lal 1909 Punjab Record 95 (8) the parties were Oswal Jains of Delhi. It was held that among Jains adoption was a purely secular transaction designed, inter alia, to perpetuate the name and family of the adopter without any religious meaning. No special ceremonies were necessary to give legal effect to adoption. A widow of a deceased Jain may adopt without any authorisation from her husband. A married man having children of his own may be adopted and it was not necessary that he must be younger than the adoptive fathers widow adopting him. This authority, in our judgment, proves that among Jains there was no restriction of age and a person equal or older in age to the adopter could be adopted. It may be mentioned here that in Chandreswar Prosad Narain Singh v. Bisheshwar Pratap Narain Singh (1927 Indian Cases 289 (9). Patna High Court had held that even Hindu Law imposed no restriction as to age and whatever be the age of the adopted son the adoption was valid if made before Upanayana if he belonged to any of the regenerate classes and before marriage. The adoption was not liable to be set aside if the boy adopted was older to the adopter. In Balabai Tukaram Babar v. Mahadu Krishna Babar AIR 1924 Bombay 349 (10) the adoption of a boy older than the adoptive father in Bombay Presidency was held valid. In Punjabai v. Shamrao (AIR 1955 Nagpur 293) (11) it was held that even a minor widow could validly adopt a person older in age than herself provided she had attained the age of discretion.
18. Appellants' learned counsel urged that the decision in Manohar Lal's case was based on evidence recorded in that case. However, in the present case none of the witnesses examined by the respondents could cite a single instance where adoptee was older or equal in age to the adopter; the said decision, therefore was of no help. We do not agree. This judgment, keeping in view the object of adoption among Jains and also the fact that even among orthodox Hindus there was no such general restriction, conclusively proves that among Oswal Jains the adoption, where adopted person was older or equal in age to the adopter, was valid.
19. The plea that such a custom was immoral or against public policy is devalid of any merit. It has been repeatedly recognised by the courts.
20. The contention, that the respondents had failed to prove the act of giving and taking and free consent of Babu Lal and, therefore, the adoption was invalid, has also no merit. Sumer Chand, Chuttan Lal, Kundan Lal Parekh, Bahadur Singh, Tara Bai and Babu Lal have stated that Babu Lal was given by his natural father Kapur Chand and taken in adoption by Tara Bai. Their evidence finds corporation from the photograph Ex. P-3 and the adoption deed Ex. P-1.
21. Tara Bai in cross-examination deposed that she had no talk with Babu Lal before she took him in adoption. She did not consider it necessary to obtain his consent for being adopted as her son because she had already obtained the consent of his natural father. Babu Lal also admitted that there was no talk between him and Tara Bai regarding adoption actually took place. From this evidence it cannot be inferred that Babu Lal was not consenting party. The fact that he allowed himself to be given in adoption by his father and the circumstance that in photograph Ex. P-3 taken at the time of adoption ceremony he was sitting just close to Tara Bai proves his free consent.
22. It was also argued that the adoption was a result of fraud and misrepresentation and had been repudiated by Tara Bai. Reliance was placed on Ex. D-1, certified copy of the written statement filed by Tara Bai in the suit which had been filed by Suraj Mal for partition of his 1/3rd share in the joint Hindu properties in 1949. In her written statement Tara Bai had stated that Kapur Chand had obtained the signatures on the adoption deed by playing a fraud. The adoption deed was to contain a term that she would re main the owner of her share till her life and Babu Lal would be obedient to her. No such term was included. When the came to know about this fact she tore it away. In cross-examination in the present suit she admitted that this written Statement had been prepared under the instructions. She, however, explained that two or three months after his adoption Babu Lal wanted to go back to his natural father at Bombay. She stopped him from doing so and threatened that if he went back to his natural father against her wishes she would destroy the deed of adoption. Babu Lal tried to snatch the deed from her in that process it was torn. In the written statement she took the said plea with the object of frightening Babu Lal so that he remained obedient to her. In view of this statement the version in Ex. D-1 is of consequence. In any case she had no right to cancel the adoption.
23. Tara Bai in her cross-examination deposed that she would not have adopted Babu Lal had she known that he was older in age to her. This part of her statement again is of no significance especially when there is no cogent evidence to prove that Babu Lal was older in age to Tara Bai. Moreover we are of considered opinion that these pleas were not open to the appellants.
24. For all these reasons we hold that the adoption was valid.
25. The last question which requires determination in the appeal is whether the appellants had become owners of the properties in suit by adverse possession.
26. It is admitted that the suit properties were joint family properties. It has further been admitted that since the death of Kastur Chand in 1936 the appellants had been managing the family properties and enjoying all the rents realised from the tenants. It has also been admitted that Suraj Mal had sold one property in 1951 and kept the sale proceeds with him. Does this conduct amount to adverse possession ? In our opinion, answer must be in the negative.
27. The expression ‘adverse possession’ means a hostile possession, that is, the possession which is in denial of the title of the true owner. It must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it was possession adverse to the real owner. It is well settled principle of law that the possession of a co-parcener or co-heir is deemed in law to be possession on behalf of all the co-parceners or co-heirs. By itself it cannot be considered adverse because possession is never adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title.
28. No doubt, if there is an ouster the possession of a coparcener can be adverse. However mere management of the joint family properties or realisation of rent would not amount to ouster. Suraj Mal was Karta of the family and as such had a right to manage properties and realise the rent. This conduct was not inconsistent with his character as a Karta. In Hardit Singh & others v. Gurmukh Singh and others AIR 1918 Privy Council page 1 (12) it was held that “if by exclusive possession of joint estate is meant that one member of the joint family alone occupies it, that by itself affords no evidence of exclusion of other interested members of the family Uninterrupted sole possession of such property, without more, must be referred to the lawful title possession by the joint holder to use the joint estate and cannot be regarded as an assertion of the right to hold it as separate, so as to assert an adverse claim against other interested members.” In Gajapati Narasimbha Deo Garu and another v. Gajapati Krishnachandra Deo Guru and Anr. (AIR 1920 Madras 793) (13) the Madras High Court held that the mere fact that a co-parcener had not enjoyed any portion of the property for 12 years or more cannot deprive him of his rights. Possession of one co-parcener is deemed in law to be possession on behalf of all co-parceners, although other co-parceners may take no part in the management and may not even enjoy any of the income of the property.
29. The contention that the appellants had denied the title of the respondent while withdrawing the suit filed by Suraj Mal in 1949 has no merit. Firstly in para 10 of the written statement the plea taken was that Suraj Mal was managing the properties as an absolute owner after attaining majority in 1950. No hostile title prior to 1950 was thus pleaded. Secondly Suraj Mal in his statement as DW-5 deposed that he withdraw the earlier suit as he had been advised by his counsel that he had no right of partition and also that Tara Bai had only a right of maintenance. He no where stated that he denied the title of the respondents or pleaded ouster or exclusion. The averment made in Ex. P-4, certified copy of the application under Order 23 rule 1, for permission to withdraw the suit, are of no help. In para 4 of the said application, on which reliance was placed, all what was pleaded was that because of the statement of counsel for the defendants and written statement it was clear that defendants Babu Lal and Tara Bai were not in possession of properties and, therefore, he (Suraj Mal) did not want to get the properties partitioned. The learned counsel urged that the averment was that Babu Lal and Tara Bai had no share in the properties and not that they were not in possession of the properties. This has not been made out. Suraj Mal has not supported this version in his statement. In the written statement of Babu Lal or Tara Bai there was no averment made by them that they had no share in the properties. No such statement was made before issues by their counsel. As a matter of fact Babu Lal was asserting his rights as an adopted son.
30. There is no evidence on record to show that in 1950 or thereafter the appellants or any of them asserted any hostile title. Suraj Mal has not stated a word about it. Babu Lal in cross-examination said “Rent from all the tenants has throughout been recovered by Lala Suraj Mal, defendant. He did not give any share from the rent recovered either to me or to Smt. Tara Bai. We orally demanded our share of the rent on some occasions but he did not pay anything and said that we should have recourse to a Court of law. I cannot say whether it was ten years or more when Suraj Mal refused to pay any share out of ten rent and asked us to approach a Court of law”. This evidence is worthless. A bare denial of a right is not an assertion of adverse ownership. To say “You go to court” merely means that only under a Court decree the appellant will pay to the respondent his due share in property and not otherwise. The appellants' answer may amount to refusal to pay but not an assertion of a hostile title. There is not a scientilla of evidence to support the case of adverse possession which may have ripened into adverse ownership. Adverse possession is a possession that is hostile, under a claim or colour of title, actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous, continued for the required period of time thereby giving an indefeasible right of possession or ownership to the possessor by operation of the limitation of actions. None of the elements is present in this case.
31. The decisions in Chhotelal Babu Lal v. Premlal Girdhari Lal AIR 1977 MP 34 (14), and Smt. Samundra Devi v. Chand Singh, AIR 1979 HP 24 (15) turn on their own peculiar facts and are of no help.
32. Article 57 of the Indian Limitation Act provides a period of three years for a suit to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never in fact took place. Time begins to run from the date when the alleged adoption be comes known to the plaintiff. This Article is however restricted to declaration in a suit in respect of adoption and not to a suit for possession, notwithstanding the fact that the Court in granting the relief was obliged to give a finding on the validity or invalidity of the adoption.
33. For these reasons the appeal has no merit and is dismissed with costs.
CROSS-OBJECTIONS (C. M. 312/73)
34. It is admitted that Kastur Chand husband of Tara Bai died in March 1936 leaving behind his widow, mother and brother Suraj Mal. It is also not disputed that they were members of a joint family and the properties in suit were joint family properties. The rule of Hindu Law then prevalent deprived a widow of any right in such properties of her husband and gave her only a right of maintenance. Kastur Chand's undivided interest in the co-parcenery property will pass to his brother Suraj Mal as surviving co-parcener. The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (Act XVIII of 1937) was enacted to give better rights to women in respect of property. Under Section 3 (2) a widow was to have same interest in joint family property as her husband had, though her interest was a limited interest, i.e Hindu Women's Estate. This Act, however, came into force on April 14, 1937 i.e, after the death of Kastur Chand. It had no retrospective operation. [See Moni Devi v. Hadibandhu AIR 1955 orissa 73 (fb)] (16). the provisions contained in section 14 of the hindu succession act, 1956 would apply to property possessed by a Hindu female and to which she had some kind of title, however restricted the nature of her interest may be. This Section would have no application to a case where a widow had no right whatsoever in the properties and had only a right of maintenance. Cross-objections, therefore, fail and are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Appeal and cross-objections dismissed.