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Ajai Johri & Ors. v. Shinghal Land & Finance Pvt. Ltd. .

Delhi High Court
Aug 8, 1983
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Judgment Summary: Singhal Land and Finance Pvt. Ltd. — Winding Up Petition

Factual and Procedural Background

Singhal Land and Finance Pvt. Ltd., incorporated in 1962, represented itself as purchasing and developing land into plots for resale. One such purported development was "Vijay Park" in village Pavi-Sadiquepur (khasra No. 476), Ghaziabad, where the company sold about 500 plots to purchasers. Five petitioners (plus a sixth purchaser) purchased plots between 1968 and 1970; the company executed sale-deeds representing that it was the absolute owner, that plots were free from encumbrances, and that vendees were put into physical possession and should obtain mutation in revenue records themselves.

The petitioners later discovered that the company did not have title to the land, that no real development had occurred, and that the land was under consolidation and irrigated (making building unlikely). After statutory notices in December 1981 and January 1982 seeking refunds with interest, petitioners initiated a winding up petition under Sections 433 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956, claiming amounts due totalling Rs. 97,225/-.

The petitioners also sought appointment of a provisional liquidator to secure records and assets; a provisional liquidator was appointed by Wad, J. (order dated 31-3-1982). The company unsuccessfully moved to vacate that appointment. Several interlocutory orders by different Company Judges (Wad, J.; Anand, J.; Chawla, J.) recorded prima facie findings of extensive public deception and raised concerns about the company's conduct and accounts. The Registrar of Companies reported complaints and summoned directors without compliance.

No oral evidence was led in the final hearing; the matter was argued on affidavits already on record. The court considered interlocutory orders and the existing material to decide whether the company should be wound up.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the claim of the petitioners for refund (for breach of warranty of title/misrepresentation) constituted a "debt" within the meaning of Sections 433(i)(e) or 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, sufficient to sustain a winding up petition.
  2. Whether the petitioners' claims were barred by limitation, or whether equitable principles (including Section 17 of the Limitation Act) or facts of inducement/lulling kept the claims alive.
  3. Whether the company had perpetrated large-scale public deception and was commercially insolvent or without substratum thereby justifying winding up.
  4. Whether the earlier appointment of a provisional liquidator and related interlocutory measures were appropriate and should be continued through a winding up order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The company represented itself in sale-deeds as absolute owner and as having put vendees into possession; these representations were false because the company had no title to khasra No. 476.
  • No real development of Vijay Park existed; sale was effected in substance by publicity and a sign-board, not by physical demarcation or development.
  • The company avoided effecting mutation in favour of vendees and refused to produce title documents and development plans despite demands; statutory notices seeking refunds were issued before filing the petition.
  • The company's books and balance-sheets did not reflect large sums collected from plot purchasers; it was commercially insolvent and had become without substratum.
  • They sought provisional liquidator appointment to protect company assets/records and to prevent dissipation.

Respondent-Company's Arguments

  • The claim is for damages for breach of warranty of title, and such claim is not a "debt" under Sections 433(i)(e) or 434 of the Companies Act; hence winding up petition is not maintainable.
  • Claims are barred by limitation because sale-deeds were executed in 1968/1970 while petition was filed in 1982.
  • Allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, etc., are denied; petitioners had knowledge of the colony and bought with knowledge ("buyer beware").
  • The company contends it purchased 105 bighas and had agreements to sell; about 60 bighas were mutated in its favour, and failure to obtain sale/mutation on the rest was due to consolidation and ceiling under the U.P. Land Reforms Act.
  • The company asserted bona fide belief that it would be able to acquire title and that the sale transactions were undertaken in good faith; possession was given and plaintiffs were to get mutation done themselves.
  • Development did not require permission under the Uttar Pradesh (Regulation of Building Operations) Act 1958 as the land allegedly lay outside regulated area. The company also pointed to prosecutions that ended in acquittals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1967 SC 744 Used in context to show that, unlike English law, an agreement to sell in India does not create an equitable estate in the purchaser; a contract for sale does not itself create any interest in the property. The court relied on the principle to hold that the company's agreement to sell did not confer title to the company, and therefore the company's representation of being absolute owner in the sale-deeds was false; this supported finding of fraud and absence of title.
AIR 1981 Delhi 291 Cited alongside other authority to illustrate the proposition that a contract for sale creates only a personal right (in personam) and not an interest in the estate (no privity in estate under Indian law). The court applied the principle to conclude that since the company had only agreements and no title, petitioners could not obtain mutation or ownership via the company's purported title; this reinforced the conclusion of misrepresentation and entitlement to refunds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the factual record and earlier interlocutory orders made on substantially the same material by three Company Judges, which had already recorded prima facie findings of large-scale deception. The court summarized and applied legal principles as follows:

  1. Representation versus title: The sale-deeds unequivocally represented that the company was the absolute owner and that vendees had possession. The court found these representations to be false because the company never obtained a sale deed in its favour for khasra No. 476; at best it had agreements to sell.
  2. Legal effect of agreements to sell: Citing Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and the authorities above, the court reiterated that in India a contract for sale does not create an interest in the property and is only a personal right to obtain a subsequent sale deed. Therefore an agreement to sell did not vest title in the company and could not be used to substantiate its claim of ownership.
  3. Consequences for purchasers: Because the company had no title, (a) no title could pass to the purchasers; (b) purchasers could not obtain mutation in revenue records based on the company’s sale-deeds; and (c) the recital of actual physical possession in the sale-deeds was prima facie incorrect because no developed plots existed on the ground.
  4. Fraud/misrepresentation and debt characterization: The court treated the company's false representations, the promises and the failure to produce title or development plans as constituting deception. Because the sale-deeds themselves included an agreement to refund money if title proved flawed, the court held that the amounts due to purchasers were debts payable by the company.
  5. Accounting and insolvency indicia: The Registrar of Companies' records and the company's balance-sheets showed that large sums collected from purchasers did not appear in profit and loss accounts or correspond to declared assets; continuous losses were shown. The court regarded this mismatch, the absence of substantial assets/substratum and the pattern of conduct as indicia of commercial insolvency and a company unfit to continue.
  6. Limitation: The company’s plea of limitation was considered. The court accepted that petitioner No. 1 was out of India for a lengthy period and invoked Section 17 of the Limitation Act (as earlier applied by Wad, J.) to hold him entitled to discretionary relief. Further, the court found that other petitioners had been lulled into inaction by promises and representations, and the course of events supported treating their claims as within time for purposes of winding up.
  7. Reliance on interlocutory findings and absence of further evidence: The court noted that no party led oral evidence and that the material before it was substantially the same as material earlier considered by three judges who had formed prima facie opinions of fraud. Given this context and the absence of convincing rebuttal by the company, the court concluded that winding up was warranted.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The court allowed the winding up petition and ordered the respondent company to be wound up. The order included that the provisional liquidator would act as the Official Liquidator and take over affairs, assets and properties of the company. The court directed publication of the winding up order in the Delhi Gazette and the newspapers specified in the earlier order dated 31-3-1982, and required filing a copy of the order with the Registrar of Companies as per Section 445.

DISPOSITION: The winding up petition was allowed; the company is ordered to be wound up and the Official Liquidator to proceed with winding up.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The petitioners are entitled to have the money they paid treated as debts due by the company; they will be creditors in the liquidation process and may realize their claims through the Official Liquidator.
  • The provisional liquidator was converted into the Official Liquidator, who will take possession of records, assets and proceed with statutory winding up steps (publication, filing with Registrar, and realization/distribution as applicable).
  • The court emphasised that the company's conduct—false representations of title, failure to develop the land, and lack of accounting for large sums collected—justified striking the company off as it had "no right to exist" and was likely to continue to perpetrate deception.
  • No broader legal precedent was articulated beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and established principles (e.g., Section 54 TPA and Section 17 Limitation Act) to the facts; the order applied established principles to the facts and directed winding up on that basis.
Show all summary ...

D.R Khanna, J.:— Singhal Land and Finance Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated in 1962 with authorised capital of rupees two lacs. Its paid capital has been Rs. 1,10,500/-. It has been claiming to effect purchase of land at different places, develop them into plots and sell them. One such colony said to have been developed was “Vijay Park” in village Pavi-Sadiquepur Pargana Loni, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad. Wide publicity for sale of plots in this colony, was given, and as a result about 500 plots sold to different persons.

2. The five petitioners who have moved the present petition under Section 433, 439 of the Companies Act, 1956, were similarly sold six plots as detailed in para 6 of the petition. The price charged from each of the petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 4 was Rs. 3,000/-, and from petitioners Nos. 3 and 5, Rs. 4,000/- each Another plot was sold to petitioner No. 6 for Rs. 6,000/-. Five of these sales were in 1968, and the sixth in favour of petitioner No. 3 in 1970. These plots were described in the sale-deeds as forming part of khasra No. 476 of that village. It was further represented in the sale-deed as under:—

“That the vendor assures the vendee that they are the absolute owners of the land and the plot is free from all encumbrances whatsoever. The vendor further assures the vendee that in the event of any flaw in the title of the vendor the property sold shall pass out from the ownership or possession of the vendee, the vendor shall be held responsible to compensate the vendor in all respects.

That the vendor has put the vendee into actual physical possession of the plot of land.

That the vendee shall take all steps to get his name mutated in the revenue records and do the necessary expenses himself to which the vendor shall have no objection.”

3. The case of the petitioners is that the respondent-company had been assuring transfer of land in their favour by the process of mutation in the revenue record and taking up the matter with the revenue authorities. However, as the time passed, it gradually became clear to the petitioners that they had been cheated and defrauded, and the respondent was avoiding on one pretext or the other to get the land mutated in their favour. All that was shown to the petitioners was a sign-board fixed at a place in Ghaziabad with the name ‘Vijay Park’, and this was how the sale of the plots was effected in their favour. No development of plots actually existed. The enquiries later revealed that the company had itself no title over the land, and as such entirely misrepresented that it was the absolute owner of the land. It was further revealed that the land had come under consolidation and was irrigated, and as such there was no possibility of building any house there The petitioners demanded proof of ownership of the land from the respondent-company, and also the plan of the developed khasra No. 476. None of them was supplied by the company.

4. It has also been averred that petitioner No. 1 was posted out of India in Zambia from October 1970 to April 1976, and thereafter at Calcutta. He later tried in 1978 to get mutation effected in his favour, but without result.

5. Alleging next that the respondent-company was served with statutory notices in December 1981 and January 1982, requiring it to refund the amount which it had received from the petitioners along with interest at the rate of 20% per annum, the present petition for winding up was brought. The total amount thus due to the petitioners is stated to be Rs. 97,225/-.

6. The petitioners have also alleged that on inspection of the record of the company maintained by the Registrar of Companies, it has been found that the company is not functioning at all, and its balance-sheet of 1978 showed that it had fixed assets of Rs. 71,810/-, of which Rs. 70,900/- constituted of the value of good will. Huge amounts collected from the purchasers of the plots do not find reflected in the balance-sheets and profit and loss accounts, and it is not known what had happened to them. Instead continued losses have been shown every year, with the result that the company is unable to pay its creditors and has become commercially insolvent having no substratum left.

7. The respondent-company has raised a number of preliminary objections to the maintainability of the winding up petition. Firstly it is urged that the claim is based upon damages for breach of warranty of title, and the same cannot be treated as ‘debt’ within the meaning of Section 433(i)(e) or Section 434 of the Companies Act. In any case, it is pointed out that the claim for damages is manifestly barred by limitation as the sale deeds were executed in 1968 or 1970, while the present petition has been brought in 1982. No specific particulars besides, it is urged, have been given in the petition with regard to misrepresentation, fraud etc. In any case, they are denied, and it is asserted that the petitioners fully knew the existence of the colony, and purchased land with knowledge of its existence, location and other details. As such the rule of “buyers beware” was applicable. The present petition is stated to be in reality an exercise for putting pressure upon the company to pay disputed claims and scandlise it by abuse of the process of the court.

8. On merits it is stated that the company had purchased land measuring 105 bighas in the area, out of which about 60 Bighas were mutated in its favour, and the rest could not be done because of the ceiling of land under the U.P Land Reforms Act. It was as such that khasra No. 476 could not be formally sold and mutated in company's favour by the previous owners. However, they had executed an agreement to sell in favour of the company authorising it to develop the land and effect sale of plots. 60 to 70% of the value of the land was paid by the company to the different owners of the land, but the sales in its favour did not materialise because of consolidation and the ceiling of land.

9. It has been claimed that the company sold the plots to the petitioners under the bona fide valid impression that the land in question would be purchased by it from the land owners whenever the opportunity for doing the same on the basis of the pending agreements to sell was available in view of the provisions of the U.P Land Reforms Act and consideration. Allegations of cheating, fraud or misrepresentation have been controverted and it is pointed out that physical possession of the plots was handed over to the petitioners, and it was left over to them to get the mutations completed. Transactions were said to have been done through common agent and acquaintance, and thus the company did not come in direct contact with the petitioners/plot holders.

10. Development of the Vijay Park Colony, it has been pleaded, did not require any authorisation from the prescribed authority under the Uttar Pradesh (Regulation of Building Operations) Act 1958 as the land fell outside the ‘regulated area’. The demarcation of the plot was undertaken three times, and this led to several prosecution against the company. They, however, resulted in acquittals. The plot holders, it is alleged, showed very little interest after obtaining sale-deeds, and did not get mutations effected in their favour, nor constructed any buildings. They seemed to have apparently bought the plots for the purpose of speculation only and, therefore, were not interested in investing any further money way of contribution towards the levelling, develoment of roads, drains etc. It has also been stated that the work of consolidation started in the village in 1969/70, and continued till 1972/73. Thereafter there was no impediment in the mutations. As such it is asserted that if the petitioners have now lost the plots, it was because of their own negligence and lack of interest for may long years. The respondent has denied that any letter was received from the petitioners demanding proof of their title or the plans.

11. Along with this winding up petition, the petitioners applied for appointment of provisional liquidator in order to take possession the records and assets of the company. This was allowed by Wad, J. on 31-2-1982 after taking note that prima facie circumstances existed for winding up of the company as large scale public deception appeared to have been enacted, and over rupees ten lacs collected from various purchasers of plots without giving them the plots. The company, it was noted, itself did not own the said land or any colony and as such had no sub-stratum. All through the attempt of the company appeared to have been to keep on promising and dodging the purchasers. It was also taken note that the company had not specifically refuted that in fact there was no colony which was being developed. This fact was rather admitted then by the company's counsel.

12. The company later moved a petition under Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules and Section 151 C.P.C and sought that the appointment of the provisional liquidator be vacated. This, however, was dismissed by Wad, J. on 26-5-1982 by an elaborate and well reasoned order. It was obseved that it appeared that there was a lay-out plan on paper, but none on the actual land. The company admitted that it had never been the owner of Kharsa No. 476, and it had only an agreement to sell with the original owners. Reference was made to the circulars which the company had been off and on sending to the plots holders, and it was noted that throughout the company was avoiding to tell the location and the fate of the plots. In fact the narration in the sale-deeds about delivery of possession was prima facie found to be incorrect. As regards the plea of limitation, it was observed that petitioner No. 1 was prevented from pursuing the matter because of his absence from India, and thereafter he showed due diligence and took all steps that were necessary to protect his rights. He was, therefore, held entitled to the disoretionary relief under Section 17 of the Limitation Act. The Plot Holders were besides lulled into inaction by promises and bright prospects extended by the company.

13. Another attempt was made by the respondent-company to get its registered office released from the provisional liquidator. This too was disallowed by Anand, J. by an order dated 19-1-1983. In para No. 4, the learned Judge took note that it was not disputed that none of the buyers of this area had possession of the plots, and there had been no development of the colony, and the right to build on the area was in serious legal jeopardy.

14. A petition under Section 477 of the Companies Act as well stands moved on record for summoning the three directors of the respondent-company, and ascertaining what they have done to about rupees twently lacs collected by them from 1965 to 1970, and to further amounts which were collected when new scheme of farm housing colonies was conceived during 1979 and 1981, these directors were said to be indulging in spending sprees on foreign tours and diverting the company's money so collected for their own benefits. Chawla J, then directed on this application that R.S Singhal, the Managing Director of the company should be examined in, this regard. It was observed that this was eminently a case in Which the directors ought to be examined for purpose of containing information as to what has become of the assets of the company. In another order dated 10-5-1983, Chawla, J. further took note of the two Company Judges having already prima facie found that the company perpatrated fraud. He was also of the same prime facie impression.

15. Before proceeding further, it may also be mentioned that the Registrar of Companies who was given notice of the winding up petition, has submitted a report in which he has also mentioned that various complaints have been received from the persons to whom plots have been sold or amounts for. their sale obtained. The directors were, therefore, summoned under section 209-a(5), but they have not complied. It has also been reported that the balance-sheet filed from the very beginning showed that the company has not made any substantial profit, and was always running in losses.

16. Reference may as well be made here to C.A No.: 136 of 1983 which the plot holders association of the Vijay Park has moved under Section 466(3) of the Companies Act, seeking the transfer of the suit which is pending in Ghaziabad, to this court. A copy of the plaint of that suit has been attached which shows that the respondent-company has started effecting resale of the plots of the so-called Vijay Park colony to some other persons who are now threatening to take possession of the land. Injunction has, therefore, been sought against them.

17. During the course of the present winding up petition the parties have not led any oral evidence. From the side of the petitioners it was stated-that the matter be set down for hearing on the basis of affidavits already filed. The respondent's counsel also stated that in view of the statement of the petitioners' counsel, he did not want to lead any evidence.

18. I have in these circumstances heard the parties counsel and considered the entirity of circumstances and material on record. The narration above of the various interlocutory orders made by different Company Judges during the course of this petition, has not been without purpose. Those orders were made on substantially the same material on which I am at this stage required to give finding whether the company is liable to be wound up. Counsel for both the parties have not chosen to lead any further evidence apart from the affidavits which already existed, and were filed with the petitions and the replies thereto. The Company filed an appeal against the orders of Wad, J. but that was rejected. Normally when an order is made seeking interim relief, a prima facie view of the affairs has to be formed, and that should not conclude the decision of the case at the final stage when both the sides have lead their entire evidence. The prima facie view cannot be treated as categorical expression of opinion on merits of the controversies which the parties latter establish. However, the complexion in the present case is somewhat different inasmuch as it is the same material on which three learned Judges have earlier formed opinions that large scale public deception appeared to have been enacted.

19. The undisputed fact which has emerged from the record is that although the company had not acquired any title over khasra No.: 476 as no sale deed was obtained by it in its favour, it had unequivocally represented in the sale-deeds to the petitioners that it was the absolute owner of the land and the plot was free from all encumbrances, whatsoever. This was clearly a wrong representation and a fraud perpatrated. The agreement to sell which the company claimed it had in its favour, did not confer any title over the land with the respondent. Unlike the law in England where an agreement of sale creates an equitable estate in the purchaser, the law in India does not recognise any such estate. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate. No privity in estate can be deduced therefrom which can bind the estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to ontain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who ontains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. (See AIR 1967 SC 744, Ram Barm Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra, and Jiwan Dass Rawal v. Narain Dass and others, AIR 1981 Delhi 291). The shelter now sought to be taken by the respondent on the rule of “buyers beware” is further of no avail as when title itself did not exist, the company could not represent that it was the absolute owner.

20. The company has next admitted that till this day it has not been able to ontain sale of khasra No.: 476 in its favour, and thus it is not even in position to plead that whatever infirmity in its rights over the plots existed, the same has been subsequently made up, and thus it is now in position to assure the petitioners that the title purported to be passed to them has now in any case become absolute and perfect. Thus the net result has been that no title has passed on to the petitioners over the plots as the Company itself had no title. There was next no question of the petitioners obtaining mutation of the land in their favour on the basis of sale-deed, as mutation in favour of the respondent itself did not exist in revenue record, and therefore, the petitioners getting themselves substituted at its place, could not arise. The sale-deeds thus played another deception when it placed the duty for obtaining Mutation on the vendees, as they could not have obtained the same till the company's name itself had earlier stood mutated. Still another deception played was the narration that the company had placed the vendees into actual physical possession while no such possession was given as the plots did not exist at the spot in the absence of development. It is correct that the petitioners should have objected to the narration in the sale-deeds of the passing over of the possession. However, when large-scale public deceptions by land racketeers are committed, the unwary buyers do fall a trap to such like luring misstatements.

21. There being thus total failure of title of the company, the petitioners are entitled to seek the return of the money paid along with interest. This was also specifically agreed to in the sale-deeds. The amounts thus due have to be treated as debts due to the petitioners. I am in this regard, satisfied that they did demand the refund of the money back, arid before that required the company to prove its title and show the development plan but the company failed to comply. The winding up petition is thus clearly maintainable.

22. The respondent-company has been taking vague stand and playing hide and seek with the plot holders. It has in its reply even taken the stand that deals were effected through agents and acquaintances, and the directors of the company did not directly come into the picture. This, it seems, is an attempt to save them from the consequences of deceptions enacted. Who those agents and acquaintances were and how the company had authorised them, have not been clarified. I am, therefore, inclined to accept the petitioners' case that annexure P-9 dated 1-8-1980 was delivered to a representative of the company at its office. In this the documents of the ownership and the plans showing the development of plots had been sought.

23. Another significant fact to be noted it that although the respondent-company claims to have obtained an agreement to sell inks favour from the previous owners on 20-3-1968, it had effected sales in favour of three of the petitioners on 1-2-1968. There was thus not even a semblance of interest in the company's favour. No affidavit of the so-called previous owners who had executed the agreement to sell has besides been filed, nor it is shown that they held the title.

24. While it has not been challenged that amounts totalling over rupees ten lacs have been recovered from the persons to whom plots were sold, these amounts do not get reflected in the profit and loss accounts and balance-sheets. The value of stock in trade in shown as Rs. 4,936/- and the development charges as Rs. 16,050/- only. Advances to land owners are disclosed as Rs. 58,670/- according to the Registrar of Companies, the respondent-company has been showing losses continuously. Such company specifically when it has enacted large scale public deception, and seems to be bent upon doing so in future as well, has no right to exist and must be wound up.

25. Now I advert to the plea of limitation. It is correct that a time barred claim cannot be made the basis for seeking winding up. However, the entire conspectus of events in the present case shows that the respondent-company had lured and constantly kept the persons to whom the plots were purported to be sold under deception. Vague promises and bright future prospects were off and on extended, and even an attempt to create extra confidence in them was made by representing that the prices of the plots had substantially, increased there and that the plots could be resold. Those circulars and letters addressed by the respondent are coached in extermely clever manner by representing on the one hand that the company was doing everything, on the other hand the buyers were to blame as they were not taking steps towards mutation, ignoring that there could not be mutation in their favour till the company itself had obtained sale and mutation in its favour. Petitioner No. 1 has brought out the circumstances how he was away from India and posted outside Delhi. His claim is thus clearly within time, and Once on its basis the company is directed to be wounded up, all the creditors take the benefit of the same. Even otherwise, I am of the opinion that other petitioners' claims can as well to treated in time as the course of events shows that they became aware and realised the deception of which they had been the victim shortly before the filing of the petition.

26. I, therefore, while allowing this petition, order the winding up of the respondent-company. The provisional liquidator will hence one act as Official Liquidator and take over the affairs and assests and properties of the company. Citation of the winding up order be published in the Delhi Gazette, and the newspapers mentioned in the order dated 31-3-1982. A copy of this order be filed with the Registrar of Companies as required by Section 445. The Official Liquidator will now proceed with the winding up.