Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Delhi Development Authority v. K.P Shankara And Another

Delhi High Court
Apr 13, 1983
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judicial Opinion Summary — Aggarwal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, K.P. Shankara, is the owner of the building bearing No. 11, Babar Lane, Bengali Market, New Delhi. On 17 February 1973, Delhi Development Authority (DDA) field staff reported that the premises were being used in contravention of the Master Plan of Delhi. After sanction for prosecution was obtained on 1 June 1973, the Secretary, DDA, filed complaints under Section 29(2) of the Delhi Development Act alleging that the respondent had let out rooms for non-residential (office/commercial) use contrary to the Master Plan. Similar allegations were made in several complaints differing by the names of tenants.

At trial the respondent stated, as to different tenants, that some tenants were using premises for residential purpose, some had vacated after notice from DDA, and in some cases eviction suits were pending. The Metropolitan Magistrate found the respondent guilty of permitting non-residential user contrary to the Master Plan and sentenced him to fines (varying by case) with default simple imprisonment terms.

The respondent appealed against conviction and sentence. The Additional Sessions Judge (Shri D.C. Aggarwal) allowed all appeals on 23 September 1975 on the ground that Section 29(2) of the Delhi Development Act punished only the actual user and not the landlord/owner who permitted the use. The present Bench considered that conclusion and proceeded to determine (a) the correct construction of Section 29(2) read with Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act, and (b) a preliminary contention that the appeal was time-barred under Sub-section (5) of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 29(2) of the Delhi Development Act penalises only the actual user of land or building, or also the owner/landlord who permits another to use the land or building in contravention of the Master Plan (i.e., whether permitting use contravening Section 14 is punishable under Section 29(2)).
  2. Whether the High Court application (special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under S.378(4) CrPC) was time-barred under Sub-section (5) of Section 378 CrPC — specifically, whether the period of limitation is six months (where the complainant is a public servant) or sixty days (in every other case) when the complaint was filed by the Secretary of the DDA.

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel for the Respondent (K.P. Shankara)

  • The respondent asserted at trial that certain tenants were using the premises for residential purposes, that some tenants vacated after receipt of DDA notice, and that eviction suits had been filed (pending) in some instances; these factual claims were advanced in defence.
  • As a preliminary point in the present proceedings, counsel for the respondent argued that the appeal was time-barred. Counsel relied on the authority Delhi Development Authority v. Punjab National Bank (1981) 19 Delhi LT 353 to contend that the Delhi Development Authority (as complainant) is the complainant within the meaning of S.378(5) CrPC and thus the limitation period is sixty days (not six months).

Counsel for the Delhi Development Authority

  • Mrs. Kumar, representing the DDA, contended that the Secretary who filed the complaint is a public servant within the meaning of Section 47 of the Delhi Development Act; accordingly, Sub-section (5) of Section 378 CrPC would afford a six-month period of limitation.
  • The DDA relied upon the Division Bench decision in Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr., 1982 Cr LJ 2230 (Delhi), which held that both the DDA and the public servant who files the complaint may be regarded as the complainant for the purpose of S.378(5) and hence the six-month period applies.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.P. Kapur v. Delhi Development Authority, 1976 Rajdhani LR 189 : (1976 Cri LJ 1285) Interpreted Section 14 and Section 29(2) — held Section 14 prohibits use by a person either by himself or through another; Section 29(2) penalises contravention of the entire prohibition in Section 14 (i.e., both actual user and permitting another to use). The Court relied on R.P. Kapur to reject the Additional Sessions Judge's conclusion and to hold that S.29(2) applies to both actual users and those who permit the use.
Bhagwanti Malhotra v. Delhi Development Authority, 1973 Rajdhani LR 661 Held that any person using or permitting the use of land/building otherwise than in conformity with the Master Plan or Zonal Plan is guilty under Section 14 and liable under Section 29(2). Referred to as supporting authority for the proposition that permitting misuse attracts liability under S.29(2).
Vijay Chand Jain v. Delhi Development Authority, Criminal Misc. (Main) No. 97 of 1969 (decided 23 July 1973) Same principle as Bhagwanti Malhotra: permitting or actual use contrary to Master Plan renders person liable under S.14 and S.29(2). Referred to as additional supporting authority for the same legal proposition.
Shallinder Kumar Kaintal v. Delhi Development Authority, Criminal Revision No. 315 of 1973 (20 Jan. 1975) Held that even where there is no direct evidence that the landlord permitted misuse, if the building is being used for commercial purposes it is for the landlord/owner to explain the circumstances under which that use arose. Used to support the proposition that the burden may lie on the landlord/owner to explain commercial use and that landlord liability is recognised.
Delhi Development Authority v. Punjab National Bank, (1981) 19 Delhi LT 353 Addressed whether the DDA or its Secretary filing the complaint is the "complainant" for S.378(5) CrPC; held the DDA was the complainant and thus the sixty-day limitation applied. Cited by respondent's counsel for the proposition that the limitation period was sixty days; the present Court noted this authority but also noted it was under appeal to the Supreme Court and stayed.
Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr., 1982 Cr LJ 2230 (Delhi) Division Bench held that both the Delhi Development Authority and the public servant who files the complaint may be considered the complainant for S.378(5) CrPC, implying a six-month limitation when a public servant files the complaint. The Court found this view persuasive and inclined to follow it, thereby treating the Secretary (a public servant) as bringing the complaint and applying the six-month limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal strands of reasoning: (A) legal construction of Section 29(2) read with Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act; and (B) the limitation issue under Sub-section (5) of Section 378 CrPC.

A. Construction of Section 29(2) vis-à-vis Section 14

- The Additional Sessions Judge had held that Section 29(2) punished only the actual user and not the owner/landlord who permitted the misuse. The Bench rejected this construction.

- The Court relied primarily on the analysis in R.P. Kapur v. DDA which explained that Section 14 contains a twofold prohibition: (a) using land or building otherwise than in conformity with the plan by oneself, and (b) permitting another to use it in that manner. Section 29(2) penalises contravention of the entire prohibition contained in Section 14 — i.e., both actual user and permitting another to use.

- The Court also referred to prior decisions (Bhagwanti Malhotra; Vijay Chand Jain) which held that any person using or permitting the use contrary to the Master Plan would be guilty under Section 14 and liable under Section 29(2). Further, in Shallinder Kumar Kaintal the Court noted authority for the proposition that if a building is shown to be used for commercial purposes it is incumbent on the landlord to explain how that state of affairs arose.

- On this basis the Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge's conclusion limiting Section 29(2) to only the actual user was legally unsound and could not be sustained.

B. Limitation under Sub-section (5) of Section 378 CrPC

- The Court cited Sub-section (5) of Section 378 CrPC, which provides differing limitation periods: six months where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case.

- Two competing lines of authority were identified: Delhi Development Authority v. Punjab National Bank (holding DDA was the complainant, thus sixty days), and Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. DDA (holding that both DDA and the public servant who files the complaint are to be considered complainants, thus six months where a public servant filed the complaint).

- The Court noted that the Punjab National Bank decision was under appeal to the Supreme Court with operation stayed, and that the Oriental Bank decision was also under appeal. After considering both decisions, the Court expressed inclination to agree with the Division Bench view in Oriental Bank that the Secretary (a public servant) who files the complaint is to be regarded as complainant for the purpose of S.378(5), thereby attracting the six-month limitation provided for public servants.

Remedial Outcome Based on the Above Analysis

- Because (i) Section 29(2) applies to persons who permit use of premises contrary to the Master Plan, and (ii) the limitation period applicable in the circumstances is six months (the Court adopting the Oriental Bank reasoning), the Court set aside the order of acquittal made by the Additional Sessions Judge and restored the Metropolitan Magistrate's conviction and sentence dated 15 July 1975.

- The Court directed that the respondent be allowed two weeks to deposit the fines awarded; failing payment, the respondent would be taken into custody to undergo the imprisonment awarded in lieu of non-payment.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED — the Court set aside the Additional Sessions Judge's order of acquittal and restored the Metropolitan Magistrate's order dated 15 July 1975 convicting the respondent under Section 29(2) of the Delhi Development Act.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondent's acquittal was vacated; the Metropolitan Magistrate's conviction and fines were restored. The respondent was given two weeks to pay the fines; if he defaults, he is to be taken into custody to serve the imprisonment imposed in default.
  • Legal implication on the construction of Section 29(2): The Court aligned with authorities holding that Section 29(2) penalises both the actual user and a person who permits another to use land/buildings in contravention of Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act.
  • Limitation point: The Court indicated its preference for the Division Bench view in Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. DDA that a public servant who files a complaint (here, the Secretary of DDA) can be considered a complainant for S.378(5) CrPC, making the six-month limitation applicable in such circumstances.
  • No broader new precedent was expressly declared by the Court beyond applying and following the existing authorities cited in the opinion; the decision primarily resolves the appeals before it by applying settled authorities and by indicating its preference on the limitation issue where conflicting decisions exist and Supreme Court appeals are pending.

Disposition: Appeal allowed. Respondent given two weeks to deposit fines; imprisonment in default to follow as directed by the Metropolitan Magistrate's order restored by this Court.

Show all summary ...

Aggarwal, J.:— This judgment shall also dispose of Criminal Appeals Nos. 131/76, 132/76, 263/76, 264/76, 265/76 and 266/76 since they involve common questions of fact and law.

2. The respondent K.P Shankara is the owner of the building bearing No. 11, Babar Lane, Bengali Market, New Delhi. On 17th Feb., 1973 the field staff of the Delhi Development Authority reported that the owner of premises bearing No. 11, Babar Lane was using the said building in contravention of the Master Plan of Delhi. After obtaining sanction for the prosecution on 1st June, 1973, the Secretary, Delhi Development Authority filed a complaint under Section 29(2) of the Delhi Development Act against the respondent. The allegation in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1976 is that the respondent had let out one room on the first floor, 11 Babar Lane, New Delhi to Payen & Co. who were using the said room as an office which is in contravention of the Master Plan. The allegation in the other complaints is similar, only the names of the tenants are different. The respondent in his examination at the trial stated that he had filed a suit against New Delhi Traders Association (Criminal Appeal No. 131, of 1976) for their eviction and the said suit is pending in the Court of Shri R. Dayal. Regarding Payen & Co. (Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1976) the respondent stated that the said tenant was using the demised premises only for residential purpose. Regarding the tenant Tag India (Criminal Appeal No. 266 of 1976) the respondent stated that he had served a notice on Mrs. Poorvi Pandey, Executive Director for vacating the premises and further had also filed a suit for eviction. Regarding Travel Advisers (Criminal Appeal No. 132 of 1976) the respondent stated that they had vacated the building soon after the receipt of notice from the Delhi Development Authority. Regarding the tenant Datta Ram Advertising Private Limited (Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 1976) the respondent stated that on receipt of the notice from the Delhi Development Authority he gave notice to the tenant who had since vacated the premises. Regarding the tenant Oriental Travel Service (Criminal Appeal No. 264 of 1976) the respondent stated that he had given the Barsati floor to the said tenant in 1972 for office-cura-residence and that the dominant purpose was residence. Regarding the Monitoring Services (Criminal Appeal No. 265 of 1976) the respondent stated that they vacated the premises after the notice from the Delhi Development Authority.

3. The trial Magistrate on an appreciation of the evidence found that the building 11 Babar Lane under the Master Plan could only be used for residence and the respondent had permitted the user of the said premises for non-residential purpose accordingly the Metropolitan Magistrate found the respondent guilty of the offence charged with and sentenced him to a fine of Rupees 1,500/- and in default of payment of fine-simple imprisonment for one month, in Criminal Appeal No. 264 of 1976; to a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default simple imprisonment for 20 days, in Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 1976 to a fine of Rs. 600/- and inf default simple imprisonment for 15 days, in Criminal Appeal No. 265 of 1976, and in each of the four other appeals to a fine of Rs. 400/- and in default of payment of fine to simple imprisonment for 10 days.

4. Against his conviction and sentence the respondent filed appeal in all the cases. The appeals were heard by Shri D.C Aggarwal, Additional Sessions Judge, who allowed all the appeals on 23rd Sept., 1975. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that S. 29(2) of the Delhi Development Act only punishes the actual user of the property and not the landlord or owner who had let out the premises or permitted the user in contravention of the Master Plan. We may straightway say that the question whether Sec. 29(2) only applied to a person-who himself misused or also to the owner/landlord who had permitted the misuser was considered in R.P Kapur v. Delhi Development Authority, 1976 Rajdhani LR 189 : (1976 Cri LJ 1285), and the Bench after a consideration of the relevant sections of the Delhi Development Act, held as under:

“12. Section 14 of the Act prohibits a person not only from using the land himself in contravention of the Master Plan but also from permitting another to use the land. The question for consideration is whether having made such a prohibition under Section 14 of the Act, the intention of the Legislature was to penalise only the actual uses of the land and not to penalise the person who permits another to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan. We see no valid reason for inferring such an intention on the part of the Legislature. The very purpose of the prohibition contained in Section 14 of the Act will be defeated if it can be circumvented by permitting another person to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan. A careful reading of the language of Section 14 and sub-sec. (2) of Section 29 of the Act supports this view. It has to be noticed that the provisions in the main part of Sec. 14 is a prohibition of the use of any land or building by a person otherwise than in conformity with the plan either (a) by himself or (b) through another person. Section 29(2) of the Act penalises a person who uses any land or building “in contravention of the provisions of Sec. 14”, the said provisions (so far as the main part of Section 14 is concerned), being, as stated above, the prohibition of the use of any land or building otherwise than in conformity with the plans either (a) by himself or (b) through another person. In other words, the main part of Sec. 14 contains a twofold prohibition, and S. 29(2) penalises the contravention of the entire twofold prohibition in the main part of S. 14, i.e both the contravention by himself and the contravention through another person. As the language used in S. 29(2) clearly brings out the said effect that was intended by the Legislature, the words “or permit to be used” were not repeated in S. 29(2). Thus sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act applies not only to a person who uses the land in contravention of the Master Plan but also to a person who permits another to use the land in contravention of the Master Plan. This, in our view, is the only reasonable construction to be put on the words used in sub-section (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act.”

5. We may add that one of us (R.N Aggarwal, J.) had the opportunity to consider this very point in two cases: Bhagwanti Malhotra v. Delhi Development Authority, 1973 Rajdhani LR 661 and Vijay Chand Jain v. Delhi Development Authority, Criminal Misc. (Main) No. 97 of 1969 decided on 23rd July, 1973 and in both the said cases it was held that any person using or permitting the use of any land or building otherwise than in conformity with the Master Plan or the Zonal Plan would be guilty of violating the provisions of S. 14 and liable to prosecution under S. 29(2).

6. In Shallinder Kumar Kaintal v. Delhi Development Authority, Criminal Revision No. 315 of 1973 decided on 20th Jan., 1975 Mr. Justice V.D Misra (as he then was) went a little further and held that even if there was nothing to show that it was the landlord/owner who had permitted the misuse of the premises in terms of Section 14 but the evidence produced showed that the building is being used for commercial purpose, in that state of affairs it was for the landlord/owner to explain the circumstances under which the building came to be used for a commercial purpose.

7. In view of the above discussed authorities, we have no hesitation in holding that the finding of the Additional Sessions Judge that Sec. 29(2) only punishes the actual user is not legally sound and cannot be sustained.

8. The learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is barred by time. Sub-section (5) of Sec. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

“No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.”

9. A reading of the above sub-section shows that where a complainant is a public servant the period of limitation is six months and in every other case the period of limitation is 60 days.

10. The contention of the counsel for the respondent is that in this case the complainant is the Delhi Development Authority and, therefore, the period of limitation would be sixty days and not six months. The counsel in support of his contention relied upon Delhi Development Authority v. Punjab National Bank, (1981) 19 Delhi LT 353. Mr. Justice Rohatgi who spoke for the Bench held that the Secretary of Delhi Development Authority was only acting in a representative capacity and that the Delhi Development Authority was the complainant within the meaning of S. 378(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and, therefore, the period of limitation would be sixty days and not six months.

11. On the other hand Mrs. Kumar, learned counsel for the Delhi Development Authority contended that the Secretary who filed the complaint is a public servant within the meaning of Sec. 47 of the Delhi Development Act and, therefore, the period of limitation would be six months. The counsel relied upon a Division Bench judgment reported as Oriental Bank Of Commerce… v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr.…, 1982 Cr LJ 2230 (Delhi) (Mr. Justice Rajindar Sacharl and Mr. Justice M.L Jain). In the said authority it has been held that both the Delhi Development Authority and the public servant who files the complaint will be considered complainant. The learned Judges in the judgment have noticed the case Delhi Development Authority v. Punjab National Bank (supra).

12. We may mention that in the case D.D.A v. Punjab National Bank (1981-19 Delhi LT 353), the Delhi Development Authority has gone in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has stayed the operation of the judgment. We are told that in the second case (Oriental Bank v. D.D.A) also an appeal has been filed and is pending in the Supreme Court.

13. We have carefully considered both the judgments and we are inclined to agree with the view taken in the case Oriental Bank of Commerce (1982 Cri LJ 2230) (Delhi) (supra). For the reasons stated we set aside the order of acquittal and restore the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 15th July, 1975. The respondent is allowed two weeks' time to deposit the fine failing which he shall be taken into custody to undergo the imprisonment awarded to him in lieu of non-payment of fine.

14. Appeal allowed.