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Ranjtt Singh Tomar Petitioner v. M/S. Hindustan Export & Import Etc. S

Delhi High Court
Sep 10, 1982
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a peon employed by the respondent company from 1958 until his summary dismissal on 23-2-1968. His monthly pay was Rs. 105 plus Rs. 5.50 as cycle allowance. The employer dismissed him for alleged misconduct: wilful refusal to obey lawful orders, persistent defiance of superiors, refusal to encash a cheque at the bank, refusal to sign the employment register, and refusal to wind the clock.

The petitioner raised an industrial dispute and the Government referred the question—whether the termination was unjustified and illegal—to the Labour Court. Although the employer did not hold any domestic inquiry before dismissal, the employer led evidence before the Labour Court. The Labour Court, on the evidence produced before it, found the employee guilty of misconduct and held the dismissal justified by its award dated 6-1-1971. The petitioner then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging that award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, where an employer dismisses an employee without holding any enquiry but later adduces evidence before the adjudicating tribunal which finds the dismissal justified, the employee is entitled to wages from the date of dismissal up to the date of the tribunal's award (i.e., should the tribunal's finding operate only from the date of the award or relate back to the date of dismissal).
  2. Whether the dismissal contravened section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act because, at the time of dismissal, a dispute concerning overtime wages and D.A. was allegedly pending before the conciliation officer.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Employee's) Arguments

  • The employee contended that because the employer dismissed him without holding any enquiry, he should be entitled to wages from the date of dismissal (23-2-1968) until the date of the Labour Court's award (6-1-1971); the dismissal should be effective only from the date on which the tribunal upheld it.
  • Reliance was placed on Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union (AIR 1959 S.C. 1342) and the extract from Wanchoo J.'s observation (referring to Phulbari Tea Estate), particularly the suggestion that an employer who makes good a defective or absent domestic inquiry before the tribunal would still have to pay wages up to the date of the award.
  • The employee also argued that the dismissal violated section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act because a dispute over overtime wages and D.A. was allegedly pending before the conciliation officer at the time of dismissal.

Respondent's (Employer's) Arguments / Position

  • Although the employer had not held a domestic inquiry before dismissal, it produced evidence before the Labour Court to justify the dismissal. The employer's position—accepted by the Labour Court—was that the dismissal was justified on that evidence.
  • Implicit in the respondent's position is reliance on the doctrine that where a tribunal finds a dismissal justified on evidence placed before it, the tribunal's finding relates back to the date of the original dismissal (the "relation back" doctrine), making the dismissal effective from the date it was passed by the employer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union, AIR 1959 S.C. 1342 Authority relied upon by employee-counsel for the proposition that even if an employer makes good a defective inquiry before a tribunal, the employer must pay wages up to the date of the tribunal's award (as per Wanchoo J.'s observation). The court noted the reliance but explained that the passage relied upon included an added clause that was later held to be an incorrect statement of law (see D.C. Roy). The court did not accept the added clause as correctly stating the law.
Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1959 S.C. 1111 Discussed in relation to whether defects in domestic inquiry can be cured by evidence before the tribunal and whether wages must be paid until the tribunal's award. The court observed that a later passage reproducing Phulbari had an added clause not borne out by Phulbari itself; the court treated the true ratio of Phulbari as corrected by D.C. Roy.
M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1959 S.C. 923 Referenced as part of the line of authorities concerning the rider on domestic enquiries and tribunal adjudications. Mentioned to show antecedent jurisprudence; used in context but no distinct novel application beyond its citation in the chain of authorities.
D.C. Roy v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1976 Lab. LC. 1142 Correction of the earlier reproduction of Phulbari's ratio; pointed out that the additional clause (after the semicolon in Wanchoo J.'s passage) was not correct law. The court relied on D.C. Roy to reject the added clause in Wanchoo J.'s observation and to support the application of the relation-back principle as properly understood.
P. H. Kalyani (P. H. Kalvani v. M/s. AIR France Calcutta), AIR 1963 S.C. 1756 Applied for the doctrine of relation back — that a tribunal's finding that a dismissal is justified can relate back and make the dismissal effective from the date it was passed. The court applied the principle from this case (as explained and limited by later authorities) to hold that the Labour Court's finding related back to the date of dismissal.
Hatakishore Sahu v. Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal, 1976 Lab. I.C. 599 Illustration of the proposition that if a tribunal holds a termination justified on evidence, the termination may be effective from the date it was passed. Used to support the proposition that a tribunal's acceptance of the employer's justification results in the application of relation back.
Laws v. London Chronicle, (1959) 1 W.L.R. 698 Authority for the proposition that disobedience can amount to total refusal to cooperate and may repudiates the employment contract. Cited to support the legal principle that wilful disobedience can justify summary dismissal.
Pepper v. Webb, (1969) 1 W.L.R. 514 Authority supporting the proposition that certain misconduct repudiates the contract of service. Cited alongside Laws v. London Chronicle to demonstrate that misconduct may justify summary dismissal.
Vine v. National Dock Labour Board, (1957) A.C. 488 Proposition that ordinarily a termination of the contract is a breach (remediable in damages) and not a nullity absent statutory intervention. Used to explain the conceptual basis for the courts' development of the relation-back doctrine: to recognize the factual act of dismissal while bridging the legal time-gap.
Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. The Management, 1973 Lab. I.C. 851 Proposition that an employer can justify its action by leading evidence before the Tribunal; defective domestic inquiry stands on same footing as no inquiry. Cited to support the court's conclusion that evidence led before the Labour Court can justify a dismissal and that relation back may therefore operate.
Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1961) 2 All E.R. 446 Quoted for the maxim that where Parliament "fears to tread" courts should not intervene to legislate by judicial decision. Relied upon to justify the court's refusal to award wages up to the date of the tribunal award and to leave such a policy matter to Parliament.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of legal reasoning grounded in the facts and the authorities cited in the record:

  1. Fact-findings and procedure: The court acknowledged (i) the undisputed absence of a domestic enquiry by the employer before dismissal and (ii) that the employer later produced evidence before the Labour Court, which found the dismissal justified.
  2. Precedential assessment: The court examined the authority relied upon by the petitioner (notably the observation in Hotel Imperial reproducing Phulbari) and observed that a later decision in D.C. Roy corrected the extra clause in that reproduction. The court therefore treated the latter addition as an incorrect statement of law.
  3. Relation-back doctrine: The court accepted and applied the doctrine (as articulated in P. H. Kalyani and related authorities) that, when a tribunal finds on the evidence produced before it that a dismissal was justified, the tribunal's decision may be treated as relating back to the date the dismissal was originally passed. The court cited cases (including Hatakishore Sahu and Workmen of Firestone) to support that an employer may cure the absence or defect of a domestic inquiry by leading evidence before the tribunal and that this places defective inquiry and no inquiry on the same footing for purposes of adjudication.
  4. Labour relations policy and managerial prerogative: The court emphasized that industrial discipline is largely a managerial prerogative and that wilful disobedience that repudiates the contract can justify summary dismissal. Authorities on repudiatory conduct (Laws v. London Chronicle; Pepper v. Webb) were invoked to show the legal basis for dismissal for disobedience.
  5. Limitation on judicial intervention: The court explained that if the taxpayer/workman is to be awarded wages up to the tribunal's award as a general rule, it is Parliament's province to enact such a rule. The judge invoked Shaw to justify refraining from judicially imposing such a policy and noted Parliament had not legislated to that effect.
  6. On the contention under sec. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (that a dispute was pending before the conciliation officer): the court found no cogent evidence on record to prove such pendency; the Labour Court had rejected the victimisation plea; the question of pendency is factual and was not established by the petitioner.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Given the Labour Court's finding on the evidence that the dismissal was justified, the judge held that the tribunal's finding related back to the date of dismissal and that the writ petition under Article 226 could not succeed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition under Article 226 is DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Labour Court's award, which found the dismissal justified, stands and is treated as relating back to the date of the original dismissal; the court applied the doctrine of relation back in this case.
  • The petitioner's contention that he was entitled to wages from the date of dismissal up to the date of the Labour Court's award was rejected; the judge declined to extend relief of that kind and indicated that any general rule requiring payment of wages pending adjudication is a matter for Parliament.
  • The petitioner's alternative contention under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was dismissed for lack of cogent evidence that any dispute was pending on the date of dismissal.
  • Costs: The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down any novel or sweeping new precedent; it applied existing authorities and emphasized that broader policy choices (such as mandating payment of wages while disputes are adjudicated) fall to Parliament.

Order announced on 6-9-1982. Judgment provides reasons for dismissal.

Show all summary ...

Avadh Behari Rosatgi, J.:— The petitioner is a dismissed employee. He was dismissed by the employer, the respondent company, for misconduct. He was a peon getting Rs. 105 per month besides Rs. 5.50 per month as cycle allowance. He was in the employ of the company from 1958 to 23-2-1968 when he was summarily dismissed. He wilfully refused to obey the orders of the employer. He persistently defied the lawful orders of his superiors. He refused to go to the bank for encashing a cheque. He refused to sign the employment register. He was asked to wind the clock which he refused. So the employer dismissed him from service.

2. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute. The Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court. The question referred was whether the termination of petitioner's services was unjustified and illegal. Before the Labour Court it was not disputed that the employer did not hold any enquiry. But the employer produced evidence before the court. The court found the employee guilty of misconduct. It came to the conclusion that he was disobedient. He was insolent. He was defiant. He wilfully refused to carry out the orders of the employer. The court on the evidence produced by the employer before it for the first time held that the dismissal was justified. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 6-1-1971.
3. On this petition two questions were raised. Firstly it was said that the employee was entitled to wages from the date of dismissal to the date of the order of the Labour Court, namely, from 23-2-1968 to 6-1-1971. This claim is made on the ground that the employer dismissed the employee without holding any enquiry into the charges. As the enquiry was held before the Labour Court it is said that the dismissal order would take effect from 6-1-71 when the dismissal was held to be justified by the court. For this submission counsel for the employee place reliance on Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union. AIR 1959 S.C 1342(1), and in particular on the following observation of Wanchoo J. at page 1347:
“In Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen, (AIR 1959 SC 1111), the rider laid down in the case of M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. (AIR 1959 SC 923) was further extended to a case of an adjudication under S. 15 of the Act and it was pointed out that if there was any defect in the enquiry by the employer he could make good that defect by producing necessary evidence before the tribunal; but in that case he will have to pay the wages upto the date of the award of the tribunal, even if the award went in his favour.”
4. Strong reliance was placed on the observations after the semicolon. These words no doubt support the employee. But in D.C Roy v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1976 Lab. LC. 1142(1145)(2) the Supreme Court pointed out that the ratio of Phulbari Tea Estate, AIR 1959 S.C 1111(3) was not correctly stated in the above passage. This passage is party a reproduction in substance of what was said in Phulbari Tea Estate at page 1113 of A.I.R 1959 Supreme Court but the last clause of the passage following the semicolon is an addition not borne out by the judgement in Phulbari Tea Estate. The words after semicolon are not a correct statement of the law. In determining the ratio decidendi Wanchoo J was in error in adding these words. This is what was decided in D. C. Roy. The Supreme Court has thus corrected its own mistake.
5. In the instant case no enquiry was held by the employer. The principles of natural justice were not observed. But the employer led evidence before the Labour Court to justify the order of dismissal. On a fresh appraisal of that evidence the Labour Court found that the order of dismissal was justified. Now the judgment of the Labour Court would relate back to the date on which the order of dismissal was passed. The doctrine of relation back was applied in P. H. Kalvani v. M/s. AIR France Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1756(4). The principle laid down in that case must apply here. (See D. C. Roy (supra) at page 1145).
6. The principle is this. Where the employer passes an order of termination whether without holding an enquiry or after holding an equiry which is found to be defective, the order of termination would be effective from the date it was passed by the employer if it is held to be justified by the Tribunal on the evidence produced before it. (Hatakishore Sahu v. Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal, 1976 Lab. I.C 599 (602) (5). By holding that the order of termination passed by the employer is justified the Tribunal accepts the order of termination having been properly passed by the employer. The doctrine of relation back is applied.
7. It is universally held that discipline must remain strictly a matter of managerial prerogative. (See 1982 Hamlyn Lecture: The Quest for Security: Employees. Tenants, Wives p. 5). The Labour Court found in this case that the employer was entitled to dismiss summarily for disobedience to lawful orders. Disobedience amounts to a total refusal to co-operate, or in some other way shows that the employee repudiates the contract. (Laws v. London Chronicle, (1959) 1 W.L.R 698(6); Pepper v. Webb, (1969) 1 WLR 514(7).
8. Labour law is essentially a functional legal subject which deals with employment in its individual and collective aspects. It is a paradox of our labour law that terms and conditions of employment are settled collectively for the great mass of the working population, whilst the individual contract of employment continues to be treated as “the cornerstone of the edifice”, to use the late Professor Sir Otto Kahn Freund's famous phrase. The contrast is between social reality and legal theory, resolved by Kahn-Freund who saw the contract of employment as the subordination of the employee to the employer and the trade union as using its power of co-ordination with the employer to secure terms and conditions of employment for employees which the “individual higgling of the market” could not achieve for them. But industrial discipline remains strictly a matter of managerial prerogative. The employee repudiates the contract of service if he wilfully disobeys the lawful and reasonable orders of the employer. Misconduct is conduct repudiatory of the contract justifying summary dismissal.
9. Counsel for the employee relies on the following observation of Chandrachud J. at page 1146 in D. C. Roy (supra):
“We would, however, like to add that the decision in P.H Kalyani's case (AIR 1963 SC 1756) is not to be construed as a charter for employers to dismiss employees after the pretence of an inquiry. The inquiry in the instant case does not suffer from defects so serious or fundamental as to make it non-est On an appropriate occasion, it may become necessary to carve an exception to the ratio of Kalyani's case so as to exclude from its operation at least that class of cases in which under the facade of a domestic inquiry, the employer passes an order gravely detrimental to the employee's interest like an order of dismissal. An inquiry blatantly and consciously violating principles of natural justice may well be equated with the total absence of an inquiry so as to exclude the application of the ‘relation-back’ doctrine. But we will not pursue the point beyond this as the facts before us do not warrant a closer consideration thereof.”
10. I am not prepared to hold that the present is a case where the doctrine of relation back ought not to be applied on the ground that there was a total absence of enquiry which would exclude the application of that doctrine. There is one main reason. The Parliament is the proper place to settle this. Labour law is a mosaic of statute and judge-made law. It is a combined product of legislation and litigation. Like International Law, the law of industrial relations is still in a fluid state. The statute does not enact that a summary dismissal, even for misconduct, will always be non est. That happens on the intervention of the statute. If a dismissal is in defiance of the provisions of a statute such a dismissal is a nullity. But if there is no statute the order of dismissal is effective, although it may be in breach of contract and the master may be liable in damages. The relationship of employer and employee does not continue in law or in fact. “Normally, and apart from the intervention of statute, there would never be a nullity in terminating an ordinary contract of master and servant. Dismissal might be in breach of contract and so unalful but could only sound in damages” (Vine v. Notional Dock Labour Board, (1957) A. C. 488 (507) (8). This is why the judges invented the doctrine of relation back. The doctrine is a clear recognition of the principle that facts are stronger than the law. So the fact of dismissal cannot be obliterated from the world of facts. What is done is that the act constructively relates back to the antecedent thing so as to cover up the time lag.
11. It is now settled by a series of decisions that the employer can justify its action by leading evidence before the Tribunal. This applies equally to cases of total absence of inquiry and defective enquiry. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry. (Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. The Management, 1973 Lab. I.C 851)(9).If no evidence is led before the tribunal or the evidence adduced does not justify the dismissal by the employer, the tribunal can order reinstatement or payment of compensation as it may think fit. But if it finds on the evidence adduced before it that the dismissal was justified, as in this case, the doctrine of relation back is pressed into service to bridge the time gap between the rupture of the relationship of employer and the employee and the finding of the tribunal.
12. If the workman is to be paid wages upto the date of the award of the tribunal the Parliament has to say so Parliament is the proper place to settle this. When there is sufficient support from public opinion. Parliament does not hesitate to intervene. “Where Parliament fears to tread it is not for the courts to rush in”. (Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions. (1961) 2 All E.R 446 (457) per Lord Reid)(10). Here Parliament fears to tread. So I do not rush in.
13. Secondly, counsel for the employee said that the dismissal is in contravention of sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act as a dispute for over time wages and D.A was pending at the time of dismissal before the conciliation officer. There is no evidence on the record to show that such a dispute was pending on the date of dismissal. There is a reference in the judgment of the labour court that a dispute was raised on behalf of the employee by one Mr. Ray, the President of the Union. On this fact the plea of victimisation was put forward which the court rejected. But that the dismissal was in contravention of sec. 33 (2) (b) was neither pleaded specifically nor proved by cogent and satisfactory evidence. The question of pendency of a dispute is essentially a question of fact. There being nothing to show that any dispute was pending on the date of dismissal the argument fails.
14. For these reasons the writ petition is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. I announced the order on 6-9-1982 at the conclusion of the arguments. I dismissed the petition. Now I have given reasons for doing so.
D.K.J Writ petition dismissed.