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Pushpa Rani v. Krishan Lal

Delhi High Court
Apr 9, 1981
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Case Summary — Reported Judgment by M.L. Jain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The husband (Kishan Lal) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against his wife (Pushpa Rani) under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The marriage had taken place on March 10, 1974. The husband alleged persistent quarrels, threats by the wife to implicate him in a criminal case, and an incident on July 28, 1976 when, he alleged, the wife attempted suicide by setting herself on fire in the kitchen; she was taken to hospital and the husband agreed not to report the matter to police for matrimonial happiness. The husband stated that the wife thereafter declared she would not live with him and he left her at her parents' house on September 4, 1976; she did not return.

The wife filed an application under section 125, Cr. P.C. for maintenance on July 4, 1977. In reply (dated October 18, 1977) the husband alleged suspicious conduct by the wife's brother. The husband filed the present divorce petition on January 10, 1979, pleading cruelty and desertion. The wife denied the suicide attempt (saying the fire was accidental), denied desertion and cruelty, and alleged that the husband paid excessive attention to and favoured Bindra Devi (a member of the Juneja family) and on occasions insulted and assaulted the wife, including an earlier episode when he left her at her parents' house against her consent.

The trial Judge recorded evidence, accepted findings of cruelty and desertion against the wife, and passed a decree of dissolution on May 24, 1980. The present opinion is an appellate decision that considers that decree and the evidence, and reaches a contrary conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the wife's alleged attempt at suicide on July 28, 1976 was established on the evidence or whether the fire was accidental.
  2. Whether the wife's alleged imputation of an illicit relationship between the husband and Bindra Devi (a person treated by the husband as a mother-figure) amounted to cruelty under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
  3. Whether the wife's continued living apart for more than two years amounted to desertion without reasonable excuse.
  4. Whether a court may take into account facts or allegations not pleaded in the original suit (for example, facts elicited during cross-examination or subsequent events) when deciding matrimonial reliefs.

Arguments of the Parties

Husband's (Petitioner's) Allegations and Contentions

  • The parties married on March 10, 1974, and lived with the Juneja family, whom the husband treated as parents.
  • The wife frequently quarrelled with him and threatened to involve him in criminal proceedings.
  • On July 28, 1976 the wife attempted suicide by pouring kerosene and setting herself on fire; he rescued her and took her to hospital. He agreed not to report the truth to police for matrimonial peace.
  • Because the wife continued to threaten and declared she would not live with him, he left her at her parents' home on September 4, 1976; she did not return — constituting desertion.
  • In reply to the wife's maintenance application, the husband alleged the wife's brother visited her secretly, giving rise to suspicion of extra-marital relations (an assertion offered by the husband in his earlier reply).
  • In his evidence the husband denied any illicit relationship with Bindra Devi and denied having made any charge of unchastity against his wife in his pleadings or replication.

Wife's (Respondent/Appellant's) Contentions

  • The wife denied the allegation of attempted suicide and maintained that the fire was accidental; she stated in a report to police that her shirt accidentally caught fire while she worked in the kitchen and the husband rescued her.
  • She admitted being taken to hospital by the husband but denied his claims that he was adopted by or treated as a son by the Junejas; she asserted that after the husband's father died she left the family home and came to live with the Junejas.
  • The wife alleged that the husband favoured Bindra Devi, danced attendance on her, bought presents and took her out, and that he ignored, insulted, humiliated and on occasion assaulted the wife — including over complaints about dowry.
  • The wife denied desertion and denied cruelty; she also alleged that on prior occasions the husband had left her at her parents' home against her consent.
  • In the course of cross-examination and in her deposition she alleged that she had seen the husband closeted with and sleeping in a compromising position with Bindra Devi (an allegation not pleaded in the original petition).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parihar v. Parihar, AIR 1978 Raj 140 Supports the proposition that facts elicited in cross-examination (though not pleaded) can in exceptional cases be taken into account for matrimonial reliefs. The trial Judge relied on this case to consider the wife's cross-examination allegations; the appellate judge followed Parihar as authority for exceptions to the general rule requiring matters to be pleaded.
Mewa Singh v. Prem Kumar, 1979 H.L.R 565 Holds that a casual reference to an imputation of adultery may have no relevance to a divorce petition. Cited by appellant's counsel to argue that the allegation not being pleaded cannot be relied upon; the appellate court considered it but found it states only the general rule.
Allam Gangadhar Rao v. Gottapalli Gangarao, AIR 1968 A.P. 291 No relief can be granted on facts/documents not disclosed in the plaint; one cannot succeed on a cause not set up. Cited by counsel to support the need for pleadings; the appellate court acknowledged the general rule but observed exceptions exist in matrimonial cases to serve justice.
Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, AIR 1976 S.C. 49 Rights are determined by facts as they exist on the date the action is initiated; subsequent happenings may only mould relief but cannot negate vested rights (except where law changes). Cited to support the proposition that subsequent events do not ordinarily change vested rights; the court accepted the proposition but noted exceptions where later events may be considered.
Ram Dayal v. Maji Devdiji, AIR 1956 Raj 12 Recognises an exception permitting courts in exceptional cases to consider events occurring after filing of suit to subserve justice and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The appellate judge relied on this case (and noted he applied it in Parihar) to justify considering the allegation elicited in cross‑examination though not pleaded.
Chand Narain v. Saroj, 1975 H.L.R 494 (Raj) Example where a fact elicited in cross-examination though not pleaded was considered to constitute cruelty. Used as precedent to support taking cross‑examination evidence into account for finding cruelty in exceptional matrimonial cases.
Kundan Lal Verma v. Kanta Rani, 1979 H.L.R 352 (P.&H.) Where certain unpleaded facts were nevertheless proved on record, they were relevant to justify withdrawal from the matrimonial home. Cited in support of the proposition that courts can, in proper circumstances, consider facts not pleaded if proved and relevant to relief.
Gurcharan Kaur v. Sardar Swaran Singh, 1978 H.L.R 175 A false allegation of adultery and attempt at poisoning by the wife did not amount to cruelty when she was provoked by husband's allegation of pre‑marital pregnancy. Invoked to show circumstances where retaliatory or provoked allegations do not constitute cruelty warranting divorce.
Jarnail Kaur v. Sarwan Singh, 1979 H.L.R 415 Illustrates that where the aggrieved party does not demonstrate the allegation caused mental shock or agony, divorce may be refused. Used to show that proof of the damaging effect of an imputation is relevant to a finding of cruelty.
Madanlal Sharma v. Santosh Sharma, 1980 H.L.R 441 (Bom) States that after parliamentary action the concept of cruelty under section 13(1)(ia) should align with English law and requires a higher standard than mere reasonable apprehension; lack of evidence of mental/physical effect may defeat a cruelty claim. Referred to illustrate the higher standard for cruelty and that mere repetition of an allegation without evidence of harm may not justify divorce.
Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 S.C. 1534 Mentioned in the context that subsequent parliamentary action altered its effect (as noted in Madanlal Sharma). Cited only to explain legislative change noted in another case; the appellate court did not base its decision directly on Dastane but noted its changed status per later authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court examined the trial record and the evidence on each asserted ground (attempted suicide, cruelty and desertion), and addressed also the procedural question whether allegations not pleaded could be taken into account.

On the alleged attempted suicide: the court noted that in the wife's report to the police she described the fire as accidental (her shirt accidentally caught fire while working in the kitchen) and the husband had told the police the fire was accidental. The court observed that if the wife had in fact attempted suicide to implicate the husband, it was unlikely that the husband would have described the occurrence to police as accidental; accordingly, the court found the attempted suicide allegation "not well founded" and that there was "no evidence to exclude" the plea of accident.

On the imputation of an illicit relationship with Bindra Devi and the question whether that imputation established cruelty: the court acknowledged that the allegation of adultery by the wife was made in cross‑examination and in deposition but had not been pleaded. The court reviewed authorities for the general rule that relief should not ordinarily be granted on facts not pleaded (citing Allam Gangadhar Rao, Rameshwar v. Jot Ram and related cases). However, the court emphasised established exceptions in matrimonial jurisprudence (citing Ram Dayal, Parihar, Chand Narain and Kundan Lal Verma) permitting a court in exceptional circumstances to consider subsequent events or facts elicited during trial even if they were not pleaded, particularly where doing so subserves justice and avoids multiplicity of litigation.

The court set out the legal standard of cruelty: "willful and unjustified conduct of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health bodily or mental or as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of such a danger" and that the test is whether a man of ordinary prudence would describe the conduct as cruel (as applied in Parihar).

Applying the standard to the facts: the court observed that there was no independent proof of the wife's allegation against the husband and Bindra Devi except the wife's own deposition; her supporting witness (RW3) did not corroborate. The husband had simply denied the allegation and had not testified that it caused him mental anguish or affected his health. The appellate judge also took into account the broader factual context: the husband himself had earlier levelled a serious allegation against the wife (suspicion of incest with her brother) and had previously left her at her parents' home; the wife was described as semi-literate and socially disadvantaged and was being urged by her parents to resume matrimonial life despite the strained relations. In this context the court treated the wife's allegation as retaliatory and noted authorities where provocation or retaliation affected the assessment of whether the imputation amounted to cruelty (e.g., Gurcharan Kaur).

On the question of desertion: though it was accepted that the wife had been living away from the husband for more than two years, the court held she did so with reasonable explanation in the circumstances and therefore that desertion without reasonable excuse had not been established.

Weighing the evidence and relevant authorities, the appellate court concluded that neither cruelty nor desertion had been proved to the requisite standard; accordingly the decree of dissolution granted by the trial court was not justified.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The appellate court quashed the decree of dissolution dated May 24, 1980, and dismissed the husband's petition for divorce. The husband is ordered to bear the wife's costs throughout.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is to set aside the trial court's decree of divorce; the husband's petition is dismissed and he must pay the wife's costs.
  • The court applied and reiterated established principles that, while facts not pleaded ordinarily cannot form the basis for relief, matrimonial courts may in exceptional cases consider subsequent events or facts elicited in evidence (including cross‑examination) when justice so requires. The opinion does not purport to establish a new general principle but applies existing exceptions in the circumstances of this case.

This summary is confined to the matters expressly set out in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

M.L Jain, J.:— The respondent Kishan Lal led a petition against his wife Pushpa Rani for dissolution of their marriage under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act The husband alleged that they were married on March 10, 1974 and were living in the house of, and along with the family of, Hans Raj Juneja and his wife Bindra Devi whom the husband treated as his parents. He further alleged that the wife used to pick up quarrels with him and threatend to involve him in some criminal case. On July 28, 1976 at about 10.30 a.m while he was in the bath room, she tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosene oil on herself and setting herself to fire in the kitchen. On hearing her shrisks, he rushed to her rescue. He and Smt. Bindra Devi removed her to hospital, where she was looked after by Junejas. Moved by her entreaties, he agreed not to report the ture facts to the police, for the sake of matrimonial happiness. But she resumed threatening him with dire consequences, and declared that she would not live with him. He was therefore, forced to leave her at the house of her parents on September 4, 1976. Since then she did not return to her matrimonial home. 2. On July 4, 1977 she filed an application under section 125, Cr. P.C for maintenance alleging inter alia that the husband all the time danced attendance on Bindra Devi and bought presents for her and carried her to places of entertainment. In his reply of October 18, 1977 the husband charged that her brother used to visit her secretly and used to be closed with her for long intervals giving rise to the suspicion that she was having some extra-marital relations with him. 3. The husband made the present petition on January 10, 1979 seeking divorce on the ground both of cruelty and desertion. 4. The wife in her reply to the divorce petition denied that she attempted suicide. Rather, the fire was accidental. She admitted that she was taken into the hospital by petitioner Krishan Lal. But she denied the claim of the husband that he was a sort of a son to the Junejas or that he was adopted or educated in their house. As a matter of fact, after the husband's father died, she left the family home and came to live with the Junejas. She repeated the allegation that the husband all the time danced attendance on Bindra Devi, brought clothes and presents for her and took her out to cinema shows and various other places of entertainment. He not only, ignored the wife, but rather went out of way to insult, humiliate and even assault her on the slightest pretext, specially on the ground that she did not bring any dowry. She alleged that earlier also, once he left her at her parents house against her consent and when she returned on August 14, 1975 he made a condition that her parents will not visit her, and on July 27, 1976 when her mother happened to visit her, the husband got annoyed and started abusing her in the presence of the mother and beat her. She denied desertion and cruelty. 5. The learned trial Judge, after recording evidence gave no categorical finding whether any attempt at suicide was proved or not and whether the fire was accidental. But he commented that the wife was ungrateful and denied the help which the husband and Junejas had extended to her at the time of and after the occurrence. Her denial was an act of cruelty. She even imputed that there was an illicit relationship between him and Bindra Devi. She had only just hinted at it in her written statement but when the husband appeared in the witness box and deposed that he treated H. R. Juneja and Bindra Devi as his father and mother, the wife directly put him a suggestion that there was an illicit relationship between Bindra Devi and him. The husband denied it. Bindra Devi deposed that they were like parents to him. She had brought up the husband as her son; she was 47 years of age, her own eldest daughter was 29 years and her sons were aged 26 and 23 years respectively. She was questioned whether she had any illicit relationship with Krishan Lal. Bindra Devi felt hurt and took exception to this defamatory and scandalous question. She even wept. When the wife appeared as a witness, she improved her allegation and said that she herself had seen the husband closeted with Bindra Devi and sleeping with Bindra Devi in a compromising position. This imputation was not a ground pleaded by the husband in the petition and it simply could not be thought of at that time. The trial judge held that the allegations could be taken note of even if not taken in the pleadings. He relied upon Parihar v. Parihar, AIR 1978 Raj 140(1), (delivered by me). The wife was not able to prove that the husband had illicit relations with Bindra Devi and that this was a false allegation made by her against his fidelity and against a person whom the husband regards as his mother and who was about 20 years older. The learned Judge was of the view that the facts elicited in cross-examination have to be taken into account in granting the relief. It was contended before him that in sec. 125, Cr. P. C. proceedings, it was the husband who had levelled a false charge of unchastity and incost against the wife that she was carrying on with her own brother and it was by way of reaction that the wife exposed the husband. But the learned Judge noticed that in his petition the husband did not talk of it and in his replication he denied that he ever made any charge against the wife, and maintained that he had no complaint as far as the character of the wife was concerned. In his examination-in-chief he did not repeat any such allegation and in cross-examination when the question was put to him in this regard, he explained that he had not made any allegation of unchastity against the wife and by extra-marital relations what he meant was that she was encouraged by her brother in her estrangement with the husband. The learned trial Judge was, therefore, of the view that the allegation having been withdrawn, it cannot be said that the husband had himself committed any cruelty. Rather, the charge of cruelty is established against the wife. 6. As regards desertion, it was admitted that the wife was living away from the husband for more than two years. The learned Judge held that she did so without reasonable excuse and she was guilty of desertion as well. 7. He passed a decree of dissolution on May 24, 1980. Hence, this appeal. 8. As far as the allegation of attempted suicide and thereby intending to implicate the husband in a criminal case is concerned, I find that the allegation is not well founded. In the report that was made to the police of the occurrence, the wife had stated that she was working in the kitchen, her shirt accidentally caught fire and her husband ran to her rescue and extinguished the fire. If it were a case of attempted suicide, them certainly, the husband, in the background of the strained relations between the two would have taken advantage of the occurrence but instead he told the police that the fire was only accidental. Even otherwise, there is no evidence to exclude the plea that it was in fact so. Respecting the second ground of cruelty, there is no doubt that the wife has imputed illicit relationship between the husband and Bindra Devi. But it is contended that since this count of cruelty was not taken in the pleadings either initially or by way of amendment, it cannot be taken into consideration. The learned counsel for the appellant cited Mewa Singh v. Prem Kumar, 1979 H.L.R 565(2), where the wife had made a false imputation of adultery in the petition for divorce, but it was held that it was only a casual reference and had no relevance to the petition. The learned counsel also distinguished Parihar v. Parihar (supra) by pointing out that there was an averment of subsequent cruelty in the subsequent pleadings. But the allegation in the cross-examination cannot take the place of pleading. He relies upon Allam Gangadhar Rao v. Gottapalli Gangarao, AIR 1968 A. P. 291(3), according to which no relief can be granted on facts and documents not disclosed in the plaint. One cannot be allowed to succeed on the cause which he had failed to set up. In Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, AIR 1976 S. C. 49(4), it was held that rights of the party are determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is initiated. The impact of subsequent happenings is that the relief may be moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated fact, but rights which have already vested in a party cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save when there is a change in the law. When a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, court may permit amendment to make up the deficiency. 9. I have considered these cases but they only state the general rule while it is equally well settled that there are exception to this rule and it is open to a court in exceptional cases to take into consideration events which may have taken place subsequent to the filing of the suit and grant relief on their basis where the relief as claimed originally in the suit may have become inappropriate by reason of altered circumstances and where this may appear to be necessary in order to shorten unnecessary litigation or to subserve the substantial interest of justice : Ram Dayal v. Maji Devdiji AIR 1956 Raj 12(5), which I followed in Parihar v. Parihar (supra). Exceptions must be applied in matrimonial cases in order to subserve the interest of justice and not to compel the parties to begin another round of litigation on the basis of subsequent events and allow the precious period of their life to go waste. It must be so done, depending, of course, on the nature of the case, because it is not only the parties which are concerned in the case but the court has a certain amount of duty and discretion to exercise. The relief entirely depends upon its satisfaction. That is why in Chand Narain v. Saroj, 1975 H.L.R 494 (Raj.) (6) a fact elicited in cross-examination though not pleaded, was considered as to constitute cruelty. In Kundan Lal Verma v. Kanta Rani 1979 H.L.R 352 (P.&H.) (7) the husband in his suit for nullity and desertion pleaded an unjustified impotence against the wife, the wife in her written statement did not say that the false charge of impotence amounted to cruelty and further did not plead that a report of theft was lodged against her in the police but all this was proved on record. It was held that the wife was justified in her withdrawal from the society of her husband. I am, therefore, of the view that the learned trial Judge was justified in holding that he could take into consideration the allegation of adultery made by the wife at the time of cross-examination and in her deposition. It could not be in the knowledge of the petitioner at the time he filed his petition. But the question still remains whether the allegation amounts to treating with cruelty. Cruelty is welful and unjustified conduct of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health bodily or mental or as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question in all such cases is whether the acts or conduct of the party charged, were cruel according to the ordinary sense of that word. It has no esoteric or artificial meaning. Upon the story being fully told, if the man of ordinary prudence would describe the conduct of the erring spouse as cruel, that should be held as cruelty, vide Parihar v. Parihar (supra). There is no proof of the wife's allegation except that she had deposed. Her witness Prakash Wati, RW3, did not support her. A false imputation of adultery is certainly a mode of treating with cruelty. But in order to reach a positive finding, one must have regard to the circumstances. 10. In Gurcharan Kaur v. Sardar Swaran Singh, 1978 H.L.R 175(8), a false allegation of adultery and attempt at poisoning made by the wife was held not to amount to cruelty so as to entitle the husband to divorce because she was provoked to hit back by the allegation in the plaint made by the husband that she had pre-marital pregnancy. In Jarnail Kaur v. Sarwan Singh, 1979 H.L.R 415(9), the wife in her written statement alleged that the husband had illicit relationship with his brother's wife. Husband did not file a replication controverting the allegation. In examination-in-chief he uttered one sentence only that he had no illicit relations with his brother's wife. He did not say that the allegation had shocked or agonised him mentally. Divorce was refused. In Madanlal Sharma… v. Smt. Santosh Sharma…., 1980 H.L.R 441 (Bom) (10), the court pointed out that Parliament nullified the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 S.C 1534(11). It must now be held that the concept of cruelty under section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 must involve the same meaning as it is understood under the English Law. It involves a requirement higher than reasonable apprehension mentioned in section 10(1)(b) before its amendment. The wife in her written statement alleged adultery with the maid servant and repeated it in her deposition but no evidence was led to prove that it affected the health mental or physical of the appellant. Divorce was refused. 11. In our case, when the direct allegation was made, the husband simply denied it and did not react to say that it had caused him mental anguish. It will be noticed that earlier the husband had accused her of a worse type of adultery and if she retaliated by an equally false charge, she should be excused because after all she is a semi-literate girl of a poor man selling vegetables on the pavement. She is not wanted in her parent's house who are trying to persuade her to live in the matrimonial home in spite of the harse attitude of the husband. Conditions in the parental house could be no better and she appears to be keen to make her home. She has no animus to desert her husband even though she was justified to do so when he charged her with incest and he himself left her at the door of her parents. 12. Thus, neither desertion nor cruelty was established and the husband was not entitled to a decree of dissolution. 13. I accept the appeal, quash the order under appeal and dismiss the husband's petition. He shall apart from his, bear her costs throughout. S.V Appeal. Allowed.