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Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. Petitioner/Landlord v. P. Tandon /Tenant.

Delhi High Court
Oct 21, 1981
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Judicial Opinion Summary — B.N. Kirpal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (owner) filed an eviction petition on 31 January 1977 seeking possession of the first floor of 6, Pusa Road, New Delhi, premises which had been let to the respondent for residential use. The stated ground for eviction was that the premises were required bona fide by the petitioner-company for allotment to its employees on a licence basis and that no other suitable accommodation was available.

The respondent filed an affidavit and leave to contest was granted. In his written statement the respondent raised multiple contentions; the Additional Rent Controller accepted, in particular, that (i) the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act were not applicable when premises are required by a limited company for its employees, and (ii) the petitioner did not require the premises bona fide for its employees. The petitioner examined one witness (Shri Radha Krishan); the respondent gave evidence on his own behalf.

The Additional Rent Controller formulated four points for determination (ownership, maintainability, bona fide requirement, and absence of other suitable accommodation) and, by order dated 29 November 1979, dismissed the eviction petition. The petitioner sought revision under Section 25B(8) of the Act; this opinion is the High Court’s disposition of that revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner is the owner of the premises.
  2. Whether the eviction petition is maintainable by the petitioner.
  3. Whether the petitioner requires the premises bona fide.
  4. Whether the petitioner has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.
  5. Whether Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act overrides or displaces Section 14(1)(e) in cases where a company (or other body corporate/local authority/public institution) requires premises for the use of its employees.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • Under Section 2(e) of the Act, "landlord" and the word "person" include juristic entities; therefore a corporate body can invoke the provisions of Section 14 (Mr. Sethi's contention).
  • The petitioner contended that it could rely on Section 14(1)(e) (or, alternatively, Section 22) to obtain possession because the accommodation was required for employees and the tenant’s occupation had ended as per the tenancy terms (the tenancy had been for 11 months as per Ex. RW1/1).
  • It was submitted that Section 22 is an addition to the remedy available under Section 14, and that the petitioner could invoke Section 22 even though the application initially referred to Section 14(1)(e).

Respondent's Arguments (as presented)

  • The respondent argued (and the Additional Rent Controller accepted) that Section 14(1)(e) is not applicable when premises are required by a limited company for its employees.
  • It was also contended that the petitioner did not require the premises bona fide — the trial court found that the petitioner’s intention appeared motivated by other circumstances (sale of property or conversion to commercial use).
  • Another respondent contention (as articulated by Shri Gupta) was that although Sections 14(1)(e) and 22 operate in the same sphere, Section 22 is confined to specific categories of landlords and therefore should prevail in company/employee cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chuni Lal v. University of Delhi, 1970 R.C.R 742 Held that grounds available to corporate bodies/public institutions under Section 22 are in addition to grounds available under Section 14 of the Act. Used to support the view that Section 14 grounds can coexist with Section 22 grounds; but noted that that case did not specifically consider Section 14(1)(e).
L.I.C. of India, Kanpur v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1977 (2) R.C.J 18; H.C. Sharma v. L.I.C., 1969 R.C.R 436; B.M. Lall v. Dunlop Rubber Co., AIR 1968 S.C. 175 Authorities for the proposition that a company can obtain premises for the use of its employees and this will be regarded as the company obtaining premises for its own use. Cited to establish that companies can hold premises for employee use and that such use may amount to premises held for the company’s benefit.
Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C. of India and another, 1980 (2) R.C.J 459 Illustrates that Section 25-B is a special procedure carved out for eviction where landlords require premises for personal necessity. Invoked analogously to argue that Section 22 is a special category carved out of Section 14 for companies/public institutions requiring premises for employees.
Kasturilal Nandraj v. Bakshi Ram, 1981 Rajdhani Law Reporter 380 Explains the limited scope of revision under the proviso to Section 25B(8): High Court will interfere only for gross illegality, material irregularity, non‑exercise or excess of jurisdiction. Applied to constrain the High Court’s jurisdiction in the present revision petition and to justify non-interference with the Additional Rent Controller’s factual findings absent gross illegality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a textual and purposive analysis of the relevant statutory provisions (Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22) and the record of facts and findings made by the Additional Rent Controller.

Key steps in the analysis:

  1. The court acknowledged that the term "person" ordinarily includes juristic entities; however, it emphasized that Section 22 is a specific provision dealing with situations where the landlord is a company, body corporate, local authority or public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees or, in the case of a public institution, for furtherance of its activities.
  2. The court asked whether Section 22 overrides Section 14(1)(e) in cases where a company requires premises for its employees. It concluded that when a company requires premises specifically for its employees, Section 22 is the provision that is applicable (i.e., Section 22, being specific, governs those cases). This did not exclude the applicability of other provisions of Section 14 in circumstances not covered by Section 22 (for example, where a company requires premises for the residence of a non‑employee such as a Chairman).
  3. The court contrasted the burdens: under Section 14(1)(e) the landlord must prove bona fide requirement for residence for himself or those for whose benefit the premises are held and absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation; under Section 22 the landlord must establish that the premises are required for employees and that one of the contingencies in clauses (a)–(d) of Section 22 exists and that the Controller is satisfied of the contingency.
  4. Turning to the facts, the court held that it would be immaterial whether the petitioner invoked Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 in the application so long as the record contained facts sufficient to invoke Section 22; therefore the petitioner could still rely on Section 22 at that stage. The court observed that clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 22 were not attracted on the record, but clause (b) (tenant acting in contravention of terms of authorisation to occupy) could be invoked because the tenancy was originally for 11 months (Ex. RW1/1) and the tenant had not surrendered possession.
  5. However, the court recognized a principal difficulty: the Additional Rent Controller had found, as a matter of fact, that the petitioner did not require the premises bona fide — the Controller inferred motives such as intention to sell or convert the property for commercial use and observed lack of any scheme for allotment to employees. The court treated that finding as a factual conclusion.
  6. The court then considered the scope of its revision jurisdiction under Section 25B(8). Relying on Kasturilal Nandraj, it emphasized that revision is limited to cases of gross illegality, material irregularity, non‑exercise or excess of jurisdiction. Absent a demonstration that the Additional Rent Controller acted with material irregularity, exceeded jurisdiction, or acted contrary to law, the High Court should not substitute its own view simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the evidence.
  7. The court found nothing on the record to establish any of the exceptional grounds that would justify interference. There was no showing of material irregularity, nor that the Controller exceeded jurisdiction or acted contrary to law.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Revision Petition is dismissed.

Additional legal holdings and practical implications drawn by the Court:

  • When a company (or similar juristic landlord) requires premises specifically for the use of its employees, Section 22 is the operative, specific provision to be applied; Section 14(1)(e) is not the applicable head for company‑employee situations of that kind. However, other provisions of Section 14 may remain available for circumstances not falling within Section 22 (for example, residence required by a non‑employee associated with the company).
  • The petitioner could, on the facts, have invoked Section 22 (and in particular clause (b) of Section 22 given the fixed 11‑month tenancy), but the Controller’s factual finding that the petitioner’s requirement was not bona fide operates against the petitioner. That factual finding applies with equal force to Section 22's requirement of bona fides for employee use.
  • The High Court’s power of revision under Section 25B(8) is narrowly circumscribed: interference is appropriate only for gross illegality, material irregularity, non‑exercise or excess of jurisdiction. A mere difference of opinion on the facts is insufficient to warrant interference.
  • Direct practical consequence: the Additional Rent Controller’s order dismissing the eviction petition stands; the parties were directed to bear their own costs. The court did not find grounds to set aside the Controller’s factual conclusions and did not identify any material error of law amounting to the limited categories of interference envisaged by Section 25B(8).

Costs: The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

B.N Kirpal, J:— By this petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the petitioner is seeking the eviction of the respondent-tenant, the petitioner's application under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act having been dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.

The respondent is the tenant of the first floor of 6, Pusa Road, New Delhi which is admittedly owned by the petitioner. These premises were let out to the respondent for residence. On 31st January, 1977 the present eviction petition was filed on the ground that the accommodation was required bona fide by the petitioner-company for allotment to its employees for use as residence on licence basis and there was no other suitable accommodation available with the company.

On an affidavit having been filed by the respondent leave to contest was granted. The respondent in his written statement raised a number of contentions. The main contentions raised by the respondent, and which were accepted by the Additional Rent Controller, were that the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) were not applicable when premises are required by a limited company for its employees and secondly the petitioner did not require the premises in question bona fide for its employees. In support of its case the petitioner examined one Shri Radha Krishan and the respondent examined himself.

The Additional Rent Controller formulated the following points for determination in the case:

“1. Whether the petitioner is owner of the premises?

2. Whether the petition is maintainable by the petitioner?

3. Whether the petitioner requires the premises bona fide?

4. Whether the petitioner has no other reasonable suitable accommodation?”

The trial court held that the petitioner was the owner of the premises. With regard to point No. 2 the trial court came to the conclusion that on a correct interpretation of Section 14(1)(e) the said provision was not available to a company and the same could be invoked only by natural persons. With regard to the other two points the trial court came to the conclusion that the premises were not required bona fide by the petitioner. The eviction petition was accordingly dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller by his order dated 29th November, 1979.

The first contention which has been raised before me by Mr. Sethi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the provisions of Section 14(1)(a) could be invoked by the petitioner in the present case. His contentien is that a landlord in Section 2(e) of the Act means any person who is entitled to receive rent. The word ‘person’ would include a corporate body. He has further submitted that Section 22 of the Act is an addition to the remedy which is available to a landlord under Section 14.

The two relevant provisions which have to be construed in this case are Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22. Section 14(1)(e) reads as under:—

“(e) that the premises let out for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.”

Section 22 reads as under:—

“22. Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or any other iaw, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Controller is satisfied

(a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment, or

(b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such premises; or

(c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises; or

(d) that the premises are required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities.”

There can be no dispute that the word “person” would ordinarily include a juristic entity. The submission on behalf of the respondent, however, is that Section 22 is a specific section which deals with the right of a company to get back the premises for the use of its employees. It is contended by Shri Gupta that Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 operate in the same sphere but as section 22 is confined only to specific categories of landlords the said section must prevail. Sections 14(1) and 22 of the Act came up for consideration before a single Bench of this Court in Chuni Lal v. University of Delhi, 1970 R.C.R 742. V.S Deshpande, J. (as he then was) held that the grounds which are available to corporate bodies and public institutions under Section 22 are in addition to the grounds available to them under Section 14 of the Act. In that case the learned Judge was concerned with the eviction of the tenant under the provisions of Section 14(1)(b), (d) and (h). The occasion to consider the applicability of Section 14(1)(e) did not specifically arise therein. It is true that a company can obtain premises for use by its employees and this would be regarded as the company obtaining premises for its own use. (See L.I.C of India, Kanpur v. State of U.P & Ors., 1977 (2) R.C.J 18, 1976 Allahabad Law Journal 478, H.C Sharma v. L.I.C 1969 R.C.R 436 and B.M Lall v. Dunlop Rubber co., AIR 1968 S.C 175). The question which arises in the present case is, however, slightly different. What is to be seen is, does Section 22 override Section 14(1)(e) or not, in so far as companies, body corporates or local authorities or public institutions are concerned when they require the premises for use of their employees? To my mind, whenever any such type of landlord requires the premises for use of its employees, it is Section 22 alone which would be applicable and not Section 14(1)(e). This does not mean that the other provisions of section 14 cannot be invoked by such a landlord. As held in Chuni Lal's case (supra), the grounds under Section 14 are in addition to the grounds under section 22. This is because Section 22 is concerned only with specific type of cases, namely, where premises are required by a company for use of its employees. Section 22 is not concerned with the other grounds which are available under Section 14. It may be that some circumstances may exist where a company may require premises, not for its employees, but still for its residence. In such a case Section 14(1)(e) can also be invoked One such case can be where the premises are required for residence of the company's Chairman, who may not be regarded as an employee of the company. In such a case the company would be entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 14(1)(e). Where, however, as already observed, the company requires the premises for its employees only the provisions of section 22, which have been specifically enacted for such a purpose, would be attracted. Just as Section 25-B is a special category which has been carved out which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require the premises for their personal necessity, as held by the Supreme Court in Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v. L.I.C of India and another, 1980 (2) R.C.J 459, similarly Section 22 is a special category which has been carved out of Section 14 of the Act.

It will be seen that under Section 14(1)(e) a landlord has, inter alia, to prove that the premises are bona fide required by him for residence for himself or for members of his family and he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Under Section 22, on the other hand, the landlord has to prove that the premises are required for use of its employees and, in addition thereto, the Controller must be satisfied about the existence of any of the four contingencies contemplated by clauses (a) to (d) of section 22.

The next question which must necessarily follow is as to whether in the present case the petitioner can be permitted to invoke the provisions of Section 22 of the Act. As long as the facts exist on the record, to my mind, it will be immaterial whether in the application the petitioner has written Section 14(1)(e) or section 22. It would, therefore, be open to the petitioner, even at this stage, to invoke the provisions of section 22, but it has to satisfy that the conditions contained therein are complied with. Admittedly clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 22 are not attracted. It is the contention of Mr. Sethi that admittedly the premises were originally given for a period of 11 months, as is evident from Ex. RW1/1. Mr. Sethi, therefore, is right in contending that it is implicit that under the terms of the agreement between the parties the premises had to be returned to the landlord after the period of tenancy had expired. The tenant not surrendering the premises could mean his acting in contravention of the said terms. The provisions of section 22(b) can therefore, be invoked by the petitioner in the present case.

The difficulty in the way of the petittoner is that the trial court has come to the conclusion that the premises are not required by the petitioner bona fide and that the intention of the petitioner appears to be motivated by other circumstances of either to sell the property or to convert it for commercial use. As already noted, even under Section 22 the landlord can obtain possession of the premises if they are required for use of its employees. Though the said section does not use the expression ‘bona fide’ it is evident that the requirement for the use of the employees by the employer must be bona fide. The trial court, while dealing with Section 14(1)(e), observed as follows:—

“A reading of the statement of the petitioner's witness AW1 reveals that there is no obligation on the petitioner to provide accommodation to its employees. From the statement of AW1 it is further admitted that the petitioner intends to sell the property. It is also admitted that the other premises held by the petitioner have been converted into commercial use. The petitioner himself has got accommodation vacant in the premises in question. If the petitioner has a real intention to provide accommodation to its employees why the accommodation which is already vacant has not been allotted to its employees. The story of providing accommodation to its employees as it appears to me has only been set up to attract the provisions of law. Had there been any reality in the intention of the petitioner, the petitioner would have definitely formulated a scheme to allot the accommodation to its employees. What has been done is that simple and bare application have been taken. No scheme has been placed before me as to whom the accommodation will be allotted and what will be the mode of allotment of accommodation. Without framing of any rules and regulations therefor I cannot accept that the petitioner has got any real intention to allot the accommodation to its employees if for the sake of arguments it is assumed that a petition u/s 14(1)(e) can be brought for such purposes. On the other hand, what I find that the intention of the petitioner in view of the statement of AW 1 appears to be motivated by the other circumstances either to sell the property or to convert it for commercial use. Thus, I find that the petitioner does not require the premises bona fide. The petitioner has other accommodations but has not used the same for the alleged purpose.”

Though the aforesaid observations were made in connection with Section 14(1)(e), they would apply with equal force to the provisions of section 22. The aforesaid finding of the trial court is purely a finding of fact. My jurisdiction under sub-section (8) of section 25b is a limited one. Dealing with section 25B(8) it has been observed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice in the case of Kasturilal Nandraj v. Bakshi Ram, 1981 Rajdhani Law Reporter 380 as follows:—

“In my opinion, the scope of revision postulated by the proviso to clause (8) of section 25B of the Act is rather restricted. The High Court would interfere in revision only when there is gross illegalit or what is sometimes called material irregularity or non-exercise of jurisdiction or exceeding the jurisdiction. If the High Court is required to interfere in each and every case in which leave is declined by the Rent Controllers, the purpose of the amendment by which section 25B was incorporated into the Act would be completely defeated. The legislative intent of incorporating Section 25B was that where a landlord bona fide comes to court seeking possession of his own property for his own residence, the tenant could not be allowed to defeat the very purpose by delay. Pleas like asking for enhanced rent are so commonly raised that they need not be commented upon. The decision of the Rent Controller may be correct or incorrect. It cannot be interfered with in revision unless there is some gross illegality. The High Court may interfere when there is great injustice being caused. I am, therefore, not inclined to comment upon the finding with regard to the size of the family of the respondent or the need of his family members. Even otherwise, prima facie, I find nothing wrong in the finding. Merely because the Additional Rent Controller has mentioned the need for a drawing room does not make the finding perverse Looking at the plan of the building, I am satisfied that the finding given by the Additional Controller is unassailable.”

Nothing has been shown to me in this case which can possibly lead me to the conclusion that the order of the Additional Rent Controller suffers from any infirmity to bring the case within the exceptions noted by the Chief Justice in Kasturi Lal's case. The order does not show that the Addl. Rent Controller has acted with material irregularity and nor has he exceeded his jurisdiction. Merely because on the evidence on record I might come to a different conclusion would be no ground for my exercising jurisdiction under section 25B (8) unless it can be shown that while arriving at the conclusion the Additional Rent Controller acted contrary to law or did not have due regard for legal principles enuciated by the courts.

For the aforesaid reasons the Revision Petition is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.