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Sushila Mehta v. Bansi Lal Arora

Delhi High Court
Oct 26, 1981
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Mrs. Sushila Mehta, instituted a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking recovery of Rs. 1,36,000 — comprising Rs. 1,00,000 stated in a document dated 26 August 1978 styled “Receipt” (signed by defendant No.1, Bansi Lal Arora) and interest of Rs. 36,000. There are two defendants: (i) Bansi Lal Arora and (ii) Mayur Cinema Private Limited.

The defendants applied under Order 37 Rule 3(5) CPC for leave to defend. At the conclusion of arguments on 21 October 1981 the court granted leave to defend conditioned on the defendants depositing Rs. 79,500 in court within 15 days. The opinion explains the reasons for that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the document dated 26 August 1978 (the “Receipt”) constitutes a "written contract" for the purposes of Order 37 CPC, and therefore whether the suit is maintainable under Order 37.
  2. Whether the defendants have disclosed facts showing a substantial defence under Order 37 Rule 3(5) CPC sufficient to obtain unconditional leave to defend.
  3. Whether the plaintiff's claim for interest (Rs. 36,000) may be joined with the principal sum under Order 37 Rule 1.
  4. Whether, under the second proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of Order 37 CPC, leave to defend must be conditioned on deposit in court of any part of the claim admitted by the defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Narula)

  • The suit under Order 37 CPC is not maintainable because it is not a suit upon a negotiable instrument nor upon a "written contract".
  • Since the suit is against two defendants and there is no possible contract with defendant No. 2 (the company), defendant No. 2 should be granted unconditional leave to defend.
  • Order 37 CPC does not apply on the original side because Chapter XV of the Original Side Rules governs; the High Court's Original Side Rules take precedence where inconsistent.
  • The claim for Rs. 36,000 is in the nature of damages (not interest) and therefore not properly joined under Order 37 Rule 1.
  • The plaint lacked the specific averment required by Rule 2(1)(b) of Order 37 CPC that no relief outside the ambit of the rule had been claimed.
  • The summons described the document incorrectly as a 'bank receipt and acknowledgement', which was said to be an erroneous description fatal to the suit.
  • Overall submission: defendants were entitled to unconditional leave to defend.

Plaintiff's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The plaintiff asserted that the Rs. 1,00,000 paid on 26 August 1978 was application money for allotment of 2,000 shares and that the receipt is a written contract admitting receipt of that money.
  • The plaintiff disputed the defendants' contention that Rs. 20,500 was part of the Rs. 1,00,000; she maintained that the Rs. 20,500 for booking a commercial flat was paid separately and supported by a separate receipt.
  • The plaintiff accepted that defendants could have unconditional leave in respect of the Rs. 20,500 (her counsel had no objection to such leave), but pressed recovery of the remainder.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mechalec Engineers v. Basic Equipment, AIR 1977 SC 577 Cited for the descriptive phrase characterizing a frivolous defence as "moon shine". The court used the phrase to characterize the defendants' plea that they were ready to allot shares as a sham defence — i.e., not a substantial defence.
Cundy v. Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459 Principle that consensus of minds (agreement) is essential to contract formation. Applied to conclude that acceptance of the plaintiff's application money by the defendants, together with promise and consideration, constituted a written contract despite the document being styled a "receipt".
Printpak Machinery Ltd. v. Jay Kay Paper Congeters, AIR 1979 Delhi 217 (Full Bench) Rule about precedence: where there is inconsistency, Original Side Rules prevail on the original side of the High Court over the CPC. The court distinguished the present case by finding no inconsistency between the Original Side Rules and Order 37 as amended; therefore Order 37 could apply to a suit on a written contract in the original side.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps, grounded in the pleadings, admissions and statutory provisions cited in the record:

  1. Admissibility and nature of the document: The court observed that execution of the 26 August 1978 receipt and receipt of Rs. 1,00,000 were admitted by the defendants. It held that the receipt, while described as a receipt, embodied the elements of a contract (payment, acceptance, promise and consideration) and therefore qualified as a "written contract" within Order 37 Rule 1. The court relied on the consensus-of-mind principle (Cundy v. Lindsay) to support formation of a contract.
  2. Scope of Order 37 on the original side: The court considered the defendants' contention that Original Side Rules displaced Order 37 on the original side. The court examined the Full Bench decision in Printpak and the amending Act of 1976 expanding Order 37 to include written contracts, and concluded there was no inconsistency between the Original Side Rules and Order 37 as applied here; the Code's provisions apply insofar as they are not repugnant to the Original Side Rules (citing Rule 12 of Ch. XV and Rule 19 of Ch. I of the Original Side Rules as making the Code applicable).
  3. Admitted amounts and documentary admissions: The court placed significant weight on a reply dated 2 October 1980 sent by the defendants' advocate (Mr. G. L. Seth), which admitted issuance of the Rs. 1,00,000 receipt, stated one cheque for Rs. 20,000 was dishonoured, admitted Rs. 59,500 was with the defendants and offered Rs. 59,500 to the plaintiff. The court treated these admissions as binding and decisive on the admitted portion of the claim.
  4. Effect of subsequent facts on admitted amount: The leave application later acknowledged that the previously dishonoured cheque of Rs. 20,000 had been paid by the bank, raising the admitted recoverable amount to Rs. 79,500 (Rs. 59,500 + Rs. 20,000 paid). The court accepted that the defendants therefore admitted holding Rs. 79,500 received from the plaintiff.
  5. Application of Order 37 Rule 3(5) provisos and standard for leave: The court analysed sub-rule (5) to Rule 3 of Order 37 CPC and its two provisos. It emphasized that leave to defend should not be refused unless the defendants' disclosed facts do not indicate a substantial defence. The court held that "substantial" requires a strong, solid defence, not frivolous or vexatious pleas.
  6. Conclusion on substantial defence: Applying that standard, the court found no substantial defence as to the admitted Rs. 79,500: the defendants admitted receipt, did not provide a satisfactory reason why plaintiff was not entitled to a refund, had themselves offered the plaintiff Rs. 59,500 and later acknowledged receipt of the Rs. 20,000 cheque. The defendants' alternative and inconsistent pleas (offer to allot shares if balance paid vs offering refund) were characterised as bogus.
  7. Procedural objections and formal defects: The court treated the alleged procedural defects (failure to aver compliance with Rule 2(1)(b) of Order 37, erroneous description in the summons, and technical contentions about applicability of Original Side Rules) as non-fatal. It stated such defects can be rectified by amendment and do not defeat the substantive entitlement under Order 37 when there is a written contract and no inconsistency between rules.
  8. Resulting order: Applying the second proviso to Rule 3(5) — that where part of the claim is admitted the defendant must deposit the admitted amount — the court required deposit of Rs. 79,500 as a condition for leave to defend.

Holding and Implications

LEAVE TO DEFEND GRANTED SUBJECT TO DEPOSIT OF RS. 79,500

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The court granted the defendants leave to defend the suit provided they deposit Rs. 79,500 in court within 15 days from 21 October 1981.
  • There was no order as to costs on the application for leave to defend; costs to abide the event.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to establish a new principle of law beyond applying Order 37 CPC as amended and confirming that a document styled as a "receipt" may constitute a "written contract" for the purposes of Order 37 when its terms and the parties' conduct show acceptance and consideration. No broader precedent beyond the application in this case is explicitly stated by the court.

Show all summary ...

Avadh Behari, J.:— The plaintiff, Mrs. Sushila Mehta, has brought this suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,36,000 under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To this suit there are two defendants—(i) Bansi Lal Arora and (ii) Mayur Cinema Private Limited. The suit is based on a document dated 26th August,1978 stvled as ‘Receipt’. This receipt is admittedly signed by Bansi Lal Arora, defendant No. 1. It reads as follows :

“Received a sum of rupees one lac only as per detail given below from Smt. Susheela Mehta W/o Maj. General K. K. Mehta R/o D-304, Defence Colony, New Delhi as application money for allotment of shares in the proposed private limited company under the name and style of M/s. Mayur Cinema (P) Limited having its registered office at 2/7, Ansari Road, New Delhi-110002 and proprietor of plot No. 1, Rajindra Place, New Delhi.
Rs. 48,000 by Bank draft of 18-8-78.
Rs. 20,000 by way of cheque of 22-8-78.
Rs. 20,000 by way of cheque of 26-8-78.
Rs. 12,000 in cash.
Rs. 1,00,000 Total.”
The plaintiff seeks to recover this amount of Rs. 1,00.000 together with interest of Rs. 36,000.
2. The defendants have made an application under Order 37 Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to defend the suit. It is this application which I heard. At the conclusion of the arguments on 21st October, 1981 I gave leave to the defendants to defend the suit on their depositing in court Rs. 79,500 within 15 days. Now I give my reasons.
3. The execution of the document dated 26th August, 1978 is not disputed by the defendants. Both in the affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit of Bansi Lal Arora, there is no denial that this receipt was executed by him. Nor is the receipt of the amount of Rs. 1,00,000 disputed. What has been pleaded is that the plaintiff initially paid Rs. 1,00,000 to the defendants for allotment of 2000 shares of the value of Rs. 2,00,000. The payment of Rs. 1,00,000 was only a part payment. Out of this amount of Rs. 1,00,000 at the direction of the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 20,500 was transferred to another account of bookings where she had booked a commercial flat in a building proposed to be built by the company which is “the proprietor of the plot No. 1, Rajindra Place”. It is admitted that there is a transfer entry of Rs. 20,000 and a separate receipt was issued for this amount, though it is contended that that was done “inadvertently.”
4. It appears to me that there is a dispute between the parties regarding this sum of Rs. 20,500. The plaintiff says that it was not out of the amount of Rs. 1,00,000 which she had paid on 26th August, 1978, that she took Rs. 20,500 and asked the defendants to deposit the name in the account of the commercial flat. Her case is that she paid separately from her pocket another sum of Rs. 20 500 for booking a commercial flat for which a separate receipt was issued to her. On this I thought that I should give unconditional leave to the defendants and I have done so.
5. As regards the admitted amount of Rs. 79,500 I am of the opinion that there is no substantial defence to the suit. It is clearly and unequlvocally admitted that the amount was received. Mr. Narula, learned counsel for the defendants, says that though it is so he disputes the liability to pay. He denies that the defendants are liable to pay the amount received. I have to see on what grounds he disputes the liability to pay the amount of Rs. 79,500 which he acknowledges to have received from the plaintiff, some by cheques and some by draft. The defence raised is that the plaintiff applied for shares and she is entitled to have the shares but she is not entitled to the refund of money. It is said in the leave application : “even now the defendants are ready to allot 2000 shares to the plaintiff against payment of the entire consideration.” It appears to me that this is a sham defence, a “moon shine”, to use the words of S. R. Das, J. (See Mechalec Engineers v. Basic Equipment, AIR 1977 SC 577(1) (580).
6. There is an important document on the file which clinches the issue. The plaintiff's counsel Mr. P. H. Parekh & Co. issued a notice dated 2nd September, 1980 to Bansi Lal Arora. He is also the director-in-charge of the company, defendant No. 2, and he has made the application for leave to defend on behalf of defendant No. 2 as well. He was called upon to pay. He sent a reply to this notice through his advocate Mr. G. L. Seth dated 2nd October, 1980. In the reply the receipt of Rs. 1,00,000 was admitted to have been issued to the plaintiff. It was stated that out of the amount of Rs. 1,00,000 mentioned in the receipt, one cheque of Rs. 20,000 was dishonoured and was returned unpaid. Rs. 20,500 was said to have been deposited by the plaintiff as earnest money for booking a commercial flat. It was admitted that a sum of Rs. 59,500 was with the defendants and this amount they were prepared to pay to her. The notice says : “Your client is well-advised to receive the balance of Rs. 59,500 from my client above-named which amount was offered to her more than ones.” And again, “Your client can collect an amount of Rs. 59,500 from my client at any time she so desires or is convenient to her.
7. There are clear admissions. This notice is referred to in the plaint. There is no denial any where that this notice was sent by Mr. G. L. Seth under instructions of the defendants. I should straightway hold on this notice that the plaintiff is entitled to receive Rs. 59,500 from the defendants because this is what they told her on 2nd October, 1980 that they are prepared to pay this amount to her. As regards the allotment of shares it was said that “as your client did not pay the balance to make up the initial deposit of Rs. 1,00,000 the proposal for allotment of shares to your client could not be considered even.” Therefore, there is no question of allotment of shares now. The plaintiff was told by Mr. Seth in his notice that she is not entitled to any shares and that all that she is entitled to is the refund of the amount of Rs. 59,500. Now that her right to take back her money is admitted, I can see no good defence to the suit.
8. In the leave application it is admitted that the cheque of Rs. 20,000 which was said to have been dishonoured in the notice of Mr. Seth has been paid by the bank to the defendants. This makes the amount of Rs. 79,5000 to which the plaintiff is entitled. Rs. 59,500 the defendants were ready to pay to her as admitted in Mr. Seth's notice dated 2nd October, 1980. The sum of Rs. 20,000 is now admitted to have been received in the leave application. The defendants must therefore be asked to deposit Rs. 79,500 in Court before they can be given leave to defend the suit. This is what I have done.
9. Mr. Narula on behalf of the defendants argued that the defendants were entitled to unconditional leave. He raised a number of points in support of his submission. In the first place he said that the present suit under Order 37 C.P.C was not maintainable because it was a suit not upon any negotiable instrument nor upon a “written contract”. Order 37 Rule 1 CPC says that the Order applies to the following clases of suits, namely :—
“(a) suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes;
(b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demands in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising,—
(i) on a written contract, or ……”
10. The question is whether the receipt dated 26th August, 1978 is a “written contract” or not. In my opinion if clearly is. The plaintiff paid the application money for allotment of shares. The defendants accepted it, though it is true that defendant No. 2 came into existence a few months later. The payment of Rs. 1,00,000 by the plaintiff as application money and its acceptance by the defendants constitutes a contract. It may be labelled as a receipt but that does not mean that it is not a contract.
11. It was said that it has not been pleaded that the suit is based on a written contract. This is not required by any provision of law. The Court has to find out whether the suit has been brought upon a negotiable instrument or a written contract or an enactment or a guarantee to which Order 37 CPC applies. The acknowledgement of Rs. 1,00,000 by the defendants for the purpose of allotment of shares as application money therefore clearly amounts to a contract. Because it is their own case that the plaintiff paid money for allotment of shares and they accepted it. There was “consensus of mind” And “consensus of mind” leads to a contract, as Lord Caizns said. (Cundy v. Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459(2) at p. 465) There was promise. There was consideration. There was acceptance. All the elements essential for the formation of the contract are presents. What more is needed to make a contract. It was not a nudum pactum.
12. Secondly, it was said that the suit is against two defendants and there is a Joint claim against them. Counsel said that there is no possibility of a contract with defendant No. 2 and, therefore, he entitled to leave. This is nowhere pleaded. The company has affirmed the contract made before its formation by Bansi Lal Arora, its promotor and director-in-charge. A private limited company was formed by husband and wife in October, 1978. The leave application has been made on behalf of both the defendants by Bansi Lal Arora and it has not been asserted that defendant No. 2 is not liable to pay on the ground that it made no contract with the plaintiff. From the leave application it appears that the company ratified the contract and the Board of Directors agreed to allot shares to the plaintiff if she paid the balance consideration. This is what is stated in the leave application, though in the notice of Mr. Seth it was said that there is no question of allotment of shares and the plaintiff can take back her Rs. 59,500. From these inconsistent pleas one thing is clear. It is this that the defence is bogus.
13. Thirdly, counsel argued that Order 37 CPC did not apply and Chapter XV of the Original Side Rules applies to the case. He said that the Rules of the High Court do not permit the plaintiff to bring a suit on the ‘written contract’ and therefore, the suit cannot proceed. There is no substance in this contention. The suit is under Order 37 CPC. In so far as the Code is not inconsistent with the Original Side Rules the Code applies. Merely because the plaintiff has referred to Chapter XV of the Rules of the High Court it does not mean that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue on the “written contract” under Order 37 of the Code.
14. I was referred to the Full Bench decision in Printpak Machinery Ltd. v. Jay Kay Paper Congeters, AIR 1979 Delhi 217(3) (FB). The full bench has said that in the event of inconsistency, the original side rules prevail on the original side of this court and not the Code of Civil Procedure. But here there is no inconsistency between the two. They are not mutually repugnant or contradictory. Both can stand side by side. In this respect the amending Act of 1976 has enlarged the scope of R. 1 of 0.37 by including written contract, enactment and guarantee within its scope. Rule 12 of Ch. XV and Rule 19 of Ch. I of the Original Side Rules make the provisions of the Code applicable to the original side. Provisions of 0.37 are expressly made applicable in so far as they are not inconsistent with Ch. XV. I am of opinion that there is no inconsistency between the “renovated Code’ and the original side rules on bringing a suit on a written contract”. I, therefore, hold that the plaintiff is entitled to sue on the written contract.
15. Fourthly, counsel submitted that assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to sue for recovery of Rs. 1,00,000 on a written contract, she is not entitled to join the claim for Rs. 36,000 which, he said, is a claim in the nature of damages. I do not agree. It is a claim for interest. Whether she is entitled to interest or not is another question. Order 37 Rule 1 says that the plaintiff can “recover a debtor liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising on a written contract.” The claim for interest can be joined with a claim for money under Order 37 Rule 1(2)(b)(i) CPC This is clear from the statute.
16. Fifthly, counsel contended that there ought to have been a specific averment in the plaint in terms of Rule 2(1)(b) of Order 37 CPC that “no relief which does not fall within the ambit of this rule has been claimed in the plaint.” This is not a fatal flaw. This averment can be introduced by amendment. At best this is a procedural defect. It can be remedied. Procedure is the hand-maiden of justice. The rules of the court are not our masters. They are servants of justice. What the court has to see is whether there is any relief claimed by the plaintiff which falls outside the ambit of Rule 1. If there is no such relief, the suit ought to proceed under Order 37 CPC.
17. Lastly, counsel said that in summons issued to the defendants it was stated that the suit is based on a ‘bank receipt and acknowledgement’. This is an arroneous description of the document dated 26th August, 1978. The erroneous description in the summons is not fatal to the suit. The suit remains a suit on a “written contract”. If the court comes to that conclusion then the suit is validity instituted under Order 37 CPC.
18. These are highly technical arguments. They do not answer the point in substance. The point in substance is whether the facts disclosed by the defendants show that they have a substantial defence to raise. Our procedural rules are now-a-days much less formalistic and more flexible, as they should be The two provisos to sub-rule (5) to Rule 3 of Order 37 CPC are a guide to the court. The sub-rule is in these words :
“(5) The defendant may, at any time within the days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as may appear to the court or Judge to be just :
Provided that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious.
Provided further that, where a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court.”
19. The provisos are addressed to the court. They say that leave should not be refused if the facts disclosed by the defendant indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise. “Substantial” is a strong word. The defence should be “substantial”. It should be strong, solid, of real worth. Not frivolous or vexatious. On the facts of this case I have come to the conclusion that the defendants have no substantial defence to raise so far as the admitted amount of Rs. 79,500 is concerned. This sum they do not dispute they received. They merely say that they are not liable to pay. No good reason is shown why the plaintiff is not entitled to the return of this money. At no time she was offered shares. At no time she was asked to pay call money. In the notice she was advised to take back her money. When the suit is brought there is a complete somersault.
20. The second proviso says that where a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court. From the notice of Mr. Seth and the application for leave to defend it is abundantly clear that the amount of Rs. 79,500 the defendants are bound to return to the plaintiff because in the notice they themselves invited her to come and take that money from them. Now it is acknowledged that the amount really received from her is Rs. 79,500 because the dishonoured cheque has been encashed admittedly by the defendants.
21. In paragraph 15 of the affidavit of Bansi Lal it is said that the defendants were prepared to pay Rs. 59,500 to the plaintiff “in full and final settlement of the entire account under both the heads”, namely, the share account and the plot account. But this assertion is clearly contrary to the notice of Mr. Seth. It is difficult for the defendants to get out of the position they took in the noice. There he plaintiff's claim was admitted to the extent of Rs. 59,500, which after the receipt of the amount of Rs. 20,000 has become Rs. 79,500. To this claim of the plaintiff the defendants have no substantial defence to raise.
22. Mr. Parekh and Mr. Arun Mohan on behalf of the plaintiff stated that they had no objection if unconditional leave is granted to the defendants as regards the sum of Rs. 20,500.
23. For these reasons, the defendants are granted leave to defend the suit on their depositing in court a sum of Rs. 79,500 within 15 days from 21st October, 1981. There will be no order as to costs on this application for leave to defend. Costs will abide the event.
U.K Leave to defend allowed for port-amount.