- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Shri Rajeshwar Dayal v. Shri Nanak Chand & Ors. .
Case Summary — Opinion by Sultan Singh, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 brought by the landlord. The property in question is Plot No. 4/3, Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Chronology and key facts recorded in the opinion:
- A lease deed dated 12.5.1942 from the Delhi Improvement Trust to Smt. Singhari Devi; the property was gifted to her daughter Smt. Gaindo Bai by gift deed dated 7.7.1945.
- Smt. Gaindo Bai sold the leasehold rights to Ganga Dayal (father of the appellant) by sale deed dated 9.10.1953. Ganga Dayal Saxena constructed structures on the plot.
- One garage was let to Nanak Chand (respondent No. 1) from 1.7.1954 at Rs. 50 per month (rent note dated 7.7.1954). The tenant used the garage as a provision store (shop).
- The lease required residential use only; the use as a shop was contrary to the lease. The Delhi Development Authority (successor to the Delhi Improvement Trust) issued notices to the landlord to stop the non-conforming use and threatened forfeiture of the lease.
- The landlord served a notice under Section 14(1)(k) on 9.9.1962 and, after no response, filed an eviction application which the Additional Controller dismissed on 9.12.1963 on the ground that the landlord had himself let the premises for shop use. The Tribunal dismissed the landlord's appeal on 10.6.1964.
- Further DDA notices were issued in 1965, 1967 and 1968. The landlord served a fresh notice under Section 14(1)(k) on 25.7.1968; the tenant replied on 17.9.1968 refusing to comply. The landlord filed a fresh eviction application on 11.3.1969.
- Ganga Dayal died during pendency; Rajeshwar Dayal Saxena was substituted as appellant under a Will. The Additional Controller dismissed the later eviction petition on 31.3.1969 as barred by res judicata. The Tribunal affirmed dismissal on 7.12.1981, prompting this second appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the subsequent eviction application (based on the statutory notice dated 25.7.1968) is barred by res judicata because of the earlier dismissal of an eviction application arising out of the notice dated 9.9.1962.
- Whether a landlord who has himself let premises for a non-conforming user (contrary to the lease) is estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
- Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan (AIR 1973 SC 921) effected a change in law that removes any estoppel against such landlords and thus permits fresh eviction proceedings based on a later notice.
- Whether the Additional Controller and Tribunal were required to decide the alternatives under Section 14(11) of the Act (i.e., whether the tenant would stop the misuser within time fixed or pay compensation) before dismissing the eviction petition as res judicata or on estoppel grounds.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The previous decision of the Controller dated 9.12.1963 was erroneous in law.
- The Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan (AIR 1973 SC 921) held that a landlord who himself let out premises in violation of the lease is not stopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) — amounting to a change in law that should apply.
- The present eviction application is based on a different cause of action (a fresh statutory notice dated 25.7.1968) and is therefore not barred by res judicata.
- There is no estoppel against the appellant despite his prior conduct, and his right to claim eviction under Section 14(1)(k) read with Section 14(11) was not adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
- User contrary to the lease is recurring; subsequent notices and fresh defaults give rise to fresh causes of action.
Respondent's Arguments
- There has been no change in law by the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand — that decision is only a declaration of the correct interpretation of Section 14(1)(k), not a change in law.
- The cause of action in the present litigation is the same as in the earlier proceedings.
- The appellant, having let the premises contrary to the lease, is estopped from obtaining eviction and the eviction petition is barred by the principles of res judicata.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan, AIR 1973 S.C. 921 | Held that a landlord who himself let premises in violation of the terms of the lease deed entered into with the President of India was not stopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act. | The court treated the Supreme Court's interpretation as effecting a change in law relevant to the present matter and relied on it to hold that the landlord was not estopped from claiming eviction. |
| S.P. Arora v. Ajit Singh, ILR 1970 (2) Delhi 130 | Earlier view of this Court that a landlord who had himself let premises for a purpose contrary to the lease was estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k). | Noted as representing the earlier local position which was superseded by the Supreme Court decision in Faqir Chand for purposes of this case. |
| Smt. Uma Kumar v. Jaswant Rai, 1960 PLR 460 | Earlier authority of this Court holding estoppel where the landlord had let premises contrary to lease terms. | Referred to as part of the pre-Faqir Chand line of authority from this Court on estoppel. |
| Lila Wati Datta v. Karol Bagh Union and Delhi Development Authority, 20(1981) Delhi Law Times 52 | Applied Faqir Chand to hold that (a) landlord was not estopped from filing eviction application despite having let premises contrary to lease; (b) subsequent eviction application was not barred by res judicata; (c) cause of action in subsequent proceeding was different; (d) when the Supreme Court interprets a statute differently from the High Court it amounts to change in law. | The court relied on this High Court decision as a prior similar instance and followed the approach that the Supreme Court's interpretation constituted a change in law applicable to landlords in similar situations. |
| Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, AIR 1971 SC 2355 | Established limits and exceptions to res judicata, including that a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties or a change in law by a competent authority may permit reopening a matter. | The court relied on the principles and extensive quotation from Mathura Prasad to conclude that res judicata did not bar the present proceedings where the cause of action was different and the law had changed by a Supreme Court decision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence tied closely to the statutory scheme and the procedural posture of the earlier and later proceedings:
-
Nature of cause of action under Section 14(1)(k):
The court explained explicitly that the cause of action under Section 14(1)(k) consists of service of a notice by the landlord asking the tenant to stop using premises contrary to conditions imposed on the landlord by relevant authorities; if the tenant does not stop, the landlord then has a cause of action to seek eviction under that section.
-
Distinction between earlier and later notices:
The earlier eviction application arose from a statutory notice dated 9.9.1962; the present eviction application arose from a fresh statutory notice dated 25.7.1968. The court found that these are different causes of action because the later notice gave rise to a fresh entitlement to proceed.
-
Recurring nature of the wrong:
User contrary to the lease was characterized as a recurring cause of action; the tenant's continued use as a shop and his failure to stop were undisputed facts supporting a fresh cause of action.
-
Effect of Supreme Court decision (Faqir Chand):
The court held that the Supreme Court's interpretation in Faqir Chand — that a landlord who had himself let premises contrary to the lease was not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) — amounted to a change in law which affected the earlier local line of authorities that had applied estoppel (e.g., S.P. Arora, Uma Kumar).
-
Res judicata and its exceptions:
The court relied on the Supreme Court's exposition in Mathura Prasad about the doctrine of res judicata: the doctrine is procedural and limited; a previous decision on matters in issue is res judicata, but the reasons for a decision are not; a pure question of law unrelated to the right, or a change in law by a competent authority, can prevent an earlier decision from operating as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Applying this, the court found the earlier proceedings did not conclusively determine the appellant's right to claim eviction under Section 14(1)(k) in light of the change in law.
-
Mandatory consideration under Section 14(11):
The court observed that sub-section (11) of Section 14 mandates that, before making an order for recovery of possession under clause (k), the Controller must fix a time for the tenant to stop misuser or determine compensation; the Additional Controller and Tribunal had not considered these alternatives because they dismissed the petition on grounds of res judicata/estoppel without determining whether the tenant would stop the misuser or pay compensation. This omission required remand.
-
Relief and procedural direction:
For these reasons the court accepted the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's judgment and the Additional Controller's order dismissing the eviction application, and remanded the matter to the Additional Controller to decide the questions arising under Section 14(11) after affording parties opportunity to be heard. The Delhi Development Authority, already a party, was to be included in proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court accepted the second appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment and the order of the Additional Controller dismissing the eviction application under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act.
Consequences and directions (implications):
- The matter is remanded to the Additional Controller to determine the issues under Section 14(11) of the Act (i.e., whether the tenant should be permitted time to stop the misuser or should pay compensation), after affording all parties, including the Delhi Development Authority, an opportunity to be heard.
- Parties were directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 7th December 1981 for further proceedings.
- There will be no order as to costs.
- The court relied substantially on the Supreme Court decision in Faqir Chand and the principles articulated in Mathura Prasad to conclude that res judicata and estoppel did not bar the fresh eviction proceedings arising from the subsequent notice; the opinion applies those precedents but does not purport to create a broader new legal rule beyond its application to the facts before the court.
This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion. No information has been added that was not present in the opinion text.
Sultan Singh, J.:— This second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) by the landlord has arisen in the following circumstances.
Plot No. 4/3 situated at Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi was taken on lease by one Smt. Singhari Devi from the Delhi Improvement Trust in terms of lease deed dated 12.5.1942 It was gifted by her to her daughter Smt. Gaindo Bai by means of a gift deed dated 7.7.1945 Smt. Gaindo Bai thereafter sold the leasehold rights to Ganga Dayal father of the appellant by means of a sale deed dated 9.10.1953 Shri Ganga Dayal Saxena raised structure over the said plot of land. He let out one garrage of the said property to Nanak Chand, respondent No. 1 with effect from 1.7.1954 on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- in terms of the rent note dated 7.7.1954 (Ex. AW3/1). The respondent No. 1 started using the said garrage for the purpose of running a provision store. According to the lease deed the property was to be used for residential purpose only. As the user was contrary to the terms of the lease deed, the Delhi Development Authority, successor of the Delhi Improvement Trust, served varioue notices upon the landlord Ganga Dayal requiring him to stop the misuser. The landlord therefore, on 9.9.1962 sent a notice to the tenant under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act requiring him to stop the misuser; Finding no response, he filed an application for his eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act. The Additional Controller by order dated 9.12.1963 dismissed the eviction application observing that the landlord himself had let out the premises for being used as a shop. The appeal filed by the landlord was dismissed by the Tribunal on 10.6.1964 It appears that the Delhi Development Authority, respondent No. 2, has been issuing notices to the landlord Ganga Dayal from time to time. Some of these notices are Ex, AW1/6 dated 13.5.65, Ex.AW1/7 dated 2.12.67, Ex AW1/8 dated 5.3.68 requiring the landlord to stop the user of the plot in question contrary to terms of the lease. The landlord, therefore, on 25.7.1968 served a fresh notice upon the tenant under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act requiring him to stop the misuser and to vacate the premises. The respondent No. 1 sent a reply dated 17.9.1968 (Ex. AW2/13) refusing to comply with the notice. Misuser was not stopped. The landlord Ganga, Dayal therefore, on 11.3.1969 filed an application for eviction on various grounds including the ground mentioned in Section 14(1)(k) of the Act. During the pendency of the eviction proceedings Ganga Dayal Saxena died and the present appellant Rajeshwar Dayal Saxena on the basis of a Will in his favour was substituted. On 31.3.1969 the Additional Controller dismissed the eviction petition on the ground that the same was barred by principles of res judicata. The appeal filed by the landlord before the Rent Control Tribunal was also dismissed on 7.12.981 Hence this second appeal.
The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the previous decision of the Controller dated 9.12.1963 was erroneous in law, that the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan AIR 1973 S.C 921 has held that a landlord who himself let out the premises in violation of the terms of the lease deed entered into with the President of India was not stopped from claiming eviction of his tenant under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act, that there was a change in law by the judicial pronouncement of Supreme Court, that the present application for eviction was based on a cause of action different from the cause of action in the earlier case, that there is no estoppel against the appellant although he himself had let out the premises for use as a shop as held in the earlier proceedings, that his right to claim eviction under Section 14(1)(k) read with Section 14(11) of the Act was not determined by the Controller and the Tribunal in the previous case and that the user contrary to the terms of the lease deed is a recurring cause of action. The learned counsel for the respondent-tenant on the other hand submits that there is no change in Jaw by the judicial pronouncement of Supreme Court as contained in Faqir Chand (supra) that it is only a declaration of the correct interpretation of the law contained in Section 14(1)(k) of the Act, that the cause of action in the present litigation is not different, that the appellant having leased the premises for a purpose contrary to the terms of lease is not entitled to an order of eviction against the tenant and the eviction petition is barred by principles of res-judicata.
Prior to the decision of Faqir Chand (supra) on 30.1.1973 by the Supreme Court it had been held by this Court that a landlord having himself let out the premises for a purpose contrary to the terms of lease was estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act (see S.P Arora… v. Ajit Singh… ILR 1970 (2) Delhi 130 and Smt. Uma Kumar v. Jaswant Rai 1960 PLR 460).
The previous eviction proceeding was based on a different cause of action i.e on the basis of a statutory notice dated 9.9.1962 sent by the landlord under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act requiring the respondent-tenant to stop the misuser. An eviction petition was filed and according to the interpretation of law as it was then prevalent the Additional Controller and the Tribunal dismissed the eviction application. The previous eviction application as already stated was dismissed by the Tribunal on 10 6.1964 There were subsequent notices by the D.D.A requiring the landlord to stop the user of plot contrary to the terms of lease failing which the landlord was threatened that his lease would be forfeited. The landlord served a fresh notice dated 25.7.1968 under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act upon the tenant and as there was no response the present eviction proceedings were filed. It seems to me that the cause of action in the two cases filed for the eviction of the respondent No. 1 are different. The cause of action for the present proceeding arose out of the statutory notice dated 25.7.1968 User of the premises contrary to the terms of the lease is a recurring cause of action. Admittedly the respondent-tenant has been using the premises as a shop and he has failed to stop the user of the premises contrary to the terms of the lease. Section 14(1)(k) of the Act reads as under:
14.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:—
(a) to (i)………
(k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situated;
The cause of action under this provision consists of giving of a notice by the landlord to the tenant asking him not to use the premises in a manner contrary to the terms imposed on the landlord by the authorities concerned and to stop the misuser. If the tenant does not stop the misuser, cause of action arises to the landlord to proceed under this section seeking his eviction. Service of notice dated 25.7.1968 under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act cannot be disputed as the tenant sent a reply dated 17.9.1968 (Ex. AW2/13), User of the premises as a shop, which is contrary to the terms of lease, is also not disputed. Thus there would be an order of eviction against the tenant-respondent No. 1. But under sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act no order for recovery of possession under this clause (k) could be passed if the tenant stops the misuser within a time to be fixed by the Controller or pays the compensation determined by the Controller. In the present case the Controller and the Tribunal dismissed the eviction application on the ground that the same was barred by principles of res-judicata. They had not determined whether the tenant was willing to stop the misuser or pay the compensation that may be determined by the Controller. In other words it means that the eviction petition was dismissed on the ground that the same was barred by principles of res-judicata and that he was estopped from claiming eviction as he had himself let out the premises for a non-conforming user. A similar matter arose before me in Lila Wati Datta v. Karol Bagh Union and Delhi Development Authority 20(1981) Delhi Law Times 52. In that case also the landlord had let out the premises to the tenant for a use contrary to the terms of the lease His petition for eviction was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. After the decision of the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand (supra) the landlord filed a fresh petition and it was held that he was not estopped from filing the eviction application, that the subsequent eviction application was not barred by principles of res-judicata and that the cause of action in the subsequent eviction application was different. Further it was held that when the Supreme Court interprets a statute in a manner different from the interpretation of the statute by the High Court, it amounted to a change in law. I further observed:
“Many landlords let out the premises themselves for use contrary to terms of their lease deed and in view of the law contained in Section 14(1)(k) of the Act as interpreted by this court they are also estopped from evicticg their tenants under the principles of estoppel and are likely to forfeit lease of their land with building thereon. This would be a great hardship to them. The law laid down in Faqir Chand (supra) must be available to such landlords to enable them to protect their lease and building. The legislature is not supposed to amend the provision of Section 14(1)(k) of the Act to protect all such landlords when the Supreme Court has interpreted the said provision holding that the landlords are not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act even if they themselves had let out the building for a purpose contrary to terms of lease deed executed between the landlord and the authority concerned.”
In view of my previous judgment, I hold that the cause of action in the present case is different from the cause of action in the earlier case, that there was change of law on account of interpretation given by the Supreme Court, that there is no estoppel against appellant, as his right to claim eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act was not determined in the previous eviction case. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that under the principles of res-judicata the litigant cannot be vexed twice. There is no dispute about this preposition of law. But there are exceptions, which are mentioned in Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, AIR 1971 SC. 2355. The Supreme Court observed as follows:
“The doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure, it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in anorher proceeding between the same parties the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts, which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A prexious decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the source of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision on law cannot be dissociated from the decision of facts on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law.”
The Supreme Court after discussing various authorities on the question of principles of res-judicata further observed:
“A question of jurisciction of the Court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit.”
The judgment in(supra) is applicable to the facts of the present case.
The ground of eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act stands proved as discussed already. But the Controller or the Tribunal has not taken proceedings under Section 14(11) of the Act which is a mandatory provision. The appeal is, therefore, accepted. The judgment and order of the Tribunal confirming the order of the Additional Controller dismissing the eviction application under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act is set aside. The matter however will have to go back to the Additional Controller for deciding the question under sub-section 11 of Section 14 of the Act whether he should exercise the one or the other of the two alternatives mentioned therein. The Delhi Development Authority is a party to the present proceedings. The Controller shall after affording an opportunity to the parties determine the questions arising under Section 14(11) of the Act. Parties are directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 7th December 1981. There will be no order as to costs.
Alert