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Smt. Lila Watti Datta /Landlord v. Karol Bagh Union Club & Another /Tenant.
Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (Sultan Singh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (landlady) took on lease plot No. 6-B/3 Northern Extension Area, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi from the Delhi Improvement Trust by deed dated 8 November 1954. Clause 10 of that deed restricted use to a residential bungalow. The appellant constructed a residential house but in 1959 let the premises to the respondent for use as a club, contrary to clause 10. The Delhi Improvement Trust was succeeded by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) under the Delhi Development Act, 1957.
The DDA issued notices objecting to the misuse and the DDA's notice dated 17 October 1963 required the appellant to show cause why the lease should not be determined. The appellant served a notice on the respondent dated 18 December 1963 requiring it to stop the misuse; the respondent did not comply. The appellant filed an eviction application on 28 February 1968 under Section 14(1)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. That application was dismissed by the Additional Controller on 20 September 1969, and the appeal was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 27 August 1971, both decisions applying the principle that a landlord who had himself let premises for a purpose contrary to lease was estopped from claiming eviction.
After the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot (AIR 1973 S.C. 921) held that a landlord was not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) because “there can be no estoppel against statute,” the appellant filed a fresh eviction petition on 24 August 1973 based on a new notice dated 8 February 1973. That application was dismissed by the Additional Controller on 10 September 1976 on the ground of res judicata (relying on the earlier dismissal), and the Tribunal dismissed the appeal on 25 October 1979 for the same reason. The present second appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the landlord (appellant) who had herself let the premises in violation of the lease deed is estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot (AIR 1973 S.C. 921).
- Whether the dismissal of the appellant's earlier eviction application operates as res judicata and thereby bars the fresh eviction proceedings based on a later statutory notice (8 February 1973) alleging continuing misuse.
- Whether the cause of action in the present eviction proceeding is different from the cause of action in the previous proceeding (i.e., whether a fresh statutory notice gives rise to a recurring cause of action that is not precluded by res judicata).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- There has been a change in law by the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand (AIR 1973 S.C. 921) holding that a landlord is not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) even if the landlord had earlier let the premises for a purpose contrary to the lease.
- The present eviction application is based on a different cause of action (a fresh notice dated 8 February 1973) from the earlier eviction case (which was based on notice dated 18 December 1963), and therefore res judicata does not apply.
- Estoppel is a rule of procedure/evidence and a change in judicial interpretation (as by the Supreme Court) alters the legal position such that the prior decision should not bind the parties in the subsequent proceeding.
- If eviction is not allowed now, the appellant risks losing her lease with the DDA and her property; therefore the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court should be available to her.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that the law declared by the Supreme Court does not constitute a subsequent change in law capable of removing the res judicata effect of the earlier judgment between the parties and relied upon State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mulamchand (AIR 1973 Madhya Pradesh 293).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S.P. Arora v. Ajit Singh, ILR (1970) II Delhi 130 | Authority followed by lower forum holding landlord who let premises for a contrary purpose is estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k). | The Rent Control Tribunal had followed this authority in dismissing the appellant's earlier eviction application on estoppel grounds. |
| Smt. Uma Kumari v. Jaswant Rai Chopra, 1960 P.L.R. 460 | Earlier authority recognizing estoppel against a landlord who permitted non-permitted use. | This Court had earlier followed that authority in holding the landlord estopped in the prior proceedings. |
| Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, AIR 1973 S.C. 921 | Held that a landlord is not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) because there can be no estoppel against statute. | Used as a subsequent Supreme Court interpretation that altered the legal position relied upon by the appellant to argue that the earlier dismissal should not operate as res judicata. |
| Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal & ors v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 S.C. 2355 | Explains doctrine of res judicata (Section 11 CPC): res judicata belongs to procedure; matter in issue may be fact, law or mixed; reasons for decision are not res judicata; a pure question of law unrelated to facts is not res judicata; change in law or different cause of action can prevent res judicata. | The Court relied on this decision at length to reason that a subsequent authoritative change in legal interpretation (by the Supreme Court) or a different cause of action may prevent an earlier decision from operating as res judicata. |
| Ratanlal Kishandas v. Bajirao Ganpat Mahalasne, 1975 Mah.L.J. 65 | Where judicial pronouncement or statutory alteration contradicts an earlier order, the earlier order will not operate as res judicata. | Invoked as supportive authority for the proposition that a later judicial change can prevent res judicata effect of the earlier decision. |
| Alimiya Mahmadmiya & another v. Sayed Mohomed Baguir El-Edroos Valde Sayed Jaffer El-Edroos & another, AIR 1968 Gujarat 257 | When law is differently interpreted by later judicial decisions or altered by statute, a prior decision between same parties cannot bind for all time and cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. | Used to reinforce the same proposition applied by the Court here. |
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mulamchand, AIR 1973 Madhya Pradesh 293 | Relied upon by respondent to argue that the Supreme Court's law is not a subsequent change capable of removing res judicata effect. | The respondent cited this case; the opinion records that the respondent relied on it but the Court did not accept the respondent's contention based on this authority. |
| Jawahar Singh v. Jai Gopal, ILR (1972) I Delhi 63 | Held that an incorrect finding on an issue of law does not operate as res judicata in a later case arising out of a different cause of action. | Invoked by the Court to support the proposition that a different cause of action prevents an earlier decision on law from being res judicata. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the central procedural question as whether the present eviction proceedings are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. It proceeded step-by-step as follows:
- The court identified the admitted facts: (i) the appellant's lease restricted use to residential bungalow; (ii) the appellant had herself let the premises as a club to the respondent; (iii) the appellant served a fresh statutory notice dated 8 February 1973 under Section 14(1)(k); and (iv) the respondent persisted in the misuse.
- The court examined Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the doctrine of res judicata as expounded by the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal (AIR 1971 S.C. 2355). It emphasized key principles from that authority: res judicata is procedural; the “matter in issue” can be fact, law or mixed; reasons for a decision are not themselves res judicata; a pure question of law unrelated to facts may not be res judicata; a previous decision will not operate as res judicata when (inter alia) the cause of action is different or the law has since been altered by a competent authority.
- The court accepted the appellant’s submission that the Supreme Court’s decision in Faqir Chand (AIR 1973 S.C. 921) — that a landlord is not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) — amounted to a change in law. The court reasoned that when a higher court later interprets a statute differently from the interpretation applied in an earlier decision between the same parties, such subsequent authoritative interpretation is a change in law for purposes of res judicata analysis.
- The court analyzed the causes of action in the two proceedings. It found that the earlier proceeding arose from notice dated 18 December 1963, whereas the present proceeding arises from a fresh statutory notice dated 8 February 1973. The court treated issuance of the statutory notice and the tenant’s failure to desist as an essential element of the cause of action under Section 14(1)(k), and held that such a cause of action is recurring in nature.
- The court characterized estoppel as a rule of evidence/procedure, not substantive law. In the previous litigation the appellant’s eviction application was dismissed on estoppel grounds, and thus the court there did not determine the appellant’s substantive right under Section 14(1)(k). Because the substantive right under Section 14(1)(k) had not been finally determined between the parties and because the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation changed the legal position, the earlier dismissal did not bar the present proceedings by res judicata.
- On these bases the court concluded that the Controller and the Tribunal were incorrect to hold that the previous judgment operated as res judicata. The court therefore accepted the appeal, set aside the Tribunal’s and Additional Controller’s orders dismissing the current eviction application, and remitted the matter to the Additional Controller to decide questions under sub‑section (11) of Section 14 of the Act (providing the Controller choose between the alternatives available there).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court's final decision was that the earlier judgment dismissing the appellant's eviction application does not operate as res judicata in the present eviction proceedings. The appeal was accepted, and the earlier orders were set aside.
More precisely, the court SET ASIDE the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 25 October 1979 and the order of the Additional Controller dated 10 September 1976. The matter was remitted to the Additional Controller to determine the questions arising under sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; the Delhi Development Authority was noted as a party to the proceedings. Parties were directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 15 May 1981. There was no order as to costs.
Implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The court recognized that the Supreme Court's interpretation in Faqir Chand (that there can be no estoppel against statute) altered the legal position and therefore made available to landlords who had let premises contrary to their lease the ability to claim eviction under Section 14(1)(k).
- The opinion emphasized that the cause of action for eviction under Section 14(1)(k) accrues upon service of the statutory notice and the tenant's failure to desist, and that such a cause of action is recurring — a fresh notice generates a new cause of action not barred by an earlier decision based on a different notice.
- The court confined itself to the consequences between the parties: the earlier dismissal did not bar the present claim and the matter must be re-determined by the Additional Controller under Section 14(11). The court did not purport to lay down any broader statutory amendment; it applied existing Supreme Court authority to the facts before it.
Direct quote of procedural directive from the judgment: "The matter... will have to go back to the Additional Controller for deciding the question under sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act whether he should exercise the one or the other of the two alternatives mentioned therein." Parties were directed to appear on 15 May 1981. No order as to costs.
Sultan Singh, J.:— This second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by the landlady has arisen out of the following circumstances.
The appellant took on lease plot No. 6-B/3 Northern Extension Area, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi for the purpose of constructing a residential house from the Delhi Improvement Trust, a body corporate under the United Provinces Town Improvement Act (Act VIII of 1919) as extended to Delhi in terms of the deed dated 8th November, 1954. She constructed a residential house and clause 10 of the deed provides that she shall not use the said land for any purpose except for erection of a building to be used as residential bungalow. In 1959, she let out the said premises to the respondent for being used as club. The Delhi Improvement Trust is now succeeded by the Delhi Development Authority under the Delhi Development Act, 1957. The misuser of the premises as a club contrary to clause 10 of the lease deed was objected to by the Delhi Development Authority by means of various notices. The notice dated 17th October, 1963 issued by the Delhi Development Authority to the appellant required her to show cause why the lease be not determined for breach of its terms. The appellant served a notice dated 18th December, 1963 upon the respondent requiring it to stop the misuser. It did not stop the misuser. The appellant on 28th February, 1968 filed an application for eviction of the respondent under Section 14 (1) (k) of the Act. As the appellant herself had let out the premises for non-residential purposes contrary to the terms of the lease between by her and the authorities, the eviction application was dismissed on the principle of estoppel by the Additional Controller on 20th September, 1969 and her appeal was also dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal by judgment dated 27th August, 1971 following the judgment in S.P Arora v. Ajit Singh, ILR (1970) II Delhi 130. This court following Smt. Uma Kumari v. Jaswant Rai Chopra 1960 P.L.R 460 held that the landlord having herself let out the premises for a purpose contrary to the terms of his lease, was estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14 (1) (k) of the Act.
The question: Whether a landlord who had himself let out the premises in violation of the terms of lease deed, was estopped from claiming eviction of her tenant under Section 14 (1) (k) of the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, AIR 1973 S.C 921 and it was held that the landlord was not estopped as there can be no estoppel against statute. The appellant on 24th August, 1973 filed another petition for eviction out of which this appeal has arisen claiming respondent's eviction under Section 14 (1) (k) of the Act alleging that she served a notice dated 8th February, 1973 requiring the respondent to stop the misuser and it, having failed to stop the misuser, is liable to be evicted, The Additional Controller on 10th September, 1976 dismissed her application on the ground that a similar application filed by her previously was dismissed and that the previous judgment operated as res-judicata. The appeal before the Tribunal was also dismissed on 25th October, 1979 on the same ground.
The admitted facts are that the plot of land was taken on lease by the appellant from the Delhi Improvement Trust now succeeded by the Delhi Development Authority; the building erected thereon is to be used as a residential bungalow; she let out the premises in suit to the respondent for use as a club; a notice dated 8th Fabruary, 1973 was served by her upon the respondent requiring it to stop the misuser of the premises. The crucial question for decision is whether the present eviction proceedings are barred is: by the doctrine of res judicata.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is change in law by the judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court after the dismissal of previous eviction case, that the present eviction application is based on a cause of action different from the cause of action in the previous proceeding for eviction. He says that there is no estoppel against the appellant although she herself let out the premises for use as a club and that misuser of the property contrary to the terms of lease granted to her by the authorities is a recurring cause of action. He submits that notice dated 8th February, 1973 Ex.A.W 1/4 requiring the respondent to stop the misuser under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act was served upon the respondent and as it has failed to stop the misuser, that the appellant is entitled to claim eviction otherwise the lease of the appellant with the D.D.A is bound to be determined and she would loose her property. His contention is that the previous eviction case was based on a notice dated 18th December, 1963 under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act and a fresh notice dated 8th February, 1973 has been served upon the respondent and as the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand (Supra) has held that the landlord was not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act in spite of the fact that the landlord himself had let out the premises for a purpose contrary to the terms of his lease, the appellant is entitled to an order of eviction. He further contends that the principle of estoppel is a procedural law and if there has been different interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court, the previous decision between the parties based on principle of estoppel, does not operate as res judicata, and that the Rule of procedure does not affect the rights of the parties and cannot supersede substantive law contained in Section 14(i)(k) of the Act.
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the principle of res judicata. It lays down that a matter directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title and had been heard and finally decided by a competent court shall not be tried again. In Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and othes v. Dossibai N.B Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 S.C 2355, the Seprcme Court has observed, “The doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure, it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and retating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the source of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision on law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision’ on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law.” The Supreme Court after discussing various authorities on the question whether a decision on a question of law operates as res judicata, further observes, “A question of jurisdiction of the court, or of procedure, or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit”. (Emphasis added).
The appellant submits that issues may be of fact, of law and of mixed questions of fact and law. As regards the issue of law in case they are pure. questions of law having no relation to the circumstances, decision regarding; such an issue will not operate as res judicata. He again relies upon the said Supreme Court case in Re: Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaisawal and others, (supra). In that case before the Supreme Court the facts briefly were that, the trial court had held that the provisions of a particular Act did not apply to the property in suit which decision was upheld by the High Court. Subsequently the High Court changed its decision in another case and held that the provisions of the Act applied in similar circumstances. The Supreme Court also upheld the application of those provisions of the Act. When the petitioner in that case moved another petition in respect of the same property and between the same parties for the application of the provisions of the Act the trial court held that it was barred by res judicata. The contention was negatived by the Supreme Court in the words reproduced above. The Supreme Court in the said case had observed that the previous decision does not operate as res judicata when the cause of action is different or when the earlier decision has been altered by the competent authority. When the previous eviction application of the appellant was dismissed the law as laid down by this Court was that the landlord was estopped from claiming eviction if he himself had let out the premises for a purpose contrary to the terms of his lease. This law has since been differently interpreted by the Supreme Coturt in Faqir Chand (supra) and therefore it seems that judgment and order rejecting the previous application of the appellant does not operate as res judicata in the present proceedings. In Ratanlal Kishandas v. Bajirao Ganpat Mahalasne and two others, 1975 Mah.L.J 65 it was held that where there was an alteration in statute or judicial pronouncement that runs counter to an earlier order, such earlier order would not be res judicata. Similarly, it is observed in Alimiya Mahmadmiya and another v. Sayed Mohomed Baguir El-Edroos Valde Sayed Jaffer El-Edroos and another, AIR 1968 Gujarat 257 that if the effect of the law has been differently interpreted by judicial decisions or altered by statute, the previous decision between the same parties cannot have the binding effect for all time and it cannot therefore operate as res judicata with regard to the same question in a subsequent proceeding. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, submits that the law declared by the Supreme Court is not subsequent change in law capable of removing the ‘Res Judicata’ effect of an earlier judgment and relies upon State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mulamchand, AIR 1973 Madhya Pradesh 293.
It is not disputed by the learned councel for the respondent that if there is change in law by amendment of the statute by the legislature, the previous decision between the parties will not operate as res judicata. Similarly when the Supreme Court interprets a statute in a manner different from the interpretation of the statute by the High Court, I think, it amounts to change in law. Many landlords let out the premises themselves for use contrary to terms of their lease deed and in view of the law contained in Section 14(1)(k) of the Act as interpreted by this court they are also estopped from evicting their tenants under the principle of estoppel and are likely to forfeit lease of their land with building thereon. This would be a great hardship to them. The law laid down in Faqir Chand (supra) must be available to such landlords to enable them to protect their lease and building. The legislature is not supposed to amend the provision of Section 14(1)(k) of the Act to protect all such landlords when the Supreme Court has interpreted the said provision holding that the landlords are not estopped from claiming eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act even if they themselves had let out the building for a purpose contrary to terms of lease deed executed between the landlords and the authority concerned. I have given my careful consideration to the argument of the respondent's counsel but I do not agree with his view.
It also appears that where the cause of actions in the two suits are different, it often happens that the matter in issue in the two suits is not the same. It seems that the cause of action in the present eviction proceeding was not in existence on the date of the former eviction case. The cause of action in the previous eviction case consisted of the statutory notice dated 18th December, 1963 under section 14(1)(k) of the Act requiring the respondent to stop the misuser and its failure to comply with the said notice while in the present eviction proceeding the cause of action consists of a fresh statutory notice dated 8th February, 1973 under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act requiring the respondent to stop the misuser and its failure to comply with it. The cause of action to a landlord under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act accrues when the tenant uses the tenanted premises in a manner contrary to the conditions imposed on the landlord by the concerned authorities and fails to stop the misuser in spite of previous notice. It is a recurring cause of action. Admittedly, the tenant-respondent used the premises as a club, the landlady-appellant served a notice dated 18th December, 1963 in the previous case and notice dated 8th December, 1973 in the present case requiring it to stop its misuser but the respondent failed to respond. Notice requiring the tenant to stop the misuser required to be given under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act is a very essential part of the cause of action for claiming eviction. It, therefore, seems that the cause of action of the present eviction proceeding is entirely different from the cause of action available to the appellant in the previous proceedings. In Jawahar Singh v. Jai Gopal, ILR (1972) I Delhi 63 it was held that incorrect finding on a issue of law does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent case arising out of different cause of action.
The rule of estoppel is not a rule of substantive law but a rule of evidence. In the previous litigation between the parties, the eviction application was dismissed merely on the ground that she herself had let out the premises for use as a club, a purpose contrary to the terms of lease. Her right to claim eviction within the meaning of Section 14(1)(k) of the Act was not determined in the previous litigation. It appears that a question of procedure unrelated to the rights of the parties to a previous suit is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. In the instant case, when the previous eviction application of the appellant was dismissed on the principles of estoppel, it meant, in other words, that Section 14(1)(k) of the Act was not applicable on account of the conduct of the appellant. Thus in the previous case the court did not exercise jurisdiction vested in it and refused to grant relief under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act to the appellant although she was entitled to such a relief on a true interpretation of Section 14(1)(k) of the Act as finally interpreted by the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand (supra) and the court had jurisdiction to grant such relief.
After giving my careful consideration to the respective contention of the parties, I am of the view that the earlier judgment between the parties dismissing the appellant's application for eviction of the respondent under Section 14(1)(k) of the Act does not operate as res judicata. The respondent-tenant in spite of notice dated 8th February, 1973 requiring it to stop the misuser has used the premises in a manner contrary to the conditions imposed by the Delhi Development Authority upon the appellant.
The Controller and the Tribunal were, therefore, not correct in holding that the previous judgment between the parties operated as res judicata. The appeal is, therefofe, accepted. The judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 25th October, 1979 confirming the order of the Additional Controller dated 10th September, 1976 dismissing the appellant's application for eviction is set aside. The matter, however, will have to go back to the Additional Controller for deciding the question under sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act whether he should exercise the one or the other of the two alternatives mentioned therein. The Delhi Development Authority is a party to the present proceedings. The Controller shall after affording the opportunity to the parties determine the questions arising under Section 14 (11) of the Act. Parties are directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 15th May, 1981. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
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