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D.N Gupta Petitioner/Tenant v. Jaswant Singh /Landlord.

Delhi High Court
Oct 30, 1981
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sultan Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 challenges the Rent Controller's judgment and order dated 30 September 1980 which dismissed the petitioner's application for leave to defend and directed eviction.

Relevant factual and procedural points stated in the opinion:

  • Owner: Jaswant Singh owned property No. 8-10, Nizamuddin (West), New Delhi.
  • Occupation history: The first floor was let in 1974 to Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.; the petitioner (D.N. Gupta) occupied the premises on behalf of BHEL until his retirement in 1978.
  • Tenancy creation and renewals: The respondent accepted the petitioner as tenant in his personal capacity effective 1 July 1978 (rent note for 11 months). The tenancy was renewed by a rent note dated 1 June 1979 for a further 11 months.
  • Negotiations and eviction notice: Negotiations for renewal in May 1980 allegedly failed; the respondent served a lawyer's notice dated 15 May 1980 requiring vacation.
  • Proceedings initiated by parties:
    • Petitioner filed an application for fixation of standard rent on 25 June 1980.
    • Respondent filed an eviction application on 8 July 1980 under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act, alleging bona fide requirement of residential accommodation for himself and family members.
  • Rent Controller's order: The Rent Controller dismissed the petitioner's application for leave to defend and ordered eviction (order dated 30 September 1980).
  • Revision: The petitioner brought this revision under Section 25B(8) challenging that order. The High Court (Sultan Singh, J.) set aside the Rent Controller's order, granted leave to defend, and directed the petitioner to file an additional properly verified affidavit. Parties were directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 2 December 1981. No order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, by his affidavit, disclosed facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of the premises (i.e., whether facts were disclosed that would justify refusing eviction on grounds of bona fide requirement).
  2. Whether disputed questions of fact (including dependency of the respondent's sons and sufficiency of existing accommodation) can be resolved on affidavit or require trial.
  3. Whether the verification in the petitioner's affidavit was defective and, if so, whether the petitioner should be permitted to file an additional affidavit remedying the defect.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner alleged negotiations for renewal took place in May 1980 but failed because proposed conditions were unacceptable (including an admission that the landlord had a bona fide requirement and an undertaking to vacate by 31 March 1981).
  • The petitioner challenged the genuineness of the respondent's asserted need, disputing:
    • The claimed size and composition of the respondent's household;
    • Whether the respondent's sons were dependent on him for residence;
    • The accuracy of the respondent's description of existing accommodation (petitioner described additional built accommodation such as a big kitchen in the courtyard and closed verandahs used as rooms);
    • That one son (Amrik Singh) was employed at Faridabad with a good salary and his wife earned income as an insurance agent;
    • That another son (Iqbal Singh) had constructed a bungalow at A-125, New Friends Colony, New Delhi, which had been let out at Rs. 2,200/- per month in August 1979.
  • The petitioner contended there had been no change of circumstances from July 1978 (creation of tenancy) to July 1980 (eviction filing) that would justify the landlord's later claim of requirement; therefore questions of change and dependency required evidence at trial and could not be resolved on affidavit.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent asserted bona fide requirement of accommodation for himself and his family (said to be 18 members), occupying ground and second floors and lacking sufficient accommodation.
  • The respondent challenged the petitioner's affidavit verification as improper and urged rejection on that ground.
  • Respondent contested several of the petitioner's factual assertions about the accommodation (for example, denying existence of a big kitchen on the ground floor and disputing the petitioner's description of facilities on the second floor), while admitting certain facts such as:
    • Amrik Singh's employment and wife's income-generating activity;
    • Iqbal Singh's bungalow at New Friends Colony was constructed and let out (respondent stated the bungalow was let out after construction in August 1979 at Rs. 2,200/- per month and that a loan had been taken from LIC to build it);
    • Ravinder Pal Singh worked with the respondent and a married daughter visited often.
  • Respondent argued the accommodation was insufficient and the petitioner's leave to defend was based on vague and indefinite grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shri Kishori Lal v. Sumitra Devi, 1979 (1) Rent Law Reporter 107 Held that a son will be deemed dependent if he was not able to set up a separate residence. The court cited this case to frame the question whether the respondent's sons were dependent for residence or were able to set up separate homes.
Sultan Singh v. Jai Chand Jain and another, 1966 D.L.T. 62 Held that a son who is self-supporting and able to set up separate residence cannot be treated as dependent on his father. The court used this principle to indicate that dependency depends on the son's capacity for independent residence and was therefore a factual issue requiring evidence.
Smt. Leela Wati v. Smt. Ganga Devi, A.I.R. 1980 Delhi 209 Held that questions as to who were dependent members and whether existing accommodation was sufficient could not be decided without trial; leave to defend could not be refused in such circumstances. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that disputes about dependency and sufficiency of accommodation required trial and warranted leave to defend.
Mool Chand v. Ganda Ram, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 240 Authority for the proposition that disputed questions of fact necessary to the landlord's relief should not be decided on affidavits and leave to contest should be granted. The court cited this case among others to justify refusal to decide disputed factual issues on affidavit and to grant leave to defend.
Kalyan Singh v. J.P. Gupta, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 242 Supports the principle that disputed factual questions should be tried, not decided on affidavit. Used as part of a line of authorities establishing that leave to defend should be granted where facts are disputed.
Fateh Singh v. Hukam Chand, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 244 Also cited for the rule that disputed questions of fact necessitate trial and not determination on affidavits. Applied with other cases to support the proposition that leave to defend should not be refused when factual disputes are genuine.
R.C. Jain v. Sk. Gupta, 1979 Raj. Law Reporter 560 Authority supporting the need to try disputed factual issues rather than decide them on affidavit. Cited by the court among several Raj. Law Reporter decisions to reinforce the principle that affidavits alone are insufficient where facts are in dispute.
Wing Comm. R.P. Jaiswal v. Hans Raj, 1979 Raj. Law Reporter 17 Another authority cited for the principle that disputed factual questions should be tried. Invoked as part of the body of case law supporting grant of leave to defend where factual disputes exist.
Dr. Shiv Nath v. Piarelal Sharma, 1979 Raj. Law Reporter (Note 25) Cited in the context of authorities holding that disputed factual issues should be tried. Included among authorities used to justify sending disputed factual matters to trial rather than deciding on affidavits.
Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. T.S. Bhatia, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 153 Authority noting that issues which are not sham or frivolous require consideration (i.e., leave should not be refused where the defence is non-frivolous). The court relied on this case to observe that the petitioner's issues did not appear to be sham or frivolous and therefore required consideration.
J.B. Kansal & Others v. Waryam Singh, 1981 (1) R.C.J. 206 Authority permitting filing of additional affidavit in support of an application for leave to contest where initial affidavit was defective. The court relied on this decision to permit the petitioner to file an additional, properly verified affidavit rather than rejecting the application for leave to defend outright.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court followed a structured analysis rooted in the facts as pleaded and the relevant authorities:

  1. The central factual dispute concerned (a) whether the respondent's asserted need for accommodation was bona fide, (b) whether the respondent's married sons were dependent upon him for residence, and (c) what accommodation was actually available to the respondent in the subject premises and elsewhere (notably the bungalow at New Friends Colony).
  2. The court noted timeline facts emphasising that a new tenancy in favour of the petitioner was created on 1 July 1978 and was renewed on 1 June 1979, which indicated there was no requirement of the landlord up to those dates. The son's house at New Friends Colony was completed in August 1979 and let out; the eviction application was filed in July 1980. The court observed that it was unclear what change in circumstances occurred between July 1978 and July 1980 to justify the landlord's claim.
  3. The court reviewed the competing descriptions of the accommodation: the petitioner alleged additional built or enclosed spaces (big kitchen in the courtyard, covered verandahs used as rooms), whereas the respondent described more limited accommodation. The court found there was a bona fide dispute regarding the existing accommodation.
  4. Regarding dependency, the court cited authorities (including Shri Kishori Lal and Sultan Singh v. Jai Chand Jain) that frame dependency in relation to the ability of a son to set up separate residence; whether the sons were dependent was therefore a factual question that could not be resolved without evidence.
  5. The court cited a line of authorities (Mool Chand, Kalyan Singh, Fateh Singh, R.C. Jain, Wing Comm. R.P. Jaiswal, Dr. Shiv Nath) to support the proposition that disputed factual questions which are material to the landlord's entitlement to relief should not be determined on affidavits and that leave to defend should be granted in such circumstances.
  6. On the procedural point of defective verification, the court observed the legal requirement under Order 19 Rule 3 CPC that affidavits specify which facts are true to knowledge and which to belief. The Rent Controller had considered the affidavit despite the verification defect. The High Court concluded that while the original affidavit could not be amended, the petitioner should be permitted to file an additional affidavit properly verifying the allegations. The court relied on J.B. Kansal v. Waryam Singh as precedent for allowing an additional affidavit.
  7. Balancing the above, the court concluded that the petitioner's allegations raised genuine, non-frivolous disputes of fact regarding dependency and accommodation that could defeat the landlord's entitlement to possession if proven — and those disputes required trial rather than determination on affidavit. Consequently, leave to defend should not have been refused.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

The revision is allowed; the order dated 30th September, 1980 of the Rent Controller in Eviction Case No. 426 of 1980 is set aside, and the petitioner-tenant is granted leave to defend the eviction application.

Direct consequences and practical implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The petitioner is permitted to file an additional affidavit reproducing all allegations contained in the affidavit dated 11th September 1980 and to verify it in accordance with law (to cure the defective verification).
  • Parties are directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 2 December 1981, on which date the additional affidavit may be filed.
  • No order as to costs was made.

The opinion does not claim to establish a new legal precedent; it applies existing authorities to conclude that disputed factual questions on dependency and sufficiency of accommodation required trial and that a defective affidavit verification could be remedied by filing an additional affidavit.

Show all summary ...

Sultan Singh, J.:— This revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is directed against the judgment and order of the Rent Controller dated 30th September, 1980 dismissing the petitioner's application for leave to defend and passing an order of eviction against him. Briefly the facts are that Jaswant Singh is the owner of the property No. 8-10, Nizamuddin (West), New Delhi. First floor of this property was let out in 1974 to Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. of which the petitioner, D.N Gupta was Deputy Personal Manager and he was in occupation of the premises on behalf of the company. He retired in 1978. The respondent accepted the petitioner as a tenant in his own right on the first floor of the said property with effect from 1st July, 1978 in terms of a rent note for a fixed period of 11 months on a monthly rent of Rs. 600/-. The petitioner renewed the tenancy for further period of 11 months by executing another rent note dated 1st June, 1979. The petitioner alleges that there were negotiations for renewal of tenancy in May, 1980, but they did not materialise. On 15th May, 1980 the respondent served a notice of eviction requiring the petitioner to vacate. The petitioner on 25th June, 1980 filed an application for fixation of standard rent. On 8th July, 1980 the respondent filed the eviction application under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act, alleging that he was the owner of the premises, that the first floor of the said property was let for residence, that he was in occupation of the ground floor comprising two bed rooms, a prayer room, one drawing cum-dining room, kitchen, latrine, bath and verandah with his two married sons and that his third married son was residing in Barsati floor comprising one room only, that the premises were less and insufficient for him and for members of his family consisting of himself, his wife, his married son Iqbal Singh with three children, his married son Ravinder Pal Singh with two children residing on the ground floor and his son Amrik Singh with five children residing in the Barsati floor. He also alleges that the sons were dependent upon him so far as the residential accommodation was concerned, that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation in Delhi or anywhere else, that he has a married daughter with two sons, who often visit him. The petitioner filed an application for leave to defend supported by a detailed affidavit. The Rent Controller dismissed the application for leave to defend and passed an order of eviction. Hence this revision petition under Section 25B (8) of the Act.

The short question for determination is: Whether the petitioner in his affidavit has disclosed facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises. The petitioner-tenant in his affidavit has deposed that the respondent-landlord has been in occupation of the ground floor with the families of his two married sons Iqbal Singh and Ravinder Pal Singh, that the second floor has been in occupation of his eldest son Amrik Singh independently along with his wife and children, that on the expiry of the fixed period of 11 months in terms of the rent note, negotiations for renewal took place in the first week of May, 1980 when the respondent sent a draft of a rent note which was not acceptable to him. The two conditions which were not acceptable were that he had realised the bona fide requirement of the respondent-landlord and that he would vacate the premises positively by 31st March, 1981. The parties could not arrive at an amicable settlement and therefore the respondent sent the lawyer's notice dated 15th May, 1980 requiring him to vacate the premises, that he filed an eviction application for fixation of standard rent on 25th June, 1980 that his tenancy started from 1st July, 1978 which was renewed by another rent agreement dated 1st June, 1979. As regards existing accommodation with the respondent-landlord he stated, “The ground floor comprises of 2 bed rooms, one drawing-cum-dining room, one kitchen converted into a prayer room, one big kitchen additionally built in the courtyard, one front verandah fully covered and used as third bedroom, one big back verandah fully closed and used as a full-fledged room, bath, lavatory and front and back courtyards. The description given by the petitioner in his application is not complete. Similarly, the accommodation at the second floor consists of one large room, one small room kitchen, bath and latrine, big open terrace a portion of which is now covered by temporary structure”. The petitioner has further alleged that the alleged need of the respondent is not genuine, that his statement that he has a big family consisting of 18 members is not true, that he wants to rent out the premises occupied by him after getting the same vacated at a higher rent, that the premises were let on 1st, July, 1978 and since then there has been no change in the circumstances and as such the alleged requirement is not bona fide, that Amrik Singh, eldest son of the respondent is employed in Auto-Pins Factory at Faridabad on a good salary whose employer has provided him with a scooter, that his wife has been an insurance agent and makes a good addition to the family income, that he is said to be owning a plot of land for building a house, that he is the head of the family of seven persons holding ration card No. 94878, that he has been maintaining a separate establishment and that in these circumstances he is an independent and self-supporting family and that he is not dependent upon the respondent needing accommodation. As regards his second married son Iqbal Singh, he has alleged that he is living on the ground floor as an independent head of separate family with his own ration card No. 94877, that he has been doing agency business from which there is lucrative return, that he constructed a Bungalow No. A-125, New Friends Colony, New Delhi and let out the same at Rs. 4000/- per month in March, 1980, that in the face of these facts Iqbal Singh cannot be treated as dependent upon the respondent requiring living accommodation. As regards Ravinder Pal Singh third son of the respondent, the petitioner has alleged that he has been working with the respondent running a shop of tailoring materials at Western Extension Area, that he and the respondent are having ration card No 94876, that the accommodation with them is sufficient at the ground floor. As regards married daughter the petitioner has deposed that her need is not of a new occurrence, that it was so even when the premises were let, that the daughter is married in Delhi itself. The petitioner has further alleged that the respondent has other reasonably suitable accommodation. His plea is that the individuals from whom the alleged need is claimed, are not dependent upon him, that Bunglow No. A-125, New Friends Colony, New Delhi was being constructed in 1979, which was meant for their self-occupation, that the ground floor of the suit property i.e B-10, Nizamuddin (West) was to be vacated and let out but when the bunglow at New Friends Colony was completed the same was let out.

The respondent-landlord in reply has submitted that the verification of the affidavit was improper and therefore the same deserves to be rejected, that the alleged grounds for leave to defend were vague and indefinite, that the second floor comprises of one room where Amrik Singh, his wife and five children had been residing, that he was not residing independently. The respondent has further alleged that the petitioner has been promising to vacate the premises by 31st March, 1981.. The respondent has denied that there was any big kitchen on the ground floor. It has however been admitted that there has been small temporary corrogated sheets in the court yard, that Barsati measures 12½′×10½½′, that there is a small store attached to it, that the allegation of existence of kitchen, bath or latrine on the second floor is wrong, that there is an open urinal. As regards status of the sons the respondent admits that Amrik Singh is employed at Faridabad drawing a good salary, having a scooter, that his-wife is an insurance agent, that his younger son lqbal Singh constructed his house at A-125, New Friends Colony, New Delhi which was let out after completion in August, 1979 at Rs. 2200/- per month, that the said house was constructed after obtaining a loan of Rs. 2 lacs from L.I.C, that the loan has to be repaid and therefore the house was let out, that Ravinder Pal Singh, third son, has been working with him, that his married daughter with two children often visit him. The Rent Controller refused the petitioner leave to defend, observing that married sons having separate ration cards cannot be the basis for grant of leave, that if a person has an independent house which has been let out still that person is dependent upon his father, that even if the respondent's son is not dependent upon him, the entire accommodation was insufficient for him. The Controller held that the requirement of the respondent was genuine. As regards legal defect in the application he observed that on merits the petitioner had no ground.

The respondent-landlord admits that his two sons are well placed and that his third son has been carrying on business with him. The income and status of his son has not been disclosed by the respondent either in his eviction application or in the reply to the application for leave to defend. The premises admittedly were let to the petitioner from 1st July, 1978 although the petitioner had been in occupation as an employee of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. since 1974. Creation of a new tenancy in favour of the petitioner in July, 1978 amounts to determination of the previous tenancy in favour of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Creation of tenancy in July, 1978 means that there was no requirement of the respondent upto that time. The tenancy was renewed in June, 1979 which will also show that there was no requirement in June, 1979. The respondent's son constructed his house which was completed in August, 1979 and let out at Rs. 2200/- per month. It is therefore not clear what was the change in the circumstances during the period from July, 1978 to July, 1980 when the present eviction application was failed. On the contrary if a son is the owner of his own house which was completed at a time when the alleged requirement arose, it does not stand to reason that he should let out his own property and claim the eviction of the tenant under his father on the ground that he was dependent upon him. On the facts of this case it cannot be decided without going into evidence whether the two married sons of the respondents were dependent upon him for purposes of residence. Thus the first disputed question is: Whether the sons are dependent upon the respondent for residence and can their requirement be taken into consideration. In Shri Kishori Lal v. Sumitra Devi, 1979 (1) Rent Law Reporter 107 it has been held by this court that a son will be deemed to be dependent if he was not able to set up a separate residence. In Sultan Singh v. Jai Chand Jain and another, 1966 D.L.T 62, it has been held that a son who is self-supporting and in a position to set up a separate residence cannot be said to be the dependent of his father. In Smt. Leela Wati… v. Smt. Ganga Devi…, A.I.R 1980 Delhi 209 it has been held that the question as to who were dependent members and as to whether or not the existing accommodation was sufficient for the landlady are questions that could not be decided without trial and that leave to defend could not be refused in these circumstances. The petitioner in his application for leave to defend has challenged the existing accommodation with the respondent. The petitioner has alleged that a big kitchen was built in the court-yard and that front verandah was fully covered and used as a bed room and that back verandah was also closed and used as a full-fledged room. On the second floor also according to the respondent there is one room, one store and open urinal but according to the allegations of the petitioner there is one large room, one small room, kitchen, bath and latrine besides a temporary structure. Thus there is a bona fide dispute regarding the existing accommodation available to the respondent. Besides this it has also been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the house at A-125, New Friends Colony, New Delhi was available for the residence of the respondent or his sons but the same was not occupied and let out in August, 1979. It is not denied that the said house after construction in August, 1979 was let out at Rs. 2200/- per month. The contention is that in those circumstances it cannot be said that the respondent has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. In other words, he says that if the accommodation at New Friends Colony is taken into consideration he has sufficient accommodation and that in any case the respondent is not entitled to an order of eviction for the alleged requirement of his son Iqbal Singh, owner of the house at New Friends Colony, New Delhi. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that when the premises were let in 1978 and the eviction petition was filed in July, 1980 there was no change of circumstances and that to determine whether there was any change in the circumstances, it was necessary to record evidence. His argument has great force. It is not a case where leave to defend can be refused. If any allegation of the petitioner is deemed to be proved it seems the respondent would not be entitled to an order of eviction against him.

Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the family of the respondent consists of 18 members, that they have been in occupation of the ground floor and the second floor which accommodation according to them is insufficient. It may be but the question is: What is the change in the circumstances and why the house at New Friends Colony owned by the son cannot be taken to be an accommodation available to the respondent or his son? There are as such disputed questions of fact and leave to defend can not be refused. It has been held by this court that if disputed questions of facts are raised and their decision is necessary to grant relief to the landlord, then those questions should not be decided on affidavits and leave to contest should be granted (See: Mool Chand v. Ganda Ram, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 240, Kalyan Singh v. J.P Gupta, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 242, Fateh Singh v. Hukam Chand, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 244, R.C Jain… v. Sk. Gupta….. 1979 Raj. Law Reporter 560, Wing Comm. R.P Jaiswal v. Hans Raj, 1979 Raj. Law Reporter 17 and Dr. Shiv Nath v. Piarelal Sharma 1979 Raj. Law Reporter (Note 25). The issues raised by the petitioner in his application for leave to defend do not appear to be sham or frivolous and require consideration (See: Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. T.S Bhatia, 1977 Raj. Law Reporter 153).

Lastly learned counsel for the respondent submits that the verification in the affidavit for leave to defend is defective and the same cannot be looked into. The verification in the petitioner's affidavit reads as follows;—

“Verified at New Delhi, this 11th day of September 1980 that the contents of paras 1 to 8 of the aforegoing affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sd/- D.N Gupta,

Deponent”

It is true that under Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure statements of facts in affidavits must be prescisely verified as to which facts or paras are true or correct to knowledge and which true to belief upon information and if this is not done then the allegations are meaningless. The Rent Controller had taken into consideration the contents of the affidavit and I have also taken into consideration to arrive at a conclusion. It seems that there is power to allow amendment, if injustice is not caused to the opposite party and other party can be compensated with costs. The question is: whether the affidavit can be allowed to be amended subsequently. I am of the view that a party can be allowed to file additional affidavit removing the defect. The original affidavit cannot be allowed to be amended. If the affidavit for leave to defend is not properly verified the deponent must be allowed an opportunity to file another affidavit in accordance with law and it would not prejudice the right of the respondent. A similar question arise before me. In J.B Kansal and others v. Waryam Singh 1981 (1) R.C.J 206 where 1 allowed the heirs of the deceased tenant to file additional affidavit in support of the application for leave to contest. Accordingly, I hold that the verification in the affidavit of the petitioner is defective but I grant the petitioner an opportunity to file additional affidavit reproducing all his allegations contained in his affidavit dated 11th September, 1980 and verifying in accordance with law.

The judgment and order of the Controller is not according to law. The revision is accepted and the order dated 30th September, 1980 of the Rent Controller in Eviction Case No. 426 of 1980 is set aside. The petitioner-tenant is granted leave to defend the eviction application. He shall file the additional affidavit as discussed above before the Additional Controller. Parties are directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 2nd December, 1981 on which date additional affidavit may be filed. No order as to costs.