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Additional Commissioner Of Income-Tax Petitioner v. Mercury General Corporation Pvt. Ltd.

Delhi High Court
Aug 25, 1981
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — S. Ranganathan, J. (Reference under the Income-tax Act, 1961)

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference arises from the assessment of M/s. Mercury General Corporation Pvt. Ltd. for assessment year 1969-70 in respect of the previous year ended 30 June 1968. The assessee owned a property known as "Pili Building" (municipal Nos. 411–422), purchased on 21 January 1963 for Rs. 4,25,000. The building contained multiple shops, offices and rooms leased to tenants.

On 31 May 1967 and 9 June 1967 the assessee entered into agreements of sale with certain shareholders (who had credit balances with the company) for 9 units (Nos. 411–416, 420, 421 and 422) for aggregate consideration of about Rs. 4,42,000. The shareholders' accounts were debited with the consideration by entries dated 1 July 1967. The agreements provided for registration of sale deeds before 31 December 1967 and recited that possession was being given and that purchasers could realise rents from 1 July 1967.

No registered sale deeds were executed. A Section 4 notification under the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the property was issued by the Collector on 30 August 1967 (followed by Section 6 notification on 23 July 1969 and notices under Section 9 in 1970). The assessee (not the proposed vendees) filed claims for compensation for the whole property, claiming an aggregate compensation figure (including land, building, damages and solatium) which the Income-tax Officer later used as the basis for assessing capital gains. The acquisition award was ultimately made on 31 March 1975 for Rs. 4,96,250 (including solatium).

The Income-tax Officer concluded that the transfer of the 9 units should be deemed to have occurred from 1 July 1967 and, adopting the assessee's claimed values as market value, computed capital gains (figures appearing in the record include Rs. 1,31,25,000 as one computation by the ITO and the reference framed the question mentioning capital gain assessed as Rs. 1,26,82,136). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) deleted the inclusion of capital gains, holding that there had been no valid sale because no registered documents had been executed and relying on Supreme Court authorities. The Department appealed to the Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal and deleted the capital gain on grounds including absence of actual or constructive possession passing to purchasers and continued receipt of rents by the assessee.

The Commissioner of Income-tax made the present reference to this Court asking whether the Tribunal erred in holding there was no relinquishment or extinguishment of rights and whether the Tribunal was right in deleting the assessed capital gain.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was in error in holding that as a matter of law there was no relinquishment or extinguishment of the right in the property by the assessee.
  2. Whether the Tribunal was right in deleting the capital gain assessed by the Income-tax Officer (the reference framed the question in terms of an assessed capital gain of Rs. 1,26,82,136).

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments (Appellant)

  • The department relied on the definition of "transfer" in Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which, by definition, includes relinquishment and extinguishment of rights over a capital asset.
  • The department contended that, even if formal registered sale deeds were lacking, the relinquishment or extinguishment of the assessee's rights may have occurred by virtue of the agreements and related steps.
  • Implicitly, the department challenged the Tribunal's findings that no transfer (in the form of relinquishment or extinguishment) had occurred during the relevant previous year.

Assessee's Arguments (Respondent)

  • The assessee argued that there had been no sale effected during the relevant previous year because no registered sale deeds were executed, relying on Supreme Court authority that a valid transfer by sale requires a duly executed and registered document.
  • The assessee pointed to the absence of actual or constructive delivery of possession to the purchasers: tenants remained in possession, no attornment letters were issued, and tenants continued to pay rent to the assessee.
  • The assessee also relied on bench decisions of this Court (CIT v. Meatles Ltd. and CIT v. Hindustan Cold Storage and Refrigeration P. Ltd.) applying the Supreme Court authorities to similar circumstances to support non-recognition of capital gains in the assessment year in question.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Bhurangya Coal Co. (1954 — 34 ITR 802) Authority for the proposition that a valid transfer (sale) requires a duly executed and registered document; limits recognition of sale for income-tax purposes in absence of registration. The Court treated this Supreme Court decision as foundational and relied upon it (as applied in subsequent bench decisions) to hold that no sale had occurred absent registration.
Alapati Venkataramiah v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Hyderabad (1965 — 57 ITR 185) Support for requirement of registration for transfer to be effective for tax purposes; used with Bhurangya Coal Co. to deny recognition of transfer in absence of registration. The Court treated this authority together with Bhurangya Coal Co. and relied on their application by this Court's bench decisions to support the conclusion that no valid sale took place.
CIT v. Meatles Ltd. (1972 — 84 ITR 37) Bench decision of this Court applying the Supreme Court authorities to facts where absence of registered documents meant no transfer/right relinquished. The Court relied on this Court's prior decision as directly applicable and controlling, noting that Associated Clothiers had been distinguished there; used to support the conclusion against the department.
CIT v. Hindustan Cold Storage and Refrigeration P. Ltd. (1976 — 183 ITR 455) Bench decision of this Court consistent with Meatles Ltd., supporting the necessity of registration for a valid transfer for tax purposes. The Court cited and followed this decision as part of the line of bench authority negating departmental contentions.
Associated Clothiers Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Calcutta (1967 — 63 ITR 224) Supreme Court decision referred to by counsel for the assessee but, as noted in the record, distinguished in Meatles Ltd. The Court noted the applicant's reliance on this case but observed it had been distinguished in Meatles Ltd., and therefore it did not alter the result here.
CIT v. Modern Flats Private Ltd. (1967 — 65 ITR 67) Discusses transfers without registered documents and the scope (or limits) of Sections such as 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 27A of the Specific Relief Act where possession or other facts are present. The Court analyzed this decision and concluded it did not support the department; instead, it was interpreted as holding that in absence of registered documents there could be no transfer, and doctrine of 53A/27A would not help where possession had not passed as required; the Court relied on the High Court's reasoning in the panultimate paragraph to reject the department's reliance on it.
CIT v. R. B. Kamdin (1974 — 95 ITR 476) Referenced by counsel for the department; contained some general observations. The Court observed that this case arose from different facts and that the observations relied upon by department were not of assistance in the present matter.
Addl. CIT v. U. P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. (1981 — 127 ITR 97) Allahabad High Court decision cited by counsel for the department, dealing with special facts concerning transfer/assessment. The Court noted the facts were special and that the decision was at variance with earlier decisions of this Court and with the Bombay High Court's view; therefore the Court declined to adopt its reasoning for the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first noting the question framed for reference — focused only on whether the Tribunal was wrong in holding there was no relinquishment or extinguishment and whether the Tribunal was right to delete the capital gain assessed. The Court observed that the department accepted that no valid sale (in the sense of a registered transfer) had been effected during the relevant previous year.

The Court examined the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal: (1) though agreements of sale were entered into, possession of the premises had not been handed over either physically or constructively to the purchasers; (2) tenants remained in possession and continued to attorn and pay rent to the assessee; (3) no attornment letters were issued and there was no evidence of the purchasers exercising control over rents or the premises; (4) the accounting credits could be in lieu of interest on deposits and did not establish agency or transfer to the purchasers.

On relinquishment, the Court reasoned that relinquishment of proprietary rights would, in principle, require the same formalities as completion of a sale — a duly registered document. Given the absence of such a document and the Tribunal's unchallenged findings about non-delivery of possession, the Court found it impossible, on the given facts, to conclude that the assessee had relinquished its rights in favour of the purchasers during the previous year.

On extinguishment, the Court considered how extinguishment of rights can occur: either by operation of law or by a transaction that has that effect. The Court found no statutory rule or transaction on the dates of the agreements that resulted in extinguishment of the assessee's rights. While government acquisition would extinguish rights, that acquisition occurred after the relevant previous year and so could not render capital gains taxable in that earlier year.

The Court surveyed the authorities relied upon by both sides, accepted the line of bench decisions of this Court (Meatles Ltd. and Hindustan Cold Storage) applying the Supreme Court authorities (Bhurangya Coal Co. and Alapati), and rejected attempts to invoke other decisions (Associated Clothiers, Modern Flats, R. B. Kamdin, U.P. State Agro Industrial) as controlling or helpful in a manner that would change the result. The Court also specifically rejected the contention that Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act applied on the facts because the Tribunal had found no passing of possession, actual or constructive.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the reference by holding that the Tribunal was not in error in holding that there was no relinquishment or extinguishment of the rights of the assessee in the properties in question and that the Tribunal was right in deleting the capital gains assessed by the Income-tax Officer.

Direct consequences: The Tribunal's deletion of the assessed capital gain is upheld and the assessee is entitled to costs; counsel's fee of Rs. 350 was awarded to the assessee. The Court's decision rests on the established requirement of a duly registered document (and corresponding factual findings about absence of possession) and confines taxability to the year in which acquisition by the Government (if any) becomes operative by law.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reaffirms existing Supreme Court and bench authorities requiring registration/formalities for recognition of transfers for income-tax purposes. The Court did not announce a novel precedent beyond applying and following the cited authorities.

Disposition

The reference was answered in the negative for the department. The assessee was awarded costs (counsel fee Rs. 350).

Show all summary ...

S. Ranganathan, J. (Oral):— This reference under the Income-tax Act, 1961 arises out of the assessment of M/s. Mercury General Corporation Pvt. Ltd. for the assessment year 1969-70 in respect of the previous year which ended on 30th June, 1968. The question referred to this court reads as under :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not in error in holding that as a matter of law there was no relinquishment or extinguishment of the right in the property by the assessee and whether the Tribunal was right in deleting the capital gain assessed by the Income-tax Officer of Rs. 1,26,82,136?”
2. The assessee company was the owner of a big property known as ‘Pili Building’ situated at Arya Samaj Road, New Delhi. The building consists of 12 units bearing municipal Nos. 411 to 422. It appears that this comprises of 50 shops, 10 offices and about 160 rooms. They are all in possession of various tenants. The property had been purchased by the assessee company on 21-1-1963 for Rs. 4,25,000 from Arya Dharam Seva Sangh, New Delhi.
3. On 31-5-1967 and 9-6-1967 the assessee company entered into agreements of sale with certain parties who were shareholders of the assessee company and who had credit balances in their accounts with the company. By these agreements the assesses agreed to sell to these persons 9 of the units bearing municipal Nos. 411 to 416, 420, 421 and 422 for consideration aggregating to about Rs. 4,42,000. The accounts of the shareholders above-mentioned were debited with the amounts of the consideration in respect of the property agreed to be sold to them, these debit entries being made on 1st July, 1967 relevant for the assessment year 1968-69. The agreements of sale, however, provided that sale deeds would be got registered before 31-12-1967. The agreements also recited that the possession of the properties which was with the tenants was being given over to the intending purchasers from the dates of the respective agreements and according to the agreements the intending purchasers were entitled to realise rents from 1st July, 1967 directly from the tenants.
4. No regular sale deeds were, however, got executed or registered in pursuance of the above agreements of sale. This was principally because a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of the property was issued by the Collector on 30th August, 1967 This we are told followed up by a notification under Section 6 on 23rd July, 1969. Notices under Section 9 were issued in 1970 and the assessee (not the proposed vendee) filed a claim for compensation in respect of the entire property consisting of 12 units. The assessee claimed a compensation of Rs. 1,75,00,000 valuing the land at Rs. 2,500 per sq. yard (the total extent of land was 3117 sq. yards), the building at Rs. 25,00,000, damages for loss due to stoppage of business at Rs. 20,00,000 and in addition to the above a claim for solatium at 15 per cent. As already seated, the intended vendees on their part did not submit any claim for compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. It appears that some of the tenants who were in possession submitted some claims. These acquisition proceedings went on for a long time and we are told by the counsel for the respondent that the award has been made long afterwards on 31-3-1975 determining a compensation of Rs. 4,96,250 (including solatium etc.).
5. It should, however, be mentioned that though the agreements of sale referred to possession of the premises being handed over to the shareholders, such possession either actual or constructive was not delivered to the intending purchasers. To this aspect we shall revert a little later.
6. While completing the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1968-69 the Income-tax Officer came to the conclusion that the transfer of the 9 units of properties should be deemed to have been effected with effect from 1-7-1967. Pointing out that the consideration for the sale fixed in the agreements of sale was a ridiculous under-valuation adjudged by the amount of compensation claim by the assessee, the Income-tax Officer adopted the assessee's claim for the properties as the market value and computed Rs. 1,31,25,000 as capital gains that had arisen to the assessee during the previous year.
7. The above inclusion of capital gains was deleted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC). Before the ACC it was pointed out by the assessee that there had been no sale of the property effected during the previous year since there had been no registered documents executed by the assessee in respect thereof. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Bhurangya Coal Co. (1954-34 ITR 802) (1) and in the case of Alapati Venkataramiah v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Hyderabad (1965-57 ITR 185) (2) were relied upon in support of the contention that there was no question of assessing any capital gains until there had been a valid transfer of the property by a duly executed and registered document. The AAC called for a report from the Income-tax Officer who submitted that even if the transactions fell short of the requirements of sale within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act read with Indian Registration Act there had been at least relinquishment of the right, title and interest of the company over the 9 units of the property. But the AAC pointed out that even in regard to the plea of relinquishment the same objection based on the absence of the registered document would prevail. He, therefore, held that there was no capital gain available for the present year.
8. The revenue filed an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Before the Tribunal reliance was placed on behalf of the department on the definition of “transfer” contained in Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which includes relinquishment as well as extinguishment of rights over a capital asset. On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee it was pointed out that there could be no question even of relinquishment or extinguishment in the absence of a proper registered document. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the revenue observing :
“In our considered opinion, it could not be held on the facts of the present case that any transfer of any part of the property had taken place in favour of the vendees in the present years. The mere execution of agreements of sales or even receipt of sale consideration could not operate as completed sales in the absence of registered sale deeds. The Supreme Court authorities in the case reported as 34 I.T.R 802, 57 I.T.R 185 and the Delhi case of 84 I.T.R 37 clinch the matter in so far as the legal position is concerned. The capital gain in the hands of the assessee would arise only on the acquisition of the property by the Government and in the year in which that acquisition is held to be operative in accordance with law. We are, further of the opinion that from the facts brought out on record and the clear statement of the assessee before us, it is plain that no possession in reality passed to the vendees under the agreements of sale although it was so purported to be so mentioned in the said agreements. There was no question of delivery of actual possession as the assessee itself was not in possession. The properties were entirely with the tenants. There was besides no constructive delivery of possession either inasmuch as no attornment letters were issued to the tenants nor they attorned to the vendees. They continued to attorne and pay rent to it. What the assessee did with that rent after realisation from them was entirely its own concern. It would have as well thrown away the same. Moreover, its case has been that if credits of rental earnings were made in the respective accounts of the vendees, it was in lieu of the interest on their deposits. No question of agency was therefore involved. The circumstances how the assessee has accepted the computation of the entire value for the present year in its total income on the basis of the annual letting value of all the 12 units of this property shown that it fully owns the ownership of the property as well as the income thereof.”
9. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal the Commissioner of Income-tax has had this reference made to this court of the question already set out. It will be seen from the frame of the question that the department is no longer agitating the questipn whether a valid sale had been effected by the assessee of the properties in question during the previous year. The finding of the AAC that there could be no sale without a duly registered document appears to have been accepted by the department. In that so far that aspect of the matter is concerned there can be no doubt at all in view of the decision of the Supreme Court already referred to and which have been applied to two decisions of this court, namely, in the case of CIT v. Meatles Ltd. (1972—84 ITR 37) (3) and in the case of CIT v. Hindustan Cold Storage and Refrigeration P. Ltd. (1976—183 ITR 455) (4). In view of these bench decisions of this court it is not necessary to refer to other authorities. Learned counsel for the applicant, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Associated Clothiers Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Calcutta (1967—63 ITR 224) (5). But this case has already been referred to and distinguished in CIT v. Meatles Ltd. (1972—84 ITR 37). Mr. Wazir Singh further invited our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Modern Flats Private Ltd. (1967—65 ITR 67) (6). It appears to us that this decision far from supporting the learned counsel actually holds that there can be no transfer of property in the absence of a registered document and that even the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 27A of the Specific Relief Act will not come to the aid of a person who has been out in possession of a property in pursuance of an agreement of sale to claim ownership or title in the property. Mr. Wazir Singh relied upon the fourth proposition set out in the head note at page 67 where it was held that the assessee had transferred all its right, title and interest in a number of flats to the various flat holders even though there had been no registered document in respect thereof. But the clue to this aspect of the decision is really contained in the panultimate paragraph of the judgment at page 80. In that case the assessee Modern Flats Private Ltd. had acquired the property by a series of transfers- none of which had been supported by registered documents. The assessee in turn conveyed its right, title and interest in the various flats to the flat holders. The department held that Modern Flats Pvt. Ltd. had become the owners of the property. The High Court pointed out that this was not possible because there were no registered documents transferring the property to the said company. Apart from this the High Court also pointed out that if the department's case was that Modern Flats Pvt. Ltd. had become the owners of the property even without such registered documents then on the same logic Modern Flats Ltd. had succeeded in transferring the ownership of the property to the various flat holders. In other words, the High Court merely pointed out that the stand of the department should be consistent and this is what has been brought out in the panultimate paragraph of the judgment referred to above. Mr. Wazir Singh also referred to the decision in CIT v. R. B. Kamdin (1974—95 ITR 476) (7) and Addl. CIT v. U. P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. (1981—127 ITR 97) (8). The first of these cases arose under a different set of facts and in a different context and the learned counsel is merely trying to rely upon some general observations at page 485 which in our opinion are not of any assistance in the present case. So far as the second Allahabad case is concerned, the facts were somewhat special and in any event in view of the earlier decisions of this court we are unable to adopt the line of reasoning of the Allahabad High Court which we may incidentally point out is at variance also with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case earlier referred to.
10. Mr. Wazir Singh suggested that this was a case governed by Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. But even this contention cannot be upheld in this particular cases. We have already extracted the findings of the Tribunal in paragraph 13 of the order. The Tribunal has clearly found that though an agreement for sale was entered into, possession of the property had not been handed over either physically or constructively to the intending purchasers. In view of this clear finding of the Tribunal even this plea based on the doctrine of specific purposes does not survive that apart as we have already pointed out, even where the doctrine could have been availed of, it was not considered to be sufficient to vast the transfedee with title. The decision in Meatles Ltd. and Hindustan Cold Storage and Refrigeration P. Ltd. are clearly against the department.
11. The only question that survive and indeed the only question which has been referred to us is whether this case can be treated as one of relinquishment or extinguishment of rights within the meaning of section 2(47). So far as relinquishment of rights is concerned for the reasons which we have already stated it is very difficult to say that the assessee company relinquished its rights in properties in favour of the intending shareholders. It will be appreciated that even for purposes of relinquishment of interest in properties there is as much necessity for a registered document as there is for the completion of a valid sale. For the same reasons as have been referred to earlier, it is therefore not possible to say that the assessee Company had relinquished its right, title and interest in the properties in question in favour of the intending purchasers.
12. So far as the question of extinguishment of rights, is concerned, we have not been able to appreciate how exactly the department tries to bring in the concept of extinguishment in the context of the present case. An extinguishment of rights of a person in certain properties can take place either on account of operation of some law or as- a result of some transaction entered into by that party which has that effect. In the present case no circumstances have been brought to our notice either by way of a statutory rule or otherwise from which it can be said that the rights of the assessee company in the properties got extinguished on the dates of the agreements. Possibly it can be said that when the land was eventually acquired by the Government such acquisition resulted in the extinguishment of the rights of the assessee in the properties. But the acquisition did not take place during the previous year. The acquisition, if any, was subsequent and, therefore, no capital gains alleged to result from such acquisition would be taxable in the assessment year with which we are concerned.
13. For the above reasons, we answer the question by saying that the Tribunal was not in error in holding that there was no relinquishment or extinguishment of the rights of the assessee in the properties in question and that the Tribunal was right in deleting the capital gains assessed by the Income-tax Officer.
14. The reference is answered accordingly. The assessee will be entitled to its costs : counsel's fee Rs. 350.
S.V Answered accordingly