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Shri Raj Chopra v. Smt. Shanno Devi And Others

Delhi High Court
Mar 26, 1980
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Summary of Legal Opinion: Sachar, J. — Letters Patent Appeal

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of the learned single Judge dated 31-5-1974, which had allowed a writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 and remitted the matter to the Lt. Governor for decision in accordance with law.

Facts (as stated in the opinion): The property No. 48-G, Nizamuddin West, New Delhi was auctioned by the Collector, Delhi on 17-11-1971 to realise money due to the Rehabilitation Finance Administration from M/s Shahakar Ltd. The appellant purchased the property for Rs. 47,000/-. The sale was confirmed by the Lt. Governor on 23-12-1971 and possession was handed to the appellant on 4-1-1972.

On 19-2-1972 respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 91 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (as applied to Delhi) seeking to set aside the sale. Section 91 prescribes that an application to set aside a sale must be made within 30 days from the date of the sale. Respondent No. 1 claimed she only became aware of the sale on 9-2-1972 and sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The Lt. Governor held that the Limitation Act was not applicable and that he had no power to condone delay. The learned single Judge held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied and remitted the matter to the Lt. Governor for consideration on merits. The auction purchaser (appellant) challenged that decision by filing this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (and the provisions of Sections 4 to 24) are applicable to an application under Section 91 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the Limitation Act can be invoked in relation to a special/local law when the First Schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe a corresponding period (i.e., whether omission in the First Schedule prevents Section 29(2) from applying).
  3. Whether the Limitation Act (and specifically Section 5) applies only to proceedings before civil/criminal courts, or whether it also applies to proceedings before tribunals or persona designata (such as the Lt. Governor or other non‑court authorities).
  4. Whether, even if the Limitation Act were inapplicable, the Lt. Governor would nevertheless have an inherent jurisdiction or power to entertain an application filed beyond the 30‑day period under Section 91.
  5. Whether the Lt. Governor’s order rejecting the application as not maintainable on the ground of the inapplicability of the Limitation Act was an error of law warranting interference.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Sanghi)

  • Before the Limitation Act can be applied to a period prescribed by a special Act (such as the Punjab Land Revenue Act), the First Schedule to the Limitation Act must contain a period for an identical application. If the Schedule contains no provision for the identical situation (here, an application under Section 91), Section 29(2) cannot be invoked to attract the Limitation Act.
  • Section 29(2) postulates that the Limitation Act applies to suits, appeals or applications that are before civil or criminal courts; an application under Section 91 made to a Revenue Officer (the Lt. Governor) is not an application before a court and therefore the Limitation Act is inapplicable.

Respondent No. 1's Argument (as presented in the opinion)

  • Respondent No. 1 invoked Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to seek condonation of delay by relying on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act so that the Limitation Act's provisions (including Sections 4 to 24) would apply to an application under Section 91 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khub Chand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099 Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies even where the First Schedule to the Limitation Act omits to provide a period for a particular proceeding covered by the special law. The court relied on this authority to reject the appellant's argument that omission in the First Schedule prevents Section 29(2) from applying; it supported the view that Section 29(2) applies even when the Limitation Act's Schedule has no corresponding entry.
Canara Bank Ltd. v. Warden Ins. Co. Ltd., (AIR 1953 Bom 35) Where the First Schedule omits a period for a particular appeal but the special law prescribes one, the special law is different and Section 29(2) can apply. The court approved the observation of Chhagla, C.J. in this case to support the proposition that omission in the First Schedule does not preclude Section 29(2) applying.
Vasanji Ghela & Co. v. State of Maharashtra, (1968 22 STC 104) (Bom) Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to applications for reference before a tribunal; it is not necessary that the application be before a court. Used by the court to support the view that Limitation Act provisions can be availed of in proceedings before tribunals/persona designata and do not have to be limited to courts.
Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma, AIR 1974 Ker 162 (FB) Majority held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to proceedings before a persona designata under the Kerala Rent Control Act (as Limitation Act only applies to Courts) — majority decision later discussed and distinguished. The court noted this authority but observed that the majority was influenced by a decision subsequently held to be wrongly decided; the opinion of Vishwanath Iyer, J. in the Kerala State Electricity Board case was considered more persuasive.
Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335 Referenced as a decision which influenced later majority reasoning about the Limitation Act's applicability to persona designata; later held to have been decided wrongly by a subsequent Supreme Court decision. The court observed that this decision was specifically held to have been decided wrongly and therefore its influence on the Kerala case majority was not accepted as authoritative for the present purposes.
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 Held that proceedings under special law need not be before ordinary (civil/criminal) courts only for Section 5 of the Limitation Act to apply; criticised earlier decisions to the contrary. The court cited or relied on this reasoning (and the opinion of Vishwanath Iyer, J.) as commending itself over contrary views and supportive of Limitation Act applicability beyond ordinary courts.
Imperial Bucket Co. v. Smt. Bhagwati Basak, AIR 1954 Cal 520 The words "suit or appeal" in Section 29 include proceedings before a persona designata; Section 29 is available to such proceedings and the statute should not be read as restricting applicability to courts only. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that applications to persona designata fall within Section 29(2) and thus the Limitation Act may apply to such proceedings.
Mehar Chand v. Twarsoo, AIR 1965 Him Pra 44 Held that "application" includes an application made to a persona designata and that Section 29(2) is not restricted to applications made to courts only. Followed as an authority supporting applicability of Section 29(2) to persona designata and non‑court fora.
Commr. of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Madan Lal Das & Sons, Bareilly, 1976 (4) SCC 464 : AIR 1977 SC 523 Application of Limitation Act provisions (including Section 12(2)) to proceedings under the U.P. Sales Tax Act; Limitation Act provisions applied even though the application was to a persona designata. Used to demonstrate that Limitation Act provisions have been applied in relation to special statutes (here, Sales Tax Act) and to support the conclusion that Limitation Act provisions can govern proceedings before persona designata.
AIR 1970 SC 209 Referenced in relation to Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act and its use when no period is prescribed by a special law. Referenced to distinguish situations where Article 137 is invoked (cases where special law prescribes no period) from the present case where the special law prescribes a period and Section 29(2) operates.
AIR 1977 SC 282 (referred again) Referenced in the opinion in relation to the changed understanding of preceding authorities and the scope of Section 29(2). Referred to as supporting the proposition that Limitation Act provisions (including Section 5) can apply beyond ordinary courts; cited to reinforce the court's interpretation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a step‑by‑step analysis which can be summarized as follows (all based on the contents of the opinion):

  1. The court first addressed the appellant's contention that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act could not be invoked unless an identical application and period were specified in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. The court rejected this contention, relying on Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khub Chand Baghel and the reasoning that Section 29(2) applies even where the difference arises by omission in the First Schedule. The court approved the view that a special law prescribing a period where the Limitation Act's Schedule is silent constitutes a difference within Section 29(2).
  2. The court then addressed the second limb of the appellant's argument — that Section 29(2) applies only to proceedings before civil or criminal courts and not to applications before revenue authorities or persona designata. The court rejected this contention as well. It relied on authorities (including Vasanji Ghela, Imperial Bucket, Mehar Chand and the Commr. of Sales Tax case) to show that Limitation Act provisions, including Section 5, can be applied to proceedings before tribunals or persona designata and that there is nothing in Section 29(2) limiting applicability to courts only.
  3. The court emphasized the change introduced by the 1963 Limitation Act: under Section 29(2) the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 apply to special/local law proceedings insofar as they are not expressly excluded. Thus Section 5 becomes clearly attracted where the special law prescribes a differing period. The court held that Section 5 was therefore available in the present case.
  4. As an alternative, the court held that even if the Limitation Act were held inapplicable, that would not prevent the Lt. Governor from entertaining an application filed beyond the 30‑day period. The court reasoned that if the Limitation Act is inapplicable, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would likewise be inapplicable, and there would be no statutory compulsion mandating dismissal of the application filed after 30 days. The authority would still have to consider whether any delay was unreasonable on the facts; the Lt. Governor would have inherent jurisdiction to entertain the application if there were sufficient reasons for delay.
  5. Applying these legal conclusions to the facts, the court held that the Lt. Governor erred in rejecting respondent No. 1's application on the preliminary ground that he had no power to condone delay because the Limitation Act was inapplicable. The Lt. Governor failed to apply his mind to whether there were sufficient reasons to entertain the application despite the delay. That error of law justified the learned single Judge's decision to set aside the Lt. Governor's order and remit the matter for reconsideration on merits.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding (core rulings emphasized):

  • The court held that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act operates to attract the Limitation Act (Sections 4 to 24) to applications under special/local laws where the special law prescribes a period different from (or where the Limitation Act Schedule omits a period for) the Limitation Act — consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the application under Section 91 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act in the present case.
  • Alternatively, even if the Limitation Act were not applicable, the Lt. Governor would have inherent jurisdiction to entertain an application filed beyond the 30‑day period under Section 91 if there were sufficient reasons for delay.
  • The Lt. Governor committed an error of law in rejecting the respondent's application solely on the ground that he had no power to condone delay; the learned single Judge correctly quashed that order and remitted the matter for reconsideration on merits.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

  • The appeal by the auction purchaser is dismissed and the order of the learned single Judge (setting aside the Lt. Governor's preliminary dismissal and remitting the matter for reconsideration) stands.
  • The Lt. Governor is required to apply his mind to the reasons given for the delay and decide whether the application filed under Section 91 should be entertained on the merits (either under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as applied by Section 29(2), or under inherent jurisdiction if the Limitation Act were deemed inapplicable).
  • No costs were awarded (the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs).

Result recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed."

Show all summary ...

SACHAR, J.:— This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge dated 31-5-1974 by which he allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 and remitted the matter back to the Lt. Governor for decision in accordance with law.

2. The property bearing No. 48-G, Nizamuddin West. New Delhi was put to auction by the Collector, Delhi on 17-11-1971 and was purchased by the appellant for a sum, of Rs. 47,000/-. The auction had taken place in order to realise a sum of money due to Rehabilitation, Finance Administration from M/s Shahakar. Ltd. on account of loan taken by it for which the son of respondent No. 1 had stood as one of the sureties. The sale was confirmed by the Lt. Governor on 23-12-1971 The possession of the property was given to the appellant/auction purchaser on 4-1-1972.

3. On 19-2-1972 the respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 91 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (as applied to Delhi) for setting aside the sale. Section 91 provides for making an application to set aside a sale at any time within 30 days from the date of the sale. The plea of the respondent No. 1 was that she had come to know of sale only on 9-2-1972 and therefore there was sufficient reason for the Lt. Governor to condone the delay and entertain the application. She had sought to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with S. 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (to be called the Act) for this purpose. The Lt. Governor however, took the view that Limitation Act was not applicable to such an application before him and therefore he had no power to condone the delay, even if the delay was sufficiently explained. The learned Judge however, has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 was applicable and there was power to admit the application after the period prescribed under Section 91 end he therefore by the impugned order remitted the matter back to the Lt. Governor for consideration on merits. The auction purchaser being aggrieved has filed this appeal. The respondent No. 1 invoked Section 5 of the Limitation Act, by virtue of Limitation Act 1963 being applicable to these proceedings because of Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act, which reads as under:—

“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

The learned Judge has accepted this contention which is challenged by Mr. Sanghi the learned counsel for the appellant. He contends that before the Limitation Act can be applicable to any period prescribed by a special Act like the Punjab Land Revenue Act two conditions have to be satisfied namely — (1) that there has to be found in the first schedule to the limitation Act a period prescribed, different from the period of limitation prescribed by the special law for an identical application. The contention, in short is that as in the Schedule to the Limitation Act there is no provision for Limitation for filing an application before the Commissioner (in this case the Lt. Governor) under Section 91 of the Act, Section 29 (2) cannot attract the Limitation Act because the condition precedent is that there must be found in the schedule the very situation which is to be found in a special law with the only difference that the period of limitation may be different. This argument proceeds on the assumption that if no period of limitation is provided in the schedule to the Limitation Act for a situation for which an application which is contemplated by special law, Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act does not cover this aspect. Now this very argument was raised and rejected in (AIR 1964 SC 1099) Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khub Chand Baghel. In that case the question was whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act could be invoked in an appeal filed under Section 116A (3) of the Representation of the People Act to the High Court. The argument was that as there was no provision in the Limitation Act prescribing any period of limitation for an appeal under the Representation of the People Act, resort to the Limitation Act was not permissible. The court posed the problem that:

“when the First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit to it, can it not be said that under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act an appeal can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period? While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits, it to the prescribed period. It is, therefore, different from that prescribed in the former”.

The court approved the observation of Chhagla, C.J in (AIR 1953 Bom 35) Canara Bank Ltd., Bombay v. Warden Ins. Co. Ltd., Bombay, that:

“if the First Schedule to the Limitation Act omits laying down any period of limitation for a particular appeal and the special law provides a period of limitation, then to that extent the special law is different from the Limitation Act.” The court after referring to the other case law ultimately held that the position was that:

“Section 29 (2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and the Limitation Act arose by omission to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.”

4. In the present case the period of time is provided under Section 91 of the Act. Even if there is no period prescribed by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act Section 29 (2) of the Act would govern such an application with the result that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will become applicable. Section 5 of Limitation Act is thus clearly attracted. This plea of Mr. Sanghi fails.

5. The next limb of this very argument was that Section 29 (2) also postulates that an application or proceedings that are covered by Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act must relate to application being filed before the Civil or the Criminal courts, and as an application under Section 91 of the Act before the Revenue Officer was not an application before a court, Limitation Act would not be applicable. We cannot agree. In ((1968 22 STC 104) (Bom) Vasanji Ghela and Co. v. State of Maharashtra, an application was filed before the Sales Tax Tribunal beyond one year and a prayer for condonation of delay was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it had no power to condone the delay. The court reversed this decision and held that the provisions of Section 29 (2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 were attracted and could be availed of for applications for reference before the tribunal and that it was not necessary that an application must necessarily be before a court before by virtue of S. 29 (2) the provisions of Limitation Act could be attracted.

Mr. Sanghi had however, relied on (AIR 1974 Ker 162) (FB) Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma, which had held by a majority that as the appellate authority under the Kerala Rent Control Act was not a Court but a persona designata Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963, was not applicable to proceedings before the appellate authority, as the Limitation Act only applies to Courts. It may however, be noted that the majority decision was influenced by the decision given by (AIR 1969 SC 1335) Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, which was specifically held to have been decided wrongly in (AIR 1977 SC 282) Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivendrum v. T.P Kunhaliumma. G. Vishwanath Iyer, J. however, held that a conclusion that the proceeding under the special law should be before ordinary (Civil and Criminal) Courts alone in order that the provision of section 5 can be applied is not warranted by the provisions of the various special laws and the Limitation Act. With respect the opinion of Vishwanath Iyer, J., commends to us more than the opinion of other learned Judges, in the Kerala case.

A similar argument that in an appeal filed before a Rent Control Tribunal which was a persona designata, section 29 (2) (a) could not be invoked to apply the Limitation Act was rejected in (AIR 1954 Cal 520) Imperial Bucket Co. v. Smt. Bhagwati Basak, and the Court observed that in the plain meaning the word “suit or appeal” refer to any suit or appeal being filed in a Court or before a persona designata and that the words “inclusive of suit, appeal or application” specified by a prescribed local law do not justify the Court in adding the words, “to Court”, and Section 29 of the Limitation Act was therefore held to be available. This view was followed by Om Parkash, J.C, in (AIR 1965 Him Pra 44) Mehar Chand v. Twarsoo, to hold that the word “application” will include an application made to a persona designata and that the applicability of Section 29 (2) was not restricted to applications which were made to a Court only. In this connection it may be noted that the preamble of the 1908 Limitation Act spoke to consolidate and amend the law relating to suits, appeals and certain applications to Courts. Now in the Limitation Act of 1963 the preamble is differently worded to say that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings. Under Section 29 (2) (a) of Limitation Act 1963 there is no restriction that only the applications filed before a Court are covered and the argument that they must nevertheless be so limited is not warranted by the language of the statute.

6. We feel that the argument based on the contention that the application under a special law must necessarily be to a Court, before the provisions of limitation act are attracted is not borne out by any precedent or principles of law. This argument does not appreciate the difference between a case where there is no period prescribed by a special law and where it is so provided. In the former instance, a party will have to invoke Article 137 of Schedule to Limitation Act 1963, and this can be resorted to for filing an application under any Act vide AIR 1970 SC 209; AIR 1977 SC 282. Such an application alone is required to be filed before a Civil Court. But in case of latter kind as in the present case where the period is prescribed under a special law like the Act, Article 137 of Schedule to Limitation Act is not being resorted to at all and the requirement of application being to a Court does not necessarily arise. In such a case the position is different. Here the respondent No. 1 seeks to invoke the applicability of Limitation Act by virtue of Section 29 (2) because a special law like the Punjab Land Revenue Act has prescribed a period for filing an application different from that prescribed by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and because of that the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 automatically become applicable; evidently thus Section 5 becomes available. Section 29 (2) attracts Limitation Act by way of analogy only when there is a limitation prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act.

It is not correct that the applicability of Limitation Act by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the said Act further postulates that an application under the special law should necessarily be made to a Court, as has been contended by Mr. Sanghi, as this is not borne out from the language or the scheme of the statute.

7. We may note that the provisions of the limitation act have been applied in computing the period of limitation under a special law like the U.P Sales Tax Act; see (1976 (4) SCC 464 : (AIR 1977 SC 523) Commr. of Sales Tax, U.P v. Madan Lal Das and Sons, Bareilly. In that case the revision under Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act was filed beyond the prescribed period of one year. The assessee however claimed the benefit of Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act for excluding the time spent in obtaining a copy of the appellate order. The argument that the U.P Sales Tax Act constituted the complete code in itself and that the Limitation Act cannot be applied was rejected by the Court which after referring to Section 29 (2) of the Act stated,

“there can be no manner of doubt that the U.P Sales Tax Act answers to the description of a special or local law. According to sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, reproduced above, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by special or local law the provisions contained in Section 12 (2) inter alia shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law”.

It is clear that the application was to a persona designata and not to a civil court and still the provisions of limitation act were held to be attracted. Similarly in the present case there is nothing in the Act excluding the applicability of provisions of Limitation Act. As such Section 5 of the Limitation Act being one of the Sections in Secs. 4 to 24 could be resorted to and was rightly held by the learned Judge to be applicable.

8. We also feel that our interpretation made above is in consonance with justice and equity. Here is a provision which permits an application to set aside a sale to be moved within 30 days from the date of sale. If the argument of Mr. Sanghi is to be accepted, the application filed even on 31st day would be time barred even if an applicant had, a cast iron explanation as to why the application could not be filed within 30 days. To take an illustration if a party was going to the office of Lt. Governor to file the application on the 30th day and an the way met with a serious accident and removed to a hospital in state of unconsciousness from where he recovers only a week or 10 days later and if even on that very day of discharge he was to file an application the result would be that such an application would have to be held as beyond time; and what is worse that Lt. Governor would have no power to condone the delay, though circumstances cry out loud for the exercise of such power. This result which would work such grave injustice cannot be accepted by us because it is not based on any sound reasoning or any principles of law. The only purpose of fixing a period is that there should be some check on the parties so that old and stale claims are not revived. That has been done by prescribing the period in Section 91 of the Act. But having done that we see no reason why by virtue of Section 29 (2) the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should not govern such an application. It is also to be appreciated that 1963 Limitation Act had made a vital change in Section 29 itself. Whereas under 1908 act scale of the provisions contained, like Secs. 4 and 9 to 18 were to apply and the remaining provisions of the limitation act were not to apply which meant that even if 1908 Limitation Act applied Section 5 as such was not automatically applicable. But that has now been changed by Section 29 (2) providing that in those like cases the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act shall apply. Section 5 of the Limitation Act thus would become applicable by its own force.

9. In the alternative if Section 5 was to be held inapplicable on the ground that the Limitation Act was not applicable to application filed under the Punjab Land Revenue Act it will still not avail the appellant. The reason is that if as urged by the appellant the Limitation Act is not applicable, on the same parity of reasoning Section 3 of the Limitation Act would similarly be inapplicable. In that view there would be no statutory compulsion to dismiss the petition filed beyond 30 days under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act. The only consequence would be that if the application is filed beyond 30 days and the delay is unreasonable and there is no proper explanation given for it the authority may refuse to entertain it. But there is, no mandate in law that because the application is filed beyond 30 days it cannot be entertained after that period. Each case would have to be decided on its own peculiar facts. This is because there may be very good and justifiable reasons why a person filed an application beyond the period of 30 days. In such a case all that could be said was that there was some delay and laches; but whether the delay was unreasonable would have to be decided by the authorities before refusing to entertain an application under S. 91 of the Act. In such a case it would be impermissible to urge that there was no inherent power with the authority to condone the delay in filing the application late.

Therefore, even if the argument of Mr. Sanghi was to be accepted that the Limitation Act was not applicable it would be still not bar the L.G from entertaining the application filed beyond 30 days, if he found that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The error of the Lt. Governor was in assuming that he had no power to entertain the application filed beyond 30 days because of the inapplicability of the Limitation Act. The Lt. Governor never applied his mind to the fact that notwithstanding the inapplicability of the Limitation Act, he would have inherent power to entertain the application if he was satisfied that there was sufficient ground because the compulsion of dismissing the application filed beyond 30 days would not apply, as Section 3 cannot be applied without at the same time applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

In any view of the matter it was incumbent on the Lt. Governor to apply his mind to the facts disclosed and to the reasons given for filing the application late and then to give his decision. As the Lt. Governor had rejected the application on the preliminary ground of maintainability on erroneous view of law, his order clearly disclosed an error of law and learned Judge was therefore right in setting aside the same and sending the matter back to the Lt. Governor for reconsideration on merits. We, therefore, must reject the contention that Sec. 5 of Limitation Act was not applicable to the case. We also hold that in any case Lt. Governor had inherent powers to entertain the application, if there were good reasons for it. But the Lt. Governor by holding that he had no power to do so refused to exercise his jurisdiction vested in him and thus committed an error patent on the face of record and the learned Judge was right in quashing the said order.

10. As a result we find no merit in the appeal and we dismiss it but without any order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.