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Union Of India And Another v. M/S. Vijay Construction Co., Meerut .

Delhi High Court
Sep 30, 1980
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sachar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 8 June 1973 the respondent entered into a contract with the Union of India for construction of 48 units of type I staff quarters at Moradabad. The contract had an original completion date of 9 June 1974 which was extended to 5 December 1974. The appellant rescinded the contract on 6 December 1974.

The opinion records that the respondent sent a notice dated 17th October, 1976 (the text later also refers to a notice date of 17th November, 1976) to the General Manager, Northern Railways, invoking the arbitration clause and informing that if an arbitrator was not appointed within the prescribed statutory period of 15 days the respondent would proceed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. A reminder was sent and an August 24, 1977 reply from the appellant stated the matter was receiving active consideration; no further substantive communication followed.

The respondent moved an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act in September 1978 — the opinion contains both the dates 8th September 1978 and 4th September 1978 in different paragraphs. The learned single Judge held that the Section 20 application was within time and directed appointment of arbitrators in accordance with the contract. The appellant appealed from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is governed by the residuary Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (i.e., whether Article 137 applies to such an application).
  2. From what date the period of limitation begins to run for an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act — specifically, whether the right to apply accrues from the date of rescission of the contract (6 December 1974) or from the date of a notice invoking arbitration under Section 37(3) (referred to in the opinion as 17th October/November 1976).
  3. Whether Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act (which deems arbitration to commence from service of a notice requiring appointment of an arbitrator) alters or postpones the running of limitation for the purpose of filing an application under Section 20 in Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondent accepted (through counsel Mr. Kumar) that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to an application under Section 20, but argued that the time from which limitation runs did not start earlier than the date when the notice invoking arbitration was sent (referred to in parts of the opinion as 17th November, 1976), and therefore the Section 20 application filed in September 1978 was within three years.
  • The respondent initially alleged the cause of action accrued on the rescission (6 December 1974) but also pleaded that cause of action accrued when the notice of 17th (October/November) 1976 was sent.

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The appellant pleaded a bar of limitation and contended that the right to apply under Section 20 accrued on rescission of the contract (6 December 1974), so that a Section 20 application in 1978 would be time-barred under Article 137.
  • Counsel in connected matters (Mr. Daljit Singh) urged that Section 20 was merely procedural and not governed by the Limitation Act (an argument rejected by the Court and noted as untenable in view of Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma).
  • The appellant also relied on the distinction between commencement of arbitration for the arbitrator’s purposes under Section 37(3) and the accrual of the right to apply to Court under Section 20 — arguing that the accrual should be fixed by the date of rescission and not by the date of service of the Section 37(3) notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 Holds that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a Civil Court; rejects earlier ejusdem generis interpretation under the 1908 Act. Relied upon to show that Article 137 governs applications under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act because there is no specific Limitation Act article for such applications.
Radhakrishnamurthy P. v. Balasubramania and Co., AIR 1949 Man 559 Illustrates that invocation of arbitration clause (date of invocation) may be treated as the date on which arbitration commenced for arbitrator's purposes. Used to explain the operation and purpose of Section 37(3) — to deem arbitration commenced from the notice date for certain purposes (e.g., to prevent a party from saying the claim before an arbitrator is time-barred).
Khemraj Lakshmichand v. State of Orissa, (1971) 2 Cut WR 927 Followed Radhakrishnamurthy to the same effect regarding commencement of arbitration. Referred to as an authority consistent with the above principle about commencement of arbitration for arbitrator's jurisdiction/time-bar questions.
Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D. Sassoon and Co., AIR 1929 PC 103 Observes that in mercantile references it is an implied term that arbitrators decide according to existing law (including the Limitation Act); otherwise claims could be brought at any time. Relied on to support the proposition that limitation principles apply to arbitration matters and that limitation should not be allowed to be defeated by indefinite delays.
Motilal Chamaria v. Lal Chand Dugar, AIR 1960 Cal 6 Followed the Privy Council reasoning in Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass regarding application of limitation principles to arbitration. Used to reinforce the view that Limitation Act principles must apply to arbitration claims.
H. Chandanmull & Co. v. Mohambal M. Mehta, AIR 1953 Mad 561 Illustrates that the word "arbitration" in Section 37(1) should be limited to proceedings before the arbitrator and not to applications to the Court under the Arbitration Act. Applied to support the distinction between proceedings before an arbitrator (where Section 37(1) imports Limitation Act rules) and Court applications such as those under Section 20.
Bhardwaj Industries v. Union of India, Suit No. 308-A of 1978 (D.K. Kapur, J.) Decision of a learned single Judge which held a Section 20 application filed in 1978 to be within time because of later communications from the railway authority. Cited and expressly rejected by the Court in this opinion as an incorrect view of law that would create uncertainty and indefinite extension of limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following legal analysis (as stated in the opinion), applying statutory interpretation, precedent and reasoned policy considerations:

  1. Article 137 of the Limitation Act is the residuary provision for applications where no specific Limitation Act article applies. In view of Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, Article 137 applies to applications under any Act to a Civil Court. Because there is no specific Limitation Act provision for an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, Article 137 governs such applications.
  2. The central controversy was identified as the date on which the right to apply under Section 20 accrues. The respondent had pleaded both the contract rescission date (6 December 1974) and the notice date (referred to variously in the opinion as 17th October/17th November 1976) as possible accrual dates.
  3. The Court emphasized a clear distinction between:
    • When an arbitration is deemed to have commenced for the arbitrator's purposes (Section 37(3), which can protect a party from a time-bar in proceedings before an arbitrator), and
    • When the right to apply to Court under Section 20 accrues for the purposes of limitation (a matter governed by Article 137).
    The Court found it impermissible to conflate these two distinct concepts.
  4. The Court rejected the argument that Section 37(3) should be treated as an exception to Article 137 for Section 20 applications. It explained that Section 37(3) is intended to address particular eventualities (for example, to protect a party who has given a notice under Section 37(3) from being time-barred before an arbitrator), but it does not change the accrual rule for filing a Section 20 application in Court.
  5. The Court reasoned that permitting limitation to be postponed by the giving of a notice under Section 37(3) would create uncertainty and make limitation depend on ad hoc facts (how long a party waited for a reply, whether a reply arrived years later, etc.), thereby undermining the firm certainty required of limitation rules.
  6. The Court referred to older authorities (Privy Council and subsequent decisions) to emphasize that arbitration references are subject to limitation principles and that it would be unfair to permit indefinite extension.
  7. Applying these principles, the Court held that the right to apply under Section 20 accrued when the respondent’s grievance arose—specifically on the rescission of the contract on 6 December 1974—and limitation had to be counted from that date. On the face of the opinion, the Court found that the application filed in September 1978 (the opinion contains both 4th and 8th September 1978 as the filing date in different paragraphs) would, in the normal course, be beyond the three-year period of Article 137 if counted from 6 December 1974.
  8. The Court criticized the contrary view taken in Bhardwaj Industries (D.K. Kapur, J.) as creating unacceptable uncertainty and as permitting excessively long effective limitation periods depending on later correspondence from the public authority.
  9. The opinion records that Mr. Kumar (respondent's counsel) orally sought relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, contending there was sufficient cause for delay because of an honest belief (based on the learned single Judge's view) that limitation would run from the notice date. The Court noted that the learned single Judge had in any event already directed appointment of the arbitrator as provided by the arbitration agreement and recorded Mr. Kumar’s concession deleting claims Nos. 6 and 7 from the list of claims.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct effects explicitly stated in the opinion:

  • The opinion contains a clear statement of law that Article 137 of the Limitation Act governs applications under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act when no specific Limitation Act provision applies, and that the right to apply under Section 20 accrues when the grievance arises (here, the rescission of the contract on 6 December 1974).
  • The Court found that, in the normal course, the Section 20 application filed in September 1978 would be beyond the three-year limitation period counted from 6 December 1974 (the opinion contains both 4th and 8th September 1978 as the application date in different paragraphs).
  • The opinion records that the learned single Judge had directed appointment of the arbitrator and that the respondent conceded deletion of claims Nos. 6 and 7 from his claim list; the Court expressed the view that Government agencies should normally have matters adjudicated on merits rather than prevail solely on limitation pleas.
  • The final line of the opinion reads: "With the observations above, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs." The opinion also contains the block notation "Appeal dismissed."

Note on internal inconsistencies in the opinion text (reported as they appear in the provided opinion): the opinion contains multiple differing references to some dates (a notice is referred to as dated 17th October, 1976 in one paragraph and 17th November, 1976 in others; the Section 20 application date appears both as 8th September 1978 and as 4th September 1978 in different paragraphs). These date variations are reproduced here only as they appear in the provided opinion and have not been corrected or reconciled.

Show all summary ...

SACHAR, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of the learned single Judge by which he has held that the application filed by the respondent under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act (the Act) was filed within time and directed the appointment of the arbitrators in accordance with the conditions of the contract.

2. On 8th June, 1973, a contract was entered into between the respondent and the Union of India for construction of 48 units of type I staff quarters at Moradabad. The contract was to be completed by 9th June 1974. This date was, however, extended to 5th December, 1974. Apparently, the work was not completed and the appellant, therefore, rescinded the contract on 6th December, 1974. The respondent sent a notice D/- 17th October, 1976 to the General Manager, Northern Railways, requiring that as per the agreement, he was to act as the sole arbitrator and informing him that he may appoint some one else as an arbitrator, within the prescribed period of 15 days from the receipt of the letter and that if no such arbitrator was appointed within the said statutory period the respondent will proceed under Section 20 of the Act or any other provision as might be open. A reminder was also sent to the appellant who by his letter of August 24, 1977, stated that the matter was receiving active consideration and final reply will be sent as early as possible. No further communication was received from the appellant. The respondent thereafter moved an application on 8th September, 1978, under Section 20 of the Act for filing the arbitration agreement and referring the matter to arbitration.

3. The appellant pleaded bar of limitation. The learned single Judge has held it against the appellant and has held the application to be within time.

4. The appellant need not have flied the appeal, but as explained by Mr. Jaitley, counsel for the appellant, a number of matters have been decided on this point, the department wants this matter to be finally decided by this Court because the learned single Judges of this court have taken contrary views on this aspect of the matter.

5. S. 37 (1) of the Arbitration Act provides that all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as they apply to proceedings in Court. There is no specific Article in the Limitation Act, 1963, laying down the limitation for filing an application under Section 20 of the Act. There is, however, a residuary Article 137 which lays down a period of limitation of three years and the time from which the period begins to run is when the right to apply accrues. (emphasis supplied). At one time under Limitation Act, 1908, there was a view that the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under Arbitration Act. That position is no longer correct law in view of Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282, which lays down that the interpretation which was given to Article 181 of Limitation Act, 1908 on the principle of ejusdem generis is not applicable with regard to Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963. It was held that Article 137 of Limitation Act will apply to any petition or any application filed under any Act to a Civil Court. As there is no specific provision under the Limitation Act for an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, it is apparent that the time for filing an application is governed by Article. 137 of the Limitation Act. This position is indeed, not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Kumar though a half-hearted effort was made by Mr. Daljit Singh, appearing in connected matter to urge that notwithstanding the decision in the Kerala State Electricity Board, an application under Section 20 of the Act was not governed by the Limitation Act and there was no limitation period, as according to the counsel Section 20 is merely a procedural section. The argument is unacceptable. In view of the Supreme Court decision, it is no longer open to urge that the applications under the Arbitration Act which are filed in civil court are not governed by the Limitation Act. To be fair to Mr. Kumar, who argued the main matter, we may note that he did not subscribe to this untenable proposition and conceded that an application under Section 20 would be governed by Article. 137 of the Limitation Act. But nevertheless he urged that the petition under Section 20 of the Act is within time as the time from which the period begins to run did not start earlier than 17th November, 1976, when the notice was given by the respondent and as the application was moved on 4th September, 1978, it is well within time.

6. The real controversy is when the right to apply under Section 20 of the Act is deemed to accrue. The respondent himself understood that the cause of action had arisen to him on 6th December, 1974, when the contract was rescinded and so stated specifically in para 8 of the application under Sec. 20 of the Act where he stated that the cause of action accrued to him when the Union of India illegally rescinded the contract on 6th December, 1974. Of course, he also added that cause of action also accrued when the notice dated 17th November, 1976 was sent by the advocate of the plaintiff for appointment of an arbitrator.

7. Mr. Kumar urges that under Section 37 (3) of the Act, for the purposes of the Section and of the Indian Limitation Act, an arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator and as that notice was sent on 17th November, 1976, that is the date when the right to apply under Section 20 of the Act would accrue in the eventuality of the arbitrator not being appointed by the other party. We cannot agree. This argument seems to mix up the question of the time of the commencement of the arbitration, and the question of limitation for filing application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. These are two distinct matters and deal with different eventualities. One has no connection with the other. Section 37 (3) deals with claim being within time before the arbitrator, which has no relevancy to the time within which and from what date application under Section 20 has to be filed. The whole confusion in the argument arises from the failure to appreciate this distinctiveness of matters.

8. At one time, it was strongly contended that no purpose would be served by sub-section (3) of Section 37 if the commencement of arbitration was to be deemed to be from a date, as in the present case from 17th November, 1976, and a period of three years for limitation purposes could start from some other date under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. This argument obviously ignores the various eventualities for which Section 37 (3) is meant. One indication is provided in Section 37 (5) itself which says that where the court orders that an award be set aside, after the commencement of the arbitration, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act for the commencement of the proceedings. Another instance in which Section 37 (3) would be relevant would be to determine whether the claim before the arbitrator is barred by time or not. To take an instance, as in the present case, notice was given on 17th November, 1976, and even if an arbitrator had been appointed in 1978 and the claim was filed before him by the respondent, it would not be open to the appellant to urge that the claim filed before the arbitrator in 1978 is time barred as it is beyond the period of three years from the date of cause of action i.e, the rescission of the contract on 6th December, 1974, because by virtue of the deeming provision of Section 37 (3) the arbitration would be deemed to have commenced from 17th November, 1976, which date is within time being within three years from 6th December, 1974. Then in Radhakrishnamurthy P. v. Balasubramania and Co., AIR 1949 Man 559, where the date of alleged breach of contract was 31st March, 1942, the invocation of arbitration clause under the Arbitration Bye-laws of Merchants' Association on 29th March, 1945 was held to be a date on which the arbitration commenced. This authority was followed in Khemraj Lakshmichand v. State of Orissa, (1971) 2 Cut WR 927.

9. One of the arguments urged by the counsel for the appellant was that if the period of limitation was not to be counted from the date of service of the notice under Section 37 (3), this may defeat the remedy of having an arbitrator appointed by moving an application under Section 20. He gives an extreme illustration where notice is given on the last day of three years from the date of rescission of the contract and then urging that if three years are to start from the date of rescission of the contract, the party could not move an application under Section 20 of the Act and thus would be without a remedy. But then illustration is where a situation is created by the party itself and the justification for the fear urged on account of inaction of the party. It is no doubt true that if the party does wait till the last date of limitation to give notice and then also wishes to wait for some days to await the reply, he would have lost the remedy under Section 20 in case the other party did not agree to the appointment of an arbitrator. But same situation will arise even if the notice is given, say one year earlier, but the party giving notice does not choose to move under Section 20 of the Act within the period of one year. The situation brought about by one's own negligence is not only an inapposite example but hardly a justification to give different meaning to the plain words of the statute. The consequence of a party itself delaying to move an application under Section 20 of the Act beyond the period of limitation and the situation resulting in a party being left without a remedy are consequences created by its own default and it is unfair to find fault with the draftsmen of the legislation for this predicament. Moreover, this argument is made obviously on the assumption as if it is condition precedent to moving an application under Section 20 of the Act to first give a notice to the other party under Section 37 (3) of the Act. This assumption, however, is unsupportable in law. Even the learned Judge accepts that it is open to the party to move an application under Section 20 of the Act without having first to give a notice under Section 37 (3) of the Act. If that be so, as indeed it is the correct law then obviously if there was no arbitration clause what a person would do by filing a suit, he could in the present case do by filing an application under Section 20 of the Act. It is not, therefore, correct to equate the giving of a notice under Section 37 (3) of the Act to the filing of a suit because the latter case can be equated only to the filing of an application under Section 20 of the Act and limitation can only be saved from the date when application under Section 20 of the Act is filed, and not from any earlier date, because giving of notice etc, are not essential conditions for moving such an application. If the view of the learned single Judge were accepted there would be no definite or specific period of limitation laid down for moving an application under S. 20 of the Act. To take the present case, if no notice is given under S. 37 (3) of the Act, application under Sec. 20 of the Act would have to be moved within three years from 6th December, 1974, the date of breach. If, however, a notice is given under S. 37 (3) the question will arise whether the limitation is to start from the date of the giving of notice or is to start sometime later on, on the ground that the party giving notice was justified in awaiting the response from the other side. And still further, how long a wait is permissible, and would it vary in each case with no definite rule as a guide but purely as an ad hoc arrangement. The interpretation would make a mockery of Section 37 (1) which provides that all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act shall apply to arbitrations as they apply to proceedings in Court. Because in the absence of a firm test when the right to apply arises as provided in Art. 137 of Limitation Act, it would vary with no certainty arid be matter of confusion everywhere. Limitation, if applicable must be firm.

In that connection, reference may with advantage be made to Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D Sassoon and Co., AIR 1929 PC 103. It may be noticed that this was prior to the enactment of 1940 Arbitration Act and did not contain any provision like Section 37 of the Act. Nevertheless, in dealing with the question, whether Indian Limitation Act of 1908 applies to arbitration proceedings, the Privy Council observed:

“Although the Limitation Act does not in terms apply to arbitrations, they think that in mercantile reference, of the kind in question it is an implied term of the contract that the arbitrator must decide the dispute according to the existing law of contract............”

“Were it otherwise a claim for breach of a contract containing a reference clause could be brought at any time, it might be 20 or 30 years after the cause of action had arisen although the legislature has prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of such a claim in any application that might be made to the law Courts.”

This case was followed in Motilal Chamaria v. Lal Chand Dugar, AIR 1960 Cal 6. There is thus no scope for the argument that the specific period of limitation provided under Article 137 of Limitation Act should be allowed to be overridden by the vague and uncertain eventuality if the notice is given under Section 37 (3) of the Act even though such a requirement is not necessary for moving an application under Section 20 of the Limitation Act.

11. Mr. Kumar had urged that Section 37 (1) of the Act applies to arbitrations, and, therefore, Section 37 (3) carves out an exception for the commencement of arbitration for the purpose of Limitation Act and, therefore, notwithstanding Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period for an application under Section 20 must be read in the light of Section 37 (3) of the Act. This argument naturally assumes as if the provisions of Section 37 (1) are applicable to proceedings before the Court under the Arbitration Act. This is a misapprehension of the position in law. The word “arbitration” should be limited to proceedings before the arbitrator and an application to set aside an award being a proceeding in Court cannot be held to be an arbitration proceeding. (See H. Chandanmull and Co. v. Mohambal M. Mehta, AIR 1953 Mad 561). Similarly, Sec. 37 (1) of the Act in terms provides that the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are to apply to arbitrations as they apply to proceedings w Court. In other words, an arbitrator in dealing with a matter submitted to him is bound to apply the provisions of the Limitation Act: Section 37 (1) has no reference to an application under the Arbitration Act for effectuating a reference to the arbitrator, such as an application for filing an arbitration agreement. There is no doubt that cl. (1) of S. 37 of the Arbitration Act deals only with the authority of the arbitrator to deal with and decide any dispute referred to him; it has no concern with an application made to the Court to file an arbitration agreement and to refer a dispute to the arbitrator.

Thus, the argument that Section 37 (3) of the Act should be read as an exception to the Limitation Act is without any merit and must be repelled.

12. Then an application under Sec. 20 cannot be held to be an arbitration within the meaning of Section 37 (1). As a matter of fact, to all the applications which are moved in a Court under the Arbitration Act, it is the provisions of the limitation act which will apply.

13. We have also been referred to a decision of D.K Kapur, J. in Bhardwaj Industries v. Union of India, Suit No. 308-A of 1978, decided on 2nd February, 1979, where the learned Judge has expressed the same view. In that case the contract was rescinded on 4th March, 1972, and the notice under Section 37 (3) was given on 26th April, 1973. But the application under Section 20 of the Act which was filed on 4th March, 1978, was held to be within time on the ground that the General Manager, Railways repeated the request to appoint an arbitrator only on 22nd August, 1977. We cannot accept this as a correct view of law. This case also will show the uncertainty and the delay which will occur if this view of the learned Judge is to be accepted.

14. According to the learned Judge in that case, the application under Sec. 20 filed in March, 1978, was well within time because the limitation would expire only in 1980. How untenable it is when it is recalled that the contract was rescinded an 4th March, 1972, the grievance of the contractor really arises from that date and yet the learned Judge would permit a period of eight years for an application to be filed under Section 20 of the Act. How uncertain the position is will be apparent if the reply in this case was received not in 1977, but in 1980, the limitation would be extended still further till 1983. This would make the applicability of Limitation Act too vague to stand. The learned Judge accepts that the existence of a right to apply arises when the contract was rescinded. But yet he postpones the right to move under Section 20 of the Act to the date when the General Manager of the railways replied rejecting the resort to arbitration on the ground that if the General Manager had accepted to refer the matter to arbitration there would be no grievance to the contractor. We feel there is a fallacy in the reasoning. No doubt if the General Manager, Railways accepted the request to refer the matter to arbitration there would be no necessity to move the application under Section 20 of the Act. But, this does not mean that the right to apply which had accrued to the contractor on the date when the contract was rescinded is not the starting period for the purpose of limitation. When the contractor is informed of the rescission, he must at that point of time take a view whether an injury has been caused to him. If he feels that it is not an injury, then obviously there is no dispute and no need to have recourse to any legal remedy. But if he feels aggrieved then the right to apply has accrued at that point of time and the same cannot be postponed to await the letter from the General Manager. It cannot be said simply because the General Manager may in an eventuality accept the request to refer the matter to arbitration that no differences had already arisen in the sense that an injury has been caused to the contractor. The right to apply for arbitration is dependent on a dispute having arisen and the dispute is whether the rescission of the contract was justified or not. The learned Judge assumes that it is only if the General Manager rejects the request for arbitration that a dispute arises. We cannot agree. The dispute between the contractor and the railway arose on the rescission of the contract. Making a request for referring the matter to arbitration is a demand to refer the dispute to the forum which the parties had agreed upon. Awaiting reply from the Railways cannot save limitation which had already started running from the date or the rescission of the contract. The rescission of the contract is a clear and straight intimation to the contractor that his work has not been found satisfactory and the consequences will follow. It is no doubt true that if in pursuance of a notice given, the arbitrator had been appointed by the Railways, no necessity to file an application under Section 20 would have arisen. But the grievance of the contractor had arisen from the date of rescission of the contract. In order to get the relief from the injury done to him by the rescission of contract, the appointment of an arbitrator was one of the steps, he had to take. The right to apply and take effective steps had thus arisen from that date.

15. We may notice that in the Judgment in Bhardwaj Industries case the learned Judge has expressed a doubt whether there is any limitation involved under Section 20 of the Act. We do not find in the judgment of the learned single Judge any reference to the Kerala State Electricity Board's case (AIR 1977 SC 282), where it has been held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to all applications under any Act. In view of the settled law, the learned Judge was in error in assuming that applications under Section 20 of the Act are not governed by the Limitation Act. As there is no other specific provision, Article 137 of the Limitation Act is the only provision applicable. We are thus of the view that the right to apply accrued to the respondent on 6th December, 1974, when the contract was rescinded and limitation has to be counted from that date. In the normal course, therefore, the application filed on 4th September, 1978, would be beyond time. The view of the learned single Judge to the contrary cannot, therefore, be accepted and must be set aside.

16. Mr. Kumar at this stage orally prayed for being given the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act as, according to him, there was sufficient cause for filing the application late. He says that application under Section 20 was filed on 4th September, 1978, in the bona fide belief that limitation would run from the date of the issue of the notice on 17th November, 1976. Considering that the learned single Judge has not only in the present case but in other cases also held the same view, we cannot say that the belief of the respondent was in any way unreasonable. The learned single Judge has already directed the appointment of the arbitrator as provided by the arbitration agreement. We may, however, note the concession which was made by Mr. Kumar regarding the claim which was filed along with the application. Mr. Kumar has stated that he does not intend to pursue claims Nos. 6 and 7. The same, therefore, may be deemed to be deleted from the list of claims. The dispute and the claim which the respondent is claiming will be now restricted to the claim filed by him except items 6 and 7 which stands deleted. We are not happy that the Government Agency, like the Railways, should deny the citizens right by taking the plea of limitation. Governmental agencies should normally have the matter adjudicated on merits and succeed or fail on the justification or otherwise of the claim.

17. With the observations above, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.