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Laxmi Kant Mukt v. Jitender Kumar Aggarwal .

Delhi High Court
Jan 12, 1980
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Case Summary — Judgment of Charanjit Talwar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal by the tenant challenging the judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi dated 15 March 1979. The Tribunal had dismissed the tenant's appeal but allowed the landlord's appeal and directed eviction of the tenant under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The respondent (landlord) had previously sued the tenant for recovery of Rs. 5,000 as arrears of rent; the trial court and the first appellate court had held the respondent to be the landlord and the owner of the demised premises. A prior second appeal (R.S.A. No. 105 of 1969) was dismissed by Avadh Behari, J. on 30 September 1975; in that judgment the Court did not express an opinion on the question of ownership though concurrent findings by lower courts had held the plaintiff to be the owner. The Rent Control Tribunal subsequently analyzed evidence and found that the premises (House No. 30, Block No. 61, Rohtak Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi) were joint Hindu family property, that a partition occurred and that a rearrangement resulted in the ground-floor coming to the share of the respondent. The tenant appealed, raising multiple objections to the Tribunal's findings and the eviction order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent is the owner of the demised premises (a threshold question, since if he is not the owner, his bona fide requirement cannot justify eviction).
  2. Whether the award (Exhibit A4) recognizing shares in an earlier partition and the decree (Exhibit A5) making that award a rule of court were invalid because they were not executed on stamp paper and not compulsorily registered.
  3. Whether the rearrangement that assigned the ground-floor to the respondent contravened Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  4. Whether an adverse presumption should be drawn against a landlord who does not appear as his own witness to prove bona fide requirement.
  5. Whether the eviction petition was defective because it sought only partial eviction (alleged omission of store and verandah) or because the plan was not supplied.
  6. Whether eviction could properly be ordered under Clause (k) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act given the absence of a lease deed executed in favour of the respondent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The award recognizing the partition and the decree making it a rule of court (Exhibits A4 and A5) were nullities because they were not executed on stamp paper and were not compulsorily registered.
  • The rearrangement by which the ground-floor came to the respondent violated Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and was therefore illegal.
  • An adverse presumption should be drawn because the landlord did not appear as his own witness to prove his bona fide requirement; reliance was placed on a decision in Shri Virendra Pal's case.
  • The landlord was not willing to swear that he required the premises bona fide for his residence.
  • The eviction petition was defective because it allegedly did not mention certain portions (store and verandah) from which eviction was sought; alternatively, the plan was not supplied to the tenant.
  • The ground for eviction under Clause (k) of Section 14(1) was not attracted because the lease deed for the land had not been executed in favour of the respondent.

Respondent's (Landlord's) Position

  • The respondent had been adjudicated as landlord (and, in concurrent findings, owner) in earlier proceedings and had a decree for recovery of rent in his favour.
  • The Rent Control Tribunal found that the property was joint Hindu family property subject to partition and rearrangement that vested the ground-floor in the respondent's share; on those factual findings he was the owner and entitled to seek eviction on grounds of bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e).
  • The respondent claimed a bona fide requirement of the premises for himself and his family (wife and six children) who had no other reasonably suitable accommodation in Delhi.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shri Virendra Pal v. Sri Daljit Sandhu (Civil Revision No. 373 of 1977), decided 14 September 1977; reported in 1978 (1) R.C.J. 365 Held that if the landlord fails to appear in the witness-box to prove his bona fide requirement, an adverse presumption must be drawn against him. The Court observed that the decision arose on its particular facts (landlord seeking to shift to Delhi for treatment and relying on an attorney's evidence) and did not lay down a general rule of law applicable to all cases. The present Court distinguished that case on facts and did not apply an automatic adverse-presumption rule.
Khurshid Haider v. Mst. Subeda Begum (S.A.O No. 335 of 1972), decided 15 December 1978; reported in 1979 (2) R.C.R. 61 Expressed the contrary view (to Shri Virendra Pal) on the proposition of drawing an adverse presumption against a landlord who does not testify. The Court treated Avadh Behari, J.'s view as not creating a conflict with Shri Virendra Pal's case because the latter was fact-specific. The present Court accepted that there was no general rule compelling an adverse presumption and decided the matter on the facts before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-by-step manner focusing first on the threshold question of ownership:

  • Prior Proceedings and Concurrent Findings: The Court noted prior decrees in favour of the respondent in earlier rent/recovery proceedings and an appeal (Exhibit R.6) where Avadh Behari, J. affirmed the decrees below but did not express an opinion on ownership. The Court explained that the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the respondent was landlord and owner were not varied by that earlier decision.
  • Tribunal's Findings on Partition and Rearrangement: The Rent Control Tribunal analyzed the evidence and found a partition in 1958, accepted by the Income Tax Officer in an assessment order dated 2 January 1961 (Exhibit A.W.2/2). The Tribunal found that after partition the tenant had returned possession in 1959 of a room and a garage on the ground-floor and that the rent had been reduced — facts admitted in cross-examination. On these findings the Tribunal concluded the ground-floor had come to the respondent's share and that the respondent was the owner of the demised premises.
  • Standard of Review: The Court emphasized that in a second appeal it could not reassess primary findings of fact made by the Tribunal; the factual findings that supported ownership and bona fide requirement were therefore not open to re-appraisal in this proceeding.
  • Validity of Award and Registration/Stamp Objection: The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the award (Exhibit A4) and the decree (Exhibit A5) were invalid for lack of execution on stamp paper or compulsory registration. The Court observed that counsel had cited no authority to support the submission that recognition of a prior family arrangement by award required execution on stamp paper or compulsory registration, and held the objection to lack merit.
  • Objection under Section 54, Transfer of Property Act: The Court held the contention that the rearrangement contravened Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act was not tenable because the rearrangement admittedly took place prior to 1 December 1962 — the date when the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to Delhi.
  • Adverse Presumption/Failure to Testify: Addressing the submission that an adverse presumption should be drawn because the landlord did not testify personally, the Court considered the two relevant authorities (Shri Virendra Pal and Khurshid Haider) and concluded there was no irreconcilable conflict. Shri Virendra Pal was treated as fact-specific and not laying down a general rule; Avadh Behari, J.'s contrary view in Khurshid Haider was applicable on different facts. On the facts of the present case — landlord having exclusive possession of only one room and a garage and a large family with no other reasonable accommodation in Delhi — the Tribunal's finding of bona fide requirement was a finding of fact and not susceptible to interference in second appeal.
  • Partial Eviction / Plan Issue: The Court held that the tenant had, in the written statement, reacted to and contested the plan attached to the eviction petition; there was no complaint that the plan had not been supplied. The Court accepted the Tribunal's approach that the plan is to be read as part of the eviction petition and that omission of full particulars in the petition did not vitiate proceedings where no failure of justice resulted.
  • Clause (k) and Sub-section (11) of Section 14: The Tribunal had not passed an eviction order under Clause (k) of Section 14(1), because the eviction was ordered under sub-clause (e). The Court treated any argument about Clause (k) as academic and unnecessary to decide, stating there was no need to resort to sub-section (11) of Section 14 in the present case.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision and immediate consequences are as follows:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effects on the parties (as ordered by the Court):

  • The Rent Control Tribunal's findings that Jatinder Kumar (respondent) is the owner of the demised premises and that he bona fide requires the premises for himself and his family are affirmed.
  • The eviction decree under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act stands. The appellant (tenant) was given three months' time to vacate the premises on specified conditions: deposit of the rent due by 10 February 1980 and payment of rent for February and March 1980 by 10 March 1980; the appellant undertook to give peaceful vacant possession on 18 April 1980 (the undertaking recorded in Court).
  • Each party was directed to bear its own costs.

No broader legal implications or a new precedent were announced in the opinion; the disposition rests on affirmation of the Tribunal's factual findings and their application to the eviction ground under Section 14(1)(e).

Show all summary ...

Charanjit Talwar, J.:— This is a second appeal by the tenant seeking reversal of the judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, passed on March 15, 1979 dismissing the appeal of the tenant but allowing the appeal filed by the landlord, and directing the tenant's eviction under S. 14 (1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

2. The first question required to be decided at the threshold is whether the respondent is the owner of the demised premises? If he is not, his requirement of those premises even if proved to be bonafide cannot be made the ground for tenant's eviction. Admittedly, the respondent herein had been held to be the landlord as also the owner of the demised premises in an earlier suit which he had filed for recovery of Rs. 5,000/- on account of arrears of rent against the present appellant, by the trial court which finding was affirmed by the 1st Appellate Court. The tenant's second appeal (R.S.A No. 105 of 1969) was dismissed on September 30, 1975 by Avadh Behari, J. While upholding the concurrent Avadh Behari J. had expressed no opinion on the question of ownership and observed thus:

“There is a concurrent finding that the plaintiff is the owner of this property. The Courts below have held that this is a joint Hindu family property, that there was a partition and that there was a rearrangement by reason of which the ground-floor of the property came to the share of the respondent-plaintiff. In my opinion it is not necessary to go into this question at all. I have not asked the appellant's therefore, express any opinion on the question of ownership.”

3. The said judgment of this Court is on the record of this case as Exhibit R. 6. Avadh Behari J, while affirming the decrees of the Courts below, had further observed in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment that “in the plaint the case of the plantiff was that he was the landlord and the defendant was his tenant. I have decided this appeal on this main ground. In the replication the questions of ownership, joint Hindu family partition, re-arrangement were all set out. The Courts have decided those questions also in favour of the plaintiff. But in my opinion the suit could have been decided on this other ground.” It is obvious from the judgment (Exhibit R. 6) that the concurrent findings that the respondent herein was not only the landlord but the owner as well, had not been varied by this Court. The said appeal was decided on a narrow ground that Shri Jatinder Kumar being the landlord of the demised premises was entitled to she recovery of the rent as claimed. However as no opinion had been expressed by this Court on the aspect of the ownership, the learned Tribunal went into this question. After analysing the evidence in detail, it found that the respondent was the owner of the premises in dismite. It has been held by the learned Tribunal that the premises, namely House No. 30, Block No. 61, Rohtak Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi was a joint Hindu family property; that there was a partition between members of the joint Hindu family; and that there was rearrangement between them by which the ground-floor of the property came to the share of the respondent

4. Mr. Dhir learned counsel for the appllant, challeng these finding. His obections are:

(1) The award (Exhibit A 4) recognizing the shares in which the property had been earlier partitioned and also the decree (Exhibit A 5) making the said award a rule of the Court, were a nullity as they had not been executed on a stamp paper and had not been compulsonly registered.

(2) The re-arrangement between the members of the joint Hindu family by which the ground-floor came to the share of the respondent, is illegal being in contravention of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.

5. On facts the learned. Tribunal has found that the partition admittedly took place in the year 1958 and the Income Tax Officer vide his assessment order (Exhibit A. W. 2/2) passed on 2.1.1961 had accepted the partition of the said property. In the year 1959, after the partition of the property the tenant-appellant herein had handed back the possession of a room and a garage on the ground-floor to the then landlord and the rent was accordingly reduced from Rs. 185/- to Rs. 140/- permensem. This fact had been admitted by him in cross-examination. It cannot, therefore, be alleged that the oral partition of the Hindu undivided family property was for any collateral purpose. In any case, in second appeal this Court cannot re-assess this finding of fact.

6. Now turning to the objections of Mr. Dhir I find that the said award recognizing the oral partition between the members of the family, which had earlier taken place, and the decree making it a rule of the Court, has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal not to require execution on a stamp paper or to be compulsorily registered. Mr. Dhir has not cited any authority to show that the award recognizing the past family arrangement is to be executed on a stamp paper or requires compulsory registration. This contention has no force. The objection regarding the re-arrangement amongst the members of the family being in contravention of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is also not tenable as admittedly this re-arrangement was made prior to December 1, 1962, the date on which the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to Delhi.

7. There is another aspect of this case which has to be kept in view. It was only because of re-arrangement between the members of the family that the ground-floor came to the share of the respondent and, therefore, his claim as a landlord for recovery of Rs. 5,000/- on account of arrears of rent had been decreed in his favour. The reasons for finding the plaintiff (respondent herein) in the said suit to be a landlord are also valid for holding him to be the owner of the demised premises. I, therefore, find no infirmity in the finding of the Rent Control Tribunal that Jatinder Kumar, respondent herein, is the owner of the demised premises. Thus his bona-fide requirement can be made the basis for eviction of the appellant from the premises in dispute. However, before adverting to the owner's bona-fide requirement, I may notice the other three submissions made by Mr. M.S Dhir, learned counsel for the appellant. He urges that the landlord not having appeared as his own witness, an adverse presumption should have been drawn against him by the authorities below; that he was not willing to swear that he required the premises bona-fide for his residence; that the eviction petition is bad as it sought partial eviction of the tenant from the rented premises; and lastly that the ground of eviction covered by Clause (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act was not attracted as the lease deed of the land on which premises are situate, had not been executed in favour of the respondent.

8. Mr. Dhir submitted that on the proposition of adverse presumption there was a conflict of opinion in this Court and the matter, therefore, needs to be decided by a larger Bench. According to him, V.D Misra, J. (as he then was) in Shri Virendra Pal v. Sri Daljit Sandhu Civil Revision No. 373 of 1977, decided on September 14, 1977 and reported in 1978 (1) R.C.J 365 had held that if the landlord failed to appear in the witness-box to prove his bona-fide requirement, an adverse presumption must be drawn against him, Avadh Behari, J. had taken a contrary view in Khurshid Haider v. Mst. Subeda Begum, S.A.O No. 335 of 1972 decided on December 15, 1978 and reported in 1979 (2) R.C.R 61. I am of the view that there is no conflict in the above-said two decisions. Avadh Behari, J., after noticing the ruling in Shri Virendra Pal's case (supra) observed that it did not lay down any rule of law. On the facts of that case it was decided that the landlord had been unable to prove his bona-fide requirement to stay in Delhi. The ground on which the eviction in the earlier case was sought was that the landlord wanted to shift to Delhi from Muktsar for the purposes of his treatment. In support of his case he had produced his attorney whose evidence regarding the intentions or the state of the mind of the landlord to live on the ground-floor or the first-floor of the premises situate at Delhi, was not considered sufficient to prove the owner's bonafide requirement. In the appeal before Avadh Behari, J. the facts were widely different and the said ruling in Shri Virendra Pal's case (supra) was found not to be applicable. The facts, before me in the present case, rare also different. Admittedly, the landlord has in his exclusive possession only one room and garage on the ground-floor of the demised premises. Admittedly, his family consists of his wife and six children, who have no other reasonably suitable accommodation in Delhi. I have already held that bona-fide requirement of the premises in occupation of the tenant is not open to question. In any case, the finding of the Rent Control Tribunal that the respondent requires the premises bonafide for himself and the members of his family dependent upon him is a pure finding of fact, and in second appeal I cannot interfere with that finding. The decree granted in his favour under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is proper and valid.

9. The third submission of Mr. Dhir that the eviction petition sought only partial eviction of the appellant from the demised premises as, according to him, in paragraph No. 8 of the petition, a store and the verandah (in the tenant's possession) had not been mentioned therein, is also mis-conceived. Admittedly, the plan attached with the eviction petition had correctly shown the premises in occupation of the tenant. It is relevant to quote below parapraph No. 8 of the eviction petition as well as the reply thereto in the written statement filed before the Controller:

“8. Details of accommodation available together with particulars as regards ground area, garden and out houses, if any (plan to be attached). The premises let to the respondent are situate on the ground-floor consisting of four rooms, a back court-yard, bath, W.C and verandah, all three in common use. The said premises are shown in colour red in the plan attached herewith. Paras 8 and 9 as stated are not admitted and thus denied. In this connection the submission made in para 4 of the preliminary objection may be read. The tenanted premises in the occupation of the answering respondent are consisting of 5 rooms with verandahs, stores, kitchen, back and front courtyards, baths and W.C are in the exclusive use and occupation of the answering respondent. The plan given by the petitioner is wrong and not in respect of the tenanted premises. The petition accordingly is defective from this infirmity and is liable to be rejected.” Reply in written statement.

10. The reply of the tenant clearly shows that the objection which is being taken before me, had not been raised in the Trial Court. The tenant, it is apparent, had filed the reply after perusing the plan. Mr. Dhir's contention that the copy of the site plan is never supplied to the opposite side and as such the admission, if any, of the appellant in the written statement be ignored and the case be decided only on the averment contained in the eviction petition which averment admittedly does not give full particulars of the premises in occupation of the tenant, is also to be rejected. No grievance was made by the tenant of non-supply of the plan of the premises. In fact, the said plan was questioned by the tenant. The submission that as full particulars were not mentioned in the eviction petition and, therefore, it should be assumed that the landlord was seeking ejectment only from that portion which was mentioned in the petition, is of no merit. I find that the parties were not at variance regarding the fact that eviction was being sought from the whole of the premises in possession of the tenant. Non-mention of the full particulars of the premises in possession of the tenant does not vitiate the proceedings as has been urged. In the present case, I find that it has not resulted in any failure of justice. The Rent Control Tribunal has rightly held that the plan, which gave full particulars, is to be read as a part of the eviction petition, I, therefore, negative the third contention raised on behalf of the appellant.

11. The last contention of Mr. Dhir is also of no avail to him. The learned Tribunal, while affirming the finding that the tenant-appellant is also running a school in the premises in dispute, has not passed the eviction order under clause (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act in view of the fact that the order for eviction was being passed under Sub-clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14. To order under sub-section (11) of Section 14 was, therefore, passed. The question raised before me, therefore, is merely academic. In the present case, it is unnecessary to take recourse to sub-section (11) of Section 14 of the Act. As such, it is purposeless to dilate on this point. The result is that the appeal fails and the parties are left to bear their own costs.

12. I would, however, grant three months' time to the tenant-appellant to vacate the premises on the condition that the rent due is deposited by the 10th of February, 1980, and for the succeeding months of February and March, 1980 by the 10th of March, 1980. The appellant, who is present in Court, undertakes to give peaceful vacant possession of the said premises on the 18th of April, 1980. His statement regarding the assurance has been recorded separately.

13. Appeal dismissed.