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Bhim Sain v. Union Of India And Another

Delhi High Court
Sep 26, 1980
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, sole-proprietor of M/s. Bhim Sain Surinder Kumar and a registered contractor with the respondents, submitted the lowest tender for construction work invited by the respondents. The tender was to remain valid for 60 days from 19th September 1978. The petitioner extended the validity period to 19th December 1978 upon request. Due to a steep rise in building material prices, the petitioner withdrew the tender on 30th November 1978. The respondents, however, accepted the tender on 2nd December 1978, unaware of the withdrawal. The petitioner’s earnest money was refunded after deducting 10%, representing liquidated damages for default under the tender terms.

Subsequently, the petitioner received a show cause memorandum alleging unbusinesslike conduct causing delay, and was threatened with removal from the approved contractors’ list. After the petitioner’s detailed reply explaining the withdrawal due to price rise and lack of communication regarding acceptance, the respondents issued a blacklisting order dated 16th October 1979, barring the petitioner from government contracts for two years. The petitioner challenged the blacklisting order under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order of blacklisting passed after affording an opportunity of being heard can be quashed on the ground that it is arbitrary.
  2. Whether the petitioner’s withdrawal of the tender without a concluded contract justifies blacklisting under the terms of the tender.
  3. Whether the State can impose a new penalty condition retrospectively by blacklisting a tenderer without prior notice.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner withdrew the tender due to an unforeseen steep rise in prices, making execution uneconomical.
  • The petitioner was not informed that acceptance had occurred on 2nd December 1978, thus withdrawal was not a breach.
  • The blacklisting order is arbitrary and violates the petitioner’s fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • The petitioner contends that no concluded contract existed, so blacklisting on withdrawal is unsupported by the tender conditions.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The petitioner acted in an unbusinesslike manner by withdrawing the tender after extending its validity.
  • Blacklisting was justified as a disciplinary action to prevent delay in execution of government work.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266 Requirement of objective satisfaction and fair opportunity before blacklisting; blacklisting deprives a person of equality of opportunity in public contracts. Court applied this principle to hold that the authority’s satisfaction must be objective and not arbitrary before blacklisting a tenderer.
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; AIR 1979 SC 1628 Executive action must be informed by reason and free from arbitrariness under the rule of law. Court relied on this to emphasize that mere formal opportunity to be heard is insufficient if the order is arbitrary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by recognizing settled law that blacklisting requires an opportunity to be heard and the authority’s satisfaction must be objective and not arbitrary, referencing the Erusian Equipment case. The court further underscored the principle from Ramana Dayaram Shetty that executive action must be reasonable and non-arbitrary.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found the impugned blacklisting order arbitrary. The tender conditions expressly limited penalty for default to forfeiture of 10% earnest money, with no provision for blacklisting upon withdrawal. The petitioner was not obliged to extend the tender validity but did so at the respondents' request. The petitioner’s withdrawal before contract formation did not constitute breach justifying blacklisting. Imposing blacklisting retrospectively as a new penalty condition was impermissible. Therefore, the blacklisting order was unsupportable in law and violated the petitioner’s right to equal treatment.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed and the impugned blacklisting order dated 16th October 1979 is quashed.

The petitioner is entitled to costs including counsel's fee. The direct effect is restoration of the petitioner’s eligibility to tender for government contracts. The court did not establish any new precedent but reaffirmed the requirement that blacklisting must be based on objective satisfaction and cannot be arbitrary or impose retrospective penalties.

Show all summary ...

The interesting question which is involved in this writ petition is as to whether an order of blacklisting, which is passed after affording an opportunity of being heard, can be quashed on the ground that it is arbitrary.

2. The petitioner is the sole-proprietor of a concern known as M/s. Bhim Sain Surinder Kumar, which is registered contractor with respondents. The respondents invited tenders for the construction of Two Tier Rack system for Publication Godown, Department of Publication, Delhi Part II Block. The tenders were to remain open for acceptance for a period of 60 days from 19th Sept. 1978 the date of opening of tenders.

3. In response to the said invitation the petitioner also submitted his tender. On the opening of the tender it was found that the quotation of the petitioner was the lowest.

4. The tender of the petitioner, though lowest, was not accepted within the stipulated period of sixty days. The petitioner was asked to extend the validity of the tender. The petitioner accepted the request and extended the validity up to 19th December, 1978.

5. After the extension of the validity period, according to the petitioner, there was a very steep rise in the price of building material. It thus became uneconomical for the petitioner to keep his tender open. On 30th Nov. 1978, the petitioner withdrew the tender. According to the respondents, on 2nd December, 1978, the Executive Engineer, in charge of the work was informed by the Government that the tender of the petitioner had been accepted. This, however, was too late because by that time the tender had already been withdrawn by the petitioner.

6. It is not disputed that according to the terms of the tender if default was committed by the tenderer then the respondents were entitled to retain 10 per cent of the earnest money which is deposited. Apparently this 10 per cent represents the liquidated damages which the parties agreed to be leviable if the tenderer did not go through with the offer.

7. Along with the tender the petitioner, as required by the conditions of the tender had furnished the earnest money. After having withdrawn the offer on 30th November 1978 the concerned Executive Engineer refunded the earnest money to the petitioner after deducting the aforesaid 10 per cent. This was sometime in Dec. 1978.

8. The petitioner was then served with a memorandum dated 20th June, 1979. In this memorandum it was, inter alia, stated that the petitioner had backed out after having given the quotation and after extending the date of validity. This according to the respondents, amounted to the petitioner having behaved in an unbusiness like manner which had caused delay in the execution of the work. The petitioner was asked to show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him and why he should not be removed from the list of approved contractors by reason of the said withdrawal.

9. A detailed reply was sent by the petitioner to the aforesaid memorandum. It was explained in the reply that the petitioner was unable to execute the work because of the steep rise in the prices of steel and other material. It was for this reason that the petitioner withdrew his offer. It was further stated that the petitioner did not, know that his tender had been in fact accepted on 2nd December, 1978 as the said acceptance was never communicated to the petitioner.

10. On 16th October, 1979 the impugned order was passed. This blacklisting order passed against the petitioner reads as follows:—

“It has been decided not to entrust any work to M/s. Bhim Sain Surinder Kumar, 26/40, Shakti Nagar, Delhi 110007 enlisted as Class III (B and R) contractors vide Memo No. C/14-III (B and R) dated 24-5-1978 for a period of two years.

No tender should be issued to them from the date of issue of this Memorandum.”

11. The aforesaid order of blacklisting is sought to be challenged in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order which had been passed, is completely arbitrary and is violative of the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 14 of the Constitution. In reply to the writ petition it has been stated that the petitioner was blacklisted because he had acted in an unbusinesslike manner by having withdrawn the aforesaid tender.

12. It is now settled law that before a person can be blacklisted he is entitled to be heard. The leading authority on this point is the case of Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal. AIR 1975 SC 266. It was, inter alia, observed by the Supreme Court in that case as under (at p. 269) :—

“Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” It follows from the reading of the aforesaid passage that the satisfaction of the relevant authority has to be objective and not subjective. In that very case it has also been observed that.

“The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. A person who is on the approved list is unable to enter into advantageous relations with the Government because of the order of blacklisting. A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchase of materials has a legitimate interest of expectation. When the State acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality.”

It has no doubt been held that the State is free to choose any person with whom it wishes to enter into contract. No person has a fundamental right for insisting that the State must enter into a contract with him. Nevertheless a person has a right to claim equal treatment to enter into a contract.

13. The aforesaid right of equal treatment cannot be taken away by the State acting in an arbitrary manner. By arbitrarily blacklisting a contractor, the effect would be that he is deprived of an equal opportunity of being able to compete with other tenderers. It is true that the order of blacklisting has been passed after giving an opportunity to show cause to the petitioner. A mere formal compliance with the requirement of law of giving an opportunity cannot offer real justice to the petitioner if the order which is passed is arbitrary. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; (AIR 1979 SC 1628) that the action of the Executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. It was observed by the Supreme Court as under (at p. 1636 of AIR) :—

“It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege.”

It must follow, therefore, that if the decision which is arrived at by the Government is arbitrary, and the decision not being objective then as held by the Supreme Court in M/s. Erusian Equipment case (AIR 1975 SC 266) (supra), the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution would have the jurisdiction to strike down such an arbitrary order.

14. The next question which would arise for consideration is as to whether in the present case order which was passed was arbitrary or not. I have no manner of doubt that the impugned order was completely arbitrary. In the conditions contained in the invitation of tender it was specifically stated that in the event of default by the tenderers, the tenderers would be liable to forfeit 10 per cent of the security amount. No other liability could be fastened on the tenderers as per the terms and conditions thereof. The petitioner was not obliged to have extended the validity of his tender after 18th November, 1978. Had the petitioner been informed that in case he withdraws the offer he was liable to be blacklisted, the petitioner would not have extended the validity of the tender. He was not obliged to extend the validity. He extended the validity of the tender on a specific request having been made to him by the respondents. By withdrawing the tender the petitioner had not committed breach of any contract. A contractor being blacklisted on the ground of committing a breach of the contract is understandable. Where, however, no concluded contract had come into existence, like in the present case, a tenderer cannot be blacklisted if he is not informed previously that such a penalty can be imposed if the offer made by him is withdrawn. In other words a new condition, not previously known to a tenderers, cannot be inserted, in effect, with retrospective effect in the invitation of tender. The new condition being that if the tender is withdrawn it would result in the tenderer being blacklisted. The action of the respondents, therefore, in removing the petitioner's name from the enlisted Class III contractors with the respondents is clearly arbitrary and unsupportable in law.

15. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 18th October, 1979 is quashed. The petitioner would be entitled to costs. Counsel's fee Rupees 550/-.

Petition allowed.