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Precision Steel & Engineering Works & Another v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal (H.U.F) .

Delhi High Court
Dec 8, 1980
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges the order passed by the Rent Controller, Delhi, on January 23, 1980, which declined leave to defend to the petitioner, a tenant facing an eviction petition filed by the respondent. The eviction petition was filed under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the ground of bona fide personal need of the respondent. The respondent was inducted into the premises based on a licence-deed, initially executed on September 13, 1971, and renewed until September 13, 1974, after which no fresh licence was executed, though the petitioner continued occupation and rent payment. The respondent claimed personal need for the premises, having sought possession since May 1974 and filing an eviction petition in September 1979 after the petitioner refused to vacate. The Rent Controller, after considering affidavits and documents, declined leave to defend, leading to this revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the premises were let out solely for residential purposes or for combined residential and commercial purposes.
  2. Whether the respondent had given consent, either initially or subsequently, to the use of the premises for commercial purposes.
  3. Whether the respondent had alternative reasonable accommodation available to him, specifically at premises No. 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial use, or alternatively, the respondent consented to such use since the premises were used as the petitioner’s branch office from the inception of tenancy.
  • The respondent had alternative accommodation available at 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi, which raised a triable issue.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The premises were let out only for residential purposes as per the licence-deed and local authority rules.
  • The respondent did not consent to commercial use of the premises, and knowledge of the respondent’s father cannot be equated with consent of the respondent himself.
  • The alternative accommodation at 32, Anand Lok belonged to the respondent’s brother and mother, and the respondent occupied it only on sufferance, not as of right.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shri Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Shri Harpal Singh Sharma, 1980 (2) Rent Control Journal 630 Permissibility of considering affidavits and documents during summary proceedings under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Supported the court’s view that documents referred to in affidavits can be examined in summary proceedings to determine if leave to defend should be granted.
Smt. V.L Kashyap v. R.P Puri, I.L.R 1977 (1) Delhi 22 Requirement for clear and precise pleadings, especially in summary proceedings. Emphasized that knowledge alone does not constitute consent and pleadings must clearly establish consent of the owner-landlord.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the letting purpose of the premises. It noted that the licence-deed clause allowing office use was conditional upon local authority rules permitting such use. Since no such permission existed, as evidenced by a refusal of commercial use permission for a related portion of the building, the premises were held to be let only for residential purposes. The court rejected the petitioner’s contention that this raised a triable issue, emphasizing that Section 25-B of the Act allows the Rent Controller to consider affidavits and documents in summary proceedings to prevent protracted litigation for bona fide landlords.

Regarding the alleged consent to commercial use, the court found the petitioner’s pleadings unclear and insufficient. Knowledge of the respondent’s father could not be equated with consent by the respondent himself, and there was no pleading of subsequent consent. The court held that the Rent Controller rightly concluded that any consent was limited to the terms of the original licence-deed, and no jurisdictional error occurred.

On the question of alternative accommodation, the court accepted the Rent Controller’s finding that the premises at 32, Anand Lok belonged to the respondent’s brother and mother, not the respondent. The respondent’s occupancy was on sufferance, not as of right. The petitioner’s denial did not amount to a clear pleading to raise a triable issue. Thus, no interference was warranted.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE REVISION PETITION WITH COSTS. The decision upheld the Rent Controller’s order declining leave to defend against the eviction petition. The direct effect is that the petitioner tenant’s application to defend the eviction was refused, allowing the eviction proceedings to continue against them. No broader legal precedent was established beyond affirming the application of Section 25-B summary proceedings and the necessity of clear pleadings and local authority compliance in assessing letting purposes.

Show all summary ...

Prakash Narain, A.C.J (Oral):— This revision petition is directed against the order of Rent Controller, Delhi, passed on January 23, 1980, declining leave to defend to the petitioner, a tenant in the premises in question, against whom a petition for eviction had been filed by the respondent under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the Act.

2. It seems the respondent was inducted into the premises in question, being the front portion of a building at B-44, Greater Kailash, New Delhi on the basis of what is called a licence-deed.

3. Clause (6) of the said Licence Deed reads as under:

“The Licensees shall use the said premises for the residence of their Directors, partners and officers. The Licensees will, however, be free to use the said premises in part or in full also for office purpose provided the rules of the local authorities so permit and in such an event the Licensees shall pay to the Owners any increase in local taxes, etc. occasioned by Such change of use of the said premises from residence to office.”

4. It is said and is not disputed that the licence-deed was renewed from time to time right from the first agreement dated September 13, 1971. After September 13, 1974 no fresh licence deed was executed and no other document was executed between the parties. The petitioner, however, continued to be in occupation of the premises and continued to pay Rs. 2,000/- p.m by way of rent.

5. The respondent filed, as noticed earlier, a petition for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of personal bona fide need invoking clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. According to him his family comprised of himself, his wife and two children both grown up. He was originally working for M/s. Ferguson & Company, a firm of Chartered Accountants, at Bombay. He left that firm some time in 1972 and came to Delhi and had intention of settling down in Delhi at that point of time. In May, 1974 he wrote a letter to the petitioner asking them to vacate the house so that he could occupy it himself. The petitioner did not do so and kept on putting him off. The respondent in September, 1977 went away to Arabia to find employment and livelihood there. He came back in February, 1978 and it is at that point of time that he finally decided to settle down in Delhi. In consequences, he first approached the petitioner to vacate the house but when they did not do so, he was compelled to file a petition for eviction in September, 1979. As the petition was filed on the ground of bona fide personal need, a prayer was made that the same be tried as summary proceedings, as permitted by the Act. Notice having been served on the petitioner of this application, it applied for leave to defend, as postulated by Section 25-B of the Act. That was the matter which came up before the Rent Controller. After considering the affidavits and documents on the record, the Rent Controller declined to grant leave. Aggrieved, the petitioner has came up to this court contending that the Controller has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him and has committed illegality and material irregularity in not appreciating that the petitioner had raised contentions which gave rise to triable issues.

6. It is not necessary to dilate on the pleadings of the parties at any great length. Suffice it to say that two points really arose for consideration. First, whether the premises in question were let out merely as residential premises or were let out as residential-cum-commercial purposes. As an alternative, it was urged that even if the same are held not to have been let out originally for residential-cum-commercial purposes, the fact that the same have been used as a branch office of the petitioner from the very inception of the tenancy or from the time that the petitioner was inducted into the premises, the knowledge of the respondent should be construed as consent given by the respondent to the premises being used for residential-cum-commercial purposes. Secondly, it was urged that the respondent had alternative reasonable accommodation available to him inasmuch as he was living in premises bearing No. 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi of which he was the owner or co-owner and this matter did raise a triable issue.

7. The Controller had rejected both these contentions. On the question of 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi, the Controller had come to the couclusion that the said premises belonged to the brother of the respondent and, therefore, the premises were not available to the respondent as of right. On the first question, namelv, the letting purpose, the Controller came to the conclusion that the Master Plan drawn up under the Delhi Development Act showed the area to be residential area and so, it must be held that the purpose of letting was for residential purpose only. The petitioner challenges both these findings before me and says that the Controller has not applied his mind to the correct law or the facts of the case.

8. I will first take up the question of letting purpose. It is common case that after September, 1974 there was no fresh licence-deed. Therefore, it is doubtful whether clause 6 of the licence-deed can be invoked by the petitioner Assuming, however, that the letting purpose continued even after September, 1974 to be the same, as was mentioned in Clause 6 of the licence-deed, we have to read that clause carefully. On a plain reading of the clause which I have already set out earlier, it is apparent that the letting purpose was for residence only. Permission was, however, granted by the landlord to the petitioner to use the premises wholly or in part also for office purposes provided the rules of the local authorities concerned permitted it. If the rules did not permit it, there was no permission under the licence-deed. Neither any rule nor bye-law has been pleaded or brought to my notice or to the notice of the Rent Controller which would permit use of the premises in question for office purposes. Indeed, a document has been placed on record by the respondent which pertains to this very building, though its back portion. That document is Exhibit ‘R’. The back portion was let out to the Fertiliser Corporation of India. It had applied to the Delhi Development Authority for permission to use the back portion for commercial purpose. The permission was refused and the Fertiliser Corporation of India was advised to take office premises in permitted localities in the same area. Therefore, one has to come to the conclusion that the rules of the local authorities did not permit this building to be used for office purposes. Therefore, the letting purpose was only for residential purposes and the conditional permission granted to use the premises for office cannot be taken advantage of by the petitioner to plead that the original letting was for residential-cum-commercial purposes. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this very aspect raises a triable issue and, therefore, the Controller at this stage should not have gone into evidence and should have granted leave to the petitioner to defend the eviction petition. The argument cannot be accepted. Section 25-B of the Act was enacted by Parliament to give some respite to landlords bona fide needing premises for themselves and not compel them to undergo the trials and tribulations of a full-fledged trial to seek eviction. The legislative intent would be set at naught if documents filed along with an affidavit and referred to in the affidavit are not allowed to be seen and read during summary proceedings. Indeed, the documents filed along with an affidavit, as postulated by sub-section (5) of Section 25-B of the Act would become part of the affidavit. I do not see any infirmity in reference being made to those documents which are referred to in the affidavit in arriving at a correct conclusion in summary proceedings of the type postulated by Chapter IIIA of the Act. The same view has been expressed by another learned Judge in Shri Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Shri Harpal Singh Sharma, 1980 (2) Rent Control Journal 630. I, therefore, hold that there was absolutely no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the Controller on the question of what was the letting purpose.

9. I now come to the alternative submission that there was consent of the respondent inasmuch as the premises in question have been used as office premises of the petitioner from the very inception. In order to appreciate this, first of all, one has to see what the pleadings are. I need not refer to the pleadings in detail. Suffice it to say that the pleadings of the petitioner are not as clear-cut and precise as they should be. What is said is that to the knowledge of Shri Prem Deva, the father of the respondent, the premises in question have been used as the Delhi office of the petitioner from the very inception. That pleadings should be clear-cut and precise, particularly in summary proceedings, can hardly be over-emphasised. One need only refer to Smt. V.L Kashyap v. R.P Puri, I.L.R 1977 (1) Delhi 22. The pleadings really are that it was within the knowledge of Mr. Prem Deva that the premises in question have been used as office premises also by the petitioner. Knowledge cannot be equated to consent. Furthermore, consent has to be of the owner-landlord and not that of his father or even an attorney. It is interesting to note that the petitioner-company's head office is in Faridabad which is very near to Delhi. The Delhi Office is presumably, a liasion office. A Director or an officer or a partner of the petitioner can live in the premises in question. That he mentions on the letter-heads that these premises are the Delhi office of the petitioner does not mean that the premises are actually being used for commercial purposes. It may be a postal address or a contact address. However, all these are matters which need not be commented upon. Suffice it to say that in terms of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 25-B of the Act the precise pleadings had to be that there was either initial consent or subsequent consent of the owner-landlord to the use of the premises as office premises also. There is no pleading of subsequent consent. As fay as initial consent is concerned, it dates back to the time of the original licence grasnted in September, 1971. That grant was in writing. The use to which the premises could be put is to be found in clause 6 of the licence-deed. It is interesting to note that in the affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 25-B of the Act, petitioner No. 1 has conveniently omitted some portions of Clause 6 of the licence-deed. Therefore, when the Rent Controllec came to the conclusion that the consent, if at all, was in terms of Clause 6 of the licence-deed, one cannot say he acted outside his jurisdiction or with such illegality or irregularity that this court should interfere with the order sought to be revised.

10. I now come to the question of the alternative accommodation. Th only alternate accommodation pleaded before me was 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi. The Rent Controller has rightly come to the conclusion that the premises belonged not to the respondent but to his brother. The documents on record show that the lease-deed is in the name of the mother and brother of the respondent. That he is living there is not disputed. The question is whether he is living there as of right. The respondent in his affidavit says that he is living on sufferance. Merely denying that contention does not an ount to a clear-cut pleading in terms of the law laid down by this court so as to raise a triable issue. I, therefore, find nothing in the case which calls for interference. The revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 500/-.

11. Revision dismissed.