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Jecronimo Francisco Sacrafamilla Eric D'Souza v. Florence Martha D'Souza Nee Fernandes .
Factual and Procedural Background
The parties, both Roman Catholics, were married on 20 February 1971 in New Delhi. After a short residence together they lived in the petitioner’s house in Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi. According to the petitioner, the marriage was never consummated because the respondent had a "mental blockade": she allegedly said she would suffer pain if intercourse occurred and refused sexual intercourse despite attempts by the petitioner and persuasion by the respondent’s mother and a medical consultation. The respondent left the matrimonial home in September 1973 to live with her mother. In May 1974 the respondent applied to Pope Paul VI for a dispensation dissolving the marriage on the ground of non-consummation; the Church investigated and dissolved the marriage, and the petitioner received communication of that dissolution from the Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Delhi in March 1975.
The petitioner filed a civil petition under Sections 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 seeking a decree of nullity (the petition was filed in March 1978). The District Judge heard the petition ex parte because the respondent did not appear; the petitioner examined only himself. The Additional District Judge granted a decree nisi annulling (nullifying) the marriage and referred the matter to the High Court under Section 20 of the Act for confirmation of the decree of nullity. The High Court proceedings were also ex parte; the petitioner’s counsel sought confirmation of the decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether frigidity or aversion to sexual intercourse by a wife (including mental or psychological causes) can be regarded as "impotency" for the purposes of clause (1) of Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869.
- Whether, on the evidence, impotency (if it can include frigidity/aversion) existed both at the time of the marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit/petition as required by clause (1) of Section 19.
- Whether the decree of nullity granted by the Additional District Judge should be confirmed by the High Court on the record before it.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted that the marriage was never consummated because of the respondent’s mental blockade, fear of pain on intercourse, and admitted frigidity and lack of love for the petitioner.
- He contended that such frigidity or conscious opposition to sexual intercourse should be regarded as impotency under clause (1) of Section 19 (i.e., incapacity to consummate the marriage whether due to physical or mental/psychological reasons).
- The petitioner’s counsel relied on several precedents to support the proposition that inability under normal conditions to consummate (including for psychological reasons) amounts to impotency, and argued that persistent refusal to consummate could lead to a presumption of impotency.
- In the District Court the petitioner gave ex parte oral evidence (he was the only witness) recounting the attempts to persuade the respondent, consultation with a doctor, the respondent’s departure in September 1973 and her application to the Church in May 1974.
Respondent's Arguments
The respondent did not appear and the opinion contains no statements of the respondent’s legal arguments or a defence presented in court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Birendra Kumar v. Hemlata Biswas, ILR 48 Cal 283 : (AIR 1921 Cal 459) | Authority tending to support that incapacity to consummate under normal conditions (including mental/psychological causes) may constitute impotency. | The court noted this decision as one of several that "do tend to support" the petitioner’s contention, but did not decide the broader legal question on the record before it. |
| Kishore Sahu v. Mrs. Snehprabha Sahu, AIR 1943 Nag 185 (SB) | Same general principle: incapacity (physical or mental) to consummate can be treated as impotency in appropriate circumstances. | Referred to as supportive authority; the High Court observed there is some authority for the contention but refrained from finally determining the point. |
| Shantabai v. Tarachand, AIR 1966 Madh Pra 8 | Same general principle concerning incapacity to consummate. | Cited by counsel and noted by the court as tending to support the contention; court did not resolve the issue on the present facts. |
| Hames Gray Wilson v. Mrs. Wilson, AIR 1931 Lah 245 | Supportive precedent indicating mental or psychological causes can underlie inability to consummate. | Placed alongside other authorities that tend to support the proposition; the court stated the contention still required further examination. |
| Digvijay Singh v. Pratap Kumari, AIR 1970 SC 137 | High Court/Supreme Court authority referred to as relevant to the general contention about impotency and consummation. | Noted by the court as part of the body of authority that "do tend to support" the contention, but the court did not pronounce finally on the legal point in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court undertook a two-part analysis.
- Legal question on definition of "impotency": The court identified the primary legal question as whether frigidity or aversion to sexual intercourse in a wife can be regarded as impotency under clause (1) of Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act (which requires that the respondent be impotent at the time of marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit). The petitioner’s counsel argued that incapacity to consummate — whether from physical defects or mental/psychological reasons — should count as impotency, and relied on several precedents. The court acknowledged that there is some authority to support that contention but declined to decide the broader legal point at that stage, stating the contention "requires further examination."
- Application of statutory requirement to the evidence: The court then applied the statutory requirement that impotency must exist both at the time of marriage and at the time of institution of the petition. It found a critical evidential gap: the petitioner’s own account established that the respondent left the matrimonial home in September 1973 and sought Church dissolution in May 1974; the petitioner waited until March 1978 to present his civil petition and gave no evidence showing that the alleged impotence or incapacity persisted up to the date of institution of the suit. Because clause (1) of Section 19 requires existence of impotency at both times, the court concluded that, on the record before it, it could not confirm the decree of nullity.
- Other observations: The court observed that ecclesiastical dissolution (the Church's grant of dissolution) does not determine civil status under the civil law; ecclesiastical proceedings do not remove the civil law requirement. The court also noted factual suggestions at the Bar that the respondent had migrated and remarried abroad, and commented on perceived inadequacies of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (inviting legislative reconsideration), but these observations did not alter the legal conclusion about the insufficiency of evidence.
- Remedy directed: Given the evidential lacuna, the court determined that the appropriate course was to permit the petitioner to lead further evidence to establish whether the statutory requirement (impotency at the time of institution) could be satisfied. Accordingly, the court set aside the decree of nullity and remanded the matter for further trial, permitting additional evidence to be led and directing the petitioner to appear before the District and Sessions Judge on 1 November 1979 for further directions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court set aside the decree of nullity granted by the Additional District Judge and remanded the case to the District Judge, Delhi, for further trial, allowing the petitioner to lead additional evidence. The petitioner was directed to appear before the District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, on 1 November 1979 for further directions.
Implications:
- The immediate practical effect is that the decree of nullity previously granted is not confirmed and the civil status of the parties remains unresolved pending further evidence and decision in the District Court; the petitioner remains, in civil law, married until a civil decree of nullity or divorce is finally granted.
- The court did not finally decide the broader legal question whether frigidity or aversion to sexual intercourse constitutes "impotency" under clause (1) of Section 19; it acknowledged existing authorities tending to support that proposition but left the question open for further examination on adequate evidence. Thus, no new binding precedent on that specific legal issue was settled by this opinion.
- The court emphasized that ecclesiastical dissolution does not substitute for civil relief; civil requirements under the Indian Divorce Act must be satisfied independently of Church proceedings.
- The court also signalled concerns about the adequacy of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 in contemporary circumstances and invited legislative reconsideration, although this is an obiter observation and not a legal holding altering the statutory scheme.
Order: Decree of nullity set aside; matter remanded for further trial and additional evidence; petitioner to appear on 1 November 1979. "Order accordingly."
PRAKASH NARAIN, J.:— The petitioner and the respondent are Christians professing the Roman Catholic Faith. They were married on February 20, 1971 in New Delhi. After marriage they resided together for a week in Delhi and then went to Goa to the house of the petitioner's parents. In Goa they stayed for about a month and then returned to Delhi. The petitioner had a house in old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi and the parties lived there.
2. According to the petitioner the marriage was never consummated on account of a mental blockade which the respondent had. She allegedly told the petitioner that she cannot permit the petitioner to have sexual intercourse with her as she would suffer pain and was afraid of that. According to the petitioner he tried his best to persuade the respondent to have normal conjugal relations but failed in his attempts. The attitude of the respondent towards leading a normal married life was then allegedly discussed by the parties with the respondent's mother. She is also stated to have tried to persuade her daughter to lead a normal life and consummate the marriage but in vain. The petitioner states that respondent's mother even took the respondent to consult a doctor but the respondent's attitude did not change. In consequence, differences arose between the parties leading to the respondent finally leaving the matrimonial home in September 1973 to live with her mother at Pusa Road, New Delhi. The petitioner further states that in May 1974 the respondent addressed a letter to His Holiness Pope Paul VI for grant of a dispensation dissolving the marriage on the ground of non-consummation. The Church ordered an investigation on the representation moved by the respondent. As a result of that investigation the Church granted the prayer of the respondent and the marriage was dissolved. A communication to this effect was received by the petitioner from the Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Delhi in March 1975.
3. The petitioner contends that on account of the non-consummation of marriage due to the respondent's attitude and due to her admission that she did not want to have sexual intercourse with the petitioner as she had fear of pain as also because she had no love for him the respondent should be held to be impotent qua the petitioner. The petitioner also relies on an admission by the respondent that the marriage could not be consummated on account of her frigidity. Thus the petitioner filed a petition under Sections 18 and 19 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 for a decree of dissolution of marriage. This petition was filed in March, 1978.
4. In the District Judge's court the petition was heard ex parte as the respondent did not put in appearance despite service. In support of the contentions in the petition the petitioner only examined himself as a witness. He did not produce any other evidence. He deposed that he was married according to the Christian rites in New Delhi on February 20, 1971. The marriage was never consummated. Initially the respondent expressed a fear that she will have pain on account of sexual intercourse. She would not even allow the petitioner to touch her. She had a mental blockade against sexual intercourse. The matter was discussed by the respondent with her mother in the petitioner's presence. Even the mother's persuasion had no effect. A doctor was consulted by the respondent along with her mother but there was no change. The respondent remained frigid and cold and finally left the matrimonial home in September 1973. She refused to come back and discharge her matrimonial obligations. The Church dissolved the marriage on the ground of non-consummation after due investigation. The respondent had expressed herself to the effect that she did not love the petitioner and did not want to have sex with him. She had married the petitioner in deference to the wishes of her mother and in fact did not want to marry him.
5. On the basis of the ex parte evidence, the Additional District Judge, Delhi granted a decree nisi annulling the marriage and referred the matter to this court under section 20 of the aforesaid act for confirmation of the decree of nullity. That is how the matter has come up before us.
6. In this court also the respondent is being proceeded against ex parte as she had failed to put in appearance despite service. Mr. Rajiv Sawhney appearing for the petitioner urges that in the circumstances of the case the petitioner is entitled to confirmation of the decree of nullity granted by the Additional District Judge.
7. Section 18 of the said Act lays down that any husband or wife may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that his or her marriage may be declared null and void. Section 19 of the Act sets out the only grounds on which a marriage covered by the Act can be declared null and void. The petitioner relies on and has invoked the provisions of clause (1) of section 19. This clause postulates a decree of nullity of marriage if the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit.
8. The first question which arises for consideration is whether frigidity or aversion to sexual intercourse in a wife can be regarded as impotency in the female. The matter is not free from difficulty. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made commendable research and has submitted that frigidity or conscious opposition as pleaded on the part of the wife should be regarded as a case of impotency. He has relied on several precedents in support of the contention that incapacity of a spouse under normal conditions to consummate the marriage, whether on account of physical defects in the sex organs or due to mental or psychological reasons, would be impotency in such spouse. The learned counsel also contends that refusal to consummate the marriage and if the refusal continues or a period of time would lead to the presumption of impotency unless reasonable or plausible excuse can be given for such refusal. At this stage we would not like to comment upon either of these contentions thou there is some authority to support it. In particular the decisions reported as Birendra Kumar v. Hemlata Biswas, ILR 48 Cal 283 : (AIR 1921 Cal 459). Kishore Sahu v. Mrs. Snehprabha Sahu, AIR 1943 Nag 185 (SB), Shantabai v. Tarachand, AIR 1966 Madh Pra 8, Hames Gray Wilson v. Mrs. Wilson. AIR 1931 Lah 245 and Digviiay Singh v. Pratap Kumari, AIR 1970 SC 137, do tend to support the contention of the petitioner's counsel that given normal conditions if consummation of marriage is a practical impossibility, impotency must be presumed The contention, however, requires further examination.
9. Assuming, however, that the contention is to be accepted and impotency is held to exist at the time of the marriage and for sometime thereafter, there is complete lack of evidence about the same state of affairs continuing at the time of the institution of the petition/suit under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act. On the petitioner's own showing the respondent left the matrimonial home in September 1973. She even moved the Church in May 1974 for dissolution of her marriage. The petitioner in his testimony in court is completely silent about the state of affairs vis-a-vis the requirement of cl.(1) of section 19 at the time of institution of the suit/petition. As the impotency must exist not only at the time of the marriage but also at the time of the institution of the suit/petition, it is not possible to grant the petitioner any relief in the absence of evidence. There as obviously a lacuna. Perhaps this lacuna was on account of the subsequent development of the Church dissolving the marriage but nevertheless it is there. The petitioner has moved the District Court three years after a communication from the Archdiocese of Delhi informing him about the dissolution of the marriage by the Church. Perhaps he was under an impression that since the Church had dissolved the marriage on the ground of non-consummation nothing further was requited to be done by him. The ecclesiastical law under which the marriage was dissolved by the Church cannot, however, affect or govern the Civil Law. Therefore, we are unable, on the record as it stands, to confirm the decree of nullity as granted by the Additional District judge.
10. It was stated at the Bar that the respondent has since migrated from India and is probably settled in Australia and has remarried. The petitioner, an Indian citizen, finds himself in a strange position and predicament. Despite the dissolution of marriage granted by the Church in the eyes of the Civil Law he continues to be a married man. He cannot get married till his first marriage is dissolved or he is granted a divorce. The inadequacy of the provisions of the Act are patent. Perhaps when this Act was passed by the legislature in 1869 it was a progressive law. Today one can almost say that it is an archaic law requiring serious reconsideration by Parliament to bring it in line with other laws governing marriages, like the Hindu Marriage Act. We can only express the hope that the legislature would take note of this aspect and amend the law so as to make citizens of India, irrespective of the faith the profess, to lead a happy, full and useful life. Provisions like Section 17A permitting State intervention by an officer appointed by the Government who could exercise the same powers and duties as exercisable in England by the King's Proctor can hardly be regarded as an appropriate provision in a Secular Democratic Republic. Be that as it may, the circumstances of the case warrant that the petitioner should be allowed to lead further evidence to bring his case if possible within the ambit of Clause (1) of Section 19 of the Act. This is necessary not only for the petitioner's well-being but in the interest of justice and the freedom guaranteed to eve Indian citizen to lead a life in which can expect fulfilment.
11. We, accordingly, set aside the decree of nullity granted by the Additional District judge and remand the case to the District Judge, Delhi, for further trial by allowing the petitioner to lead additional evidence. After the petitioner has led the additional evidence the case be decided in accordance with law afresh. The petitioner to appear before the District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, on November 1, 1979 for further directions.
Order accordingly.
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