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Shri Inder Mohan Bhardwaj Petitioner v. Union Of India And Others S

Delhi High Court
Sep 4, 1979
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner seeks a writ of quo warranto and a declaration that respondent No. 3, Shri H.N. Bahuguna (Finance Minister in the Government of India), has no right under the Constitution of India to continue as a member of the Council of Ministers headed by respondent No. 2, Choudhary Charan Singh (Prime Minister of India).

The challenge was motivated by publication in the Sunday Standard (City Edition, New Delhi) of 12 August 1979 of two letters: one said to be written by respondent No. 2 to Shri Morarji Desai (dated in the opinion as 2-4-1976 in one place and referenced elsewhere as 2-4-1978) and one by respondent No. 3 to Shri Morarji Desai dated 10-7-1978. The letter(s) published included allegations by respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 3 was “in close touch with the Communist Party of India” and was “regarded in some circles as an agent KGB”. Respondent No. 3 replied (in the 10-7-1978 letter) denying and describing these allegations as “sad and sordid reading” and “worse than self condemnatory.”

The petition advances that the allegations, if accepted, render respondent No. 3 constitutionally unfit to be and continue as a Minister (invoking Article 102(1)(d) — acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State). The petition proceeded on the assumption that the letters were written as published. The Court was asked to determine whether those letters made respondent No. 3 ineligible to remain a member of the Council of Ministers.

Procedurally: the petition was amended to add a further point (para 28-A) concerning a post-resignation situation: respondents 2 and his Council tendered resignation on 20-8-1979 which the President accepted on 22-8-1979, but the Prime Minister and his colleagues were requested to continue in office pending arrangements. The petitioner contends that after acceptance of resignation a fresh oath under Article 75(4) was necessary for continued functioning. The Court found no substance in the primary contention based on the published letters and would have dismissed the petition if it had remained unamended, but it issued a limited show cause notice on the amended point (para 28-A) to respondents 1 and 3 only, fixing 19 September 1979 for response.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the allegations published in the letters (that respondent No. 3 had allegiance/adherence to a foreign State or was an agent of a foreign intelligence service) rendered respondent No. 3 constitutionally ineligible to be, or to continue as, a Minister — specifically under Article 102(1)(d).
  2. Whether a mere allegation, including one made by a high official such as the Prime Minister or Home Minister, suffices to disqualify a person under Article 102(1)(d) or whether adjudication in the manner required by the Constitution (Article 103 and the Election Commission/Presidential reference) is necessary before disqualification can be declared.
  3. Whether, after the President accepted the resignation of the Council of Ministers and requested them to continue in office until other arrangements were made, a Minister (respondent No. 3) must take a fresh oath under Article 75(4) to continue functioning.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (summarised from counsel Mr. Lekhi)

  • The published letter by respondent No. 2 alleges that respondent No. 3 was in close touch with the Communist Party of India and was regarded as an agent of the KGB; as Home Minister, respondent No. 2 must have acted on concrete information and thus the allegation should be treated as proved or sufficient to disqualify respondent No. 3.
  • Because Article 102(1)(d) disqualifies anyone "under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State" from being a member of Parliament, the same disqualification should logically apply to a Minister; therefore respondent No. 3 should be declared ineligible to be a Minister.
  • The petitioner relied on the Ministerial oath in the Third Schedule (oath of secrecy) to argue that an agent of a foreign intelligence agency could not, by the nature of the role, be fit to be a Minister.
  • On the post-resignation point (as to para 28-A): once the Council's resignation was accepted by the President and they were only requested to continue until arrangements were made, a fresh oath under Article 75(4) was required for any continued exercise of ministerial office.

Respondents' Positions (as reflected in the opinion)

  • Respondent No. 3 in his letter denied the allegations strongly, calling them malicious and “worse than self condemnatory.” The opinion records a clear denial by respondent No. 3 of the allegation of KGB connection.
  • The Court also records that respondents did not deny having written the letters as published; the parties take contradictory stands as between respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 3, showing that one or both positions are contested.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 663 at 716 That courts do not provide a judicial remedy for every political mischief; certain questions are political and not justiciable, and relief may appropriately be sought through the electorate or political processes rather than the courts. The Court invoked this principle to underline that some matters (political controversies of public interest) may be outside judicial remit and that the petitioner’s thrust — though of political interest — was not necessarily within the ambit of judicial relief. The citation supported the Court’s view that allegation by public or political figures does not automatically convert a political controversy into a judicially-adjudicable disqualification without proper legal process.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the matter by reference to the Constitution's provisions on ministerial appointment and parliamentary disqualification and the procedure to determine such disqualifications:

  1. The Court began with Articles 74 and 75, noting that the Constitution prescribes no express qualifications for appointment as a Minister other than the requirement in Article 75(5) that a minister must be a member of either House of Parliament within six months — a provision not engaged here.
  2. Attention focused on Article 102(1), especially sub-clause (d) (that a person is disqualified if he "is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State"). The petitioner relied solely on Article 102(1)(d); no other disqualifications were invoked.
  3. The Court accepted the logical proposition that a person who is disqualified from being a Member of Parliament would typically be ineligible to be a Minister as well, but emphasised that disqualification under Article 102 requires more than mere allegation.
  4. The Court emphasised the constitutional procedure in Article 103: if a question arises whether a member has become subject to any disqualification under Article 102(1), it must be referred to the President, whose decision follows the opinion of the Election Commission and is final. Accordingly, an adjudicative process is required before disqualification can be declared, and a mere allegation — however serious — does not suffice.
  5. Because respondent No. 3 had explicitly denied the allegation and because the only material relied upon was a letter containing allegations (and not any adjudicative finding), the Court held it could not, in proceedings for quo warranto and on the present record, treat the allegation as equivalent to a finding that respondent No. 3 had incurred the disqualification under Article 102(1)(d).
  6. The Court rejected the argument that an allegation by a high official (for instance, a Prime Minister or Home Minister) should be treated as sufficient proof to disqualify a person, observing that doing so would allow political rivals to use such allegations as a tool to disqualify opponents. The Court found no logic in limiting admissible allegations only to certain office-holders and stressed that the rule of law requires proof according to law before acting on such allegations.
  7. The Court considered but found the Official Secrets Act definition of "foreign agent" (Section 4(2)(b)) irrelevant to the constitutional question, because that definition is relevant in prosecutorial contexts under Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act and would itself require adjudication by a court of law.
  8. Relying on the political-question principle (as illustrated by Baker v. Carr) and on the framers’ recognition of political restraint (citing Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly Debates), the Court indicated that many concerns raised were of political rather than judicial character and that appropriate redress may lie in the political domain.
  9. On balance, the Court found no substance in the primary contention that respondent No. 3’s published allegations rendered him constitutionally ineligible; it held that mere allegation cannot be accepted without adjudication.
  10. Because the petition had been amended to raise a further point (para 28-A) concerning the effect of the President having accepted the resignation and the requirement, if any, of a fresh oath under Article 75(4), the Court issued a limited show cause notice on that specific point to respondents 1 and 3 only (not to respondent No. 2), fixing 19 September 1979 for response. The Court explained that impleading respondent No. 2 had been necessary only for the original point, which had been rejected.

Holding and Implications

Core ruling: The Court found no substance in the petitioner's primary contention that the published allegations against respondent No. 3 are sufficient to render him constitutionally disqualified under Article 102(1)(d). The Court declined to treat the allegations as proved in these proceedings and emphasised that adjudication under the Constitution (Article 103 procedure) or by a competent court/authority is required before a disqualification under Article 102 can be declared.

As to the amended point (para 28-A) concerning the acceptance of the resignation and the necessity (or otherwise) of a fresh oath under Article 75(4) for continued functioning, the Court did not finally decide the issue on the present record but issued a limited show cause notice to respondents 1 and 3 (hearing fixed for 19 September 1979). Notice to respondent No. 2 was considered unnecessary on that limited point.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the petitioner’s principal contention (that respondent No. 3 is disqualified by reason of alleged allegiance or adherence to a foreign State based on the published letters) has been rejected on the merits for want of proof and appropriate adjudicative process; the petition would have been dismissed in its original form.
  • The matter was not finally adjudicated on the supplementary point (para 28-A), and further proceedings were ordered limited to that issue.
  • The Court did not lay down any new legal precedent on the substantive meaning of Article 102(1)(d); rather, it reaffirmed the constitutional requirement of adjudication (Article 103) and the rule-of-law principle that allegations, however serious, require proof according to law before they result in disqualification. The opinion therefore produced no broad new precedent beyond applying these established principles to the facts before it.
R.S    Ordered accordingly.
Show all summary ...

Rajinder Sachar, J.:— By this petition the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of quo warranto and seeks a declaration that respondent No. 3, Shri H.N Bahuguna, the Finance Minister in the Government of India, has no right under the Constitution of India to continue as a member of the Council or Ministers headed by respondent No. 2, Choudhary Charan Singh, the Prime Minister of India.

2. The challenge to the appointment of respondent No. 3 is apparently inspired by the publication in the issue of 12th August, 1979, of Sunday Standard, City Edition, New Delhi, a Letter written by respondent No. 2 on 2-4-1976 to Shri Morarji Desai, the then Prime Minister of India and the letter written by respondent No. 3 to Shri Morarji Desai on 10-7-1978. It is mentioned in the petition that respondents 2 and 3 were at the relevant times in April-July, 1978 members of the Council of Ministers in Desai Cabinet and were holding the portfolios of Home and Petroleum respectively. The letter of 2-4-78 written by respondent No. 2 to Shri Morarji Desai starts by saying that the same was being written to bring to the notice of the Prime Minister the doings or the activities of a colleague which cannot but bring the government to disrepute and lead to the ruination of the Janta Party. The letter mentions a number of incidents but the present petition is the portion to and Mr. Lekhi for the petitioner also restricted himself to the portion of the letter where into reads ‘respondent No. 3 is in close touch with the Communist Party of India and is its great support’. The letter goes on to say that through it he has tried to establish contacts with the USSR. In fact he is regarded in some circles as an agent KGB'. This letter was shown to respondent No. 3 by Shri Moraji Desai with a view to giving him an opportunity of having his say with regards to the contents thereof, and that is how the letter of 10-7-78 was written by him. Respondent No. 2 as a master-piece in unsubstantiated invectives and self-assumed of this writ petition, respondent No. 3 described this as sad and sordid reading and describes the plea that he was a friend or supporter of C.P.I and through it he tried to establish direct contacts with USSR was worse than self condemnatory. The letter further says ‘what is worse is that the Home Minister Choudhary Charan Singh little realising the value of office he holds makes a wild charge of my so-called connection with KGB as claimed by some unidentified sources. If the Home Minister of a country makes this charge without adequate or possible proof is only needs a careful thought whether such a position of trust or charge is in the safe hand. In the absence of any evidence the charges are obviously malicious the Home Minister must be called upon either to prove the charges or withdraw them unconditionally.’ The petition alleges that KGB mentioned in the letter of respondent No. 2 is the political intelligence agency of USSR recruiting local agents who in turn further the political aims and objects of the USSR even if its aims go contrary to the best interests of the country of which the agent is a citizen. The petition alleges that respondent No. 2 as the then Home Minister in the Union of Cabinet must be presumed to have acted not on mere hearsay but must have before him concrete information before he levelled such serious allegations against his own cabinet colleague. It is on the basis of these allegations that it is averred in the petition that the charges of foreign connection made in the letter of April 2, 1978, by Choudhary Charan Singh not withstanding the reply by Shri Bahuguna on July 10, 1978, wholly and totally disqualifies and renders respondent No. 3 constitutionally unfit to be and continue in the office as a Minister in any cabinet as long as the said charges hold the field. It is also mentioned in the position that there is no denial by respondent No. 2 or respondent No. 3 of having written the letters as have been published in the Sunday Standard dated 12-8-1979. For the present purpose we will proceed on the assumption that these letters were in fact written. The question however still remains whether these letters result in making respondent No. 3 ineligible to remain a member of the Council of Ministers.

3. Article 74 of the Constitution provides for a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President. Article 75(1) provides for the appointment of Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister. No qualification as such is prescribed in the Constitution to be appointed to Minister. There is of course a bar under Article 75(5) inasmuch as that a Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of either House of Parliament shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister. This clause obviously is not applicable because respondent No. 2 was a member of Lok Sabha before it was dissolved on 22-8-1979. Article 102(1) provides for disqualifications for being chosen as and for being a member of either house of Parliament and mentions various eventualities. Sub-clause (d) of Clause (1) of the Article contemplates an eventuality if he is not a citizen of India or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State or is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. (emphasis supplied). Clause (c) provides that if he is so disqualified by or under any law by Parliament. The said disqualification has been provided in the Representation of People Act and it is not Mr. Lekhi's case that respondent No. 2 is disqualified under any provision of the said Act. the sole argument of Mr. Lekhi on which he seeks a declaration about the Constitutional ineligibility of respondent No. 2 to remain a Minister is on the ground of the alleged disqualification mentioned in Article 102(1)(d) i.e under any acknowledge of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. Mr. Lekhi contends that if a person cannot be a member of the Parliament if he is under any acknowledgement of allegience or adherence to a foreign State, it inevitably follows that such a person is also disqualified to be a Minister. Though Article 102 does not mention disqualification for being a minister, we are prepared to accept that a person will be ineligible for being a Minister if he suffers from any of the disqualifications as mentioned in Article 102. This is both logical and understandable. Because if there is any constitutional bar on a person being a member of either House of Parliament it surely cannot be accepted that a Minister who holds a more responsible position should be free from fetters of the disqualifications laid down in the Constitution. The broad argument that if a person is disqualified under Article 102(1)(d) to be a member he will not in any way advance the case of the petitioner. No suggestion is given that respondent No. 3 suffers from any of the disqualification mentioned in sub-clause (a), (b), (c) and (e) of clause 1 of Article 102. Only clause (d) is invoked. Now admittedly respondent No. 3 is a citizen of India and has not acquired the citizenship of foreign State. This was not disputed by Mr. Lekhi. He stressed solely the plea that respondent No. 3 must be held to be disqualified because of being under acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. Mr. Lekhi has referred to the oath of secrecy that a minister has to take in terms of third schedule to the Constitution by which he swears that he will not directly on indirectly communicated or reveal to any person or persons any matters which shall be brought under his consideration or shall become known to him as a minister for the Union except as may be required for the due discharge of his duties as a minister. The purpose of referring to the oath was in support of his argument that if a person was an agent of an intelligent agency of a foreign government he would by its very nature be violating the oath of secrecy and cannot obviously remain a member of the Council of Ministers. That a spy cannot be qualified to be a minister is a self evident proposition with which no one can have even a moments difference. The difficulty comes when Mr. Lekhi asks us to accept the allegation made in the letter of respondent No. 2 as being equivalent to a finding that respondent No. 3 has become disqualified under Article 102(1)(d) as he is under acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. This we find impossible to do on the present State of the record. Respondent No. 3 has clearly denied this allegation and has castigated it as a wild charge and as malicious. We are not called upon nor are we competent in these proceedings of quo warranto to determine the veracity or otherwise of the respective allegations made in these two letters of respondents 2 & 3. Mr. Lekhi made much of the fact that in view of the completely contradictory stand taken by respondents 2 and 3 it is apparent that one of them is not telling the truth. This argument of Mr. Lekhi itself shows that weakness in his stand that respondent No. 3 should be held to be constitutionally disqualified to be a minister, even when all that counsel can say in support of such an allegation is the letter written by respondent No. 2. Mr. Lekhi emphasises that the allegation that respondent No. 2 being a KGB agent was made by no less a person than the then Home Minister of the country and the present Prime Minister and urges that this is a proof of its correctness. We accept that the allegation made in the letter of respondent No. 2 is a serious one. We also accept that the allegation has come from a very responsible quarter. But we must at the same time also note that this allegation has been denied and repudiated with vehmence by respondent No. 2, an equally responsible personage. Mr. Lekhi sought to contend that the acknowledgement of adherence to a foreign State does not necessarily have to come from the person concerned, but may even be made by a third person and that would be enough to disqualify a person against whom this acknowledgement is made. He was however cautious enough to realise the gravity of the implication of this interpretation because then any political rival may acknowledgement seek to disqualify him under Article 102(1)(d). That is why Mr. Lekhi sought to restrict that this acknowledgement should be by an incumbent Prime Minister, Home Minister for Finance Minister. We cannot of course appreciate the logic of restricting it only to these personages. Mr. Lekhi suggested that he is restricting it because these persons would know about the true facts but that may equally would not extend this benefit to them. This argument itself is illogical and leads to an anomalous situation. It amounts to say that the allegation should be accepted as proved without adjudication. However high or responsible may be the source of allegation it is still an allegation. This country if governed by the rule of law which necessarily requires that no allegation made by howsoever high an authority can be accepted and acted upon in a court of law unless the same has been proved in accordance with law and procedure laid down therein.

That a mere allegation of kinds mentioned in Article 102 of the Constitution does not entail this disqualification is clear from Article 103 which requires that if any question arises as to whether a member of either house of Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of Article 102 the question shall be referred for the decision of the President and his decision shall be final, and that before giving any decision on any such question, the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion. It is also not disputed by Mr. Lekhi that if the House of People has not been dissolved and an allegation has been made against respondent No. 3 within the meaning of clause (d) of sub-clause (1) of Article 102 he could not have been disqualified for remaining a member of the Parliament unless an enquiry was first held and decision given in terms of Article 103 of the Constitution. All that he could say was that the provisions of Article 103 were not available at the present time. But that does not mean that a mere allegation must be accepted as proved. The requirement of adjudication before disqualifying a person cannot be whittled down. Mr. Lekhi referred to the definition of foreign Agent in Section 4(2) (b) of the Official Secrets Act which includes any person …. In respect of whom it appears that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting him of having been employed by a foreign power. We do not see its relevancy to the present case because that definition is relevant when a person is proceeded against in a court of law under Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act and that necessarily would require adjudication by a court of law. It is apparent therefore that unless there is a finding by a court of law or any other constituted authority that a person has incurred the disqualification under Article 102(1)(d) the argument cannot be accepted that respondent No. 2 must be held to be disqualified on the sole ground that allegation has been made by a very high personage like the then Home Minister and the Prime Minister of the country. It is not Mr. Lekhi's case that respondent No. 2 has any authority under the law to hold that a person has incurred the disqualification under Article 10(1)(d). Thus we have nothing more to go than mere allegations which cannot be accepted in a court of law.

4. The question posed by Mr. Lekhi that whether in view of these serious allegations having been made by respondent No. 2 he should have advised the President to include respondent No. 3 in his Council of Ministers or whether respondent No. 3 against whom the allegation had been made by respondent No. 2 should have agreed to be a member of Council of Minister headed by respondent No. 2 are questions on which public may legitimately expect some answers. It is possible as Mr. Lekhi says that public opinion may be greatly agitated and may want to know as to where the truth lies. We do not deny that these questions may be of grave political interest to people at large. But then the questions which may be of interest on a political plane are not necessarily within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction, the argument of Mr. Lekhi suffers from the inability to accept as was pointed out by justice Frankfurter in Charles. We, Baker v. Joe Carr 369 US 663 at 716, ‘that there is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief and ‘in this situation, as in others of like natures, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed civically militant electorate. In a democratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that scars the conscience of the people's representatives.

5. Framers of the Constitution also recognised this limitation. Thus when Dr. Ambedkar was asked to introduce a disqualification against a convicted person being appointed a Minister of State he disagreed on the ground that it is not necessary to put all this in the Constitution and that ‘this is a case which may eminently be left to the good sense of the Prime Minister and to the good sense of the Legislature with the general public holding a watching brief upon them.’

(See: Constituent Assembly Debates: Vol. VIII Page (1160)

6. Had the petition remained in the unamended form as it was originally filed the same would have to be dismissed because we have found no substance in this contention made by Mr. Lekhi.

7. This petition, however, was amended and a further point was raised which is mentioned in para 28-A of the petition. The point raised that the respondent No. 2 tendered the resignation of himself and his Council of Ministers on 20-8-1979 and the same was accepted by the President on 22-8-1979, but respondent No. 2 continues to function as a Minister without taking the fresh oath of office. The petitioner has filed a further affidavit on 31-8-1979 reproducing the letters said to have been written by respondent No. 2 tendering his resignation to the President and the President's letter of the same date accepting the resignation and requesting the respondent No. 2 and his colleagues to continue in office till other arrangements are made. Mr. Lekhi's contention is that Article 75(4) provides that before a Minister enters upon his office the President shall administer to him the oath of office and secrecy. Mr. Lekhi concedes that respondent No. 3 had taken the said oath when he was sworn in as a Minister on 25-7-1979 but says that when he was sworn in as a Minister on 25-7-1979 but says that when the resignation of the Council of Ministers was accepted by the President on 20-8-1979 the oath could no longer serve the purpose for the further functioning of respondent No. 2 as Minister. The contention is that though it may be open to the President to appoint respondent No. 2 as a Minister after accepting the resignation, the respondent No. 2 cannot enter upon his office without taking a fresh oath of office.

8. Though we have fond that there is no substance in the first contention, show cause however will be issued only on the allegations made in para 28-A on this point. The notice need issue only to respondents 1 and 3 because the impleading of respondent No. 2 was necessitated only because of the first point which we have rejected and it is not necessary to issue notice to respondent No. 2. Issue show cause on this limited point for 19th September, 1979.

R.S Ordered accordingly.