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Amolak Singh Jain v. Satyawati

Delhi High Court
Mar 21, 1979
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Case Summary — Objections to Execution Sale of 51/100th Share, 1 Purana Quila Road, New Delhi

Factual and Procedural Background

A decree for monetary relief was passed on 24 April 1973 in Suit No. 99 of 1966 for Rs. 1,00,000 with interest and costs. Execution proceedings (Execution No. 63 of 1973) were instituted on 2 August 1973 to recover the decretal amount by attachment and sale of the property at 1, Purana Quila Road, New Delhi. Attachment was ordered under Order 21, Rule 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Managing Committee of Guru Harkishan Public School was prohibited from making certain payments and deposited Rs. 35,434.81, which was paid to the decree-holder pursuant to orders dated 23 August 1973 and 5 February 1974. The judgment-debtors’ share in the property (51/100th) was attached by order dated 25 September 1975.

Because the prohibitory order had not been served for a sufficiently long time, it was ordered to be served by publication; that publication appeared on 29 April 1977. Various hearings took place through 1977 concerning an application under Order 21, Rule 66 (EA 213/77), culminating in issuance of a proclamation of sale and fixation of auction for 26 September 1977. The property (51/100th share) was sold at auction on 26 September 1977 to the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee for Rs. 4,55,000. The sale was made absolute and a sale certificate was ordered to be issued by order dated 2 November 1977.

On 16 November 1977 several judgment-debtors filed EA 365/77 seeking to set aside the sale as void on multiple grounds (including alleged non-issue of notice under O.21 R.66(2), procedural defects in proclamation and conduct of sale, that counsel present was not authorised, lack of advertisement by drum/handbills, fraud, and undervaluation). The decree-holder denied these allegations and contended that objections were time-barred and that the judgment-debtors had notice and opportunity to object during the proceedings.

Preliminary issues were framed (time, maintainability under Sections 47 and 151 CPC, necessity of auction-purchaser as party). Following discovery that the Limitation Act provision for setting aside such sales had been amended to 60 days, the court framed additional issues addressing whether the sale was void or liable to be set aside and what relief should follow. Evidence was not produced by the judgment-debtors and counsel for the judgment-debtors stated they did not wish to lead evidence in support of objections. The matter was decided on the basis of the record, the parties' submissions, and applicable rules.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the objection petitions were filed within time (in light of the Limitation Act / amendment prescribing sixty days to set aside an execution sale).
  2. Whether the objections are maintainable under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure after confirmation of sale and issue of sale certificate, or whether they fall under Order 21 Rule 90 (i.e., whether they are to be treated as applications under O.21 R.90 for setting aside a sale for material irregularity or fraud).
  3. Whether the auction purchaser is a necessary party to the objections to the sale.
  4. Whether the sale held on 26 September 1977 is void (i.e., a nullity) as alleged in EA 365/77, specifically for non-issue of notice under Order 21 Rule 66(2) and other alleged defects in the publication/conduct of the sale.
  5. Whether the sale is liable to be set aside for any of the reasons mentioned in the objection petitions (including alleged fraud, lack of advertisement, unauthorised advocate appearing, undervaluation, and alleged satisfaction of the decree by deposit of rents).

Arguments of the Parties

Judgement-Debtors' Arguments

  • No notice under Order 21, Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure was ordered to be issued to the judgment-debtors, so the sale is void.
  • Terms of the proclamation were not settled and the judgment-debtors were not given an opportunity to file objections to the proclamation.
  • On 4 August 1977 the counsel (Mr. Ashok Aggarwal) who appeared was not appointed by the judgment-debtors.
  • No beat of drum, hand-bills, or posters were issued and no notice was pasted on the property or the courthouse — irregularities in publication of sale.
  • The sale was a fraud on the Court and the judgment-debtors and the sale price (Rs. 4,55,000) was grossly undervalued compared to an asserted worth of more than Rs. 20 lacs.
  • By order dated 5 February 1974 the tenant (Managing Committee of the School) was directed to deposit rent in court; thus either the decretal amount was satisfied or the tenant should have deposited — and allegedly the auction purchaser is the same as the tenant.

Decree-Holder's Arguments

  • Objections (as filed) were lodged more than thirty days after sale and are time-barred (the decree-holder relied initially on the shorter period argument).
  • The application under O.21 R.66 was made on 19 July 1977 in the presence of counsel for the judgment-debtors, and subsequent orders were passed in their presence without objection, so they had notice and opportunity.
  • Dates for affixation of proclamation and auction were fixed in the presence of the judgment-debtors' counsel; the sale occurred on 26 September 1977 and later time was given to file objections but none were filed — thus confirmation on 2 November 1977 was proper.
  • Hand-bills were issued and there was advertisement by beat of drum; the sale price for the 51/100th share was reasonable given that the judgment-debtors were not in possession; the sale is not liable to be set aside.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bishnudeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, AIR 1951 SC 280 Principle that allegations of fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. must be pleaded with full particulars (dates, items); general allegations are insufficient. The court applied this principle to hold that the judgment-debtors' general allegation of "fraud" without particulars must be ignored and cannot support setting aside the sale.
Sundrabai Ramchandra Rabade v. Anandrao Haribhau Rabade, AIR 1973 Bom 301 Held that the notice provision in sub-rule (2) of R.66 is not mandatory; non-service makes a sale voidable and the remedy lies under Order 21 Rule 90, not Section 47 CPC. The court relied on this authority to treat the objections as falling under O.21 R.90 (for irregularity/fraud) rather than Section 47, and concluded that non-issue of R.66(2) notice rendered the sale voidable (not a nullity).
AIR 1945 PC 178 Authority that an applicant to set aside a sale for irregularity/fraud under O.21 R.90 must show that the applicant sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. The court invoked this principle to require the judgment-debtors to prove substantial injury from any alleged irregularity; finding no proof of substantial injury, the court refused to set aside the sale.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from statutory text and a review of the parties' conduct and evidence (or absence thereof). The critical statutory provision considered was Order 21 Rule 66 CPC (text reproduced in the record), which requires a proclamation of intended sale "after notice to the decree-holder and the judgement-debtor" and specifies what the proclamation should contain. The court identified the legal question whether the requirement of issuing notice prior to drawing up the proclamation (sub-rule (2)) is mandatory (making any sale void if omitted) or directory (making the sale voidable).

On construction and applying authority (notably Sundrabai Ramchandra Rabade), the court held that non-issue of notice under R.66(2) is not a mandatory nullifying defect but renders the sale voidable — therefore the proper remedy is under Order 21 Rule 90 (application to set aside sale for material irregularity or fraud), not Section 47 CPC. The court emphasized that O.21 R.90 requires proof that the applicant sustained substantial injury due to the irregularity or fraud.

The court examined the judgment-debtors' conduct during the pre-sale proceedings: they appeared after publication, were repeatedly given time to file objections (directed to file objections till 19 July 1977, granted further time but they did not file objections), their counsel attended several hearings including the fixing of auction date and the order directing proclamation affixation, and no contemporaneous objections were taken. The court found this conduct inconsistent with a claim that they were deprived of notice or opportunity to object to the particulars specified for the proclamation.

On the fraud/irregularity allegations the court applied Order 6 Rule 4 CPC and the principle from Bishnudeo Narain: where a party pleads fraud or similar matters, particulars must be given. The judgment-debtors made general allegations of fraud without particulars (dates, actors, circumstances) and thus the court declined to consider such vague allegations.

The court also reviewed other specific contentions (no beating of drums, no handbills, unauthorised advocate, gross undervaluation, tenant deposit satisfying decree). It found that the judgment-debtors produced no evidence on any of these points; the order of 5 February 1974 injuncting the tenant to deposit rent did not direct payment to the auction purchaser, and the auction purchaser (Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Managing Committee) was different from the tenant (Guru Harkishan Public School). Given lack of pleaded particulars and lack of evidence of substantial injury, the court concluded that the sale, though potentially voidable for non-issue of R.66(2) notice, had not been shown to be liable to be set aside.

The court also addressed limitation: Article 127 of the Limitation Act (as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976) prescribed sixty days (replacing thirty days) to apply to set aside an execution sale. The court found EA 365/77 (filed 16 November 1977) was within that sixty-day period; however other objections filed later (EA 30/78 and EA 296/78) were time-barred.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING:

OBJECTIONS DISMISSED WITH COSTS

The court held that:

  • EA 365/77 (filed 16 November 1977) was within the prescribed limitation period (sixty days) and so is not time-barred; the other objection petitions (EA 30/78 and EA 296/78) were barred by time.
  • The sale held on 26 September 1977 is not a nullity but is at best voidable for any non-issue of the R.66(2) notice; however, the judgment-debtors failed to plead particulars of fraud or to prove any substantial injury arising from any irregularity.
  • Accordingly, no ground existed to set aside the sale; the objections (365/77, 30/78 and 296/78) were dismissed with costs.
  • Costs: the judgment-debtors were ordered to pay counsel's fee of Rs. 500 to the auction purchaser and Rs. 500 to the decree-holder.

Implications for the parties (direct effects): the earlier confirmation of sale and issuance of the sale certificate (2 November 1977) stands; the auction purchaser's title as purchaser at execution sale remains intact; the judgment-debtors have failed to overturn the sale and must pay the court-ordered costs. The opinion did not assert or establish a new legal precedent beyond the application of existing authorities (the court relied on established authorities and statutory provisions to resolve the matter).

Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

These are applications to set aside sale of 51/100th share of property at No. 1, Purana Quila Road, New Delhi auctioned on 26th September, 1977 for Rs. 4,55,000 in favour of Delhi/Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, Delhi. On 24th April 1973 a money decree for Rs. one lac with interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of payment of this amount i.e 25th June, 1962 till the date of decree and future interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of decree till realisation and costs of suit Rs. 4,101.95 P. was passed in suit No. 99 of 1966. Defendant No. 1 was to pay Rupees 40,000 with interest, defendants 4A and 4B and defendants 1 to 3, 6 to 12 as legal representatives of defendant Smt. Kirpa Devi were to pay a sum of Rupees 20,000 with interest from the property of the deceased, and defendants 8 and 9 as well defendants 6 to 9 as legal representatives of defendant No. 5 deceased were to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000 with interest, to the plaintiff. On 2nd August, 1973 execution No. 63 of 1973 was filed for the recovery of the decretal amount by attachment and sale of the said property at 1, Purana Quila Road, New Delhi, by attachment under Order 21, Rule 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an amount of Rs. 32.000 due to Rani Kirpa Devi lying in deposit with the Managing Committee of Guru Harkishan Public School New Delhi and also by attachment of Rs. 3,000 per month out of rent falling due to the judgement-debtors on the first of every month from the managing committee of Guru Harkishan Public School. By order dated 23rd August, 1973 the Managing Committee of said School was prohibited from making payment of the amount due to late Rani Kirpa Devi or to any of her legal representatives. The Managing Committee of the said School accordingly deposited Rs. 35,434.81 and the same was ordered to be paid to the decree-holder as per Order dated 5th February, 1974. This amount is stated to have been paid to the decree-holder. Judgement-debtors by order dated 5th February, 1974 were restrained from recovering rent from the School and the Managing Committee of the said School was directed to deposit Rs. 2,700 out of rent becoming due to judgement-debtors every month in this court.

2. The share of the judgement-debtors in the property was stated to be 51/100. Accordingly by order dated 25th September, 1975, 51/100th share in the said property was ordered to be attached. The order prohibiting the judgement-debtors from transferring or charging the property in any way and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge was not served for a sufficiently long time and therefore by order dated 4th January, 1977 the said prohibitory order was directed to be served by publication which was published in the daily issue of ‘Indian Express’ dated 29th April, 1977. The judgement-debtors by this notice were also directed to appear in court on 9th May, 1977 at 10-30 A.M Bawa S.C Singh, Advocate was appearing in these proceedings as counsel for the judgement-debtors. S. Mohd. Anis, Advocate appeared for counsel for the judgement-debtors on 9th May, 1977 and judgement-debtors were granted time to file objections till 19th July, 1977 on which date the counsel for judgement-debtors again prayed for a week's time to file objections, which was granted but objections were not filed. On 19th July, 1977 counsel for the decree-holder in the presence of counsel for the judgement-debtors also filed an application (EA 213/77) under Order 21, Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was ordered to be placed on 29th July for appropriate orders. On 29th July, 1977 the execution case was directed to be placed before the Court on 4th August, 1977 for sale order. On 4th August, 1977 in the presence of counsel for the decree-holder and Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Advocate for counsel for the judgement-debtors, the Court directed issue of warrant of sale as well as proclamation of sale. The sale was fixed for 26th September, 1977. The decree-holder filed an application (EA 253/77) and on 1-9-1977 in the presence of counsel for the decree-holder and judgement-debtors it was ordered that the proclamation of sale be affixed at the Court house and at the spat by 7th September, 1977. The proclamation of sale was accordingly issued which was affixed at the court house and at the spot and the property was put to sell on 26th September, 1977. The property was purchased by Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Managing Committee Delhi for Rs. 4,55,000. The sale held on 26th September, 1977 was made absolute in the name of the auction purchaser and the sale certificate was ordered to be issued in favour of the purchaser by order dated 2nd November, 1977. It was observed that objections to the auction were not filed by any of the parties within the prescribed period, and consequently the sale was made absolute and sale certificate was ordered to be issued. On 16th November, 1977 judgement-debtors Nos. 1, 2, 5(a) to 5(d) and 6 to 9; filed application (EA 365/77) praying that proceedings from the date of filing of application under Order 21 R.66 of the Code of Civil Procedure be ignored and the alleged sale dated 26th September, 1977 be held to be nullity, on the ground that no notice of application under Order 21, Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure was ever ordered to be issued to any of the judgement-debtors, that terms of proclamation were not settled, that no opportunity was given to the judgement-debtors to file objections against sale, that on 4th August, 1977 when the property was directed to be sold, Mr. Ashok Agarwal, Advocate who appeared for counsel for judgement-debtors, was never appointed as an Advocate by any of the judgement-debtors, that there was no beat of drums at site and that hand-bills or posters for the sale were not issued, that there was no pasting of any notice on the property or the court house, that sale is in fraud of Court and judgement-debtors, that property has been sold for Rs. 4,55,000 while it was worth more than twenty lacs. The decree-holder in his reply pleads that the objections having been filed more than 30 days after the sale are barred by time, that application under Order 21, Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made on 19th July, 1977 in the presence of counsel for judgement-debtors and thus they had valid notice of the application, and all orders on this application were passed in the presence of counsel for judgement-debtors without any objection, that the various dates for affixation of proclamation of sale at the spot and the court house as well as the date of auction were fixed in the presence of counsel for judgement-debtors, that sale took place on 26th September, 1977 and on 29th September, 1977 time was allowed to judgement-debtors to file objections but objections were not flied and therefore sale was confirmed on 2nd November, 1977, that hand-bills were issued and there was advertisement by beat of drum, that Rs. 4,55,000 price of 51/100th share of property was reasonable and proper as the judgement-debtors were not in possession of the property, and that the sale was not liable to be set aside. Judgement-debtors also filed an application dated 16th January, 1978 (EA 30/78) praying that the issue of sale certificate be stayed till the decision of the previous application (EA 365/77). The prayer for stay of proceedings was declined by order dated 17th January, 1978. The following preliminary issues were framed on 12th September, 1978 and the matter was adjourned for arguments :

“1. Whether the two objection-petitions E.A Nos. 385/77, and 30/78 are within time ?

2. Whether the two objection-petitions are maintainable under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure after confirmation of the sale and issue of the sale certificate ?

3. Whether the auction-purchaser is a necessary party to these objections ?”

3. On 9th October, 1978 arguments were heard in part on the preliminary issues and it was discovered that Article 127 of the Limitation Act 1963 prescribing 30 days period from the date of sale to set aside sale in execution of decree was amended by Code of Civil procedure (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976 and for ‘thirty days’ a period of sixty days was prescribed to set aside such a sale prima facie, it appeared that petition dated 16th November, 1977 (EA 365/77) was within time and it was not considered necessary to decide the preliminary issues and the following additional issues were framed on 9th October, 1978 :

“1. Whether the sale is void as alleged in EA 365/77 ?

2. Whether the sale is liable to be set aside for any of the reasons mentioned in EAs 365/77 and 30/78 ?

3. Relief.”

4. Time was granted to the parties to lead evidence in support of these issues but no evidence was produced and counsel for judgement-debtors made a statement that judgement-debtors did not want to produce evidence in support of their objections. In their application (EA 296/78) an objection was raised by the judgement-debtors that the tenant in the property by order dated 5th February, 1974 was directed to deposit the rent in Court and that no amount is due to the decree-holder and as such the sale was liable to be set aside. It was further prayed that the tenant be directed to file statement of account indicating the amount of rent paid in Court from the date of order dated 5th February, 1974. It was further alleged that the auction-purchaser and the tenant in the property are one and the same person. All these three objection-applications have been heard together.

5. The question for decision is whether the sale held on 26th September, 1977 is void as no notice under Order 21, Rule 66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was ordered to be issued. The answer depends upon the true interpretation of Order 21, Rule 66 which is as under :—

“66. (1) Where any property is ordered to be sold by public auction in execution of a decree, the Court shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made in the language of such Court.

(2) Such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the decree-holder and the judgement-debtor and shall state the time and place of sale, and specify as fairly and accurately as possible —

(a) the property to be sold (or, where a part of the property would be sufficient to satisfy the decree, such part);

(b) the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate, where the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or in part of an estate paying revenue to the Government;

(c) any inumbrance to which the property is liable;

(d) the amount for the recovery of which the sale is ordered; and

(e) every other thing which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property :

(Provided ....................... parties.)

(3) Every application for an order for sale under this rule shall be accompanied by a statement signed and verified in the manner hereinbefore prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings and containing, so far as they are known to or can be ascertained by the person making the verification, the matters required by sub-rule (2) to be specified in the proclamation.

(4) For the purpose of ascertaining the matters to be specified in the proclamation, the Court may summon any person whom it thinks necessary to summon and may examine him in respect to any such matters and require him to produce any document in his possession or power relating thereto.”

6. If the issue of notice to the decree-holder and the judgement-debtors before drawing up the proclamation of sale as required by sub-rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory the sale would be void but if it is directory the sale would be voidable. In the present case, the judgement-debtors were at all relevant times aware of the execution proceedings and they never filed any objections challenging the facts specified in the proclamation of sale issued vide order dated 4th August, 1977. The judgement-debtors on 9th May, 1977 were directed to file objections till 19th July, 1977 they did not file but sought further time to file the same but even then no objections were filed. Application under O.21 R.66 (EA 213/77) was filed in the presence of thee counsel for the judgement-debtors on 19th July, 1977 which was adjourned to 29th July, 1977, The counsel for the judgement-debtors was however not present on 29th July, 1977 but when it came up for hearing on 4th August, 1977, counsel for judgement-debtors was present and he did not seek any time to object to the contents mentioned in the application under O.21 R.66 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order fixing the date of sale as 26th September, 1977 was passed in the presence of the counsel for the judgement debtors but even then the counsel for the judgement debtors did not object to it, Again on 1st September, 1977 counsel for the judgement debtors was present when it was ordered that proclamation be affixed at the Court house and at the spot by 7th September, 1977. The conduct of the judgement-debtors from the date when they appeared after the service of the prohibitory order on 9th May, 1977 till the date of auction leads to me to the conclusion that the judgement-debtors were never serious to challenge the facts mentioned in the application under O.21, R.66 and they were only waiting for the property to be suctioned and to take objections only thereafter. If really there were any objections against the particulars to be specified in the proclamation of sale as required by O.21 R.66(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure they could have come forward and made a petition to this Court requiring the matters which the judgement debtors wanted to be included in the proclamation of sale. The judgement debtors in their objections have not alleged any irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale There is also no allegation of any substantial injury by reason of any irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting sale The word ‘fraud’ has been used in the objections, but no particulars of the fraud are mentioned therein. Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as under :—

“In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.”

7. Under this rule party relying on misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, undue influence etc. is required to give particulars of such pleas with dates etc. It is now well established that if particulars are not given such pleas are to be ignored. In Bishnudeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, (AIR 1951 SC 280), it has been observed as follows :—

“Though pleas of undue influence and coercion may overlap in part in some cases they are separable categories in law and must be separately pleaded.

In cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion.

In the case of coercion when a Ct. is asked to find that a person was threatened with death it is necessary to give particulars to the nature of the threat, the circumstances, the date, time and place in which it was administered and the name of the person threatening. In the absence of such particulars it would be impossible to reach a proper conclusion,”

8. No particulars of the alleged fraud are pleaded by the judgement debtors. It is, therefore, not possible to determine the plea of fraud in the absence of particulars. As regards irregularity in publishing or conducting sale the case of the judgement debtors is that notice under O.21 R.66(2) was never ordered to be issued. Issue of notice under this rule is a part of publication of the proclamation of sale and as such the sale is to be objected to under R.90 of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is as under :—

“90. (1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder, or the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it.

(2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud.

(3) No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken an or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up.

Explanation : The mere absence of, or defect in, attachment of the property sold shall not, by itself, be a ground for setting aside a sale under this rule.”

9. In Sundrabai Ramchandra Rabade v. Anandrao Haribhau Rabade, AIR 1973 Bom 301, it has been held that the provision as to notice of auction contained in sub-r. (2) of R.66 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not mandatory and so non-service of the notice upon the judgement-debtors will only render the subsequent sale voidable at his instance and the application filed by the judgement debtors for setting aside sale will fall under O.21 R.90 and not under S.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus it appears that the present objections do not fall under S.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure but fall only under O.21 R.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he sale is also not a nullity. The judgement debtors at all relevant time were aware of the execution proceedings. There is no allegation of any substantial injury to them by non-issue of notice under R.66(2) of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicants judgement-debtors are to show substantial injury under O.21 R.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure as held in AIR 1945 PC 178. There is no irregularity in publishing the proclamation of sale. The non-issue of the notice under R.66(2) of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure; therefore, does not entitle the judgement-debtors to get the sale set aside.

10. As regards other points that Ashok Aggarwal, Advocate was not authorised, that there was no beating of drum and distribution of handbills and posters, and that property was worth Rs. 20 lacs and sold only for Rs. 4.55 lacs, no evidence has been produced by the judgement debtors on any of these points and hence these are not grounds for setting aside the auction sale.

11. Another objection of the judgement debtors is that by order dated 5th Feb 1974 the tenant, Managing Committee of the School was required to deposit the rent and that by said deposit the decree stands satisfied or that the tenants ought to have deposited the same. There is no evidence in support of such pleas. The auction purchaser is a different body than the School. There is no direction to the auction purchaser in the order dated 5th February, 1974. The last contention of the learned counsel for the judgement debtors was that the auction purchaser is the tenant in the suit property. The auction purchaser is Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Managing Committee, Delhi, while the tenant in the property is Guru Harkishan Public School and the injunction order dated 5th February, 1974 is addressed to the Managing Committee of the said school.

12. I, therefore, hold that the objection petition (EA 365/77) having been filed within sixty days from the date of sale is within time and that the objection petitions Nos. 30/78 and 296/78 having been filed on 17th January, 1978 and 3rd October, 1978 are barred by time further hold that the sale held on 26th September, 1978 is not void but is voidable but no steps were taken to plead and produce evidence on behalf of judgement debtors to show that there was any irregularity or fraud in publishing, or conducting sale. No substantial injury has been proved or pleaded and as such the sale is not liable to be set aside.

13. Learned counsel for the judgement debtors has referred to authorities which are on the points not pleaded in the objection petition. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider these authorities.

14. No ground is therefore available to the judgement debtors to set aside the sale. As already mentioned the sale was confirmed on 2nd November, 1977, the Sale Certificate has also been issued since then. These objections (365/77, 30/78 and 296/78) are therefore dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 500/- to be paid to the auction purchaser and another fee Rs. 500/- to be paid to the decree-holder by the judgement debtors.

Order accordingly.