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M/S Gidney Club, New Delhi & Another Petitioner v. Union Of India & Others S

Delhi High Court
Dec 13, 1978
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (V.S. Deshpande, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner No. 1 is a club — the Delhi Branch of the All India Anglo-Indian Association (Gidney Club). Petitioner No. 2 is a member of that club. The club held a licence in form L-19 for the retail vend of foreign liquor under Rule 1 of the Delhi Liquor Licence Rules, 1976, framed under section 58 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (as applied to Delhi). The licence covered the period from 1 April 1977 to 31 March 1978.

On 15 March 1978 the Delhi Administration sent a letter to clubs (including the petitioner Club) stating that, "Under and in accordance with the Excise Policy for the Year 1978-79, licences in form L-19 for retail vend of foreign liquor at club are to be discontinued w.e.f. 1-4-1978," and requesting disposal of existing stock and furnishing of particulars in case stock remained.

The petitioners challenged the validity of that letter by a writ petition. The petitioners contended that (a) the Administration's excise policy is not "law" and so could not be used to refuse renewal, (b) Rule 13 of the Delhi Liquor Licence Rules prescribes a procedure for non-renewal which was not followed, and (c) the prohibition policy was an irrelevant consideration for the Collector when deciding renewal (licensing being a quasi-judicial function). The Delhi Administration opposed the petition, asserting that there is no fundamental right to carry on the liquor trade, that prohibition policy implements Article 47 of the Constitution, and that the policy decision was a legitimate and relevant basis for refusing renewal.

The writ petition was dismissed by the court, the judgment concluding that the excise prohibition policy (implementing Article 47) could validly be implemented by executive action, that the statutory scheme and rules contemplated such a policy, and that Rule 13's procedural requirements were satisfied in substance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Directive Principles of State Policy (specifically Article 47) can be enforced or implemented by executive/administrative action without specific legislation or rules.
  2. Whether the impugned administrative letter discontinuing Form L-19 licences (effective 1-4-1978) is valid lawfully to refuse renewal of licences.
  3. Whether the procedural requirements of Rule 13 of the Delhi Liquor Licence Rules (notice, recording objections, and passing a definite order) were required to be followed strictly before refusing renewal on the ground of a general prohibition policy.
  4. Whether the prohibition policy was a relevant consideration that the licensing/quasi-judicial authority could take into account in deciding renewal of club licences.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Government's excise policy for 1978-79 is not "law" and so cannot lawfully deprive the petitioners of their claim to renewal of the licence; therefore the impugned letter is liable to be quashed.
  • Rule 13 of the Delhi Liquor Licence Rules prescribes a procedural regime (notice, recording objections, passing a written order) that was not followed before refusal of renewal; thus the refusal was procedurally invalid.
  • The prohibition policy was an irrelevant consideration for the Collector in exercising his quasi-judicial function of renewing licences; consideration of that policy rendered the renewal decision illegal.

Respondent (Delhi Administration)'s Arguments

  • No person (including the petitioners) has a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor; the State may prohibit sale of intoxicating liquors.
  • The Punjab Excise Act vests exclusive privilege to sell liquor in the Government and contains provisions (including section 58) enabling rules to implement prohibition; the Administration's prohibition policy implements Article 47 of the Constitution and is therefore a relevant and valid consideration.
  • The impugned policy/letter provided sufficient notice; the policy was a logical extension of earlier announced prohibition programmes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan (1951) SCR 325 Early position that Directive Principles are subsidiary to fundamental rights (historical reference). Used to contrast the initial judicial emphasis on Part III over Part IV and to show the evolution of constitutional interpretation.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) Supp SCR 1 Principle that the Court should read collective directive principles into fundamental rights; neither Part III nor Part IV is superior. Cited as marking the shift to treating Part IV directives as complementary to Part III and as supporting enforceability of constitutional values in administration and adjudication.
State Kerala & another v. N.M. Thomas & others (1976) 2 SCC 310 Support for the view that directive principles and fundamental rights are to be balanced; illustrating judicial shift. Referred to in the context of judicial recognition of Part IV values in relation to Part III.
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain and another, AIR 1975 SC 1590 Enforcement of constitutional "value considerations" derived from the Preamble and non-enforceable provisions. Relied on to show that courts can enforce value considerations that originate outside express enforceable provisions; used analogically to support enforcement/implementation of Article 47 values.
R.R. Dalavai v. State Of Tamil Nadu (1976) 3 SCC 748 Use of a directive (Article 351) to justify state action (pension scheme) where it opposed divisive tendencies; example of enforcing a directive. Cited to argue that Article 351's enforceability supports the proposition that Article 47 can likewise underpin administrative decisions (court said Article 351 cannot be distinguished in nature from Article 47).
Har Shankar & others v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner and others (1975) 3 SCR 254 There is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants; State may prohibit all activities related to intoxicants. Applied directly to hold that the petitioner Club had no fundamental right to vend liquor and that the statutory scheme vests monopoly and prohibition powers in the State.
M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 439 Protective discrimination (e.g., reservation) can be implemented by executive/administrative instructions without specific legislation or rules. Used by analogy to support the proposition that executive action can implement constitutional policy objectives without prior formal rules, provided they do not contravene law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by posing the principal constitutional question: whether a Directive Principle (Article 47) can be enforced or implemented by administrative action. The court proceeded through a structured analysis grounded in constitutional text, statutory provisions, precedent, and principles of administrative law.

Key steps in the court's reasoning:

  1. Distinction and interaction between Part III (fundamental rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles): the court observed that although directives are "not enforceable by any court" under Article 37, this does not reduce the Preamble or directive principles to mere platitudes. The court traced jurisprudential development from an early emphasis on Part III (Dorairajan) to the more balanced approach in Kesavananda Bharati and subsequent authorities, which read directive principles into the constitutional fabric alongside fundamental rights.
  2. Precedential support: the court relied on later decisions (including Kesavananda Bharati, N.M. Thomas, Indira Nehru Gandhi, and R.R. Dalavai) to show that courts and administrators may appropriately give effect to constitutional values and directive principles in governance and adjudication, and that examples exist of directives being given practical effect.
  3. Statutory framework: the court examined the Punjab Excise Act (as applied to Delhi). It emphasized that section 58 expressly empowers the Lieutenant Governor to make rules and to implement "generally the policy of prohibition." Other provisions (sections 24, 26 and section 43) restrict possession and sale of intoxicants to licensing permissions and expressly state that licensees have no right to claim renewal. Therefore, the statutory scheme contemplates prohibition and vests broad regulatory powers in the State.
  4. Executive implementation of statute: the court stated the settled principle that a statute may be implemented either by rules or by executive instructions unless the statute requires rule-making as a condition precedent. The court gave examples (e.g., Article 309 powers) and analogies (protective discrimination under Articles 15/16 and M.R. Balaji) to show executive action can legitimately give effect to policy objectives without separate rules.
  5. Application to the impugned letter and Rule 13: the court analyzed Rule 13 (procedural requirements for non-renewal). It concluded that (a) where non-renewal is based on a general policy of prohibition of wide application (a policy decision of general application), the individualized notice-and-hearing procedure in Rule 13 does not strictly apply, and (b) even if Rule 13 applied, the requirement to comply with natural justice must be satisfied in substance, not mere formalism. The 15 days' notice conveyed by the 15 March 1978 letter was found sufficient in substance to allow representations and thus to satisfy Rule 13's objective.
  6. Relevance of the prohibition policy and role of licensing authority: the court rejected the contention that a quasi-judicial licensing authority is barred from considering government policy. It found no rule or provision in the Act or rules limiting the licensing authority to fixed criteria; rather, the statute and rules furnish guidelines and expressly contemplate prohibition. Therefore, the licensing authority was obliged to take the declared government policy into account.
  7. Conclusion on rights and maintainability: because (i) the club had no fundamental right to vend liquor (per Har Shankar), (ii) the statutory framework permitted and contemplated prohibition and non-renewal, and (iii) the Executive's policy did not contravene any law or rule, there was no legal right entitling the petitioners to renewal such that a writ petition could be maintained to compel renewal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — the writ petition is dismissed (without order as to costs).

Implications (direct effect as stated in the opinion):

  • The administrative decision communicated by the 15 March 1978 letter discontinuing L-19 licences with effect from 1-4-1978 was held valid; the petitioners' challenge failed.
  • The petitioner Club had no enforceable legal right to renewal of the licence under the statutory scheme (including section 43 of the Punjab Excise Act), and therefore no basis for maintaining the writ petition to compel renewal.
  • The court held that the Directive Principle in Article 47 may be implemented by executive action so long as such action does not contravene any law or rule; the licensing authority may take a declared prohibition policy into account when exercising its functions.

The opinion applies and interprets existing authorities and the statutory framework to the facts. The judgment does not purport in its text to announce that it creates a distinct new precedent beyond the application and synthesis of the cited authorities and statutory provisions.

Show all summary ...

V.S Deshpande, C.J:— Can Directive Principles of State Policy embodies in Part IV of the Constitution (Article 47 in this case) be enforced by administrative action by the state? This important question along with others is raised by this writ petition on the following facts:

2. Petitioner No. 1 is a Club, which is the property of and an activity of the Delhi Branch of the All India Anglo-Indian Association, New Delhi. Petitioner No. 2 is a member of the Club. A licence for the retain vend of foreign liquor at a club (bona fide or proprietory) in form L-19 was granted to the Club under Rule 1 of the Delhi Liquor Licence Rules, 1976 made under section 58 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, as applied to Delhi. The licence was for one year from 1-4-1977 to 31-3-1978 The relevant parts of section 58 authorising the framing of Rules regulating the sale of liquor are as follows:
“58. (1) The Lieutenant Governor of Delhi may, by notification, make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to excise reveniue.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi may make rules—
* * * *
(e) regulating the periods and localities for which, and the persons, or classes of persons to whom licences, permits and passes for the vend by wholesale or by retail of any intoxicant may be granted and regulating the number of such licences which may be granted in any local area;
(f) prescribing the procedure to be followed and the matters to be ascertained before any licence is granted for the retail vend of liquor for consumption on the premises;
* * * *
(o) implementing generally the policy of prohibition.
* * * *
3. On 15-3-1978 the following letter was addressed to the various clubs including the Gidney Club, petitioner No. 1:
“Subject: Renewal of the Licence in form L-19.
Sir,
Under and in accordance with the Excise Policy for the Year 1978-79, licences in form L-19 for retail vend of foreign liquor at club are to be discontinued w.e.f 1-4-1978. You are hereby requested to dispose of by way of sale to the members for consumption at the club premises the stock of liquor available with you under the said licence up to 31-3-1978. In case any stock of liquor remains unconsumed, the intimation of the same along with a consumption/receipt statement for the year 1977-78 may kindly be furnished to the undersigned for further disposal of the same, falling which necessary action as per provision of the rules will be taken.”
4. The validity of this letter is challenged in the writ petition on the following grounds:
(1) Under the Punjab Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder the regulation of sale of liquor including the grant and renewal of licences is to be done according to law. The excise policy for the year 1978-79 given as the reason for the decision not to renew the L-19 licences held by the Clubs is not law. The impugned letter is, therefore, liable to be quashed.
(2) The renewal of licences is governed by Rule 13 which is as follows:
“Whenever it is proposed not to renew a licence which is renewable and granted on a fixed fee, the authority competent to renew it shall give notice to the holder of such licence, record objections, if any, put forward by the licensee, and pass a definite order in writing. The licensee may be given, on an application, an authenticated copy of such order.
Note:— The Excise Inspector is responsible for laying before the Collector by the 7th January, a list of all licences requiring renewal, in order that the Collector may decide whether to consider the question of non-renewal of any licence. This list should be accompanied:
(a) in the case of any licences on assessed fee, by the certificate of sales required by rule 28, and (b) in the case of bottling licences, by a similar certificate showing the gallons, London Proof, bottled upto 31st December.”
Application for renewal was made by the petitioner-Club on 22-1-1978 as per annexure A-1. The procedure prescribed in Rule 13 was not followed before the renewal of the licence was refused to the petitioner-Club.
(3) In so far as the policy of the Government enforcing prohibition or partial prohibition in Delhi has led to the issue of the impugned letter, it was not a relevant consideration to be taken into account by the Collector of Excise who was empowered to renew the petitioners L-19 licence. The function of renewing the licence is quasi-judicial under Rule 13. The quasi-judicial authority was not entitled to take into consideration such an irrelevant consideration. Hence the decision of non-renewal is illegal.
5. The Delhi Administration has opposed grant of any relief to the petitioneRs For, no person including the petitioner-Club has any fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor. The sale of intoxicating liquor may be absolutely prohibited by the Government. The exclusive privilege to sell liquor vests in the Government only under the Punjab Excise Act. The policy of prohibition is valid as it implements the Directive Principles embodied in Article 47 of the Constitution, which is as follows:
“Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health.—The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medical purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.”
Right from 1956-57 the Union Territory of Delhi has been introducing measures to prohibit drinking in public places. On 2nd October, 1975 the Central Prohibition Committee adopted a twelve-point minimum programme for prohibition. This was given wide publicity. On 2nd October, 1977 the Delhi Administration accepted the Central Prohibition Committee and announced a number of measures to achieve total prohibition in Delhi by April, 1980. The impugned policy for the year 1978-79 is only a logical corollary and extension of the policy declared on 2nd October, 1977. The impugned letter gave sufficient notice to the petitioner Club before the decision not to renew the licence became effective. The prohibition policy was a relevant consideration for the decision not to renew the licence.
(1) The first ground of attack, namely, that a mere administrative policy cannot deprive the petitioners of their right to renewal of the licence for vending liquor and that this can be done only by making a law or a rule raises the fundamental question as to whether a Directive Principle of State Policy can be enforced by executive action without resorting to the making of a law or a rule. The Constitution as a whole is not only law but the supreme law of India. It is true that a distinction can be made between those provisions of the Constitution like the fundamental rights embodied in Para III and certain other provisions like the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy embodied in Part IV of the Constitution which according to Article 37 “shall not be enforceable by any court”. This distinction has to be properly understood. What it means is that a writ petition cannot be filed to compel the Government to put into action objective set out in the Preamble and to implement every directive principle in Part IV. This does not mean that the Preamble and the directive principles are mere homilies or pious platitudes which can be ignored while making state Policy either by legislation or by administrative action. Theoretically it may also be arguable that a statute cannot be invalidated by courts on the ground that it is contrary either to the Preamble or to the Directive Principles of State policy though this technical argument is fast losing its credibility and the trend of the development of constitutional law may soon make it untenable. In the initial period after the commencement of the Constitution emphasis was naturally laid on the fundamental rights as the people were eager to exercise the newly given fundamental rights to remedy the wrongs which till then could not be redressed. After the first flush was over awareness dawned on the state and the people that the fundamental rights were for the benefit of the individual meaning the common man or everyone and not merely for the benefit of the few or the privileged ones who were better placed financially to enforce them as compared to the common man or masses who were often unable to take advantage of them for lack of means. This imbalance was due to disparity of economic conditions. The emphasis thereupon started shifting from the enforcement of fundamental rights for the benefit of the few to the recognition of the State Policy in implementing the directive principles. This contrast is reflected in the change from the view expressed initially in The State Of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, (1951) SCR 325(1), in which it was held that the directive principles have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights (per S.R Das, J.) to the views expressed in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp SCR 1(2), and State Kerala and another v. N.M Thomas and others, (1976) 2 SCC 310(3), V.R Krishna Iyer, J. in a majority judgment has expressed this change in paragraph 134 as follows:
“Kesavananda Bharati has clinched the issue of primacy as between Part III and Part IV of the Constitution. The unanimous ruling there is that the Court must wisely read the collective directive principles of Part IV into the individual fundamental rights of Part III, neither part being superior to the other: Since the days of Dorairajan judicial opinion has hesitatingly titled in favour of Part III but in Kesavananda Bharati the supplementary theory, treating both parts as fundamental, gained supremacy.”
6. The decision in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain and another, AIR 1975 SC 1590(4), was arrived at by enforcing the value considerations derived from the preamble and other so-called non-enforceable provisions of the Constitution. Just as Article 47 places a duty on the state of bring about prohibition, Article 351 places a duty on the Union Government to promote the spread of Hindi. The action of the Tamil Nadu legislature in appropriating funds to meet the costs of a pension scheme and the executive order of the State Government granting pensions from the said fund to anti-Hindi agitators was challenged in R.R Dalavai v. State Of Tamil Nadu., (1976) 3 SCC 748(5). The appellant contended that the spirit and the letter of Article 351 was violated by the said pension scheme. The Supreme Court held that the said scheme contained the vice of disintegration and fomenting fissiparous tendencies and that if any State is engaged in exciting emotion against Hindi or any other language such provocation has to be nipped in the bud because these are anti-national and anti-democratic tendencies. This decision is based on the enforcement of a directive in Article 351 which cannot be distinguished in its nature from the directive in Article 47. If Article 351 can support a decision, Article 47 also can do so.
7. Comparative constitutional law also supports the enforceability of the Preamble, the Directive Principles of State Policy and such other values embodied in the Constitution. The Directive Principles in Part IV of our Constitution have been inspired by the parallel provisions in the Irish Constitution of 1937. The Irish Judges have treated the Preamble and the Directive Principles as substantive bases for judicial decisions; so also have the Canadian and the West German Judges. These decisions have been referred to in Comparative Constitutional Law, (1977) by Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tannonhous, pp. 92, 670, 673, 94, 95 and 53. Even the French legal system which does not have a judicial review of legislation by a superior court enables the Constitutional Council to declare law an unconstitutional on the ground that the said law is contrary to certain principles embodied in the Constitution rather than to any specific provision thereof. [Constitutional Protection of Equality, edited by T. Koopman, (1975), a study of Five Constitutions; a protection of Equality in French Public Law, pp. 141-142].
8. Section 43 of the Punjab Excise Act makes it clear that the petitioner Club has no right to the renewal of its licence. That section reads as follows:
“No person to whom a licence, permit or pass may have been granted, shall be entitled to claim any renewal thereof and no claim shall lie for damages or otherwise in consequence of any refusal to renew a licence permit or pass on the expiry of the period for which it remains in force.”
The relevant provisions of section 58 show that rules could be made thereunder to bring about partial or total prohibition. Sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of section 24 take away the right of any person to possess intoxicating liquor except as permitted by a licence. These provisions are as below:
“24. (1) No person shall have in his possession any quantity of any intoxicant in excess of such quantity as the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi has under section 5, declared to be the limit of retail sale, except under the authority and in accordance with the terms and conditions of—
(a) a licence for the manufacture, sale or supply of such articles; or
(b) in the case of intoxicating drugs, a licence for the cultivation or collection of the plants from which such drugs were produced; or
(c) a permit granted by the Collector in that behalf.
(2) …………………
(3) A licensed vendor shall not have in his possession at any place, other than that authorised by his license, any quantity of any intoxicant in excess of such quantity as the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi has under section 5 declared to be the limit of sale by retail, except under a permit granted by the Collector in that behalf.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi may by notification prohibit the possession of any intoxicant or restrict such possession by such conditions as he may prescribe.”
Section 26 forbids the sale of liquor except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence. None of these provisions can be attacked as being an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioner Club to sell liquor. For, by a series of decisions, which culminated in five-Judge Bench decision in Har Shankar & others v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner and others, (1975) 3 SCR 254(6), it has been held, per Chandrachud J., that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State under its regulatory powers has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants—its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants (page 227 F.G). This decision is based on an exhaustive analysis of the provisions of the Punjab Excise Act and, therefore, fully applies to our case.
9. If the petitioner Club has no fundamental right to vend liquor, the writ petition cannot be maintained unless the claim of the petitioner to the renewal of the licence can be based on any of the provisions of the Punjab Excise Act. Since the petitioner Club has no claim to possess liquor or to sell liquor or to have the licence renewed, there is no legal right for the enforcement of which the writ petition can be maintained. The question is whether the refusal to renew the licence can be based on the policy of prohibition. The Punjab Excise Act is enacted not only for securing revenue to the State by the regulation of the business of liquor but also for bringing about prohibition as is shown by the relevant provisions of section 58 reproduced above. If so, the prohibition policy is a relevant consideration for refusal to renew the licence of the petitioner Club.
10. It is settled law that a statute can be implemented by the authority concerned either by framing rules or by issuing executive instructions. The reason is that unless the statute so says, the framing of rules is not a condition precedent to the enforcement of a statute. This may be illustrated from the Constitution itself. The provision to Article 309 enables the President or the Governor to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service of civil servants. Nevertheless, the terms and conditions of the services can be regulated by the issue of administrative notifications even if no rules are framed.
11. Similarly, provisions can be made by the Government under Articles 15(3), 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution for helping women and children, backward classes and scheduled castes and tribes by way of protective discrimination to enable them to achieve in reality equality of opportunity guaranteed by Articles 14, 15(1) and 16(1). Such provisions, even though apparently contrary to the fundamental right of equality of opportunity can be made either by legislation or by rules or by purely administrative instructions. The policy of protective discrimination has been enforced by the state by purely administrative instructions without framing rules or enacting legislation. For instance, in M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore, (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 439, the protective reservation was by way of administrative instructions. This method of implementing the policy was never objected to. At page 473 of the report, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“It is for the attainment of social and economic justice that Art. 15(4) authorises the making of social provisions for the advancement of the communities there contemplated even if such provisions may be inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 15 or 29(2). The context, therefore, requires that the executive action taken by the State must be based on objective approach.”
The reason is that the executive power of the Government is co-extensive with its rule making power. The basic principle is that the exercise of the executive power of the Government cannot be challenged by a petitioner unless he shows that such executive action contravenes any law. No such contravention has been shown to have been made by the implementation of the policy of prohibition. We are of the view, therefore, that the Directive Principle embodied in Article 47 can validly be implemented by executive action so long as it does not contravene any law or rule. Since the monopoly of regulating the liquor trade is vested in the Government, the executive policy of the Government must prevail as it does not trench on any one's legal rights.
(2) The Delhi Liquor Licence Rules, 1976 were made before the decision of the Delhi Administration was taken in 1977 to bring about prohibition in Delhi. Rule 13, therefore, does not deal with non-renewal of the licence on the ground of the prohibition policy. In the absence of prohibition policy, licensees whose licences are not to be renewed have to be individually noticed and heard before an order of refusal to renew is passed. But this procedure has no application when a general policy of prohibition is adopted and the decision not to renew the licences of the Club is not based on any consideration relating to the particular Club, but is based on a general policy. No question of giving notice to the individual Clubs and hearing their objections arises when a policy decision of general application is the reason for non-renewal of L-19 licences of all the Clubs. The first answer to this contention is that Rule 13 has no application when non-renewal is based on the policy of prohibition.
Even if it is assumed that Rule 13 has still to be complied with, then the question is whether the compliance has to be in spirit or according to the letter of Rule 13. The answer is not in doubt. Rule 13 embodies the natural justice principle of hearing the party before an adverse order is passed against him. It is well settled that compliance with natural justice must be looked at from the view point of substance and not of technicality. The very object of natural justice is that technicality should not defeat justice and that substantial justice must be done. The impugned letter conveys to the petitioner Club that in accordance with the prohibition policy all licences in Form L-19 for retail vend of foreign liquor at a Club are to be discontinued with effect from 1-4-1978. MRs Pappu for the petitioners, contended that this is a decision already arrived at without hearing the petitioneRs That would be merely a technical way of looking at it. In substance the impugned letter is a declaration of the intention of the Government communicated to the petitioner Club in advance. The non-renewal was to be effected from 1-4-1978, while the petitioner Club was informed of the intention of the Government on 15-3-1978. The petitioner Club had thus 15 days time to represent to the Government against the implementation of the intention communicated in the impugned letter. No particular time is prescribed in Rule 13 to be given to the petitioner Club to represent against the intention of non-renewal. In fact, Rule 13 itself contemplates that the decision of non-renewal should be taken before the objections of the licensee concerned are heard. The decision conveyed by the impugned letter is, therefore, fully in accordance with Rule 13. In view of the fact that the petitioner Club could have little or nothing to say against the policy of prohibition, there was very little chance of the petitioner persuading the Government not to follow the policy of prohibition. In these circumstances the period of 15 days given to the petitioner Club was sufficient notice and the requirements of Rule 13 have been satisfied in spirit and substance. The mere fact that the impugned letter is not called the notice and does not invite objections from the petitioner Club is not decisive. The petitioner Club knew well that there was time for putting up objections if the petitioner Club wanted to do so. In fact the petitioner Club has filed a copy of objections put up by many Clubs to dissuade the Government from the policy of prohibition. No date is found on this copy of representation to the Government. But it shows that the Clubs had the opportunity of making a representation and they availed themselves of it. If so, Rule 13 does not invalidate the impugned letter.
(3) What is a relevant consideration for the issue of an order by the Government? If the impugned letter is issued in exercise of the executive power given by a statute it is the statute which is to be looked into to find out the considerations which would be relevant in issuing the said order. The whole scheme of the Punjab Excise Act is to take away from the individuals the right to trade in liquor and to vest it in the Government. Absolute powers are given to the Government to prohibit possession and sale of liquor by persons other than the Government. Specific intention of the legislature to bring about prohibition through the instrumentality of the Act is shown by section 58, whereunder rules to enforce that policy can be made. If the Government has the monopoly of regulating liquor trade it is not necessary for the Government to make rules to bring about prohibition. All that the Government has to do is to refuse to renew the licences or to restrict the sale possession and consumption of liquor by appropriate changes in the licensing conditions. All this is done under the Act and the Rules. No further rules need be made. The prohibition policy is not only relevant but a fundamental consideration governing the executive action of the Government. This last contention also, therefore, fails.
12. MRs Pappu for the petitioners also urged that the licensing function has been recognised by the court to be a quasi-judicial function. The licensing authority has to consider the merits of the case of the petitioner Club as to whether its licence should be renewed or not and if the state Government imposes its own view on the licensing authority then the decision not to renew the licence is vitiated.
13. While it is true that normally the licensing function is administered quasi-judicially, it is not correct to say that the quasi-judicial authority must not take into consideration the policy enunciated by the Government. It is only when quasi-judicial authority has to decide on certain limited consideration the issue before it that it is barred from deciding the said issue on other consideration even if such extraneous considerations consist of a Government directive. But neither under Rule 13 nor under any other rule or provision of the Punjab Excise Act is the licensing authority limited to certain fixed criteria in renewing or refusing to renew a licence. Obviously the provisions of the statute and the rules furnish the guidelines in renewing or not renewing the licence. Since the statute itself contemplates enforcement of a prohibition policy and such policy can be declared administratively the licensing authority was bound to take into consideration the administrative declaration of the policy and give effect to it in the performance of its function. No fault can be found with it on this account.
14. For the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed without order as to costs.
L.RG Petition dismissed.