Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Murari Lal v. Union Of India .

Delhi High Court
Jan 12, 1978
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition for revision was filed by alleged partners of M/s Delhi Gram Flour Mills & Co. seeking to call for records of a complaint filed by the Union of India against Durga Prasad, Manager of the firm, and its ten partners. The complaint arose after a Food Inspector, M.K. Bhan, took a sample of ‘basin’ from the firm’s premises on 31.3.1973 for analysis under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Charges were framed against the accused by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 3.10.1975. One accused, Shrimati Suman Kanodia, challenged the framing of charges under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution, resulting in the quashing of charges against her by Gill, J. on 26.4.1977, on the ground that she was not shown to be in charge or responsible for the business. Subsequently, the other accused sought review of the framing of charges against them, but the Magistrate declined to review the order. Consequently, the petitioners approached this Court for quashing the proceedings pending against them.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the charges framed against the alleged partners of M/s Delhi Gram Flour Mills & Co. could be sustained in the absence of evidence showing that they were in charge of or responsible for the conduct of the business under section 17(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
  2. Whether the proceedings pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate ought to be quashed on the basis of the precedent set in the case of Shrimati Suman Kanodia.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Reliance on the judgment of Gill, J. which quashed the charge against Shrimati Suman Kanodia on the ground that she was not shown to be in charge of the business or responsible for its conduct.
  • Contended that similarly, there was no evidence against them to prove that they were in charge or responsible for the conduct of the business.
  • Asserted that the Food Inspector’s investigation was inadequate, relying on information from the Income-Tax Commissioner, which does not establish the partners’ active involvement in the business.

Respondent's Position

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Suman Kanodia v. Union of India, 1977 (I) F.A.C 161 Establishes that liability under section 17(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act requires proof that the accused was in charge of or responsible for the conduct of the business. The court applied this precedent to quash the charges against the petitioners, as there was no evidence showing their responsibility for the business conduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the evidence, particularly the Food Inspector’s testimony, which showed reliance on the Income-Tax Commissioner’s report to identify the partners but lacked any investigation into their actual role or responsibility in the firm’s business conduct. The Court noted the inadequacy of the investigation, emphasizing that authorities responsible for income assessment do not maintain records relevant to business conduct. The Court found no evidence that the petitioners were in charge or responsible for the business, a necessary element under section 17(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act to sustain charges. The Court also expressed concern over the casual manner in which serious offences of adulteration were prosecuted. It considered but refrained from ordering further evidence due to the significant delay between the sample collection and the proceedings, which could prejudice the accused’s defense. Ultimately, the Court relied on the precedent set by Gill, J. in the Suman Kanodia case to quash the charges against the petitioners and discharge them.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the petition and quashed the order for framing charges against the petitioners, discharging them from the proceedings.

The direct effect of this decision is the termination of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners due to insufficient evidence of their responsibility for the business conduct. The Court did not establish any new precedent beyond affirming the application of the existing principle that liability under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act requires proof of control or responsibility over the business. No broader implications beyond the immediate parties were discussed.

Show all summary ...

Yogeshwar, Dayal, J.:— This is a petition for revision by Sarvshri Murari Lal, Beg Raj, Mukat Behari, Brij Lal, Rajinder Kumar s/o Brij Lal, Om Prakash, Rajinder Kumar and Vijay Kumar, alleged partners of M/s Delhi Gram Flour Mills & Co., for calling for the records of the complaint filed by Union of India through Shri U.S Sharma, Food Inspector of the Office of the Director General, Health Services, against Durga Prasad, Manager of the aforesaid firm and its ten partners and for setting aside the border dated 21.11.1977 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and also for quashing the proceedings pending before Shri J.M Malik, Metropolitan Magistrate in relation to that complaint.

2. The facts relating to the petition are that one M.K Bhan, Food Inspector, visited the premises of the Delhi Gram Flour Mills & Co. on 31.3.1973 and lifted sample of ‘basin’ from Durga Prasad who was the Manager at the Mill of the firm. After performing the usual’ formalitities of getting the sample divided and tested by the public Analyst, the complaint was filed under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The learned Magistrate recorded the evidence of the complainant and passed an order on 3.10.1975; for framing the charge against the accused persons. Against the said order dated 3.10.1975, one of the accused persons, Shrimati Suman Kanodia, felt aggrieved from the said order and filed a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order for framing of the charge.

3. That petition came up for hearing before Gill, J. and the learned Judge by his judgment dated 26th April, 1977 quashed the charge framed by the learned trial court against the said petitioner.

4. Gill, J. took the view after examining the record of the case that as there was no evidence that Shrimati Suman Kanodia was in-charge of the business or that she was responsible for the conduct of the business, she could not be vicariously saddled with the liability under section 17(1) of the aforsaid Act.

5. In view of the aforesaid findings of Gill J. the other eight accused persons also filed a petition for reviewing the order for framing of the charge against them. The learned Magistrate by order dated 21.11.1977 expressed his inability to review the order of his predecssor, if I may say so, rightly. In view of the helplessness of the learned Magistrate, the aforesaid petitioners approached this Court by the present petition for exercise of inherent or revisional jurisdiction for quashing the proceedings.

6. So far as the record of the case is concerned; it is identical with the record of the case of Shrimati Suman Konodia noticed the state of evidence as under:

“In the present case, the evidence of the Food Inspector is that he had required the Commissioner of Income-Tax to inform him about the names of the partners of the Delhi Gram Flour Mills & Company as per their record and that the Commissioner had sent him the names of the partners including that of the petitioner. In cross examination, Food Inspector stated that he gave the names of the partners on the basis of the report of the Commissioner of Income-Tax and that he had not investigated as to whether the partners stated to him were working or not. It is contended that the petitioner is neither incharge of the business nor she is responsible for the conduct of the business. It is a question of fact whether a particular partner is incharge of and responsible for the conduct of the business. There is absolutely no evidence to prove this fact against the petitioner.”

7. Mr. D.C Mathur who was also the counsel in the case of Shrimati Suman Kanodia has tried to press to his advantage the observations of Gill, J. mentioned above and has contended that in view of this state of evidence, the present petitioners are also entitled to the same advantage and relief.

8. It is most unfortunate that such serious offences of adulteration are being prosecuted in such a. casual fashion. No serious afford was made by the Food Inspector who was the Investigating Officer in even eliciting information as to the composition of the firm and conduct of its business either from the Registrar of Firms or the Competent authorities under the Shops & Establishments Act. His approaching the income-tax authorities do not maintain the records as to the conduct of the business. They are authorities only for collection of revenues and they are concerned only with the income of the firms etc.

9. The Food Inspector, in cross-examination, stated that one of the reasons for the delay in the prosecution was that he tried to get information from various other department of Delhi Administration and the Central Government but he did not specify from which department he made any effort to collect relevant information. One cannot imagine that one wing of the Government will not assist another wing. I would have been inclined, after quashing the proceedings, to direct further evidence being recorded under section 540 of the old code; but in view of the fact that the article of food of which the sample was taken is ‘basin’ which was lifted practically more than four years back and that may cause prejudice to the accused persons in their defence, I am refraining from exercising those powers.

10. For the reasons given by Gill, J., in the aforsaid case of Smt. Suman Kanodia v. Union of India, 1977 (I) F.A.C 161, I hereby quash the order for framing the charge against the aforsaid petitioners only and discharge them,

11. Petition allowed.