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Tarlok Singh Petitioner v. The Superintendent Of Customs & Another S
Analytical Summary of the Opinion by R.N. Aggarwal, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
On 7 March 1978 police intercepted a car bearing registration No. UPI 3031 transporting cloth valued at about Rs. 50,000. Mukhtiar Singh, Sagar Singh and Tara Chand (occupants) were arrested; the driver, identified as Tarlok Singh, fled. During investigation the police found that the cloth had been illegally imported from Triveni Bazar, Nepal, and customs authorities were informed.
On 15 March 1978 Mr. M.R. Kathuria, Customs Inspector (Preventive), applied to the Magistrate stating that the accused were reasonably believed to have committed an offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962, that the clothes and the car were liable to seizure under the Act, and prayed that the police hand over the goods and the car to the customs authorities. The Magistrate obtained the S.H.O.'s report and ordered the goods and the car to be handed over to the customs authorities.
A few days later Tarlok Singh applied for release of the car UPI 3031 to him on superdari. The customs authorities opposed that application; the Magistrate heard the parties and dismissed Tarlok Singh's application. Tarlok Singh filed the present revision petition challenging the Magistrate's order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the expression "any goods" in section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 covers a motor car (conveyance) used to transport smuggled goods, thereby permitting its seizure under section 110(1).
- Whether, once a seizure is made under section 110(1), the seized conveyance (the car) can lawfully be released to its owner on superdari pending adjudication under section 124 and related provisions.
- Whether the seizure in this case was effected by a "proper officer" as defined in the Act (i.e., whether the seizure was by a duly authorised officer).
- Whether the petitioner's apprehension that the car would deteriorate if not released on superdari amounts to sufficient reason for interim release when the Customs Act prescribes specified post-seizure procedures (including the six‑month period under section 110(2)).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Mr. C.L. Prem on behalf of Tarlok Singh) Arguments
- Section 110 contemplates only "goods" on which duty is payable (i.e., dutiable goods) and does not extend to the car used as a means of transport; therefore the car is not covered by section 110 and may be returned to the owner on superdari pending adjudication under section 124.
- The seizure under section 110(1) was not made by a duly authorised officer, and therefore the seizure is legally invalid.
- The petitioner had lent the car for use at a wedding; if the car is not given on superdari it will deteriorate/become junk over a few years and the petitioner will suffer serious loss — implying that equitable considerations support interim release.
- Relied on precedent: Deputy Superintendent, Customs, Preventive, West Bengal v. Sitaram Navsaria and another (AIR 1968 Calcutta 274) — arguing that the authority in that case supports returning the conveyance pending further proceedings.
- Also relied on other authorities cited in the petition (Deo Dutta Sharma v. Manohar Lal & Ors; Charan Singh v. Gehl Singh & another; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co. and another), contending they supported the petitioner's position.
Respondent's (Customs) Position
- Customs took the view (as reflected by their application to the Magistrate) that the clothes and the car were liable to seizure under the Customs Act and sought an order that police hand over the goods and car to the customs authorities for necessary action under the Act.
- The customs authorities opposed the petitioner's application for release of the car on superdari when that application was moved before the Magistrate.
- The customs authorities proceeded on the legal basis provided in the Act for seizure and subsequent adjudication/confiscation proceedings (sections 110, 115, 124 and 135 were pivotal in the customs position as recorded by the Court).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Deputy Superintendent, Customs, Preventive, West Bengal v. Sitaram Navsaria & another, A.I.R. 1968 Calcutta 274 | The Single Judge observed that Customs Authorities have power under section 110 of the Customs Act to seize goods; where goods are in custody of court/police and Customs wish to exercise s.110 powers, a court considering an order under section 523 Cr.P.C. need only see whether the power is vested in Customs and need not enter into the merits of the basis for belief; in that case the Judge also ordered that a lorry might be returned to registered owner on bond pending initiation of proceedings. | The petitioner relied on this authority to argue for return of the car. The Court in the present opinion considered the decision but distinguished it: there were no clear reasons in the cited authority for returning the lorry and it may have been that no confiscation proceedings were initiated in that case. The present Court held that once seizure is made under section 110(1) of the Act, the procedural formalities under section 124 must follow and there is no provision in the Act for handing over seized property pending adjudication. |
| Deo Dutta Sharma v. Manohar Lal & Ors, 1974 P.L.R. Vol. 76 p. 16 | Not described in the provided opinion. | The Court states it has gone through this authority and considered it but held that it is not applicable to the present case. |
| Charan Singh v. Gehl Singh & another, 1974 P.L.R. Vol. 76 p. 115 | Not described in the provided opinion. | The Court states it has gone through this authority and considered it but held that it is not applicable to the present case. |
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co. & another, AIR 1967 S.C. 276 | Not described in the provided opinion. | The Court states it has gone through this authority and considered it but held that it is not applicable to the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis follows the statutory text and structure of the Customs Act, 1962, and the recorded facts. The reasoning proceeds in the following steps:
-
Interpretation of statutory language:
- The Court examined definitions in the Act: section 2(14) defines "dutiable goods" and section 2(22) defines "goods", the latter expressly including "vessels, aircrafts and vehicles" and other movable property. Consequently, the phrase "any goods" in section 110 is read to include conveyances (such as the car UPI 3031) as provided by the statutory definitions.
-
Application of sections relevant to seizure and confiscation:
- Section 110(1) authorises a "proper officer" who has reason to believe goods are liable to confiscation to seize such goods. The Court held that this includes the power to seize the car alleged to have been used in smuggling the cloth from Nepal.
- Section 115(2) makes any conveyance used as a means of transport in smuggling or carriage of smuggled goods liable to confiscation unless the owner proves lack of knowledge/connivance and compliance with prescribed precautions; thus the vehicle may be subject to confiscation proceedings.
- Section 124 requires that before confiscation the person be given notice in writing informing him of the grounds and an opportunity to make representation and be heard; subsection (2) of section 110 (as referred to by the Court) provides that if no notice under clause (a) of section 124 is given within six months of seizure, goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized (subject to possible extension by the Collector for a further six months on sufficient cause).
-
Consequence for interim release on superdari:
- The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that section 110 only contemplates dutiable goods and excludes the car, on the basis that the Act's definition of "goods" includes vehicles; therefore the car is properly within the scope of section 110.
- Because the car was seized under section 110(1), the Court held that the post-seizure procedural regime prescribed by the Act (notably section 124 and the time limits in section 110(2)) must be followed; there is no provision in the Act authorising release of a seized conveyance to its owner on superdari pending the adjudication required by those provisions.
-
Consideration of precedent and other contentions:
- The Court addressed the Deputy Superintendent (Sitaram Navsaria) decision relied upon by the petitioner, noting that while that authority recognises the Customs power under section 110 and recognises practical difficulties, there were no clear reasons in that decision for returning the lorry in question and it was possible that no confiscation proceedings had been initiated in that case. Thus the present Court distinguished the authority and found it not determinative in this matter.
- Other cases cited by petitioner were considered by the Court but were said to be not applicable; the opinion does not elaborate the content of those authorities beyond stating they were examined and found inapplicable.
-
On the contention that the seizure was not by a "proper officer":
- The Court observed that the application to the Magistrate for seizure was made by Mr. M.R. Kathuria, Customs Inspector (Preventive). There was no plea before the Magistrate that the application had not been made by a duly authorised officer; the Court therefore found no material to support the petitioner's challenge to the validity of the seizure on that ground.
-
On the petitioner's apprehension of damage/deterioration to the car:
- The Court held that this apprehension is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory scheme. The Act obliges customs authorities to take proceedings for confiscation within six months, failing which the goods must be returned; the statutory timeline and remedial mechanism address concerns about prolonged detention. The Court emphasised that the stringent measures in the Act target prevention of smuggling.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petition dismissed.
Implications:
- The Magistrate's order dismissing the petitioner's application for release of the car on superdari is upheld; the car remains seized and the statutory procedures under the Customs Act (notably sections 110, 115 and 124) govern subsequent steps (including notice, representation, hearing and possible confiscation).
- The Court concluded that a conveyance used (or alleged to be used) in the smuggling of goods falls within the scope of "goods" under the Customs Act and may be seized under section 110(1); post-seizure statutory safeguards (notice and adjudication under section 124) must be observed and there is no provision in the Act for interim return to owner on superdari pending adjudication.
- No broader legal principle or novel rule was announced beyond the application/interpretation of the existing statutory scheme; the decision applies the Act to the facts and emphasizes adherence to the procedural safeguards and timelines contained in the statute. The Court noted that the measures under the Act are stringent and aimed at preventing smuggling.
Disposition: Petition dismissed.
R.N Aggarwal, J.:— The relevant facts for the decision of this revision petition are these: on 7th March 1978 the police intercepted a car bearing registration No. UPI 3031 carrying cloth worth about Rs. 50,000. Mukhtiar Singh, Sagar Singh and Tara Chand who were in the car were arrested; 4th person who was identified as Tarlok Singh driver ran away. During investigation the police found that the cloth had been illegally imported from Triveni Bazar, Nepal. The customs authorities were informed of the alleged seizure.
2. On 15th March 1978 Mr. M.R Kathuria, Customs Inspector (Preventive) made an application to the Magistrate that the accused are reasonably believed to have committed an offence punishable under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 (briefly “the Act”) and that the clothes and the car are liable to be seized under the Act and prayed that the police be directed to hand over the goods alongwith the car to the customs authorities for necessary action. The Magistrate called the report of the S.H.O Karol Bagh and made an order for handing over the goods and the car to the customs authorities. A few days thereafter Tarlok Singh made an application for the release of the Car No. UPI 3031 to him on superdari. This request was opposed by the customs authorities. The learned Magistrate after hearing the parties dismissed the application of Tarlok Singh. Against the aforesaid order, Tarlok Singh has come in revision.
3. To appreciate the legal controversy involved in the petition it will be useful to set out the relevant provisions of the Act. The relevant provisions read as follows:
“110. SEIZURE OF GOODS, DOCUMENTS AND THINGS.
(1) If the proper officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under this Act, he may seize such goods:
Provided that where it is not practicable to seize any such goods, the proper officer may serve on the owner of the goods an order that he shall not remove, part with, or otherwise deal with the goods except with the previous permission of such officer.
(2) Where any goods are seized under sub-section (1) and no notice in respect thereof is given under clause (a) of section 124 within six months of the seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized:
Provided that the aforesaid period of six months may, on sufficient cause being shown, be extended by the Collector of Customs for a period not exceeding six months.
115. CONFISCATION OF CONVEYANCES
(1) *** *** ***
(2) Any conveyance or animal used as a means of transport in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of any smuggled goods shall be liable to confiscation, unless the owner of the conveyance or animal proves that it was so used without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, and the person in charge of the conveyance or animal and that each of them had taken all such precautions against such use as are for the time being specified in the rules:
Provided that where any such conveyance is used for the carriage of goods of passengers for hire, the owner of any conveyance shall be given an option to pay in lieu of the confiscation of the conveyance a fine not exceeding the market price of the goods which are sought to be smuggled or the smuggled goods, as the case may be.
124. ISSUE OF SHOW CAUSE NOTICE BEFORE CONFISCATION OF GOODS, ETC. — No order confiscating any goods or imposing any penalty on any person shall be made under this Chapter unless the owner of the goods or such person —
(a) is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the goods or to impose a penalty;
(b) is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein; and
(c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter:
Provided that the notice referred to in clause (a) and the representation referred to in clause (b) may, at the request of the person concerned be oral.
135. EVASION OF DUTY OR PROHIBITIONS. — Without prejudice to any action that may be taken under this Act, if any person —
(a) is in relation to any goods in any way knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of any duty chargeable thereon or of any prohibition for the time being imposed under this Act or any other law for the time being in force with respect to such goods, or
(b) acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111,
he shall be punishable, —
(i) in the case of an offence relating to any of the goods to which section 123 applies and the market price whereof exceeds one lakh of rupees, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine:
Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the court, such imprisonment shall not be for less than six months;
(ii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
4. A reading of the above provisions would bring out that if a customs officer duly authorised has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under the Act he can seize those goods. Section 124 provides that the authority before confiscating the goods shall give a notice in writing to the person concerned informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the goods or to impose a penalty. Sub-section (2) of section 100 provides that if no notice is given, as required under clause (a) of section 124 within six months of the seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. Section 135 provides for punishment for evasion of duty.
5. Mr. C.L Prem, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that section 110 only contemplates goods on which duty is pay able and that the car used in transporting the goods is not covered by section 110 and therefore, there is no legal bar to the return of the car on superdari to its owner pending adjudication proceedings under section 124 of the Act. I do not agree with this contention. Sections 2 (14) and 2 (22) of the Act define the expressions “dutiable goods” and “goods”. The two definitions read as follows:—
2 (14) “dutiable goods” means any goods which are chargeable to duty and on which duty has not been paid;
2 (22) “goods” includes —
(a) vessels, aircrafts and vehicles;
(b) stores;
(c) baggage;
(d) currency and negotiable instruments; and
(e) any other kind of moveable property;
The words employed in section 110 (i) and ‘any goods’ and this expression would obviously include both ‘dutiable goods’ and “goods” as defined in section 2 (22) Section 115 (2) clearly provides that any conveyance or animals used as a means of transport in smuggling the goods or in the carriage of any smuggled goods shall be liable to confiscation unless the owner of the conveyance or animals proves that it was so used without his knowledge or connivance. The allegation in the case in hand is that cloth was smuggled from Nepal and it was being transported in car No. UPI 3031. On the allegation made, there can be no doubt, that the customs officer had the authority to seize the car under section 110. After the seizure under sub-section (1) of section 110 the authority has to follow the procedure laid down in section 124. In case a notice is issued to the petitioner or to any other person as required by clause (a) of section 124 it will be for the petitioner to satisfy the authority that the car was used in transporting the smuggled goods without his knowledge or connivance. If no notice is given as provided under clause (a) of section 124 then the consequences as laid down in section 110 (2) will follow. The above is the scheme of the Act in a case where an action is taken under section 110 (1).
6. Mr. Prem in support of his contention relied on the Deputy Superintendent, Customs, Preventive, West Bengal v. Sitaram Navsaria and another, A.I.R 1968 Calcutta 274 (1). The facts of the cited case are that certain categories of goods including mostly ball bearing and steel files of foreign origin, which were believed to be smuggled property, were seized by the police from party No. 1 therein. In another case (Criminal Revision No. 988 of 1965) the police had seized a lorry loaded with bundles of cinnamon and cloves of foreign origin from the custody of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 therein. Party No. 1 was the driver of the lorry and party No. 5 was the owner thereof. The seizures in both the cases were made by the police under section 54 Cr.P.C/411 I.P.C While the case was pending for investigation the customs authorities made an application to the Chief Presidency Magistrate praying for a direction on the Investigating Officer concerned to hand over the seized goods to the customs authorities at the conclusion of the investigation or trial to facilitate proceedings under the Customs law against the concerned offenders. The police ultimately submitted final reports in both the cases and the Chief Presidency Magistrate, after hearing the parties made an order that the seized goods be returned to the accused and the customs authorities may, if necessary, thereafter make there own independent seizure from the person who takes delivery of the goods without further reference to the court. The above order was challenged by the customs authorities by a petition in the High Court. A Single Judge of that Court held as under:
“The Customs Authorities, under S. 110 of the Customs Act 1962 have the unfettered power of seizure of the goods. Where the Customs Authorities by virtue of that power went to make the seizure but the goods concerned being in the custody of the Court, could not or did not want to seize the same without the Court's order, in such a case all that the Court need see if it wants to make an order under section 523 of Cr.P.C in favour of Customs Authorities is whether the power that they want to exercise is vested in them by law and if it is so vested, the Court need not enter into the question of the merits of the materials which may provide the basis for the belief that the goods concerned are contraband. That is a matter which the Customs Authorities would have to prove by evidence in the proceeding that they would have to start if they want to make an order of confiscation. There is also no question of surrendering the Court's discretion to the opinion of the Customs Authorities because all that the Court has to see in the matter of disposal of property under section 523 Cr.P.C is that the order that is passed is an appropriate order in the facts and circumstances of the case.
There are practical difficulties in the matter of refusing to act up to the prayer made by the Customs Authorities in the exercise of powers granted to them under the Act. Under the Customs Act itself, the Customs Authorities would have the power given to them in section 110 to seize the goods from the custody of the police and there may be a conflict between the Customs Authorities eager to exercise their powers and the police authorities anxious to carry out the orders of the Court.
Then again if under the orders of the Magistrate the Customs people have to make the seizure from the parties concerned after they have got back their goods from the police, it may as well be that they will never come to get back their goods and to face the consequences thereof and that again would frustrate the purposes of the Customs Act.”
As regards the lorry the learned Judge made the following order:
“There is a lorry seized in the case out of which Criminal Revision Case No. 988 of 1965 has arisen. It may or may not be liable the confiscation under sec. 115 of the Customs Act. The Customs Authorities will have to initiate a proceeding if they want to confiscate the lorry. There is no reason why pending disposal of the proceeding the lorry should be detained. It may be returned to the registered owner on a bond and on terms.”
7. Mr. Prem relying on the above observations contended that the decision in Deputy Superintendent, Customs (supra) is on all fours of the case in hand and the same order may be made in respect of the car. There are no clear reasons given in the cited authority for returning the lorry. It is possible that in that case no proceedings were initiated for the seizing of the lorry. I have earlier discussed the various provisions of law bearing on the point and, to my mind, there appears to be no escape from the conclusion that once the seizure is made under section 110 (1) of the Act then the other formalities to which I have adverted, must follow. There is no provision in the Act for handing over the seized property to the owner pending adjudication under section 124.
8. Mr. Prem further drew my attention to the following authorities: Deo Dutta Sharma v. Manohar Lal & Ors. 1974 P.L.R Vol. 76 p. 16 (2). Charan Singh v. Gehl Singh & another, 1974 P.L.R vol. 76 p. 115 (3). State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co. and another, AIR 1967 SC 276 (4), I have gone through the cited authorities and, in my view, they are not applicable to the case in hand.
9. Mr. Prem next contended that the seizure under section 110 (1) was not by a duly authorised officer and therefore, there is no legal and valid seizure. There is nothing on record to support the above contention. Section 2 (34) of the Act defines the expression “proper officer” and the definition reads as under:
“2 (34) “proper officer”, in relation to any functions to be performed under this Act, means the officer of customs who is assigned those functions by the Board or the Collector of Customs;”
The application to the Magistrate for seizure was made by Mr. M.R Kathuria, Customs Inspector (Preventive). There was no plea before the Magistrate that the application was not by a duly authorised officer. This contention of Mr. Prem is without merit.
10. Mr. Prem lastly contended that the car was given by the petitioner to Mukhtiar Singh and others for use in a wedding and that if the car is not given on superdari to the petitioner it will be reduced to a junk after few years and the petitioner would be put to serious loss. This apprehension of the petitioner is not correct. As already stated, the customs authorities are under a legal obligation to take proceedings for confiscation within six months, failing which the seized goods have to be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. The measures contemplated under the Act are stringent and obviously they have been introduced with the object of preventing smuggling.
For the reasons stated I find no merit in the petition and it is dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
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