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Ganga Ram Petitioner v. Mohd. Usman
Structured Summary of the Opinion: Civil Revision Petition No. 418 of 1972
Factual and Procedural Background
This Civil Revision Petition was filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (No. 9 of 1887) against the judgment and decree dated 4th October, 1972 of Shri B.B. Gupta, Judge, Small Cause Court, Delhi, in Suit No. 3343 of 1972.
The original suit was filed by the respondent, Shri Mohd. Usman (the landlord), seeking recovery of Rs. 561.75 for the period 1969–1972. The plaintiff alleged that the petitioner, Shri Ganga Ram (the tenant), was a statutory tenant paying Rs. 60 per month, while parts of the premises had been sublet by the tenant to others who paid rent aggregating Rs. 78.26 per month. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) had assessed the rateable value of the premises by taking into account both the rent paid by the tenant and the amounts paid by subtenants, resulting in an increased tax liability. The plaintiff relied on Section 121(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act to recover from the tenant the difference between the tax actually levied and the tax that would have been leviable if assessment had been made on the rent of Rs. 60 alone.
The tenant contested the suit on various pleas. The Subordinate Judge observed that an earlier similar suit by the respondent had been decreed and that a Civil Revision by the petitioner in that earlier matter was dismissed (marked as Exhibit P.4). The present Civil Revision challenged the Subordinate Judge's decree.
During initial consideration, the single judge (B.C. Misra J. at an earlier stage) formed the view that interpretation of Section 121 of the Corporation Act might require hearing the Municipal Corporation, issued notice to it, and indicated two specific questions for reference to a larger Bench. The matter was then placed before a Full Bench of three Judges for final decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Municipal Corporation of Delhi can fix the annual rateable value at a figure higher than the amount of rent paid by the tenant to the landlord by taking into consideration the amount of rent paid by the subtenants to the tenant.
- Whether the landlord is entitled to recover under Section 121 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act the enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant notwithstanding the contract of tenancy and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 and Section 4 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman, I.L.R. 1971 (1) Delhi 639 | Held by H.R. Khanna C.J that Section 121(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act prevails over Section 7(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act where Section 121(1) deals with the specific contingency of assessment exceeding contracted rent. | The Court adopted and endorsed the reasoning and conclusion of H.R. Khanna C.J, stating agreement that Section 121(1) has an overriding effect over the provision in Section 7(2) of the Rent Act. |
| South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum and another, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 207 | States the principle that a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope, leaving the general provision to apply where the special provision does not operate. | The Court relied on this principle (as applied by H.R. Khanna C.J) to justify giving effect to the special provision in Section 121(1) of the Corporation Act over the more general provision in the Rent Act. |
| Sunderdass Tola Ram and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, C.M. (M) No. 197 of 1971 (Division Bench, decided 26th March, 1973) | The Division Bench expressed the view that the Delhi Rent Control Act (a later and special statute dealing with landlord-tenant rights) prevailed over Section 121(1) of the Corporation Act, and therefore Section 121(1) was set at naught by Section 7(2) of the Rent Act. | The Court treated that opinion as obiter dictum, criticized the reasoning (particularly the assertion that the Rent Act was a later and special statute), and explicitly refused to accept that view as laying down the correct law. |
| Asa Ram v. District Board, Muzaffarnagar, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 480 | Used by the Division Bench in Sunderdass to support the proposition that where two Acts are repugnant, the later must prevail (drawing on the general rule of precedence between statutes). | The Court noted that the Division Bench relied on this decision, but it did not accept the Division Bench's application of the later-enactment rule to the present conflict, given the factual and statutory history examined in the opinion. |
| King v. Justices of Middlesex, (1831) 2 B & Ad. 818 | Ancient authority quoted to the effect that where two Acts passed in the same session and coming into operation the same day are repugnant, the later (in the order of assent) prevails. | The Court recorded that this principle was invoked by the Division Bench (via Asa Ram), but the Full Bench disagreed with the application of that general rule to conclude that the Rent Control Act ousted Section 121(1) in the circumstances of these statutes. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a structured manner:
- On the first question (whether MCD could assess rateable value higher by taking subtenant rents into account), the Court declined to decide the point on the present record. The Court emphasized that the validity of the levy by the Municipal Corporation directly concerns the Corporation and that the Corporation was not a party to the suit brought by the landlord in which only recovery from the tenant was claimed. Although notice had been issued to the Corporation during earlier proceedings and an appearance was entered for the Corporation in the Revision, the Court considered it unfair to adjudicate on the validity of the levy without the Corporation having been made a proper party with opportunity to file pleadings. Accordingly, the first question was not considered or decided.
-
On the second question (whether the landlord can recover the enhanced house tax from the tenant under Section 121(1) notwithstanding the contract and Section 7(2) of the Rent Act), the Court analysed the relevant statutory provisions by reference to their text and purpose:
- The Court reproduced and considered Section 121(1) and (3) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and Section 7(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
- The Court observed that Section 121(1) specifically addresses the contingency where the rateable value assessed on a tenanted premises exceeds the amount of rent payable to the person upon whom the taxes are leviable, and grants that person the right to recover the excess property tax from the tenant. By contrast, Section 7(2) of the Rent Act generally bars the landlord from recovering from the tenant "the amount of any tax on building or land imposed in respect of the premises occupied by the tenant."
- The Court examined prior authority, particularly the decision of H.R. Khanna C.J in Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman, which had rejected the contention that because the Rent Act was a later enactment it should have overriding effect. H.R. Khanna C.J had treated Section 121(1) as a special provision directed at a particular contingency and applied the principle that a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope (citing the South India Corporation case).
- The Full Bench expressly agreed with H.R. Khanna C.J's reasoning, finding that Section 121(1) is a special enactment dealing with a specific contingency and therefore has an overriding effect to the extent of its scope over the general prohibition in Section 7(2) of the Rent Act.
- The Court then considered the Division Bench decision in Sunderdass Tola Ram v. MCD which had taken the opposite view, holding that the Rent Act (as a later and special statute) prevailed and nullified Section 121(1). The Full Bench found that opinion to be obiter dictum and disagreed with its premise. The Court reviewed statutory chronology and history: the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was enacted in 1957 and provisions of the Rent Act of 1958 (and the earlier 1952 Act then in force in the region) showed that it was not correct to treat Section 7(2) as a later provision that should override Section 121(1). The Full Bench concluded that the Division Bench's reliance on the "later and special statute" rationale was unsound in the factual statutory context and that the Division Bench had not considered the H.R. Khanna decision.
- Based on the foregoing statutory interpretation and precedential analysis, the Full Bench answered the second question in the affirmative: the landlord is entitled to recover under Section 121(1) the enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant notwithstanding the contract of tenancy and the provisions of Section 7(2) and Section 4 of the Rent Act.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Civil Revision Petition No. 418 of 1972 is dismissed.
The direct legal consequence for the parties (as articulated in the opinion) is that the landlord is entitled to recover, under Section 121(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant notwithstanding the terms of the tenancy agreement and the provisions of Section 7(2) and Section 4 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Court also expressly rejected the contrary view expressed by the Division Bench in Sunderdass Tola Ram (describing that view as not laying down the correct law).
Costs: The petition was dismissed without costs.
The opinion confines itself to the matters litigated: it did not decide the validity of the Municipal Corporation's assessment procedure (the first question was not decided because the Corporation was not a properly joined party). The Full Bench's ruling settles the interpretation of the interaction between Section 121(1) of the Corporation Act and Section 7(2) of the Rent Act as recorded in this opinion.
T.V.R Tatachari, C.J:— This Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (No. 9 of 1887) against the judgment and decree of Shri B.B Gupta, Judge, Small Cause Court, Delhi, dated 4th October, 1972, in Suit No. 3343 of 1972.
2. The said suit was filed by the respondent herein, Shri Mohd. Usman, for recovery of Rs. 561.75 p. alleging that the petitioner herein, Shri Ganga Ram, was a statutory tenant under him on a monthly rent of Rs. 60, and that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi assessed the rateable value of the house No. 369 at Rs. 1,720 and imposed other charges like water tax, scavanging tax, fire tax, etc. amounting to Rs. 111.80 p. It was also alleged in the plaint that the petitioner (tenant) had sublet the premises in his tenancy to three persons who were paying rent to him amounting to Rs. 78.26 p. per month, that the said amount was taken into consideration by the Corporation in determining the rateable value of the premises, and that the Corporation determined the rateable value on the basis that the premises in dispute was fetching rent at the rate of Rs. 60 plus Rs. 78.26 p. = Rs. 138.26 p. It was submitted that the respondent (plaintiff) was entitled under Section 121 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act to recover from the petitioner (tenant) the difference between the amount of the property tax levied on the property and the amount of tax which would be leviable upon the premises if the said tax was calculated only on the amount of rent of Rs. 60 per month paid by the petitioner (tenant) to the respondent without taking into consideration the such of Rs. 78.26 p. that was paid by the subtenants to the petitioner (tenant), that the respondent thus paid an extra sum of Rs. 561.75 p. to the Municipal Corporation for the period 1969 to 1972, and that he was entitled to recover the same from the petitioner. The petitioner (tenant) contested the suit raising various pleas.
3. The suit was heard by Shri B.B Gupta, Judge, Small Cause Court, Delhi. The respondent had earlier filed a similar suit for recovery of extra tax from the petitioner (tenant) for an earlier period, and the same was decreed. A Civil Revision was preferred by the petitioner (tenant) to this Court against the said judgment and decree and the same was dismissed by the judgment which has been marked as Exhibit P. 4 in the present suit. Observing that a perusal of the said judgment shows that the same pleas were taken by the petitioner (tenant) in the said earlier suit and had been overruled by the High Court, the learned Subordinate Judge decreed the present suit. The petitioner (tenant) has filed the present Civil Revision Petition against that judgment and decree.
4. The present Civil Revision came up for hearing before B.C Misra J. in the first instance. The Learned Judge considered that the provision involved the interpretation of Section 121 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and, therefore, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi should be heard. He accordingly issued notice to the Corporation to show cause why it should not be impleaded in the Revision. It appears from the record that though the learned Judge did not subsequently pass any order impleading the Corporation, Mr. C.L Chaudhry, Advocate, entered appearance for the Corporation and was heard by the learned Judge at the time of the hearing of the Revision Petition. After hearing the counsel for the petitioner and the respondent, and Mr. Chaudhry for the Corporation, the learned Judge noted that while Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act provides that the landlord shall not recover from the tenant, by increase in rent or otherwise, the amount of any tax on building or land imposed in respect of the premises occupied by the tenant. Section 121 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act enables the landlord to recover from the tenant any excess of the amount of house tax which has been levied on the building and which is in excess of the amount which would be leviable on the amount of contracted rent received from the tenant, and that there was thus a conflict between Section 7 (2) of the Rent Act and Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act. The learned Judge also observed that in Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman, I.L.R 1971 (1) Delhi 639 (1), H.R Khanna C.J (as his Lordship then was) held that Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act would prevail upon Section 7 (2) of the Rent Act, while a Division Bench of this Court, S.N Andley C.J and S.N Shankar J., held in Sunderdass Tola Ram and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, C.M (M) No. 197 of 1971 (2), decided on 26th March, 1973, that the right given by Section 121 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was set at naught by Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, and that the provisions of the Rent Act prevailed, it being a later and special statute. The learned Judge further observed that the decision of H.R Khanna, C.J was not noticed by the Division Bench. In the circumstances, the learned Judge considered that the questions involved in the case need to be decided by a larger Bench.
5. The learned Judge indicated the following two questions as arising for determination in the Revision: —
“ (1) Whether the Municipal Corporation of Delhi can fix the annual rateable value at a figure higher than the amount of rent paid by the tenant to the landlord by taking into consideration the amount of rent paid by the subtenants to the tenant; and
(2) If so, whether the landlord is entitled to recover under section 121 of the Corporation Act the enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant notwithstanding the contract of tenancy and the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 and 4 of the Delhi Rent Control Act ?”
The Civil Revision Petition then came up before two of us (T.V.R Tatachari, C.J and Yogeshwar Dayal, J.) on 23rd March, 1977, and it was directed to be posted for hearing by a Full Bench of three Judges. That is how the Civil Revision Petition has now came up before us.
6. It is not clear from the order of the learned single Judge as to whether he wanted to refer only the two questions or the entire Civil Revision Petition to the larger Bench. However, the learned counsel for the parties are agreed before us that the entire Civil Revision Petition may be treated as referred for decision by us.
7. So far as the first question is concerned, it cannot be permitted to be raised and decided in the present case as the suit, as framed, was only for recovery of the excess tax amount from the tenant. The learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant) submitted that he would like to challenge the levy of the tax also and the first question may also be considered by us. In our opinion, he cannot be permitted to do so because the validity of the levy of the tax by the Corporation taking into consideration the rent paid by the subtenants to the tenant concerns the Corporation, but it was not made a party to the suit filed by the landlord. If the tenant wants to question the validity of the levy, he has to do so by an appropriate proceeding making the Corporation a party. It is true that notice was issued by the learned single Judge to the Corporation in this Civil Revision Petition and Mr. C.L Chaudhry appeared for the Corporation. Yet, his appearance was only in response to the notice issued by the learned single Judge in the Revision, and it would be unfair to the Corporation to add it as a party for the first time in this Revision Petition and decide the validity of the levy without giving it a proper opportunity to file a regular pleading in writing regarding the same. We, therefore, informed the counsel that we will not consider and decide the first question.
8. As regards the second question, it is necessary to refer to Section 121 (1) and (3) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. They read as follows: —
“121. Apportionment of liability for property taxes when the premises assessed are let or sublet —
(1) If any land or building assessed to property taxes is let, and its rateable value exceeds the amount of rent payable in respect thereof to the person upon whom under the provisions of section 120 the said taxes are leviable, that person shall be entitled to receive from his tenant the difference between the amount of the property taxes levied upon him and the amount which would be leviable upon him if the said taxes were calculated on the amount of rent payable to him.
(2) . . . . . . . . ..
(3) Any person entitled to receive any sum under this Section shall have for the recovery thereof, the same rights and remedies as if such sum were rent payable to him by the person from whom he is entitled to receive the same.”
“7. Lawful increase of standard rent in certain cases and recovery of other charges —
(1) . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Where a landlord pays in respect of the premises any charge for electricity or water consumed in the premises or any other charge levied by a local authority having jurisdiction in the area which is ordinarily payable by the tenant, he may recover from the tenant the amount so paid by him; but the landlord shall not recover from the tenant whether by means of an increase in rent or otherwise the amount of any tax on building or land imposed in respect of the premises occupied by the tenant:
Provided . . . . . . . . . .”
9. A perusal of the above provisions shows that while Section 121 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, enables the landlord to recover from the tenant the excess tax levied on a building let out to the tenant, the second part of Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, precludes him from recovering from the tenant any tax imposed in respect of the premises in the occupation of the tenant. The question for consideration is as to whether these two provisions are in conflict with each other.
10. In Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman (supra), H.R Khanna C.J considered this question and rejected a contention urged before him that as the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) is a later enactment compared to the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957), the provision in the Delhi Rent Control Act should have an overriding effect. The learned Chief Justice pointed out that the bar created by the second part of Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act pertains to “normal tax on the building” occupied by the tenant, while Section 121 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act “deals with the contingency where the property tax levied for the tenanted premises is more than the amount which would have been levied had the assessment been made on the basis of the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord”, and that “as Section 121 is an enactment dealing specially with that particular contingency”, its provision would have an overriding effect on the basis of the well established principle that “a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope, leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply” as enunciated in South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandurm and another, A.I.R 1964 S.C 207 (3). The learned Chief Justice observed that “the fact that the Delhi Rent Control Act was enacted in time subsequent to the enactment of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act would not make much material difference”. He further observed that apart from the above, he was of the view that the provisions of Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act were not attracted to the case before him as those provisions dealt with tax on building or land imposed in respect of premises “occupied by the tenant”, while in the case before him, as in the present case before us, the tenant of the premises in dispute had “ceased to occupy” portions of the premises which have been sublet by him. With respect, we are in complete agreement with the reasons given by the learned Chief Justice as well as with his view that Section 121 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act has an overriding effect over the provision in Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
11. We have, however, to consider the decision in Sunderdass Tola Ram and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra). In that case, until the financial year 1969-70, the building in question was assessed to house tax on an annual rateable value of Rs. 50,240. In July, 1970, the Assistant Assessor and Collector of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi proposed to increase the rateable value from Rs. 50,240 to Rs. 61,500, with effect from 1st April, 1970, on the ground that there were additions to the building and changes in the rent. The owners-landlords of the building filed their objections to the said proposal, stating that there had been no increase in the rent which was being recovered by them from the tenants, and that some of the tenants had made unauthorised constructions in the said building without the permission of the owners-landlords or of the Building Department of etc. Municipal Corporation. The Deputy Assessor and Collector made a verification at the site and confirmed that the owners-landlords were getting the same rent as before from the various tenants. He, however, took the view that by reason of the unauthorised constructions made by the tenants, the accommodation and the property had gone up and so should be the rental value. In that view, he increased the annual rateable value to Rs. 57,890.
12. The owners-landlords preferred an appeal to the Additional District Judge, Delhi, but the same was dismissed. They then filed a petition in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying that the enhancement of the rateable value may be quashed as being illegal and void. The petition was heard by a Division Bench of this Court, S.N Andley C.J and S.N Shankar J. The Division Bench held firstly that under section 124 (3) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, notice had to be given to the owner or to any lessee or occupier of the building when the rateable value of the building was sought to be increased, but that no notice of the proposed increase was given by the Corporation to any of the tenants who had made the unauthorised constructions on the basis of which the annual rateable value was proposed to be increased, and that in the absence of such notice no increase could be made. The Division Bench then observed that in that view of the matter, a contention urged on behalf of the Corporation that even if the annual rateable value was increased without giving notice to the tenants, the owners-landlords could not have any complaint as they could recover the additional tax from the tenants under Section 121 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, as well as the contention in reply by the owners-landlords that by reason of Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the additional tax on the building could not be recovered by them from the tenants, did not fall for determination. Yet, the Division Bench considered the conflict between Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act and Section 7 (2) of the Rent Control Act, and held that the Delhi Rent Control Act is a later and special statute dealing with the rights and liabilities between landlords and tenants, and, therefore, the Delhi Rent Control Act would prevail over the Corporation Act as held by the Supreme Court in Asa Ram v. District Board, Muzaffarpur, Muzaffarnagar, A.I.R 1959 Supreme Court 480 (4), where the Supreme Court approved the following observation in King v. Justices of Middlesex, (1831) 2 B and Ad. 818 (5) —
“Where two Acts of Parliament which, passed during the same Session and were to come into operation the same day, are repugnant to each other, that which last received the Royal assent must prevail and be considered pro tanto a repeal of the other.”
In that view, the Division Bench expressed its opinion that the right given by Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act to the landlords was set at naught by Section 7 (2) of the Rent Control Act.
13. With due respect, we are unable to agree with the above opinion of the Division Bench. In the first place, the said opinion was an obiter dictum. In the second place, the reason given by the Division Bench for its view, namely, that the Rent Control Act was a later and special statute was not correct. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was enacted in 1957. At that time, the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (38 of 1952) was in force. It contained a provision in section 6 thereof in terms identical with the provision in Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It is not, therefore, correct to proceed on the basis that Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was a later provision. Further, as pointed out by H.R Khanna, C.J in Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman (supra), the bar created by the provision in the Rent Control Act pertains to “normal tax on a building” occupied by a tenant, while Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act deals with the particular contingency where the property tax levied for the tenanted premises is more than the amount which would have been levied had the assessment been made on the basis of the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord. Thus, the provision in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was the later and special provision, and it would not be correct to proceed on the basis that the provision in the Rent Control Act is a later and special provision, while in fact Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act is a later and special provision. The decision in Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman (supra) does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Division Bench which had, therefore, no occasion to consider the reasons given by H.R Khanna C.J in the case of Ganga Ram (supra). For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the Division Bench regarding the conflict between Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act and Section 7 (2) of the Rent Control Act cannot be accepted as laying down die correct law.
14. For the foregoing reasons, our answer to the second question mentioned by B.C Misra J. is in the affirmative and we accordingly hold that the landlord is entitled to recover under Section 121 (1) of the Corporation Act the enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant notwithstanding the contract of tenancy and the provisions of Section 7 (2) and Section 4 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. No other point or question was urged before us in the Civil Revision Petition.
Civil Revision Petition No. 418 of 1972, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.
Petition dismissed.
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