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Smt. Angoori Devi Petitioner v. Smt. Chameli Devi
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-petitioner sued for recovery of arrears of rent claimed at Rs. 28 per month for a room (8 x 6 sq. feet) from 8-3-1969 to 7-1-1970, totaling Rs. 280, against the defendant-respondent (her tenant). The learned Judge, Court of Small Causes, Delhi, partly decreed the suit by accepting the defendant's contention that the agreed rent was Rs. 5 per month rather than Rs. 28. The trial's evidence comprised documentary material (a bound printed receipt book containing counterfoils, Exhibit P-1, with 31 counterfoils bearing the defendant's thumb impression showing rent at Rs. 30 later reduced to Rs. 28) and oral testimony (plaintiff and her son on the plaintiff's side; defendant and one Ishwar Chand (D.W.1) on the defendant's side). The trial judge rejected the documentary evidence as coerced thumb impressions and preferred the defendant's oral evidence. The plaintiff filed the present revision in the High Court under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, challenging the trial judge's findings and contending that those findings were based on conjecture and were perverse.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court can interfere with the decision of the Judge, Court of Small Causes, Delhi, under the true construction of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.
- Whether the trial judge's findings rejecting the documentary evidence (the counterfoils and thumb impressions) and preferring the defendant's oral evidence were such that the decision was perverse or amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
- Whether the trial judge erred in effectively shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove the genuineness of the counterfoils, instead of requiring the defendant to prove coercion.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-Petitioner's Arguments
- The learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner urged that the trial judge's decision was based on mere conjectures regarding the documentary evidence (the receipt counterfoils).
- The plaintiff contended that none of the reasons given by the trial judge for rejecting the documentary evidence could stand scrutiny.
Defendant-Respondent's Arguments / Trial Judge's Findings
- The trial judge found that the thumb impressions on the counterfoils had been taken by coercion at one time and therefore the recitals in the counterfoils were not binding on the defendant. The reasons given by the trial judge included:
- The defendant had made complaints to the police and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate shortly before the suit, claiming her thumb impression had been taken by coercion on many receipts.
- An apparent pattern in the brightness of thumb impressions: a bright print followed by diminishing brightness over groups of three or four counterfoils, suggesting the defendant was made to touch the ink pad and multiple impressions taken at once.
- The room previously fetched only Rs. 12.37; it was not believable that the rent rose suddenly to Rs. 30 in 1966.
- The defendant's monthly earnings were only Rs. 50, making it unlikely she would agree to pay Rs. 30 or Rs. 28 per month.
- On oral evidence, the trial judge preferred the defendant's testimony (supported by Ishwar Chand) that rent was Rs. 5 per month over the plaintiff's and her son's testimony.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 S.C. 698 | Revision, unlike appeal, does not carry a right of rehearing; interpretation of the scope of statutory revisions under section 25. | Used to explain that the High Court cannot treat the present revision as a rehearing of trial findings; acknowledged that statutory revisions under section 25 have a wider scope than some other revisions but do not amount to a full rehearing. |
| Official Receiver, Kanpur v. Abdul Shakoor, AIR 1965 S.C. 920 | High Court could not question findings of fact reached by trial court even where statutory presumption was relevant (in context of similarly worded proviso). | Cited to illustrate limits on interfering with trial findings where statutory language is similar, and to contrast scope of different revisions. |
| Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas, AIR 1969 S.C. 1344 | Reaffirmation of Hari Shankar: scope of section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wide and equated with the ambit of the first proviso to section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. | Relied upon to show that the power of the High Court under section 25 to examine whether a decision is "according to law" is broader than interference in a second appeal on grounds of being "contrary to law." |
| Delhi Transport Corporation v. Delhi Administration & Others, I.L.R (1973) 1 Delhi 838 at 850 | Clarification of the meaning of "no evidence": absence of evidence that would be believable by a reasonable person (i.e., not literally zero evidence). | Applied to conclude that a trial court decision based on evidence that a reasonable person would find unbelievable is perverse and not "according to law." |
| Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bombay 223 | Purpose of section 25 is to enable the High Court to ensure there has been no miscarriage of justice; a perverse decision results in a miscarriage of justice and is not "according to law." | Quoted to support the proposition that section 25 empowers the High Court to set aside decisions that are perverse or amount to a miscarriage of justice. |
| Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan, AIR 1943 Nagpur 7 (FB) | Discussion on the meaning of "justice" and that "justice according to law" is legal/formal justice; a decision contrary to overwhelming weight of the record is perverse. | Used to reinforce that a decision contrary to the weight of record is a ground for interference under section 25. |
| Poorao Chand v. Motilal, (1963) Suppl. 2 SCR 906 | Reaffirmation of the ambit of section 25 as explained in Hari Shankar. | Reinforced the court's adoption of the established interpretation that section 25 permits interference where the decision is not "according to law" in the broader sense. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court proceeded in two analytical strands: (A) factual appraisal of the documentary and oral evidence and (B) legal appraisal of the scope of section 25 in light of authorities.
A. Factual appraisal of evidence
- Documentary evidence (Exhibit P-1, counterfoil book): The court personally scrutinised the bound receipt book. It found that the trial judge's principal factual basis — that thumb impressions showed a regular diminishing brightness pattern indicating all impressions were taken at one time — was not supported by the actual appearance of the counterfoils. The opinion notes specific examples (Exhibits P-2 to P-5; P-10 to P-13; P-15 to P-17; P-22 to P-28) where brightness patterns did not consistently support the trial judge's inference.
- The court emphasised the bound nature of the counterfoil book and that Exhibits P-2 to P-9 were alternate counterfoils with pages for another tenant, K.C. Gupta, between them. The serial numbering and dating of the counterfoils flowed in order for both tenants, which the court held was inconsistent with the hypothesis that all the defendant's thumb impressions were taken on one day.
- The court explained that the alternating pattern of counterfoils was readily explained by the ordinary practice that both tenants paid rent in turn and receipts were issued in the sequence of payment — not by a contrived pattern of leaving alternate pages blank for later coercive thumb impressions. The bound nature of the book made the trial judge's theory implausible.
- On the other factual points relied upon by the trial judge (police/Magistrate complaints, alleged sudden rent rise from Rs. 12.37 to Rs. 30, and the defendant's earnings), the High Court observed alternative explanations and found those matters insufficient to overcome the documentary evidence. For instance, complaints could be false, rents in Delhi had been rising, and the defendant's income alone was not decisive because others may have contributed to rent.
- Oral evidence: The court held that where documentary evidence stands firmly in favour of the plaintiff, the oral testimony of the plaintiff and her son should be preferred over the defendant's oral testimony (and Ishwar Chand) because witnesses can lie but documents (properly evaluated) are more reliable.
B. Legal appraisal — scope of section 25
- The court analysed the ambit of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, drawing on authorities (particularly Hari Shankar and its reaffirmations). It stated that section 25 provides a remedy of revision (not an appeal or a re-hearing) but that the phrase "according to law" enables the High Court to examine the decision as a whole.
- The court explained that the power under section 25 is wider than some other revisionary or appellate remedies (e.g., second appeals limited to "contrary to law" or section 115 CPC). The High Court may interfere where the trial decision is not "according to law" because it is perverse or based on evidence that a reasonable person would find unbelievable.
- Applying the above, the court concluded that three factors vitiated the trial judgment: (i) a perverse factual conclusion about the counterfoils; (ii) consequent misappreciation of oral evidence that should have conformed with the documentary finding; and (iii) an effective error of law in the trial judge placing the burden of proving genuineness on the plaintiff when the defendant had to prove coercion. Together these defects led to a miscarriage of justice.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Revision allowed. The trial court's decision is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs; the costs of this revision shall be borne by the defendant respondent.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit for rent arrears succeeds and the defendant must pay costs of both the suit and the revision as ordered by the High Court.
- The High Court applied and reaffirmed the principle that under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, it may interfere where a trial court's decision is perverse or amounts to a miscarriage of justice because it is not "according to law" — including situations where the decision is based on evidence that a reasonable person would find unbelievable or where the trial court misallocated the burden of proof. This is an application of established authorities rather than the establishment of a new principle in the opinion.
Note: This summary is confined strictly to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.
V.S Deshpande, J.:— The question whether this Court can interfere with the decision of the Judge, Court of Small Causes, Delhi depends on the true construction of the ambit of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 under which this revision has been filed by the plaintiff-petitioner, Section 25 is as follows: —
“Revision of decrees and orders of Courts of Small Causes. —
The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case “decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.”
2. The suit of the plaintiff petitioner for recovery of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 28/- from 8-3-1969 to 7-1-1970 amounting to Rs. 280/- from the defendant respondent, her tenant, was only partly decreed by the learned Small Cause Judge because he held that the rent agreed to be payable by the defendant respondent to the plaintiff petitioner for a room measuring 8 X 6 sq. feet was only 5/- per month as averred by the defendant respondent and not Rs. 28/- per month as was claimed by the plaintiff petitioner. The evidence before the learned judge was (a) documentary and (b) oral.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
3. The documentary evidence was a bound printed receipt book in which the various columns had to be filled up at the time of giving a rent receipt. At the relevant time, the plaintiff respondent had two tenants and the counterfoils of the receipts issued to them are contained in the receipt book, Exhibit P-1, while the actual receipts had been delivered to the tenants. As many as 31 counterfoils of receipts given to the defendant respondent are contained in this bound book and each of them bears the thumb impression of the defendant respondent. The rate of rent in the counterfoils is shown to be Rs. 30/- per month. This was later reduced to Rs. 28/- per month. The learned Small Cause Judge held that all the thumb impressions of the defendant respondent were taken by coercion by the plaintiff petitioner and her helpers at one time on these counterfoils the recitals of which are not, therefore, binding on the defendant respondent. The reasons for this conclusion given by the learned judge were as follows: —
(1) The defendant respondent made a complaint to the police as also to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that her thumb impression had been taken on many receipts by coercion. This complaint was made shortly before the suit was filed by the plaintiff petitioner.
(2) A scrutiny of the counterfoils shows that the thumb impression on Exhibit P-2 is bright while the brightness diminishes as one goes to Exhibit P-3, Exhibit P-4 and Exhibit P-5. Similarly, the thumb impression on Exhibit P-6 is bright but the brightness goes on diminishing as one proceeds to the next three or four receipts and this occurs for every group of three or four receipts. The inference is that after every three or four receipts, the defendant respondent was made to touch the ink pad and all these thumb impressions were, therefore, taken at one time.
(3) The room was fetching only Rs. 12.37 p. as rent from the former tenant and it is not believable that the rent was suddenly increased to Rs. 30/- per month in 1966 when the defendant respondent took the room on rent.
(4) The defendant respondent earned only Rs. 50/- per month and could not have agreed to pay Rs. 30/- or Rs. 28/- per month as rent.
ORAL EVIDENCE
4. Only the plaintiff and her son who collected the rent for the plaintiff had personal knowledge of the rate of rent on the plaintiff's side. On the defendant's side, the defendant of course had the personal knowledge as to the rate of rent but one more witness D.W 1 Ishwar Chand also stated that the rent was agreed to between the parties at Rs. 5/- per month in his presence. The other witnesses had no personal knowledge of this matter. The task of the learned judge was, therefore, to scrutinise the evidence as to the rate of rent and to come to a conclusion as to whether the evidence of the plaintiff and her son was preferable to the evidence of the defendant and Ishwar Chand or not. The learned judge concluded that the defendant's version was preferable to that of the plaintiff because of the reasons given by him in rejecting the plaintiff's documentary evidence.
5. The question before the High Court, therefore, is whether the decision of the Small Cause Judge can be questioned in the above circumstances. The learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioner has urged that the decision of the trial judge is based on mere conjectures as to the nature of the documentary evidence. None of the reasons given by the trial judge for rejecting the documentary evidence could stand scrutiny. I, therefore, scrutinised the bound book of counterfoils Exhibit P-1. It is found that the thumb impression on the first counterfoil Exhibit P-2 is fuller and brighter than the thumb impression on Exhibit P-3, Exhibit P-4 and Exhibit P-5. It cannot, however, he said that the brightness of the thumb impression diminishes in regular order as one proceeds from Exhibit P-2 to Exhibit P-5. On the other hand, it would appear that the thumb impression on Exhibit P-5 is brighter than the thumb impressions on Exhibits P-3 and P-4. The learned trial judge failed to notice this. His theory, therefore, that the defendant respondent was made to touch the ink pad once and the four thumb impressions from Exhibit P-2 to Exhibit P-5 were taken one after the other from the ink absorbed by the thumb of the defendant respondent is not supported by the actual appearance of these thumb impressions. Similarly, the thumb impressions on Exhibits P-10, P-11, P-12 and P-13 seem to have almost the same degree of brightness a fact which goes against the theory propounded by the learned trial judge. It is also difficult to distinguish between the relative brightness of Exhibits P-15, P-16 and P-17. Nor can it be said that any such difference can be noticed in the relative brightness of many other Exhibits such as Exhibits P-22, P-23, P-24, P-25, P-26, P-27 and P-28.
6. The fundamental and obvious facts regarding the book of counterfoils which the learned trial judge entirely forget to notice were the following, namely: —
(1) The book is a bound one.
(2) That Exhibit P-2 to Exhibit P-9 were not consecutive but were alternate counterfoils. Counterfoils of another tenant K.C Gupta existed in the bound book between each two of these exhibits.
(3) Each counterfoil of the defendant as also of K.C Gupta was numbered and dated. These numbers and dates smoothly flow in a serial order. Each number is followed by a subsequent serial number and the dates also conform with the sequance of the numbers. That is to say, the lower the number the earlier the date.
7. The question which the trial judge should have tackled is this. It is in evidence that K.C Gupta was the other tenant of the plaintiff during this time, namely, October 1966 to April 1967. If so, the plaintiff's case is greatly strengthened by the fact that both the tenants were issued similar receipts and the counterfoils of these receipts are contained in serial order according to numbers and date. There is nothing to suggest that the counterfoils signed by K.C Gupta were not signed on the dates of these counterfoils' and that the serial numbers thereof were not correct. If the defendant's story that her thumb impressions from Exhibit P-2 to Exhibit P-31 were all taken at one time were true, then either of the two things must have been done. If K.C Gupta had not signed the counterfoils of receipts given to him before the date on which the defendant's thumb impression is said to have been taken by coercion, then the book of the counterfoils from Exhibit P-2 onwards must have been blank. It would pass comprehension as to how it could occur to the plaintiff at that time that the thumb impressions of the defendant from Exhibits P-2 to P-9 should be taken on alternative pages leaving one page blank between each of these Exhibits. It is also simply unbelievable that K.C Gupta would have obliged the plaintiff subsequently in filling these alternative blank pages and signing them while they bore different consecutive numbers and the dates. Alternatively, if K.C Gupta had already signed the counter foils in respect of those receipts on the date on which the complaint was made to the police and the Magistrate by the defendant, then it should have been inquired into by the trial judge whether K.C Gupta was made to sign counterfoils on alternate pages while the pages in between two counterfoils of K.C Gupta were left blank till all those blank pages were filled by the thumb impression of the defendant subsequently taken. How could it have occurred to the plaintiff that for more than a year she should go on taking K.C Gupta's signature on alternate pages with the hope that thereafter she would be able to secure the thumb impressions of the defendant by coercion on the blank pages ? These considerations never occurred to the learned trial judge. Had he cared to view the documentary evidence in the light of the bound nature of the book and the consecutive numbers and the dates of the exhibits, he could not have reached the conclusion that the thumb impressions of the defendant were all taken on one day. For, no reasonable person can believe that on the date on which the defendant's thumb impressions were alleged to have been taken by coercion either Exhibits P-2 to P-9 had been left blank or the corresponding counterfoils signed by K.C Gupta had been left blank. On the other hand, it seems to be quite clear that the counterfoils were signed by K.C Gupta and by the defendant precisely in accordance with the numbers and the dates which they bore. The consecutive positions of the Exhibits P-2 to P-9 and the counterfoils of K.C Gupta wedged between each two of them cannot be changed because all of them are pages of a bound book. The only explanation why the counterfoils Exhibit P-2 to P-9 alternates with the pages of counterfoils of K.C Gupta is that each month the rents were paid by both the defendant and K.C Gupta one after the other and the receipts were accordingly given by the plaintiff to these two persons in the order in which the rents were paid and this is the only reason why the counterfoils of these receipts alternate with each other. The nature of the counterfoil book cannot thus be explained by the theory of the learned trial judge that all the Exhibits P-2 to P-31 were thumb-marked by the defendant on one day. The finding of the learned judge as to the nature of the counterfoils is, therefore, perverse and is such as no reasonable person could have arrived at in a judicial manner.
8. As to the making of complaints to the police and the Magistrate, they could be made falsely with a view to counter an impending suit for recovery of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 30. As to the raising of the rent from Rs. 12.37 p. to Rs. 30 in 1966, such a thing is not inherently unbelievable. Rents in Delhi have been on the rise for the last some years and the landlords are taking advantage of the departure of the previous tenants and the plaintiff could have taken advantage to raise the rent to more than, double the rent of this room. Defendant's income alone is not relevant to the rate of rent. Her daughters and sons-in-law may also be using this premises and contributing towards payment of rent. The occupation of the room is accompanied by common rights over other premises and exclusive use of the top roof. The premises are situated in the heart of Delhi. Unless, therefore, the defendant could demolish the strong documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff not much can be made out of the rate of the rent.
ORAL EVIDENCE
9. Witnesses can lie but documents cannot. As the evidence of the counterfoils stands firmly in favour of the plaintiff's case, it is the oral evidence of the plaintiff and her son as against that of the defendant and Ishwar Chand which had to be believed as being in conformity with the documentary evidence.
10. The question as to the scope of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, has to be considered in the light of the circumstances of this case summarised above. Three factors have vitiated the judgment of the trial Court. Its conclusion as to the counterfoils was such as could not be arrived at judicially by a reasonable person. The appreciation of the oral evidence was bound to be such as to conform to the finding as to the documentary evidence. The perverse finding as to the counterfoils made the judge to prefer the defendant's evidence to the plaintiff's evidence. The result was that the decision as a whole became perverse and resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice. Incidentally the learned trial judge, without saying so, virtually placed the burden to prove the genuineness of the counterfoils on the plaintiff though the burden was on the defendant to show that the counterfoils were executed by her under coercion because the execution of the counterfoils by the defendant had been proved.
11. The question is whether all or any of the above defects in the trial court's decision enable this Court to interfere with that decision within the ambit of section 25. Let us, therefore, try to understand the meaning of section 25. The following propositions may be offered to explain its meaning: —
(1) Section 25 gives the remedy of a revision as contrasted with that of an appeal. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 S.C 698 (1), paragraph (7), unlike an appeal revision does not carry with it a right of rehearing. This Court cannot, therefore, treat this revision as a complete rehearing of the findings of the trial judge. The first proviso to section 75 (1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 is in the same terms as section 25. It was held by the Supreme Court in Official Receiver, Kanpur v. Abdul Shakoor, AIR 1965 S.C 920 (2) that the High Court could not question the findings of fact reached by the trial court even if in reaching the said finding the trial court was required to take into consideration a statutory presumption.
(2) But the scope of all revisions is not necessarily the same. It is the language of the statute giving the remedy which would determine the scope of the particular revision. It was recognised by the Supreme Court in HARI SHANKAR, referred to above, that the scope of the statutory revisions under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as also under other statutes similarly worded is wider than the scope of the revision under section 115 Civil Procedure Code which is restricted to jurisdictional defects. The Court observed in paragraph (8) that “the phrase ‘according to law’ refers to the decision as a whole, and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simplicitor.” In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas, AIR 1969 S.C 1344 (3), the decision in HARI SHANKAR was reaffirmed. The ambit of the power of the High Court under the first Proviso to section 75 (1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 was equated with the ambit of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. In both these provisions the power of the High Court to examine the trial court's decision with a view to find out whether it was “according to law” was held to be wider than the power of the High Court in second appeal under section 100 (1) (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure which restricted interference to the trial court decision being “contrary to law”. If the inquiry is whether the trial court's decision is “contrary to law” then one has to find out whether the trial court made any specific error of law or whether any part of its decision was directly contrary to some law. On the other hand, if the inquiry is whether the decision of the trial court is “according to law” then it may not be necessary that any specific part of the trial court's decision is contrary to a specific provision of any particular law. The decision as a whole would nut be according to law if, for instance, it is based on no evidence. As explained in Delhi Transport Corporation… v. Delhi Administration & Others…S, I.L.R (1973) 1 Delhi 838 at 850 (4), the meaning that a decision is based on no evidence is not that literally there is no evidence to support it. The meaning of “no evidence” is the absence of such evidence as would be believable by a reasonable person. If the trial court, therefore, purports to believe some evidence which on the face of it is unbelievable, then the decision of the trial court would be perverse and would not be “according to law” though in believing unbelievable evidence, the trial court did not violate a specific provision of any particular law. This is why Beaumont, C.J in Bell & Co. Ltd.…Applicant; v. Waman Hemraj…Opponent., AIR 1938 Bombay 223 (5), laid down that “the object of section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice^ that the decision was given according to law.” A perverse decision results in miscarriage of justice. Hence it is not a decision given according to law. Bose, J. in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan, AIR 1943 Nagpur 7 (FB) (6), queried as to what would be the meaning of “justice” in this context. Justice may be social, moral or legal. Niyogi, J. answered the query by holding that justice according to law may be taken to mean “legal or formal or conventional justice.” This means justice between the parties according to the record of the case. If, therefore, the decision of the trial court is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the record, it would be a decision which no reasonable person could arrive at being, a miscarriage of justice and would not be according to law. In HARI SHANKAR, the Supreme Court fully approved of the observations of the Beaumont, C.J in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hamraj as to the ambit of section 25. The decision in HARI SHANKAR was also reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in yet another case, namely, Poorao Chand v. Motilal, (1963) Suppl. 2 SCR 906 (7).
(3) The perversity of the decision of the trial court in the present case, the error of law committed by it in placing the burden of proof on wrong shoulders and the consequent miscarriage of justice rendered the trial court decision as a whole as being not “according to law” within the meaning of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.
12. The trial court's decision is, therefore, set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs. The costs of this revision shall also be borne by the defendant respondent.
Revision allowed.
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