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Prahlad Dass v. Bhagirath Lal

Delhi High Court
Feb 24, 1976
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59 of 1958, was filed by the tenant against the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 30th September, 1972, which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the eviction order of the Controller dated 31st January, 1972. The eviction was ordered on the ground of non-payment of rent, treating it as a second default, thereby denying the benefit of section 14(2) of the Act to the appellant. The appeal was initially filed without a certified copy of the Controller's order but with an application for exemption. The certified copy was later filed after the court's vacation, leading to a dispute over the limitation period and condonation of delay. The appellant sought condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, alleging difficulties in obtaining the certified copy due to the file being transmitted to the High Court. The respondent contested the sufficiency of grounds for condonation. After condonation was granted, the court proceeded to consider the merits of the eviction petition and the applicability of section 14(2) of the Act regarding prior benefit to the tenant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay in filing the certified copy of the Controller's order with the appeal should be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether the tenant had previously obtained the benefit under section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, thus disqualifying him from further benefit upon a subsequent default in rent payment.
  3. Whether the decision in the precedent case of Shrimati Rama Gupta v. Rai Singh Kain applies to the present facts, particularly regarding withdrawal of eviction petitions and the tenant's entitlement to benefit under section 14(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the delay in filing the certified copy was due to procedural difficulties in obtaining the copy and thus should be condoned.
  • The appellant argued that the finding of the Tribunal that the tenant had previously obtained the benefit under section 14(2) was incorrect and not sustainable.
  • Relying on the decision in Shrimati Rama Gupta v. Rai Singh Kain, the appellant submitted that the eviction petition had been withdrawn by the landlord, and therefore the tenant did not receive the benefit under section 14(2).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that the appeal was incompetent without the certified copy and that the delay was not sufficiently justified to warrant condonation.
  • The respondent maintained that the tenant had indeed obtained the benefit under section 14(2) by depositing arrears of rent pursuant to the Controller’s order, constituting a first benefit precluding further benefit upon subsequent default.
  • The respondent argued that the withdrawal of the eviction petition was limited to certain grounds and did not amount to withdrawal of the petition on the ground of non-payment of rent, distinguishing the present case from the Rama Gupta precedent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Order 42 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by High Court of Punjab) Requirement of filing certified copy of the first court's order with the second appeal The court held that the appeal is deemed filed only upon filing the certified copy; exemption from filing is subject to limitation plea and cannot be used to bypass this requirement.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act Condonation of delay in filing appeals The court condoned the delay of eight days attributable to the appellant in obtaining the certified copy, considering it not inordinate or due to gross negligence.
Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 Benefit to tenant on deposit of rent to avoid eviction; disqualification on second default The court found the tenant had obtained the benefit once by complying with the Controller’s order, thus precluding benefit on subsequent default and justifying eviction.
Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure Right to withdraw suit or abandon part of claim The court held that withdrawal of part of the eviction petition (grounds of misuser and damage) did not amount to withdrawal of the entire petition, especially the ground of non-payment of rent.
Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 Application of Order 23 Rule 1 in proceedings before the Controller Supported the principle that a plaintiff can abandon part of a claim, but that does not extend to withdrawal of unrelated grounds in the same petition.
Shrimati Rama Gupta v. Rai Singh Kain, 1972 RCJ 712 Effect of withdrawal of eviction petition on tenant’s benefit under section 14(2) The court distinguished this precedent, finding that in the present case the eviction petition was dismissed on deposit of rent, not on withdrawal by the landlord, thus the tenant did receive the benefit under section 14(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the procedural issue of delay in filing the certified copy of the Controller’s order with the appeal. It acknowledged the requirement under Order 42 Rule 1 CPC that the certified copy must accompany the appeal and that the appeal is deemed filed only upon such filing. The exemption granted was subject to limitation, and thus the appellant could not rely on it to avoid dismissal for delay. However, the court found that the appellant had applied for the certified copy within time and that the delay was largely due to circumstances beyond the appellant’s control, amounting to only an eight-day delay attributable to the appellant. This was not considered gross negligence, and the delay was condoned.

On the merits, the court examined whether the tenant had previously obtained the benefit under section 14(2) of the Act by deposit of rent, which would disqualify him from receiving the benefit on a subsequent default. The court noted that the Controller’s order dated 26th September 1960 (Ex. A2) established that the tenant had complied with an earlier order to deposit arrears, thereby receiving the benefit under section 14(2). The court rejected the appellant’s reliance on the Rama Gupta case, distinguishing it on facts: in Rama Gupta, the eviction petition was withdrawn by the landlord, whereas in the present case, the petition was dismissed on the tenant’s deposit of rent, constituting a benefit under the Act.

The court further reasoned that withdrawal of part of the eviction petition relating to other grounds (misuser and substantial damage) did not amount to withdrawal of the entire petition, especially the ground of non-payment of rent. This interpretation was supported by Order 23 Rule 1 CPC and the Supreme Court decision in Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal.

Accordingly, the court upheld the finding of the Tribunal that the tenant had obtained the benefit once and that the subsequent default disqualified the tenant from further benefit under section 14(2), justifying eviction.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The court dismissed the tenant’s second appeal, affirming the eviction order on the ground that the tenant had previously obtained the benefit under section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and had subsequently defaulted in rent payment for three consecutive months. The court’s decision clarifies that a tenant’s prior benefit under section 14(2) precludes relief on a second default, and that partial withdrawal of eviction grounds does not equate to withdrawal of the entire petition. No new precedent was established; the decision applies the existing legal framework to the facts, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

B.C Misra, J. (Oral):— This second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59 of 1958, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), has been filed by the tenant against the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 30th September, 1972, by which it has dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the Controller, dated 31st January, 1972, finally ordering eviction of the appellant on the ground of non-payment of rent and it treated it a case of second default and so the benefit of section 14 (2) could not be afforded to the appellant.

2. The appeal in this court was filed on 10th October, 1972 accompanied by a certified copy of the appellate judgment, but with a plain copy of the order of the Controller and without certified copy of the same. The appeal was accompanied by an application for exemption from filing the certified copy of the same and the exemption was granted subject to that plea of limitation. The certified copy has finally been filed in this court on 4th July, 1973 while this court was on vacation from 25th May to 7th July, 1973. In these circumstances, the respondent has contended that the appeal as filed was incompetent unless it was accompanied by the certified copy of the order of the court of first instance and the appeal be deemed to have been filed on the day the said certified copy had been filed and so it was barred by time.
3. The appellant has filed an application (CM 298 of 1976) on 20th February, 1976 for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The main ground alleged for condonation of delay is that the certified copy of the order of the Controller had been applied for on 9th October, 1972, as is apparent from the annexure filed along with the application, but the application was returned on 22nd May, 1973 on the ground that the copy could not be prepared since the file had been transmitted to the High Court. The appellant thereupon filed an application in the registry of this court for supply of the certified copy on 30th May, 1973, which was ready on 7th June, 1973 during the vacation of the court and the same was eventually filed on 4th July, 1973 as mentioned above. The appellant contends that the time from 9th October, 1972 up to 7th June, 1973 should be treated as time requisite in obtaining the certified copy of the order of the first court. The respondent has filed a reply to the application in which the dates mentioned above are not denied, but it is contended that there is no sufficient ground for condonation of delay.
4. There is no doubt that in the second appeal in this court, whether against a decree or against an order, in view of Order 42 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the High Court of Punjab which has been continued in this court, the certified copy of the first court must accompany the memorandum of appeal along with the order of the lower appellate court under challenge. The appeal, therefore, would be deemed to be filed only on the date when the certified copy had been filed; otherwise the appeal would be incompetent. It is true that the exemption for filing the same was granted on the date the appeal was admitted, but the exemption was subject to the plea of limitation and so the appellant cannot take advantage of the order granting exemption.
5. On the material placed on record, I am satisfied that the appellant applied to the copying agency for supply of certified copy of the order of the Controller on 9th October, 1972 which was well within time for filing the appeal against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal and the same was returned on 22nd May, 1973 and the appellant thereafter filed an application for copy on 30th May, 1973. In this way the delay that can be said to be on the part of the appellant consists of only eight days. This, in the circumstances of the case, cannot be considered to be a very inordinate delay. The copy was ready on 7th June and the appellant was indeed entitled to file it on the reopening of the court on 7th July, 1973, and he did it on 4th July, 1973. In my opinion, there is no gross negligence on the part of the appellant in filing the certified copy of the order and sufficient ground has been made out for condonation of delay. As a result, I allow the application and condone the delay in filing the appeal. Costs of this application will be costs in the appeal.
6. Coming to the merits of the case, Mr. Uma Dutta, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the finding of the Tribunal that the appellant had obtained the benefit of section 14 (2) of the Act earlier is contrary to law and is not sustainable. The material facts of the case are that “the appellant is a tenant in respect of some premises in Shahdara. The tenancy commenced on 1st October, 1958 and the rate of rent was Rs. 40/- per month. The appellant tenant defaulted in payment of rent and consequently the respondent instituted a petition for his eviction on the ground, inter alia, non-payment of rent being the ground mentioned in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act, along with grounds of misuser and substantial damage mentioned in clauses (c) and (j) of the aforesaid proviso”. The eviction petition was numbered as 291 of 1960, and Mr. O.P Garg, then “Controller, passed an order under section 15 (1) of the Act on 24th August, 1960 directing the tenant to pay arrears of rent within one month and continue to pay future rent in accordance with the provisions of law.” He then posted the petition for recording of evidence. It appears to me that the copy of the order under section 15 (1) of the Act has not been filed on the record of the court below, but this fact has not been denied. It also stands established by the subsequent order of Mr. O.P Garg dated 26th September, 1960 (certified copy of which is Ex. A2). Almost whole of the said order is reproduced in the order of the Tribunal, the material portion of which is to the effect that in the above said eviction petition the tenant had, in compliance with the order dated 24th August, 1960 passed under section 15 of the Act, duly deposited arrears of rent and thus the tenant became entitled to the benefit of section 14 (2) of the Act. As regards the question of costs under section 15 (6) of the Act the tenant admitted service of the notice, and stated that he sent two money orders, but they were not tender of the amount due to the landlord. Therefore, the Controller awarded Rs. 13/- as costs to the landlord against the tenant. This part of the order has been construed by the Rent Control Tribunal below as the first benefit within the meaning of section 14 (2) of the Act. There is no doubt that the tenant had escaped eviction by deposit of the rent in pursuance of an order passed under section 15 of the Act. This certainly constitutes a benefit under section 14 (2) of the Act. If this was so, the proviso to sub-section (2) is attracted. It reads as follows:
“Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive months.”
There is no doubt that the appellant tenant has made default for three consecutive months subsequent to the order in the previous proceedings and the rent from 1st September, 1965 up to 31st March, 1968 was admittedly due on the date of the petition for eviction. Mr. Uma Dutta, counsel for the appellant, has contended that Ex. A2 cannot be deemed to be a benefit given to the appellant tenant. He relies upon a decision of my learned brother, Shrimati Rama Gupta… v. Rai Singh Kain…., 1972 RCJ 712 (1), and contends that a perusal of the order (Ex. A2) shows thus:
“The respondent's (tenant's) learned lawyer has conceded vide his statement that he has no objection to the permission being granted to the petitioner to withdraw the present petition, with liberty to sue afresh on the same cause of action.”
Mr. Uma Dutta submits “that the respondent had really withdrawn the petition and so has brought the case within the rule of law laid down in Rama Gupta's case”.
7. I am unable to agree with this submission. In Ex. A2, after disposing of the grounds of eviction as non-payment of rent and referring to section 15 (6) of the Act, the Controller proceeded to observe that the landlord had pleaded substantial damage to the suit premises and misuser by the tenant. He, however, found that the petition suffered from formal defects as all the ingredients of section 14 (5) and Section 14 (10) of the Act had not been satisfied. Under these circumstances he allowed the landlord to withdraw the petition with liberty to file it on the same cause of action. “The cause of action, in so far as non-payment of rent for that period is concerned, on which eviction had been sought under clause (a) had existed and had culminated in the order that had been passed under section 15 (6) of the Act dismissing the petition on deposit of arrears of rent made in compliance with an order under section 15 of the Act. That cause of action did not survive and the tenor of the order shows that neither parties have alleged the petition to be withdrawn in so far as the eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent is concerned and this matter has finally been concluded by the order dismissing the petition with costs. What the landlord had been allowed to agitate in another proceedings and in respect of which the necessary ingredients had not been satisfied for want of which the petition was likely to fail on account of formal defect was eviction sought on the ground of substantial damage and misuser of the premises being clauses (j) and (c) of section 14 (1) of the Act. It is in respect of these causes of action that liberty had been given to the respondent landlord to sue afresh on the same cause of action”. The petition that was allowed to be withdrawn was in respect of the surviving petition on the same ground and not the whole of the petition which had really been disposed of by the said order.
8. Mr. Dutta has strenuously argued that Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the plaintiff to withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim. This provision undoubtedly applies to the proceedings before the Controller under the Act. If there were any doubt relating to it, reference may be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 (2). The claim of the respondent landlord in the eviction petition was the relief of eviction on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a), (c) and (j) of the relevant proviso. It was certainly open to the landlord to abandon any of the grounds of eviction and that would certainly be a part of his claim. It is difficult to accept the submission that the word ‘claim’ is confined only to relief and not to any grounds of obtaining the relief. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission that by abandoning or withdrawing the claim for eviction on the grounds mentioned in clauses (c) and (j), the respondent landlord should be deemed to have withdrawn the whole of the petition including the grounds of eviction mentioned in clause (a) thereof. As observed above, so far as the petition for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent mentioned in clause (a) is concerned, the same has been disposed of as prescribed by section 15 of the Act, in particular section 15 (6) and section 14 (2) of the Act and there was no question of withdrawing the same. I, therefore, hold that the respondent had not withdrawn his petition for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent mentioned in clause (a) and the same had been finally decided by the Controller by Ex. A2. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, fails and I agree with the Tribunal below that decision in Rama Gupta's case has no application to the facts of this case.
9. Even otherwise, a reference to Rama Gupta's case would make it clear that in paragraph 4 of the judgment, his lordship has proceeded to observe as follows:
“As far as the claim based on non-payment of rent was concerned, it could fall either because there was no valid notice of demand under section 14 (1) (a) of the Act or it could fall under section 14 (2) by reason of the tenant making a deposit. If the case had been decided on merits then the tenant's claim that the standard rent was Rs. 14/- would have been gone into and a decision would have been arrived at to determine whether there had been any default in the payment of rent. The landlord, however, took the simplest way out of this situation by withdrawing the rent deposited in the court and also by withdrawing the ejectment petition. It is impossible to come to the conclusion that the tenant got a benefit under section 14 (2) when the case was withdrawn. The previous ejectment petition was not dismissed on the ground that the tenant had made a deposit, but on the ground that the landlord withdrew the ejectment petition. This voluntary act of the landlord cannot be said to be a benefit to the tenant under section 14 (2) of the Act.”
The learned Judge has noticed that there was some decision of this court which had taken contrary view and reference has been made to a larger Bench for reconciling the views of this court. But, I would not enter into this controversy for the moment. Suffice it to say, that in this case the learned Judge found as a fact that the previous eviction petition had not been dismissed on the ground that the tenant had made deposit, but on the ground that the landlord had withdrawn the case. This observation would take the facts of the present case out of the rule of law laid down by his lordship. In the instant case reference may again be made to Ex. A2, where the Controller had clearly stated that the tenant had complied with the order to deposit arrears of rent and had become entitled to the benefit under section 14 (2) of the Act and the petition for eviction was dismissed under section 15 (6) of the Act. The petition for eviction in the instant case had by Ex. A2 not been dismissed on the ground of withdrawal by the landlord as had been contended in Rama Gupta's case, but it had been dismissed in the ground that the tenant had deposited the rent on compliance with the order, which as noticed above would clearly distinguish the instant case from the rule of law laid down in the said case.
10. I have, therefore, no hesitation in endorsing the finding of the Tribunal below and find there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their respective costs.
Appeal dismissed.