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Lala Ram v. Kalawati .
Judgment Summary: Yogeshwar Dayal, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a tenant's appeal against concurrent orders of the Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal ordering ejectment of the appellant under proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ("the Act").
The respondent landlady filed a petition for eviction on the ground that the premises were let to the appellant for residence and were now bona fide required by the landlady for herself and for her only daughter (who is married and has been residing with the respondent). The landlady pleaded that she had only one room, one kotha and one kitchen on the first floor which were occupied by the appellant and that, besides herself, her married daughter with her husband and three children were residing with the landlady and that the landlady had no reasonably suitable accommodation for herself and her family members.
The appellant disputed the asserted exclusively residential purpose of letting (pleading mixed residential and commercial use), denied the necessity of the premises for the respondent, and contested that the daughter was dependent on the landlady. It was, however, admitted that the daughter and her family had been residing with the landlady. Service of the notice terminating tenancy was also denied by the appellant.
The Additional Rent Controller found that the premises were let for residential purposes, that incidental commercial user did not alter that purpose, that the landlady's daughter and son-in-law with their children had been residing with the landlady for a long time, that the daughter was dependent on the landlady for residence, and that the landlady had no other suitable accommodation. The Tribunal affirmed those findings and held that the daughter and her family fell within the meaning of "self" in proviso (e) to section 14(1) and that the notice dated 31st July 1968 had been served (noting an endorsement dated 3rd August 1968, although the Tribunal mistakenly recorded the year as 1972).
Dissatisfied, the tenant appealed to the court before which opinion was delivered by Yogeshwar Dayal, J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the landlady's married daughter and her family can be regarded as part of "self" or otherwise as members dependent on the landlady for the purposes of proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
- Whether the notice determining tenancy (dated 31st July 1968) was validly served on the tenant-appellant.
- Whether the permission granted by the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was without jurisdiction and whether such a challenge can be entertained in ejectment proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The landlady's daughter and her family cannot be considered dependent on the landlady because the daughter is married and her husband earns independently.
- No valid service of the notice determining tenancy was proved; the registered envelope bore only a postman's endorsement "refused" dated 3rd August 1968 and that was not sufficient proof of service, particularly since the sender's name on the envelope was that of the counsel.
- The permission granted by the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was without jurisdiction because the application for permission did not mention the ground of eviction (bona fide personal requirement).
Respondent's Arguments
- The premises were let for residential purposes and any incidental use did not alter that character.
- The landlady required the premises bona fide for herself and for her daughter (who lived with her) and there was no other suitable accommodation available to them.
- The daughter and her family had been residing with the landlady for a long time and were dependent (at least for residence) on the landlady.
- The notice dated 31st July 1968 was sent in a registered envelope which bore the postman's endorsement "refused", and this constituted sufficient proof of service; the respondent produced a witness (A.W.1 Ajit Singh) to that effect.
- The objection to the Competent Authority's permission could not be raised in the ejectment proceedings as such orders are challengeable only by writ or under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| C. L. Daver v. Amar Nath Kaput (1962 64 PLR 521) | Construction of "dependent" in section 14(1)(e): not confined to those wholly financially dependent; includes persons not wholly independent and those dependent for residence; dependence may be non-financial. | The Court relied on this reasoning to conclude that dependence does not mean only financial dependence and that the daughter could be considered dependent for residence. |
| Jasvant Singh v. Smt. Prem Kumari (1934 66 PUS 881) | Support for the view that dependence need not be purely financial (as applied in construing "dependent"). | Followed as supporting authority for treating the daughter and her family as within the ambit of dependence or inclusion in "self". |
| Bhagwan Dass v. Smt. Shakuntla Devi (CR 41-D/61, decided 22 Oct 1961) | Interpretation that "self" in proviso (e) to section 14(1) includes family members who have always been living with the landlord, whether dependent or not. | Relied upon to treat the landlady's daughter and her family's requirement as part of the landlady's own requirement ("self"). |
| T.C. Rekhi v. Uma Gujral | Authority adopting the same reading of proviso (e): family members living with landlord are included in "self". | Applied as supporting precedent for inclusion of co-resident family members within "self". |
| P.D. Sharma v. Ram Lubhaya | Similar pronouncement on construction of proviso (e) to section 14(1) concerning inclusion of family members. | Followed and used to reinforce the Court's approach to "self" including resident family members. |
| J.L. Mehta v. Hira Devi (1970 DLT 484) | Affirmation of the reading of proviso (e) that the landlord's own use includes use by family members who have been living with the landlord. | Cited as a decision that followed the earlier line of authorities and supports treating the daughter and her family as part of "self". |
| Division Bench decision in SAOs 131, 152, 11 and 106 of 1971 (1972 RLR (7) 153) — Chief Justice Andley and Tatachari J. | Interpretation of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act: the section's second part deals with the manner of service of the notice itself and not with the cover/envelope; the section does not require registration or that the cover indicate the nature of the document inside; an endorsement of refusal is entitled to a presumption of correctness. | The Court relied on this decision to hold that the postman's endorsement "refused" on the registered envelope and production of the sending witness were sufficient proof of service and that the tenant bore the burden to rebut the presumption. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based exclusively on the findings and materials recorded in the opinion:
- Factual findings made by the Tribunal and the Additional Rent Controller — specifically that the landlady, a widow, had only one daughter who had been living with her along with husband and children for a long period (the Tribunal found at least 25 years) and that the landlady had no other suitable accommodation — were accepted. Those factual findings were not assailed before the Court and, accordingly, were treated as conclusive.
- On the legal question of dependence and/or inclusion within "self" in proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Act, the Court reviewed and relied upon prior authorities (including C. L. Daver and Jasvant Singh) which hold that "dependent" need not mean wholly financially dependent and may include persons dependent for residence. The Court also relied on decisions (Bhagwan Dass, T.C. Rekhi, P.D. Sharma and J.L. Mehta) that read "self" in proviso (e) to include family members who have always been living with the landlord, whether dependent or not.
- Applying those principles to the undisputed facts (long continued co-residence of the daughter and her family with the landlady), the Court concluded that the daughter and her family fall within the meaning of "self" in proviso (e) and that their requirement can be aggregated with that of the landlady for the purposes of bona fide personal requirement.
- Concerning service of the notice, the Court relied on the Division Bench authority on section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the effect that proof of service concerns the notice itself and not the envelope. The registered envelope bearing the postman's endorsement "refused" and the testimony of the landlady's witness (A.W.1 Ajit Singh) who deposed that the notice (Exhibit A-2) was sent in that envelope (Exhibit A-3) constituted sufficient proof of service. The Court emphasized the presumption in favour of the endorsement and placed the burden on the tenant to rebut it, noting that the tenant produced no cogent evidence to displace the presumption.
- As to the objection that the Competent Authority's permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was without jurisdiction because the eviction ground was not stated in the application, the Court held that such an omission did not render the permission subject to collateral attack in ejectment proceedings. The Court observed that orders granting permission had become final and could be challenged only by writ or under Article 227, not in the present proceedings.
- Given the acceptance of the lower courts' findings as to the bona fide personal requirement and valid service, and the legal conclusions drawn from precedent, the Court found no substantial question of law or ground to interfere with the concurrent decisions below.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The concurrent orders of the Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal ordering ejectment under proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 are upheld. Costs were awarded (counsel's fee Rs. 200/-).
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the tenant's appeal fails and the ejectment order in favor of the landlady stands; the tenant must bear the costs fixed by the Court.
- The Court applied established authorities on (a) the construction of "dependent" and the inclusion of co-resident family members within "self" in proviso (e) to section 14(1), and (b) the evidentiary treatment of registered envelopes bearing a "refused" endorsement under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The opinion applies existing precedents rather than announcing a new legal principle; no new precedent was declared in the text of the opinion.
- Objections to the Competent Authority's permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act were held not amenable to challenge in ejectment proceedings and must be raised by appropriate writ or Article 227 proceedings.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." (Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-.)
Yogeshwar Dayal, J.:— This is a tenant's appeal against the concurrent judgments of the Additional Rent Controller and the Triounal ordering ejectment of the appellant under Proviso (ej to section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”),
2. The facts of the case are that the respondent land-lady filed the present petition for eviction of the appellant from the premises in dispute on the ground that the premises in dispute were let out to the tenant-appellant for residence and that now the premises are bona-fide required for herself and for her only daughter who is married and is residing with the respondent depending on her. It was pleaded by the respondent that she has only one room, one Kotha, one kitchen on the first floor of the building which is also occupied by the appellant and besides herself her daughter alongwith three children and her husband was also residing with the respondent and that the respondent does not have any reasonably suitable accommodation for herself and her family members. The appellant disputed the purpose of letting being only residential and pleaded that the premises were let out both for residential and commercial purposes The appellant also denied that the premises are required by the respondent. It was also pleaded by the appellant that the daughter of the respondent is not dependent upon the respondent. It was, however, not denied that the daughter of the respondent alongwith her family has been residing with the landlady. The service of notice was also denied. The Additional Rent Controller held that the premises were let for residential purposes and the incidental user by the appellant would not convert the purpose of letting. The Rent Controller also found that the land-lady's daughter and her son-in-law with their children had been residing with the land-lady since a long time; that the daughter, was dependent on her mother, the land-lady, for residence and that the land-lady respondent had no other suitable accommodation. Dissatisfied by the order of the Additional Rent Controller, the appellant filed an appeal before the Tribunal who, as stated earlier, also dismissed the appeal vide order dated 17th August, 1972. The Tribunal agreed with the funding of the Additional Rent Controller. The Tribunal held that the land-lady is a widow and had no other issue to look after her and she had only one daughter who had been living with the land-lady and in these circumstances the daughter would be included in the word self used in proviso (e) to section 14 (1) of the Act. The Tribunal held that the accommodation with the land-lady is wholly insufficient for her bonafide personal requirements. Before the Tribunal, service of a valid notice determining tenancy was also challenged but the Tribunal found that notice dated 31st July, 1968, had been served on the appellant in view of the report of refusal dated 3rd August 1968. (by mistake the Tribunal has noted the date as 3rd August 1972).
3. Mr. Bhagwan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has not contested the other findings of the courts below except (1) that the daughter and her family could not be considered as members dependent on the land-lady as she is married and her husband is earning independently; and (2) that no notice determining the tenancy was served on the appellant.
4. In support or the first submission that the daughter and her husband and children could not be considered as dependent on the landlady, the learned counsel relied upon C. L. Daver v. Amar Nath Kaput . 1962 64 PLR 521, in which Falshaw C. J. construed the meaning of the word dependent appearing in section 14 (1) (e) and it was held that it cannot be construed as meaning nothing but wholly dependent in the sense of not earning anything at all and being entirely dependent on the parents (in that case the father) for board, lodging and food, The term must be construed as meaning somebody not wholly independent or self-supporting and in a position to set up separate residence. Dependence may not in all circumstances be entirely a matter of finance and this would particularly be so in the case of an unmarried daughter who may be employed, but in whose case for various reasons it would not be desirable for her to attempt to live away from her parents and on her own. The same view was also taken by Grover J. in the case of Jasvant Singh v. Smt. Prem Kumari . 1934 66 PUS. 881. The judgment far from helping the appellant supports the case of the respondent.
5. It will be noticed that the respondent land-lady has been a widow having no son or any other relative except the married daughter who has always been living with the land-lady along with her husband the children. The land-lady, in fact, is also dependent in a sense on her daughter and the daughter on her mother for residence.
6. It has already been held by this Court in numerous cases that the expression ‘self appearing in the proviso (e) to section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act includes all members of the family of the landlord who had always been living with the landlord whether as dependent or otherwise. See Bhagwan Dass v. Smt. Shakuntla Devi . CR 41 -D/61, decided on 22nd October 1961, by G.D Khosla C.J) T.C Rekhi v. Uma Gujral,4 decided by I.D Daa C. J., and P.D Sharma v. Ram Lubhaya,5 decided by Deshpande J. These cases were followed by Sachar J. in the case of J.L Mehta v. Hira Devi . 1970 DLT 484. It has been held in the aforesaid cases that the correct reading of proviso (e) to section 14(1) means that where the landlord (or the landlady as in this case) requires premises for his/her own use then his own use includes the use of himself and the members of his family. The second part of the proviso comes into operation when the landlord requires the premises himself as well as for the benefit of such family members who had not been living with him earlier but who are in some way dependent on him either financially or for purposes of residence or for any other sufficient reason. In that case it is essential that the member must be dependent on him, otherwise order for ejectment will not be made but as in the present case the land-lady herself resides in the house along with her daughter and her husband, it is not necessary that those members who reside with her should be in some way dependent upon her. In the present case ihe family consists of land-lady, and her married daughter along with her husband and children. In this case the requirement of the land-lady will be treated as ‘his or her own use’ because she and her daughter's family will be treated as “self”.
7. It will be noticed that the finding of fact has been recorded by the Tribunal based on the pleadings of the parties and it was not even assailed before me. that the daughter with her husband and children has always been residing, at least for the last 25 years with the respondent, land-lady. In view of this finding it must be held that the requirement of the daughter, her husband and the children can be considered with the requirement of the respondent, land-lady within the meaning of the word “self” in the proviso mentioned above.
8. Mr. Bhagwan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant brought to my notice a statement of the land-lady that she has some rental income but she spends that on herself and in view of this statement of the land-lady, the learned counsel tried to make an argument that the daughter and the grand-children were not dependent on the Jand-lady. As observed in the two aforesaid judgments decided by Falshaw C. J. and fotlowed by Grover J. that dependence does not mean merely financial dependence, the term must be construed to mean somebody not wholly independent and includes a person dependent for residence. In the present case I fully agree with the finding of the Tribunal that on the facts and circumstances of the case the daughter and her family are dependent on the land-lady for residence.
9. The next submission made by Mr. Bhagwan Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, is that service of the notice determining the tenancy has not been proved as the registered envelope, Exhibit A-3, (in which copy of notice dated July 31, 1968, Exhibit A-2 was sent) merely contains an endorsement of the postman as “refused” dated 3rd August, 1968. It was submitted that it is not sufficient proof, of service and as sender, the name of the counsel appears on the envelope. This submission of the learned counsel is contrary to the Division Bench decision of this Court in SAOs 131.152, 11 and 106 of 1971 decided by Chief Justice Andley and Tatachari J. (1972 RLR (7) 153) wherein it has been held that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act consists of two parts. The first part relates to notice while the second deals with the manner of service of the notice. But the second part is concerned only with the notice itself and not with the cover or the envelope containing the notice. section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not say that the notice should be registered with acknowledgement due or otherwise. This section does not speak of any envelope or cover nor does it say that the cover should indicate the nature of document inside the envelope. On acceptance of such a document the tenant would know the contents of documents.
10. Clause (a) of this section does not contemplate refusal of the notice. There is a presumption in favour, of the endorsement “refusal” to be correct. The burden was on the tenant who disputed the said endorsement. I do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent, landlady should have produced the postman to prove the endorsement. The respondent, land-lady had produced A.W I Ajit Singh who deposed that notice, copy of which is Exhibit A-2, was sent in the envelope Exhibit A-3 which contains the endorsement of refusal. This is sufficient proof of service of notice and the burden lay on the tenant to disprove it as the presumption was rebuttable. The tenant led no cogent evidence except saying that he had gone to Agra. It cannot be disputed that Agra is quite close to Delhi and a person can gc and come back from Agra to Delhi on the same day. Both the courts below have believed the endorsement as correct. No substantial question of law is involved to enable me to interfere with this finding of fact. The last submission made by the learned counsel was that the permission granted by the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was without jurisdiction inasmuch as in the application for permission the ground of eviction, namely, bonafide personal requirement was not mentioned. I need not go into the correctness of such question as, in my View, such objection cannot be raised in these proceedings. Orders granting permission have become final and such omission cannot render the permission as being without jurisdiction. The order of the Competent Authority could have been challenged only in writ proceedings or proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution and not in the proceedings for ejectment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order granting permission is without jurisdiction of the Competent Authority.
11. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-.
12. Appeal dismissed.
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