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Prof. Balraj Madhok And Others Petitioners v. Registrar Of Co-Operative Societies And Others S

Delhi High Court
Jun 7, 1974
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (V.S. Deshpande, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners were members of the Shakti Co-operative House Building Society (Respondent 3), a society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 as applied to Delhi, having become members prior to 1968. The society's original bye-laws (framed in 1959) did not prohibit membership by persons who owned a house or land for building a house in Delhi. In 1968 the Government issued model bye-laws for house building co-operative societies, which the respondent society adopted. Two relevant 1968 bye-laws were (i) bye-law 5(i)(e) disqualifying from membership a person who (or whose spouse or dependents) owns a dwelling house in Delhi, and (ii) bye-law 8(vii) declaring cessation of membership upon undertaking certain purchase/sale activities or purchase of a house/plot for construction in specified ways.

The Registrar and Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Respondents 1 and 2) treated the petitioners as having ceased to be members on the basis of these 1968 bye-laws. The petitioners, who did not deny owning houses in Delhi, filed a writ petition (filed 2 August 1973) seeking a declaration that they continued to be members and an order quashing the action of Respondents 1 and 2. They argued that the 1959 bye-laws governed their membership and that the 1968 bye-laws could not be given retrospective effect.

Between the adoption of the 1968 bye-laws and the filing of the petition, the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rules, 1973 came into force on 2 April 1973. The respondents contended that the petitioners' membership had ended either upon the adoption of the 1968 bye-laws or, in any event, on 2 April 1973 when the 1972 Act and 1973 Rules took effect. The court addressed whether the petitioners were members on the date the writ petition was filed; if not, they lacked locus standi to challenge interference in management.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Can a person who owns a house or land for building a house in Delhi continue to remain a member of a house building co-operative society in Delhi?
  2. Whether the 1968 model bye-law 5(i)(e) affected only eligibility to become a member (prospective application) or also the continued membership of persons who were already members prior to 1968.
  3. What is the effect of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rules, 1973 (notably section 92(1), section 9(1), section 97(2)(v) and rule 25(2)) on the petitioners' membership which had been acquired under the earlier statute and the society's bye-laws?
  4. Whether the saving provision in section 98(b) of the 1972 Act preserved the petitioners' membership rights acquired under the repealed Bombay Act and thereby prevented the new rules (rule 25) from depriving them of membership.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners relied on the 1959 bye-laws which governed their admission and contended that the 1968 bye-laws could not retrospectively deprive them of membership; in particular, bye-law 5(i)(e) applied only to new admissions and not to persons who had already become members.
  • They argued that their membership was a right acquired under the earlier statute and was saved by section 98(b) of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972, which would protect rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities acquired under the repealed Act.
  • The petitioners also asserted management interference by the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar, but the court observed that such a complaint required them to be members on the date of the writ petition to have locus standi.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (Registrar and Assistant Registrar) argued that the petitioners' membership terminated when the society adopted the amended 1968 bye-laws.
  • Alternatively, they contended that on the coming into force of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and its Rules on 2 April 1973, the petitioners ceased to be members by virtue of provisions of the new Act and rules — specifically sections 92(1), 9(1) and 97(2)(v) of the 1972 Act and rule 25(2) of the 1973 Rules.
  • The respondents relied on the rule-making power in section 97(2)(v) to contend that the rules could prescribe conditions affecting persons already admitted as members and that rule 25(2) operated to deem members to have ceased membership upon incurring the disqualifications specified in sub-rule (1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya ((1968) 2 E.C.R. 679 at 705) Authority for the proposition that rules framed under an Act are "as officacious as the Act itself". The court invoked this authority to support the position that rules made under the 1972 Act (and hence the rules' substantive effect) could render inconsistent bye-laws ineffective and operate as alteration or rescission of bye-laws to the extent of inconsistency.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis:

  1. Interpretation of bye-law 5(i): The court examined whether the phrase "eligible to be a member" in bye-law 5(i)(e) should be read as governing only the eligibility to become a member (prospective application) or also the continued eligibility to remain a member (existing members). It noted that the verb "be" may mean "to exist" or "to become", and recognized plausible arguments for both constructions. The court observed that bye-law 6 exempted original members only from bye-law 5(i)(b), implying other portions of bye-law 5 might apply to original members. Despite this, the court did not resolve the construction question conclusively because it found the later statutory scheme determinative.
  2. Prospective nature of bye-law 8(iii): The court agreed with the petitioners that bye-law 8(iii) (regarding cessation of membership) operated prospectively and therefore did not apply to the petitioners.
  3. Effect of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and Rules, 1973: The court held that on 2 April 1973 the 1972 Act and the 1973 Rules came into force. Under section 92(1) every existing society is deemed to be registered under the new Act and its bye-laws continue in force only "so far as the same are not inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act" and until altered or rescinded. Section 97(2)(v) empowers rule-making in relation to conditions for admission and membership and specifically contemplates affecting persons already admitted as members. Rule 25(2) of the Rules expressly provides that notwithstanding anything in any rule or bye-law, a person who becomes or has already become subject to disqualifications specified in sub-rule (1) shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member from the date when the disqualification was incurred.
  4. Inconsistency and effect on the 1968 bye-laws: Rule 25(1)(i) disqualified a person owning a residential house or plot in Delhi from membership. Rule 25(2) thus conflicted with the 1968 bye-law 5(i)(e) to the extent that the rule applied to persons who had already become members. The court observed that the power to affect existing members by rule was not novel and had been present in section 71(2)(d) of the Bombay Act; the legislative intention underlying the rule-making sections of both statutes was similar. Consequently, where rule 25(2) created a disqualification applicable to existing members, the inconsistent portion of the 1968 bye-laws ceased to operate.
  5. On the saving provision (section 98(b)): The court rejected the petitioners' reliance on section 98(b) (which saves rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities acquired under the repealed Act). The court explained that the saving provision does not prevent the new Act and rules from taking away rights previously acquired under the repealed Act. The court invoked the settled principle that a later statute may be contrary to an earlier law of the same legislature and effect an implied repeal to the extent of inconsistency. Thus what was saved by section 98 was nonetheless taken away by section 92(1) read with rule 25(2).
  6. Conclusion on membership: Because rule 25(2) applied to persons who had already become members and deemed them to have ceased membership when they incurred the specified disqualifications (ownership of dwelling house/plot), the petitioners — who owned houses in Delhi — ceased to be members of the respondent society from April 2, 1973. Thus, on the date of filing the writ petition (2 August 1973) the petitioners were not members and consequently had no locus standi to pursue the claimed reliefs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE PETITION IS DISMISSED. The court held that the petitioners ceased to be members of the respondent society from 2 April 1973 when the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rules, 1973 came into force, by virtue of rule 25(2) read with rule 25(1)(i) and section 92(1) of the 1972 Act.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners were deemed to have ceased to be members as of 2 April 1973 and therefore lacked locus standi to challenge the respondents' actions; their writ petition was dismissed on this ground alone and without any order as to costs.
  • Legal consequence described by the court: The decision establishes that rules framed under the 1972 Act (specifically rule 25(2)) could render bye-laws inconsistent with the new statutory scheme ineffective or altered to the extent of inconsistency; a saving clause such as section 98(b) does not prevent the new Act and rules from taking away previously acquired rights when there is inconsistency.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies established principles (including the effect of later statutes on earlier provisions and the force of rules made under statutory authority) but does not record the creation of a novel, standalone precedent beyond its application to the facts of this petition.

Disposition

Petition dismissed. No order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

V.S Deshpande, J.:— Can a person who has a house or land for building a house in Delhi continue to remain a member of a house building co-operative society in Delhi ? This question which may affect many persons besides the petitioners arises for decision in this writ petition.

The petitioners became members of the Shakti Co-operative House Building Society (Respondent 3), a body registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 as applied to Delhi, prior to 1968. Under section 71 (2) (c) and (d) of the said Act, the Chief Commissioner could make rules prescribing the matters in respect of which a society may make bye-laws and also prescribing the conditions to be complied with by persons applying for admission or admitted as members. The admission and the continuance of the petitioners as members of the society was governed by the bye-laws of the society framed in 1959. Those bye-laws did not pro-habit a person who had a house or land on which a house could be built in Delhi from becoming a member. As a matter of policy, however, the Government thereafter seems to have decided that land allotted to co-operative societies should be leased out only to such members as do not have a house or a plot of land in Delhi. In 1968, therefore, model bye-laws for house building co-operative societies were framed by the Government. These bye-laws were sent to the house building co-operative societies for adoption by them. It was obvious that those co-operative societies who would not adopt these bye-laws would not be given land by the Government to be leased to their members. The respondent 3 society adopted the new bye-laws. The following bye-laws of 1968 are relevant: —

5 (i) (e):— “Any person shall be eligible to be a member of the society provided . . . . . . he or his wife (she or her husband in case of a woman) or any of his/her dependents does not own a dwelling house in Delhi.”

8 (vii):— “A person ceases to be a member . . . . . . on undertaking the business of purchase and sale of houses or land for construction of houses either directly or indirectly or on purchasing a house or a plot of land for construction of house either in his own name or in the name of any of his dependents through any other source and the member shall, within one month of his undertaking the said business of purchase of a house or a plot of land shall inform the society about this.”

The petitioners complain that the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Delhi Administration, (Respondents 1 and 2) have on the strength of these bye-laws treated the petitioners as having ceased to be members of the respondent 3 society. The petitioners do not deny that they have houses in Delhi but they contend that they were nevertheless entitled to become members of the society under the bye-laws of 1959 and that the bye-laws of 1968 have no retrospective application so as to deprive them of their membership. The main relief prayed by the petitioners, therefore, is for a declaration that they continued to be the members of the respondent 3 society and for the quashing of the action of the Respondents 1 and 2 treating them as non-members.

Though the writ petition was filed on August 2, 1973, the petitioners did not refer to the effect of the coming into force of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rules, 1973, on April 2, 1973. The petitioners were also office bearers of the respondent 3 society and also complained of interference by the respondents 1 and 2 in the management of the society. Unless and until, however, the petitioners show themselves to be members of the society on the date on which the writ petition was filed, they would have no locus standi to make the aforesaid complaint. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider any other question except the one raised above in dealing with this writ petition.

The writ petition has been contested by the respondents 1 and 2. The respondent 3 is represented by different counsel for two rival managing bodies but we are not concerned here as to which of them has the right to represent the society. It has been pointed out on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2 that the petitioners have no locus standi to file this writ petition firstly because their membership came to an end when the amended bye-laws of 1968 were adopted by the society. Secondly, at any rate, on the coming into force of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and the rules framed thereunder from April 2, 1973, the petitioners definitely ceased to be members of the respondent 3 society. The defence has placed reliance on sections 92 (1), 9 (1) and 97 (2) (v) of the new Act which are reproduced below: —

“92. Saving of existing societies. — (1) Every society now existing which has been registered under the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1904 or under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 or under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi, shall be deemed to be registered under the corresponding provisions of this Act, and its bye-laws shall, so far as the same are not inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, continue in force until altered or rescinded.”

S. 9 (1). — Registration. — If the Registrar is satisfied. —

(a) that the application complies with the provisions of this Act and the rules;

(b) that the objects of the proposed society are in accordance with section 4;

(c) that the proposed bye-laws are not contrary to the provisions of this Act and the rules; and

(d) that the proposed society has reasonable chances of success,

the Registrar may register the society and its bye-laws.”

“97. Rules. — (1) The Lieutenant Governor may, for any cooperative society or class of co-operative societies, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely —

(v) the conditions to be complied with by persons applying for admission or admitted as members, for the election and admission of members, and for the payment to be made and the interest to be acquired before the exercise of the right of membership.”

Shri G.S Vohra for the petitioners in his oral argument placed reliance on section 98 (b) of the Act which is also reproduced below: —

“Repeal and savings. — On the day on which the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 comes into force, the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, as in force in the Union territory of Delhi shall stand repealed:

Provided that the repeal shall not affect —

(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act so repealed . . . . . .”

The question whether the petitioners had continued to be members of the society on the date of the filing of the writ petition is to be decided in the light of the legal provisions, referred to above. The first part of the question is whether they ceased to be members when the amended bye-laws of 1968 came into force.

What is the meaning of the expression “eligible to be a member” used in the 1968 bye law No. 5 (i) ? The verb “be” has two meanings, namely, (a) to exist, and (b) to become. The former refers to the existence of state of affairs in presenti while the latter refers to the coming into existence of a new state of affairs. It is argued for the petitioners that the 1968 bye-law No. 5 (i) refers only to the eligibility of a person to become a member. As the petitioners had already become members of the society prior to 1968, bye-law 5 (i) is not applicable to them. On the contrary, the respondents have urged that even a person who is already a member ceases to be eligible to continue as a member if he does not satisfy bye-law 5 (i) (e). That is to say, if a person became a member of the society prior to 1968 and owned a dwelling house in Delhi and continued to own the house even after 1968, then he is not eligible to be a member in the sense that he is not eligible to continue to be a member of the society under the amended bye-laws. As against the contention of the petitioners that bye-law 5 (i) (e) does not apply to existing members, it may be pointed out that bye-law 6 specifically says that “original members are exempted from the provisions of bye-law No. 5 (i) (b) “. The inference from bye-law 6 is that even the original members are not exempted from the other parts of bye-law No. 5 including 5 (i) (e). If it is applied to the original members, then one may be inclined to construe the word “be” to mean “to exist” in preference to its other meaning “to become”. We may, just by way of illustration of an instance of legislative use of the word “be” in the above sense, point out that in Article 102 of the Constitution also the word “be” is used in the sense of “exist” as contrasted to “become”. Under Article 102 (1) a person is disqualified for “being chosen as” and also for “being a member of either Houses of parliament” etc. The dichotomy there is between becoming a member and continuing to be a member of parliament. There is, therefore, much to be said for the view that even under the 1968 bye-law No. 5 (i) (e) the petitioners were disabled from continuing to be members of the society. We do not, however, need to base our decision of this case on the construction of bye-law No. 5 (i) (e) inasmuch as, in our view the provisions of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and the rules framed thereunder, to be considered later, are decisive to show that the petitioners could not, at any rate, continue to be members of the society after April 2, 1973.

We agree with the contention of the petitioners that bye-law 8 (iii) regarding the cessation of membership is prospective in its application and, therefore, did not apply to the petitioners.

The next part of the question to be considered is the effect on the membership of the petitioners of the coming into force of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and the rules framed thereunder from April 2, 1973. Firstly, as the society respondent 3 is deemed to be registered under section 9 of the Act of 1972 its bye-laws cannot be contrary to the provisions of the said Act and the rules made thereunder. Secondly, if the 1968 bye-law 5 (i) (e) applied only to the admission of new members then the said bye-law would continue in force only upto April 2, 1973. For, it is inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act within the meaning of section 92 (1) these provisions include the rules framed under the Act. Not, such rules are “as officacious as the Act itself” (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya. (1968) 2 E.C.R 679 at 705. Thirdly, the said bye-law is altered or rescinded within the meaning of section 92 (1) by rule 25 (2).

Rule 25 (2) of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rules, 1973 is as follows: —

“25. Disqualifications for Membership — (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the rules or the bye-law of the co-operative society, if a member becomes or has already become, subject to any disqualifications specified in sub-rule (1), he shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member from the date when the disqualifications were incurred.”

This rule is inconsistent with bye-law 5 (i) (v) even if the latter is construed in favour of the petitioner. Rule 25 (2) clearly says that not only a person who becomes a member but also a person who has already become a member would be subject to the disqualifications specified in sub-rule (1) of rule 25 and such a person shall be deemed to have ceased to become a member from the date he incurred the disqualification. Rule 25 (1) (i) disqualifies a person from becoming a member if he owns a residential house or plot of land in Delhi. This rule has been framed under section 97 (2) (v) which expressly empowers the framing of a rule which would affect not only persons applying for admission but also persons who were admitted as members already. It is to be noted that the same power to affect the membership of persons who have already become members by the making of rules was also given by section 71 (2) (d) of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. The legislative intention underlying the rule-making sections of both these statutes is, therefore, the same. The power to frame bye law is to be given to the Society by these rules. We do not know if respondent 3 society has framed any new bye-laws under the new rules. Assuming that the 1968 bye-laws still continue to be in force bye-law 5 (i) (v) thereof ceases to be in force because it is inconsistent with rule 25 (2) framed under the new Act if bye-law 5 (i) (v) of 1968 is construed to refer only to persons applying to become members but not to persons who had already become members. If, on the other hand, it is construed to apply to persons who had already become members, then even before the coming into force of the new Act and the new rules, the petitioners had ceased to be members on the coming into force of the bye-laws of 1968. At any rate, the petitioners ceased to be members of respondent 3 society from April 2, 1973 when rule 25 (2) came into force.

Shri G.S Vohra argued that the membership of the society was a right of the petitioners and that it was saved in favour of the petitioners by section 98 (b) of the new Act. He went so far as to argue that rule 25 (2) could not take away that right from the petitioners when the right was saved by section 98 (b). This argument does not stand scrutiny. The effect of section 98 like section 6 of the General Clauses Act is only to ensure that rights acquired under the Act which is repealed are not destroyed merely by the repeal of the Act. This effect does not go to the extent of preventing the new Act from taking away a right which had been acquired under the repealed Act. It is a well settled principle that a statute of Parliament cannot deprive the Parliament of making a law in future contrary to the law which Parliament has already made in the past. This is why the inconsistency between a old and a new statute of the same Legislature results in an implied repeal of the old statute by the new statute to the extent of inconsistency. What was, therefore, saved by section 98 has been taken away by section 92 (1) read with rule 25 (2). The bye-laws of 1968 could not be perpetual and could not be saved from the effect of their inconsistency with the new Act and the rules or from being altered or rescinded by the rules framed under the new Act. The disqualification for becoming a member is specified by rule 25 (1) (i). Rule 25 (2) says that the said disqualification will be incurred even by a person who has already become a member of the society. It, therefore, applies to the petitioners who were already members before the new Act and the rules came into force. But by virtue of rule 25 (2) the disqualification is deemed to have been incurred when the petitioners acquired houses or plots of land in Delhi. We are not really concerned with the retrospective effect of disqualification. It would be sufficient for our purpose to hold that on the date of the writ petition, namely, August 2, 1973, the petitioners had ceased to be members of the respondent 3 society. They were not entitled, therefore, to maintain the reliefs prayed for in this writ petition. Their writ petition is, therefore, dismissed on this ground alone without any order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.