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Raghuvansh Kumar Petitioner v. Madan Lal & Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition was filed under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 227 of the Constitution seeking quashing of proceedings initiated by the Sub Divisional Magistrate (Shri A. S. Awasthi) under Sections 107, 112 and 117 Cr.P.C.
The factual matrix as recorded in the opinion: On 22-12-1972 the first respondent (Madan Lal Sharma) presented a complaint (addressed to the Minister of State for Home Affairs but handed to the SDM) alleging that on 23-9-1972 he had been assaulted and threatened with death and that the present petitioner (Raghuvansh Kumar) was responsible. The SDM recorded an order on 22-12-1972 directing the complainant to produce witnesses on 27-12-1972.
On 27-12-1972 the complainant and two witnesses gave statements. The SDM thereupon passed an order (on 27-12-1972) stating he was satisfied there were genuine grounds for proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C. against several named persons (including the petitioner) and summoned them for 12-1-1973; the order directed that summons should be accompanied by a notice under Section 112 Cr.P.C. asking the respondents to show cause why they should not furnish a personal bond of Rs. 5,000 with a like amount as surety for one year. The petitioner appeared and executed the bond.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the order made by the Sub Divisional Magistrate under Section 112 Cr.P.C. complied with the mandatory requirement to set forth the "substance of the information received" and related particulars required by that section.
- Whether the High Court could quash the impugned order under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, or whether the petitioner was required in the first instance to move the Sessions Court (and thereby invoke Sections 435/439 or a recommendation procedure under Section 438 Cr.P.C.).
- Whether the practice embodied in the referred Rule (Rule 3 of Chapter 1-A(b), Vol. V of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court) requiring prior application to Sessions Judge/District Magistrate should prevent the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in the petition before it (in light of limitation and other procedural considerations).
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments Presented by Counsel for the First Respondent (Shri Sita A. K. Dar)
- Attempted to distinguish Madhu Limaye on the ground that the petitioner in that case was in custody while the present petitioner was not (because he executed a bond).
- Argued that the impugned order, if susceptible of being quashed at all, could be quashed only under Sections 435 and 439 Cr.P.C., and not under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution; in other words, the petitioner should first move the Sessions Court (which could then make a recommendation to the High Court under Section 438 Cr.P.C.).
- Pointed out that, except for the present petitioner, respondents 3 to 7 had not even been served by the Magistrate (advanced as a procedural point in opposition to relief sought).
Arguments Presented by Counsel for the Petitioner (Shri Vijay Kishan and Shri S. C. Malik)
- Challenged the validity/operation of Rule 3 of Chapter 1-A(b), Vol. V of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court in the light of Article 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (which prescribes 90 days for applying for revisional powers), contending that the Rule could cause delay and prejudice by compelling petitioners to approach lower authorities first.
- Argued (through Shri S. C. Malik) that even though the practice exists to require recourse to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate first, the High Court should not dismiss a revision or petition on that ground where justice requires departure from practice; cited a number of authorities to support that approach and to contend the petition should not be dismissed merely because the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate had not been moved.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2486) | The requirement under Section 112 Cr.P.C. that the magistrate's order set forth the "substance of the information received", giving proper notice of the grounds for action; the order must be sufficiently informative and is the foundation of jurisdiction under Chapter VIII. | The Court relied on the Supreme Court's exposition to hold that the SDM's order in the present case did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 112 and must be quashed; it rejected the attempt to distinguish Madhu Limaye based on custody. |
| Balraj Madhok v. The Union of India (A.I.R. 1967 Delhi 31) | That an order under Section 112 Cr.P.C. is the basis of Chapter VIII proceedings and must be in writing, setting forth particulars of the information received. | Used to support the proposition that Section 112's requirements are mandatory and that the magistrate must write a "speaking order" setting out objective facts forming the basis for his satisfaction. |
| Banarsi Lal v. Smt. Neelam (A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 304) | That compliance with Section 112 Cr.P.C. is foundational and mandatory; courts are disinclined to approve violations of mandatory or even directory provisions. | Adopted to reinforce that non-compliance with Section 112 cannot be treated lightly and supports quashing of non-complying orders. |
| Tara Chand v. The State (1968 D.L.T. 537) | That powers under Part IV (preventive powers) are judicial and must be exercised judicially and in conformity with law; the Section 112 order must set forth the substance of the information. | Relied upon to underscore the necessity of judicial exercise of preventive powers and compliance with Section 112 formalities. |
| R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866) | Scope of inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C.: it cannot be exercised where other specific Code provisions apply, but may be used to quash proceedings to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice. | Invoked by the Court to justify exercise of Section 561-A in an appropriate case like the present one where the Section 112 order is patently illegal. |
| Rajendra Nath Mahato v. T. Gangooly, Deputy Superintendent of Police (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 470) | Limit on High Court's power under Section 561-A: the High Court cannot examine whether there is sufficient legal evidence in support of an order or finding. | Used to show that the High Court's power to quash under Section 561-A does not require re-assessment of evidence sufficiency; supports quashing where jurisdictional/legality defects exist. |
| S. Naryanan v. Kannamma Bhargavi (A.I.R. 1969 Kerala 126) | Observations on the import of Article 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the practice of requiring initial presentation of revisions to Sessions Judge/District Magistrate even where they can only make a recommendation under Section 438 Cr.P.C. | Referred to in the discussion of Rule 3 and limitation issues; the Court observed it was unnecessary to pursue the discussion further for the present case. |
| Vijay Pal v. The State (1972 Cr. Law Journal 543) | Decision by V.D. Misra, J. based upon the Rule requiring prior application to Sessions Judge/District Magistrate (Rule 3). | Mentioned; the Court stated the decision and the Rule were not determinative for the present matter and refrained from expressing opinion on their validity. |
| Chokat Ahir v. Suri Singh (A.I.R. 1940 Patna 299); Municipal Board v. Bhim Singh (A.I.R. 1962 Allahabad 450); Suraj Bali v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 438); Bon Behari Mondal v. Bhusan Chandra Barui (A.I.R. 1969 Calcutta 287); Veera Ramayya v. Udayagiri Venkata Seshavatharam (A.I.R. 1956 Andhra 97) | Authorities cited for the proposition that the Court may, in special or exceptional circumstances, depart from strict practice and that justice may require not insisting on preliminary recourse to lower forums. | Relied upon in the petitioner's submissions (cited by Shri S. C. Malik) and referenced in the opinion to support the conclusion that the High Court could be approached under Section 561-A and Article 227 in the present circumstances. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in the following analytical sequence, based wholly on the material in the opinion:
- The Court examined the SDM's chronology and the text of the SDM's order of 27-12-1972 which recorded that the SDM had "gone through the statements" of the complainant and two witnesses and was "satisfied that there are genuine grounds" for proceedings under Section 107 and summoned several persons and directed a notice under Section 112 for a bond of Rs. 5,000.
- The Court then examined the statutory text of Section 112 Cr.P.C. and the Supreme Court's recent authoritative exposition (Madhu Limaye) which had explained that an order under Section 112 must be in writing and must set forth the substance (i.e., the essence) of the information received so that the person required to show cause knows the grounds for the Magistrate's apprehension of a breach of the peace; the order is foundational to jurisdiction.
- The Court surveyed decisions of this Court and other authorities (Balraj Madhok, Banarsi Lal, Tara Chand) which confirm the mandatory character of Section 112's requirements and stress that preventive powers must be exercised judicially with written reasons sufficient to constitute a "speaking order".
- The Court rejected the attempt to distinguish Madhu Limaye on the basis that the petitioner here was not in custody: it held that execution of an interim bond under Section 112 amounts to fetters on liberty analogous to release on bail, and therefore the distinction was without force.
- Applying the legal requirement to the facts, the Court concluded that the impugned order under Section 112 was not made in accordance with the mandatory requirements of that section (i.e., it failed to set out the required substance/particulars) and therefore the order was legally defective.
- Addressing procedural objections that the petitioner should have first approached the Sessions Court or invoked Sections 435/439 or the recommendation procedure under Section 438, the Court analyzed the scope of Section 561-A (citing R. P. Kapur and Rajendra Nath Mahato) and observed that the High Court's inherent power under Section 561-A may be invoked to quash proceedings in an appropriate case to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice; it also observed that a Sessions Judge would be able only to make a recommendation to the High Court (under Section 438) and could not himself pass a final order quashing the Section 112 order, and therefore it was not necessary to compel recourse to that lesser remedy.
- The Court declined to decide the broader validity of the local Rule (Rule 3) which conditions reception of revision petitions on prior application to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, noting that the validity of that Rule did not fall to be determined for resolution of the present petition and that consideration of that question might require a larger Bench.
- On the issue that some other respondents had not been served, the Court observed that its concern was limited to the defect as it affected the present petitioner and that if similar non-compliant orders existed as to other respondents they would likewise be bad; the Court refrained from further pronouncements on respondents who had not moved the Court.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's core ruling was that the order made by the Sub Divisional Magistrate under Section 112 Cr.P.C. did not comply with the mandatory requirements of that section and therefore the impugned order is quashed.
Direct consequences and directions contained in the order:
- The District Magistrate, Delhi, was directed to forward the first respondent's complaint to a competent Magistrate other than Shri A. S. Awasthi for being dealt with according to law.
- The petitioner was directed to appear before the District Magistrate on 10-5-1973.
- The opinion records the order "accordingly" — that is, the quashing of the Section 112 order and the consequential directions above.
Broader implications: The Court indicated that Section 112's formal requirements are mandatory and that the High Court may, in an appropriate case, invoke Section 561-A Cr.P.C. and Article 227 to quash orders that are patently illegal; the Court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities and expressly refrained from deciding the validity of the local Rule concerning revision practice. The opinion therefore effected direct relief between the parties and did not declare or establish a novel legal principle beyond applying and following existing case law.
S. Rangarajan, J.:— This is a Petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. and Article 227 of the Constitution for quashing and setting aside the proceedings taken by the Sub Divisional Magistrate (Shri A. S. Awasthi) under Section 107, 112 and 117 Cr. P.C
The first respondent (Madan Lal Sharma) presented a Petition to the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 22-12-1972 this Petition was addressed to the Minister of State for Home Affairs. It contained allegations to the effect that two persons, who were partners of a firm, were engaged in the quarrying of Jamuna sand and had become inimical to Madan Lal Sharma Respondent on account of opposing the quarrying rights granted to said partnership firm. The complaint was that on 23-9-1972 some persons pounced upon the first respondent when he was getting into his car, assaulted him and threatened to kill him. An allegation was made that the present petitioner (Raghuvansh Kumar) was responsible for the same. The police was said to be reluctant to take action in the matter. Upon receipt of the said petition the Sub Divisional Magistrate passed an order on the same day in the following terms:
“Application given to me today personally, the applicant heard. He has been asked to bring witnesses on 27-12-1972”.
On 27-12-1972 the first respondent presented himself along with two other witnesses (Ram Chand and M. P. Patreja). After recording their statements the Sub Divisional Magistrate passed an order on the 27th itself in the following terms:
“I have gone through the statements given by Ram Chand (2) M. P. Patrija (3) Madan Lal and am satisfied that there are genuine grounds for proceedings under Section 107 Cr. P.C against (1) Sis Ram, (2) Bal Kishan (3) Bharat Singh (4) Jagdish (5) Raghubans Kumar (6) Niamatullah. They are therefore summoned for 12-1-1973. Along with summons should accompany a notice u/s 112 Cr. P.C asking respondents to show cause as to why they/he should not furnish a personal bond for Rs. 5,000/- with the surety in the like amount for keeping good conduct and behaviour for a period of one year”.
After the receipt of the summons for 12-1-1973, the present petitioner appeared in the said Court and he was asked to execute a bond for personal appearance in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- with one surety, which he did.
Section 112 Cr. P.C reads as follows:
“When a Magistrate acting under section 107, section 108, section 109 or section 110 deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under such section, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and, the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required”.
The above and the other relevant provisions of law were considered by the Supreme Court recently in Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (A.I.R 1971 S.C 2486), (1). Hidayatullah, C.J observed as follows:
“The procedure begins with S. 112. It requires that the Magistrate acting under S. 107 shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond, the term for which it is to be in force and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required. Since the person to be proceeded against has to show cause, it is but natural that he must know the grounds for apprehending a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquillity at his hands. Although the section speaks of the ‘substance of the information’ it does not mean the order should not be full. It may not repeat the information bodily but it must give proper notice of what has moved the Magistrate to take the action. This order is the foundation of the jurisdiction and the word ‘substance’ means the essence of the most important parts of the information”.
Bhargava, J. agreed with the order made by Hidayatullah, C.J (with whom the others comprising the bench concurred) except to differ regarding the interpretation of Section 117 (3) Cr. P.C (with which we are concerned in this case). Bhargava, J. also pointed out that the information contemplated by Section 107 Cr. P.C may be received from the Police or on a private complaint; in the latter case he was bound, however, to hold some enquiry himself or to have an enquiry made through the Police, so that he may be able to form a correct opinion as to the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding. But in whatever way the Magistrate makes the order he has, when making the order, to record in writing the substance of the information received which necessarily means the part of the information which was the basis of his information that sufficient grounds exist for initiating proceedings.
In the present case the Magistrate was not acting on the basis of any information laid by the Police but on the complaint, addressed to the Minister of State for Home Affairs though handed over to the learned Magistrate, by the first respondent. The learned Magistrate recorded the statements not only of the first respondent but also two other witnesses.
Hegde, C.J (as his Lordship then was) pointed out in Balraj Madhok v. The Union of India (A.I.R 1967 Delhi 31) (2) that an order under Section 112 Cr. P.C is the very basis of a proceeding under Chapter VIII of the Code and that it should be made in writing setting forth the particulars of the information received. The Legislature in its wisdom required the substance of the information to be set out not only to enable the person or persons concerned against whom such proposed action is to be taken to know what is stated against them but also to ensure that the Magistrate writes a speaking order setting out the objective facts on the basis of which he is satisfied about the existence of necessity to require a person or persons to show cause against the action proposed.
Dua, C.J (as his Lordship then was) followed the above-said view in Banarsi Lal v. Smt. Neelam (A.I.R 1969 Delhi 304) (3) and pointed out that compliance with the requirements of Section 112 Cr. P.C was the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder; in other words, the requirements also were mandatory. His Lordship also pointed out that assuming that such non-compliance is a mere irregularity the Courts are clearly disinclined to approve or encourage, in advance, violations of mandatory provisions for even the directory provisions of law are intended by the Parliament to be obeyed and the Courts cannot just ignore them.
In Tara Chand v. The State (1968 D.L.T 537) Jagjit Singh, J. also pointed out that the powers conferred on the Magistrate in respect of prevention of offences under Part IV of the Code of Criminal Procedure are of judicial character and it is necessary to exercise them in a judicial manner and in conformity with the requirements of law. The Magistrate could not play with the liberty of the people on the pretext of taking preventive action. In the order to be made under Section 112 Cr. P.C the substance of the information received has to be set forth.
In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye's case and in the cases decided by this Court there is no need to notice the decisions of other High Courts. There is no force at all in Shri Sita A. K. Dar's attempt to distinguish Madhu Limaye's case on the ground that the petitioner, in that case, was in custody whereas in the present case the petitioner was not, since he had executed a bond because a person on trial is not a free person. In proceedings initiated under Section 112 Cr. P.C taking an interim bond from the person against whom similar action is being taken is the equivalent of releasing him on bail. In other words fetters are placed on his liberty by the bond.
It is thus clear that the impugned order under Section 112 Cr. P.C is not one made in accordance with the requirements of the said section which are mandatory. The order has to be and is hereby quashed.
It only remains to notice two further arguments of Shri Sital A. K. Dar, learned counsel for the first respondent: Firstly, the said order could be quashed, if at all, only under Sections 435 and 439 Cr. P.C but not under section 561-A Cr. P.C or Article 227 of the Constitution. In other words, the petitioner should in the first instance move the Sessions Court and can move this Court only if it refused to make a recommendation to the High Court under Section 438 Cr. P.C According to Rule 3 of Chapter 1-A (b), Vol. V of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court the Deputy Registrar is not to receive a petition to revise orders of original Courts in non-appealable cases except where the copy of the order of the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, refusing to make such a recommendation is filed. It seems needless for the petitioner to invoke Section 439 Cr. P.C in this case because the order under Section 112 Cr. P.C is patently illegal and could be quashed even by invoking the power under section 561-A Cr. P.C and/or Article 227 of the Constitution. A Court cannot decline to take action under Article 227 of the Constitution on the ground of the existence of an alternative remedy unless such remedy can by itself be directly effective. Merely resorting to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate for making a recommendation to this Court under Section 438 Cr. P.C cannot be said to be that kind of alternative remedy which the aggrieved party must be compelled to resort to on pain of his application under Article 227 of the Constitution being dismissed. Similar considerations will apply even to an application under section 561-A Cr. P.C
The scope of section 561-A Cr. P.C has been explained by the Supreme Court on more than one occasion. In R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab. (A.I.R 1960 S. C. 866) (5) the Supreme Court pointed out that the inherent power of the High Court under section 561-A Cr. P.C cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered under any other provision of the Code and that the same must be utilised to quash proceedings in an appropriate case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Gajendragadkar, J. (as his Lordship then was) referred to the following cases, namely, of absence of requisite sanction, the allegations made in the F. I. R. or the complaint not constituting the offence alleged even when taken at their face value, even in cases where the allegations constituted an offence if there was no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge where interference under Section 561-A is permissible.
Ray, J. speaking for the Supreme Court in Rajendra Nath Mahato v. T. Gangooly, Deputy Superintendent of Police (A.I.R 1972 S.C 470), (6) pointed out one limit, viz., that of the High Court not being able under section 561-A Cr. P.C to examine whether there is sufficient legal evidence in support of the order or finding; the interference by the High Court by way of quashing the order issuing process under Section 204 Cr. P.C by a Magistrate other than the one who had taken cognizance of the offence was upheld. There seems to be no reason, therefore, to compel the petitioner to approach the Sessions Court under Section 438 Cr. P.C because a Sessions Judge could, if at all, make no more than a mere recommendation to the High Court to quash the order under Section 112 Cr. P.C and cannot pass any final order concerning the same himself.
In this view there is no need in this case to go into the validity of Rule 3 of Chapter 1-A (b), Vol. V of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court, which is being currently followed by this Court. The same reads as follows:
“As regards petitions under section 436 and section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, the Deputy Registrar will not receive petitions for revision of orders of original Courts in non-appealable cases, unless the applicant files with his petition a copy of the order of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, as the case may be, to show that he has applied to one or the other and his petition has been refused. The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate can release a prisoner on bail or suspend a sentence pending a reference to the High Court”.
Shri Vijay Kishan, who appeared along with Shri S. C. Malik for the petitioner, challenged the validity of the said Rule in the light of Article 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a period of 90 days for applying to any court for exercise of revisional powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 as well, from the date of the order sought to be revised. The above Rule was framed before 1963, when there was no statutory period of limitation for filing criminal revisions. It is urged that if the Deputy Registrar of this Court is by reason of the said Rule required not to receive petitions for revisions under Section 436 and 439 Cr. P.C except when the petitioner has applied to one or the other of the courts below mentioned in the said Rule and the same application has been refused it is just likely that the petitioner may have to spend more than the period of 90 days fixed by Article 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and may be out of time for filing a revision in this Court and would be at least exposed to the risk of having to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act to get the delay in filing the revision petition in this Court excused. Whatever may be the position when the party concerned himself voluntarily avails himself of the enabling provision (Section 438 Cr. P.C) whether there is justification in the matter of this Court compelling a party to apply to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate in revision has to be seriously considered if the question arises.
The decision of the Kerala High Court in S. Naryanan v. Kannamma Bhargavi (A.I.R 1969 Kerala 126) (7) contains certain observations based on the import of Article 131 of the Limitation Act, 1963, on the practice of some High Courts in ensuring that revisions shall be filed in the first instance to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate, even in cases where they cannot make an effective order themselves but only make a recommendation under Section 438 Cr. P.C An effective order can be made then only in cases falling under Section 439 Cr. P.C It is, however, needless to pursue this discussion any further because the validity of the said Rule does not fall for consideration in the present proceedings in the view taken by me. Nor is it necessary, in the said view, to discuss the decision of V.D Misra, J. based upon the said Rule in Vijay Pal v. The State (1972 Cr. Law Journal 543) (7A). I may only state that such a contention based upon Article 131 of the Limitation Act was not advanced before V.D Misra, J. and Section 561-A was also not invoked. If any decision in this case had to be reached involving the consideration of the validity of the said Rule I would have considered it necessary to place the matter before my Lord the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench to decide the validity of the said Rule and the decision of V.D Misra, J. based on the said Rule. But in the view I have taken the said course is not necessary; I, therefore, refrain from expressing any opinion on that question. Besides the validity of the said Rule is not a matter which need necessarily be considered judicially; it is open to this Court itself to revise the said Rule in exercise of its rule making power.
It has been urged that it will not be proper for me to dismiss the revision petition which has been admitted on the ground that the petitioner has not moved the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate under Sections 436 and 439 Cr. P.C The petition to revise the impugned order having been admitted and the concerned parties having been heard it would not be proper to dismiss it on the ground that the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate has not been moved.
Shri S. C. Malik has cited a number of authorities in support of this position; it will be sufficient to refer only to a few of them: Chokat Ahir v. Suri Singh (A. I. R. 1940 Patna 299), (8), Municipal Board v. Bhim Singh (A.I.R 1962 Allahabad 450), (9), Suraj Bali v. Emperor (A.I.R 1942 Oudh 438) (10) and Bon Behari Mondal v. Bhusan Chandra Barui (A.I.R 1969 Calcutta 287), (11). In the last of them N. C. Talukdar, J. has discussed the cases at length and observed that though law is good, justice is better; even as distinct from a rule of law, he observed, that it cannot be allowed to override the latter and be her jealous mistress, the practice being nothing more than the palladium of justice. This approach, with respect, seems to have force. The observations of Subba Rao, C.J (as his Lordship then was) in Veera Ramayya v. Udayagiri Venkata Seshavatharam (A.I.R 1956 Andhra 97) (12) only amount to this that the Court will not deviate from the practice except on special, exceptional or extraordinary grounds; when there are no such grounds the fact that a revision has been admitted by the Court could not make any difference in the enforcement of the rule of practice, for the party concerned with open eye ignored such a practice and filed a revision directly in the High Court. There is no scope for the application of such a principle in the present case having regard to the above discussion. This Court has been approached under section 561-A Cr. P.C and Article 227 of the Constitution both of which could properly be invoked by the petitioner in this case.
Secondly, Shri Sital A. K. Dar referred to the fact that excepting the present petitioner respondents 3 to 7 had not even been served by the Magistrate. It is needless for me to say anything regarding this because I am merely concerned to point out that the order as it has been drawn up under Section 112 Cr. P.C as against the present petitioner does not comply with the mandatory provision of Section 112 Cr. P.C and hence has to be quashed. It follows that if the same kind of order has been passed (in similar terms) in regard to the other respondents also it will also be bad, even though they have not moved this Court. If the order is in different terms against respondents 3 to 7 and that is sufficient compliance with law it will follow that nothing that is stated in the order would affect the validity of such an order. It is needless to say more about this aspect of the matter since the petitioner alone has moved this Court by means of this petition and the province of this Court is merely to point out that the order which has been drawn up under Section 112 Cr. P.C in the terms stated above is an order which fails to comply with the mandatory provision of Section 112 Cr. P.C and is hence bad. The said order is accordingly quashed.
It follows that the learned District Magistrate, Delhi will forward the respondent 1's complaint to a competent Magistrate other than Shri A. S. Awasthi for being dealt with according to law. The petitioner will appear before the Distt. Magtt. on 10-5-1973.
Order accordingly.
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