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P.R Nayak Petitioner v. Union Of India And Others S

Delhi High Court
Jan 17, 1973
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — P.R. Nayak v. Union of India (Commission of Inquiry)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges the constitution and continuance of a one-man Commission presided over by Justice J.N. Takru ("the Commission"). The petitioner, P.R. Nayak, a government servant and then Managing Director of Indian Refineries Limited (IRL) (later merged with Indian Oil Corporation (IOC)), sought relief against the Union of India (Ministry of Petroleum & Chemicals) and Justice Takru. The Commission was appointed to inquire into alleged irregularities concerning contracts and construction of two pipelines (Gauhati–Siliguri and Haldia–Barauni–Kanpur) and payments to two contractors (Bechtels and Snam-Saipem).

The Commission's appointment followed the April 29, 1970 report of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings (the Committee), which recommended investigation and departmental action against officers if warranted. The Government initially appointed the Commission by a resolution dated August 22, 1970 and later extended its tenure multiple times. On March 20, 1971, the Government issued a notification under section 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (the Act) applying the Act's provisions to the Commission. The Commission framed issues, received statements from multiple parties (including the Government, IOC, IRL, contractors, and Arun Roy Choudhury — who assisted the Commission and later intervened), and undertook evidence-collection (including extensive file requisitions).

The petitioner raised multiple grounds: that the Commission was not validly appointed under section 3 of the Act (a resolution rather than a proper notification), that the matters to be inquired into were not "definite matters of public importance" (or had been exhausted by the Committee), that the Commission acted mala fide or discriminatorily, that the Commission showed bias (including favour to Choudhury), that it exceeded jurisdiction in procedural acts (seizure/inspection), and that certain terms of reference (notably term (i) — power to recommend action against officials) were beyond the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Commission was validly constituted under section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (i.e., whether the August 22, 1970 instrument satisfied the statutory requirement to appoint a Commission).
  2. Whether a later notification under section 11 of the Act could validate or render the originally appointed authority a Commission under section 3 for the purposes of the Act.
  3. Whether the matters referred to the Commission amounted to "definite matters of public importance", or whether the Parliamentary Committee's report precluded such a reference.
  4. Whether term (i) of the terms of reference (to recommend further action against particular officials) was ultra vires the Act and therefore invalid.
  5. Whether extensions of the Commission's time-limit were permissible and whether such extensions were arbitrary or mala fide.
  6. Whether the Commission acted with procedural unfairness or bias against the petitioner (including alleged preferential treatment to Arun Roy Choudhury) and whether preliminary findings by the Commission created reasonable apprehension of bias.
  7. Whether procedural acts by the Commission (including production/inspection of documents and issuance of notices under section 8B) were within its jurisdiction and complied with statutory safeguards.
  8. Whether the issue of notices under section 8B satisfied the statutory threshold (relevancy/prima facie material) and whether their issuance was discriminatory.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (P.R. Nayak)

  • The Commission was not validly appointed under section 3 of the Act because it was constituted by a government "resolution" (published in Gazette Part I, Section 1) rather than by a proper notification in the form contemplated for appointments under section 3.
  • The Government itself treated the Commission as not constituted under the Act (evidenced by later issuing a notification under section 11), showing confusion or procedural defect.
  • The Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings had already investigated and recommended disciplinary follow-up; thus, no "definite matter of public importance" survived to justify the Commission.
  • Term (i) (authority to recommend action against particular officials) was beyond the Commission's powers under the Act and impermissible, since a Commission's findings are recommendatory and its proceedings inadmissible in future civil/criminal proceedings.
  • The appointment and continuance of the Commission were discriminatory because other statutory forums (Central Vigilance Commissioner, CBI, Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, service rules) could have dealt with disciplinary matters, and a public inquiry produced unfair exposure.
  • The time-extensions of the Commission were impermissible, unreasonable and contrary to the statutory limit fixed at appointment.
  • The Commission acted mala fide and showed bias: it allegedly accepted Choudhury's affidavits, permitted him privileged access, seized documents without authority, gave ex parte hearings, issued s.8B notices on weak bases, and framed preliminary charges against the petitioner which created apprehension of bias for later proceedings.
  • The Commission relied on defectively verified affidavits (especially Choudhury's) without adequate scrutiny, in violation of procedural rules and principles of verification.

Respondents' Arguments (Union of India / Commission / Secretary)

  • The Government had formed the requisite opinion that it was necessary to appoint an inquiry into definite matters of public importance and had applied its mind; the terms of reference and accompanying affidavits demonstrate that conclusion.
  • Publication form (resolution vs notification or which part of the Gazette) is not determinative; the essential requirement is publication of the Government's opinion in the Official Gazette — the rules in the Central Secretariat Manual are not statutory and cannot invalidate an appointment.
  • Where a body is constituted by executive order or resolution, section 11 permits the Government to apply the Act to such body by subsequent notification; that notification rendered the Commission a Commission under section 3 for Act purposes.
  • The Parliamentary Committee's report did not make final determinations of facts; it recommended further verification and investigation, so an independent inquiry remained necessary.
  • The Commission's term (i) was objectionable in principle but the Government and Commission otherwise acted within statutory power; the Government legitimately sought a fact-finding body to advise on complex matters involving public undertakings and public funds.
  • The Commission's procedural acts (requests for files, inspections, issuance of s.8B notices) were justified by the material before it, including affidavits of the Government, IOC, IRL and Choudhury; there was no unlawful "seizure", since files were voluntarily produced or furnished subject to privilege claims.
  • Any assistance accepted from Choudhury was acceptable because without his supplemental material (as a member of the public) the affidavits of the Government and public undertakings left little to inquire into; Choudhury denied any claim of improper ex parte access.
  • The Commission's preliminary task of framing charges (after the Central Vigilance Commissioner declined due to conflict) was a justified delegation to a retired High Court judge capable of advising the Government on prima facie charges; such preliminary work did not of itself establish bias.

Intervener / Arun Roy Choudhury (role and contentions reflected in the record)

  • Choudhury appeared as a member of the public and filed affidavits alleging misconduct; he assisted the Commission in identifying and inspecting files.
  • He denied allegations that he received improper ex-parte access and contended that he did not receive preferential treatment — noting that many of his own applications were rejected or not fully allowed.
  • He supported the Commission's use of his material while noting that his role was as an assisting party and not a privileged insider.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P. and others (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1381) That formation of Government opinion under section 3 may be proved by evidence and affidavits (i.e., the formation of opinion need not be recited in the notification itself). Cited to show that a resolution need not itself recite the Government's formation of opinion as long as such formation can be proved by evidence; the Court accepted that principle but noted the subsequent s.11 notification indicated the original resolution was not under s.3.
The State of Jammu and Kashmir & others v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad & another (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 122) Same principle as above — formation of opinion can be evidenced outside the notification. Used with similar effect to support that formation of opinion need not be in the text of the resolution but can be shown by affidavit; did not decide the legality of the original resolution here.
Ganga Bishnu Swaika & another v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society & others (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 615) Authority for the proposition that formation of an opinion can be proved by extrinsic evidence. Cited to buttress the Court's discussion on proving Government opinion for s.3 appointments; Court relied on the same doctrine in analysing whether the Commission had been appointed under s.3.
Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & another (1959 Suppl. S.C.R. 319) Similar authority cited in the context of proving Government opinion and other procedural points. Referred among earlier authorities to support the Court's view that proof of opinion can be made by affidavit; used to frame the interpretation of s.3 and the effect of subsequent s.11 notification.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & others (1959 S.C.R. 279) Limits to a Commission's competence to recommend punitive action; Commission's report is recommendatory and s.6 renders its evidence inadmissible; a Commission cannot properly recommend punishment to be imposed proprio vigore. The Court relied on this authority to hold that term (i) (power to recommend further action against particular officials) was beyond the scope of the Act and ordered its deletion; Dalmia formed the principal legal basis for that conclusion.
P.V. Jagananath Rao & others v. State of Orissa & others [1968 (3) S.C.R. 789] Supports the proposition that conduct of an individual can, in some circumstances, amount to a definite matter of public importance. Used to reject the petitioner's contention that individual conduct could not be a matter of public importance; Court applied the principle to hold the terms of reference were within scope.
Krishna Ballabha Sahay & others v. Commission of Inquiry & others [1969 (1) S.C.R. 387] Reinforces that individual conduct may be a public matter where it prejudicially affects public interest. Relied on to support the proposition that the matters before the Commission (alleged mismanagement of public undertakings) qualified as definite matters of public importance.
The State of Bihar v. D.M. Ganguly & others (1959 S.C.R. 1191) Consideration of interplay between specific enactments and section 21 of the General Clauses Act (power to amend notifications/orders). Rejected by the Court as distinguishable and not controlling on whether extensions (amendments) of time for the Commission were permissible under the General Clauses Act.
Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957 S.C.R. 575) Test for bias: whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that bias attributable to a tribunal member might have affected the tribunal's final decision; the appearance of justice must be preserved. Applied as the governing test for evaluating the petitioner's allegations of bias against the Commission and its presiding member; the Court used the test to assess whether reasonable apprehension of bias existed.
Gullapalli Mageswara Rao etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & others (1960 (1) S.C.R. 580) Two principles: (1) no man shall be judge in his own cause; (2) justice should appear to be done; any situation of bias disqualifies a judge/quasi-judicial authority. Relied upon to underscore natural justice principles when examining allegations that the Commission, having undertaken preliminary work, could not act impartially.
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Sri Satyanarayana Transports (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1303) Principle that quasi-judicial authorities must act impartially and above suspicion; prior conduct may disqualify if it shows inability to act with an open mind. Quoted to reinforce the standard to be applied in assessing apprehension of bias against the Commission.
Payyavula Vengamma v. Payyavula Kesanna & others (1953 S.C.R. 119) Relates to arbitrators taking statements of a party behind the back of the other party — concerns fairness and ex parte communications. Referred to in the context of allegations that the Commission allowed inspection or communications to Choudhury that were not available to others; the Court found no evidence of unfair ex parte procedures akin to those cases.
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [1955 (1) S.C.R. 941] Also concerns fairness where one party takes evidence or communicates without other party's knowledge — relevant to ex parte allegations. Invoked to assess accusations of unfair behind-the-scenes communications; Court concluded allegations were unsubstantiated and did not demonstrate bias.
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya [1955 (2) S.C.R. 1] Deals with procedural fairness and improper communications in adjudicative contexts. Cited as part of the jurisprudence on ex parte conduct; Court found the facts here distinguishable and the allegation of such unfairness unproven.
A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 652) Emphasises importance of verification to ensure genuineness/authenticity of allegations in affidavits. The Court distinguished Nambiar: held that defective verification may render affidavits inadmissible in evidence, but the Commission could use affidavits as allegations (not as evidence) for the purpose of issuing notices and identifying matters to be inquired into.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing each major line of attack in sequence, applying statute, precedent, and the record:

  1. Validity of appointment under section 3:
    • The Court noted section 3 requires the appropriate Government to form an opinion that appointment of a Commission is necessary and to publish appointment in the Official Gazette. It held that the technical form (resolution vs notification or which Gazette part was used) is not determinative because the Central Secretariat Manual is not statutory.
    • However, the Court found that the August 22, 1970 resolution did not appear to be issued under the power in section 3: it did not expressly state the Government's formation of opinion and was published where resolutions are normally published. The subsequent March 20, 1971 notification under section 11 (applied the Act to the authority) demonstrated the Government treated the original instrument as an executive appointment dehors the Act.
    • The Court concluded that the resolution was an exercise of executive power creating an authority which, by virtue of the later s.11 notification, was lawfully made subject to the Act (i.e., s.11 can convert an executive-appointed authority into a deemed s.3 Commission for Act purposes).
  2. Applicability and effect of section 11:
    • The Court explained section 11 applies where an authority other than a s.3 Commission was set up under a resolution/order and the Government, by notification, directs that the Act applies to it; upon such notification the authority is deemed to be a s.3 Commission for purposes of the Act.
    • The Court rejected the petitioner's submission that the original resolution was void and therefore nothing survived to which s.11 could apply; instead it accepted the legal fiction created by s.11 that the authority could be treated as a s.3 Commission from the date of notification.
  3. Whether matters were "definite matters of public importance":
    • The Court examined the terms of reference and the Parliamentary Committee's report. It held that the Committee's report did not contain final factual findings; rather it recommended further verification and investigation. Citing authorities that individual conduct can amount to a matter of public importance, the Court concluded the questions about alleged mismanagement and misuse of public funds were indeed definite matters of public importance.
  4. Validity of term (i) (recommendations for action against particular officials):
    • Relying principally on Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia, the Court observed that a Commission under the Act has no judicial powers and its report is recommendatory; statements before a Commission are inadmissible in later proceedings under section 6. Accordingly, the Commission should not be empowered to recommend punishment or actions that would amount to securing redress/punishment proprio vigore.
    • The Court held term (i) went outside the scope of the Act and therefore directed deletion of term (i) and issued a mandamus restraining the Commission from making recommendations as contemplated by term (i).
  5. Extensions of time and the General Clauses Act:
    • Addressing the challenge to extensions, the Court observed that even if the Commission were initially appointed under section 3, nothing prevented the Government from extending the time specified by amending the instrument under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The Court rejected the view that the initial time-limit could never be extended.
  6. Allegations of mala fides, discrimination and excess of executive power:
    • The Court found no evidence that the Government acted mala fide in constituting the Commission; it concluded the Government properly sought an independent body to verify matters where the Government itself was implicated in allegations.
    • It rejected the petitioner's contention that appointment of the Commission was discriminatory vis-à-vis other statutory remedies because the dominant purpose was fact-finding into the alleged mismanagement of public undertakings.
  7. Allegations of bias (including preliminary charges and findings) and procedural complaints:
    • The Court applied the reasonable-apprehension-of-bias test (Manak Lal and related authorities). It analysed the Commission's handling of the preliminary framing of charges, the nature of the Commission's "findings" in that exercise (not conclusive statements of guilt but observations that defence required proof), and the circumstances that led the Government to entrust framing of charges to Justice Takru (Central Vigilance Commissioner conflicted), concluding that the preliminary exercise did not of itself produce a justifiable apprehension of bias.
    • The Court examined specific instances relied upon by the petitioner (use of the word "misled" in an order, alleged ex parte access to Choudhury, alleged seizure of documents, reliance on Choudhury's affidavits, unequal extensions for filing statements) and found either that the Commission's orders contained reasoned explanations, that documents were produced voluntarily subject to privilege, or that Choudhury's role was as a public informant assisting the Commission. The Court found insufficient material to conclude bias or unfairness that would justify restraining the Commission.
    • The Court distinguished authorities on verification of affidavits (A.K.K. Nambiar), observing that although verification is necessary for admission in evidence, affidavits may serve at a preliminary stage as allegations that justify inquiry/issuing notices under the Act; the Commission's use of such affidavits was not unlawful in context.
  8. Issuance of section 8B notices:
    • The Court examined whether the Commission had satisfied itself that there was material warranting notices under s.8B. It found from the record that the Commission considered affidavits and other material, discussed names, allowed party submissions, and set out reasons before issuing notices. The Court rejected the claim that notices were issued arbitrarily or discriminatorily; it also accepted the Commission's reasoned approach in declining to issue notices to Ministers where no definite allegation affecting their conduct had been brought forward.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petition succeeds only in part. The Court ordered deletion of term (i) of the original terms of reference, namely:

“(i) arising out of (h); to recommend further action, if any, that must be taken against particular officials whose conduct is assessed as meriting this.”

The Court issued a mandamus directing the Commission not to make any recommendations as contemplated by that term (i). No costs were awarded.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Commission remains constituted and authorized to proceed under the Act as applied by the s.11 notification, except that it is restrained from recommending punitive action or specific disciplinary measures against named officials (term (i) deleted).
  • The petitioner's broader challenges (invalidity of the Commission's constitution, mala fides, bias, improper procedural acts, invalid extensions, invalid issuance of s.8B notices) were largely rejected by the Court on the facts and record; those aspects of the Commission's work continue subject to the statutory and procedural constraints identified by the Court.

Broader implications and precedent: The Court applied established principles (including Dalmia on limits to Commission recommendations and Manak Lal on bias) but did not purport to lay down a novel, sweeping principle; its decision primarily resolves the concrete statutory and factual disputes between the parties in this litigation.

Order: Term (i) deleted; mandamus issued restraining the Commission from making recommendations as envisaged by term (i); no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

S.N Andley, C.J:— The constitution and continuance of the one-man Commission presided over by Justice J.N Takru, hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”, has been challenged by the petitioner P.R Nayak on various grounds. Respondent No. 1 to this petition is the Union of India through the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals and respondent No. 2 is Justice J.N Takru himself. The petitioner, a Government servant, was, at the relevant time, the Managing Director of the Indian Refineries Limited, a public sector undertaking, now merged with the Indian Oil Corporation, another public sector undertaking.

Shortly stated, the Commission was appointed to inquire into alleged irregularities in the grant of contracts and in the actual construction of the Gauhati-Siliguri and Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur Pipelines and in the payments made to two contractors namely, (1) Bechtels as Design Engineers and over-all Supervisors in Gauhati-Siliguri Pipeline and as Design Monitors and Project Managers in Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur Pipeline and (2) Snam-Saipem for contracting Gauhati-Siliguri and Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur Pipelines.
It is not disputed that the appointment of the Commission was preceded by the report dated April 29, 1970, of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings which had, inter alia, recommended to Government, —
“to take immediate steps to bring to book the guilty officers on the basis of the evidence that is already available. The least that would be done is to proceed departmentally without delay against the officers concerned under the relevant Government Servants Conduct Rules.”
The Commission was appointed by a resolution dated August 22, 1970 (published in the Gazette of India, Part 1, Section 1) of the Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals and Mines and Metals (Department of Petroleum). The resolution stales that the Government of India “have decided to set up a one-man Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 headed by Shri (Justice) J.N Takru, retired Judge of Allahabad High Court.” The Commission was required to submit its report within a period of six months. It was to devise its own procedures and to call for such information and take such evidence as it may consider necessary. The terms of reference were as follows: —
“(a) (i) to determine whether any payment to Bechtels (as Design Engineers and overall Supervisors in Gauhati-Siliguri Pipeline and as Design Monitors and Project Managers in Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur Pipeline) was made in excess of the amount sanctioned by Government and if so, was such payment justified ?
(ii) was the induction of Bechtels into the aforesaid projects mala fide and were they shown any undue favour by officials of the IRL/Government.
(b) to determine whether there have been omissions in regard to scrutinising, editing, compiling and maintaining contractual documents relating to the investigations, designs, construction and supervision of the Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur pipeline and whether the negotiations leading to the contracts were carried out diligently and whether adequate records of the negotiations were kept.
(c) whether the then Managing Director, IRL, acted on his own by-passing the Board of Directors in his dealings with Snam and Bechtels in vital matters concerning the capacity of the Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur Pipeline, and whether the amendment of the contract adversely affected the capacity of the pipeline, and whether negligence or improper motive is substantiated against the Managing Director, IRL, for not bringing these to the notice of the Board/Government, and, in particular, whether the General Manager and Managing Director were perfunctory and casual in dealing with an important communication of the 26th September, 1963 from Bechtels to IRL mentioning the design capacity of Haldia-Barauni-Pipeline as 1.9 million Tonnes per year.
(d) to investigate the circumstances in which the sanction for the total project cost of HBK pipeline was not issued by Government and whether there was loss to the public interest as a result.
(e) in view of the objection raised by West Bengal Government and Indian Mining experts over the laying of the pipeline over coal bearing area, to advise whether there was any carelessness and negligence in discharge of responsibilities by Government/IRL/IOC officials.
(f) to determine the circumstances in which the IRL/IOC spent money in excess of the sanctioned estimates in the case of the GSPL Project;
(g) to investigate the circumstances under which IRL/Government awarded the construction contracts for Gauhati-Siliguri and Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur pipelines to Snam-Saipem on negotiated basis without calling for global tenders;
(h) to advise on whether there has been any negligence or carelessness or mala-fide motive on the part of any of the officers of Government/IRL/IOC and their staff in the discharge of their duties on any of the foregoing or other related issues, which, in the opinion of the Commission, are relevant;
(i) arising out of (h); to recommend further action, if any, that must be taken against particular officials whose conduct is assessed as meriting this; and
(j) generally, to report on any other matter that is relevant, in the opinion of the Commission.”
Since the work of the Commission was not expected to be completed within the time appointed by the aforesaid resolution, its tenure was extended by another six months upto August 31, 1971 by a further resolution dated February 20, 1971. Then, a notification dated March 20, 1971 (published in the Gazette of India, Part II, Section 3 (ii) on April 24, 1971) was issued by the Government of India in exercise of power conferred by section 11 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, directing that all the provisions of the Act shall apply to the Commission. Since further time appeared to be necessary for the report of the Commission to be ready, time was again extended upto February 29, 1972 by resolutions of the Government of India dated August 26, 1971 and September 6, 1971. Then on October 25, 1971 the Government issued another notification [published in the Gazette of India, Part II Section 3 (ii) ] referring the following further matters to the Commission: —
“(h) whether the Snam-Saipem was shown any undue favour by officials of Indian Refineries Limited or Indian Oil Corporation or the Government, in connection with the award of the aforesaid contracts and in connection with the execution of the Gauhati-Siliguri and Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur pipeline projects under the aforesaid contracts.
(i) to investigate the circumstances that caused considerable delay in the completion of Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur pipeline project;
(j) to investigate the circumstances which led to the continuance of Shri Nittoor Sreenivasa Rau after his retirement as Central Vigilance Commissioner to enquire into the laying of a section of the Haldia-Barauni pipeline over the coal-bearing areas.”
Thereafter, by notification dated March 3, 1972, the date of submission of the report of the Commission was extended to August 31, 1972 and by notification dated August 30, 1972 to August 31, 1973. In the meantime, on June 20, 1972 and August 7, 1972 the Commission framed issues which required determination after statements had been filed by various persons concerned with the proceedings of the Commission including the Government of India; the Indian Oil Corporation; the petitioner; the aforesaid two contractors and one Arun Roy Choudhury, hereinafter referred to as “Choudhury”, who represented himself as well as a National Committee so-called for assisting the Commission and to whom, it is alleged by the petitioner the Commission has abdicated its functions. It may also be stated here that it is alleged by the petitioner that at the instance of Choudhury, the Commission “seized” numerous files and documents from the Ministry of the Government of India and the Indian Oil Corporation. Choudhury has been permitted to appear in the proceedings before us as an intervener.
The first point that has been raised is that the Commission, not having been duly appointed under section 3 of the Act by a proper notification, is not a Commission within the meaning of the Act. The appointment of a Commission under the Act is provided by section 3. Sub-section (1) of section 3 without its proviso which is not material says: —
“The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall if a resolution in this behalf is passed by the House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly.”
This sub-section requires (1) the formation of an opinion by the appropriate Government that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of inquiry, (2) for making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance. Upon the formation of such opinion, the appropriate Government may appoint a Commission of Inquiry by notification in the official Gazette to perform its functions within such time as may be specified in the notification. It is an enabling section except in cases where a resolution in that behalf has been passed by the House of the People or by the Legislative Assembly of a State. If such a resolution has been passed, the appropriate Government has to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in the manner stated but that is not the case here. It is contended that initially the Commission was not a Commission of Inquiry under the Act as it had been appointed not by a notification but by the aforesaid resolution of the Government dated August 22, 1970 and being so, the Commission was appointed by an executive act of the Government and not in exercise of power under the Act. It is asserted that even the Government was not clear as to whether the Commission had been appointed under the Act. It is alleged that the counsel for the Ministry stated before the Commission in February and March, 1972 that the appointment of the Commission had not been made under the Act but was by way of an executive act and as such section 3 of the Act was not applicable but this statement was not adhered to as on March 30, 1972 it was stated that the Government had formed an opinion that it was necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry under the Act and this decision was published by way of a resolution dated August 22, 1970. The petitioner also places reliance on the Central Secretariat Manual of Office Procedure (Diglot Edition 1969). Chapter VI of this Manual contains forms and rules of correspondence. Para 76 in this Chapter provides that the form of notification “is used for notifying by publication in the Gazette of India the promulgation of rules and orders, delegation of powers, appointments, promotions, etc., of gazetted officers etc.” Para 77 provides that the form of resolution “is used for public announcements of decisions of Government on important matters of policy, appointment of committees or commissions of enquiry and of the results of the review of important reports of such bodies.” It is pointed out that notifications are to be published in the Gazette of India, Part II, Section 3 (ii) and resolutions are to be published in the Gazette of india, part i, section 1. In the present case, as stated earlier, the first resolution dated August 22, 1970 and the subsequent resolutions were published in the Gazette of india, part i, section 1 while the notification dated March 20, 1971 issued in exercise of power under section 11 of the Act was published in the Gazette of India, Part II, Section 3 (ii).
Reliance by the petitioner upon the aforesaid Manual of Office Procedure for the contention that the Commission was not constituted under the Act is misconceived. The rules in this Manual are not statutory and are merely rules of office procedure. They have, therefore, no statutory force to entitle the petitioner to say that their non-compliance renders the constitution of the Commission illegal. Section 3 does not in terms require a notification in its technical sense. The only requirement of the section is that the opinion of the appropriate Government that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry should be published in the official gazette. It is immaterial to the validity of the appointment of the Commission, subject to other conditions of section 3 being satisfied whether the opinion of the appropriate Government has been expressed in the form of a resolution or of a notification or whether these are published in any particular part of the official gazette. Assuming, therefore, that the appointment of the Commission in this case was by an “order” as contemplated by para 76 of the aforesaid Manual, it would not matter whether this order is styled as a notification or as a resolution so long as it is notified or published in the official gazette.
There is, however, substance in the contention that even the Government was proceeding on the basis that the Commission was not constituted under the Act by the aforesaid resolution dated August 22, 1970. Firstly, this resolution does not state that the Commission is being appointed in exercise of powers under section 3 of the Act. Secondly, it does not contain the expression of an opinion of the Government that it is necessary to appoint a Commission. It is true that it is not necessary to recite the formation of opinion in the resolution or notification itself as the formation of such opinion can be proved by evidence aliened and even by affidavits filed in Court as has been held by the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P and others (A.I.R 1961 Supreme Court 1381 (1); The State of Jammu and Kashmir and others v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and another (A.I.R 1967 Supreme Court 122) (2); Ganga Bishnu Swaika and another v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society and others (A.I.R 1968 Supreme Court 615) (3) and Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another: 1959 (Suppl.) Supreme Court Reports 319, (4). It is also true that in its affidavits filed in this Court, the Government has taken the stand that such an opinion was formed before the issue of this resolution and even the resolution says that the Commission has been appointed under the Act. But the fact remains that the Government issued a notification dated March 20, 1971 published in the official gazette on April 24, 1971 in exercise of powers conferred by section 11 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act is in these terms: —
“Where any authority (by whatever name called), other than a Commission appointed under section, 3 has been or is set up under any resolution or order of the appropriate Government for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and that Government is of opinion that all or any of the provisions of this Act should be made applicable to that authority, that Government may, subject to the prohibition contained in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the said provisions of this Act shall apply to that authority, and on the issue of such a notification, that authority shall be deemed to be a Commission appointed under section 3 for the purposes of this Act.”
It applies the Act to an authority, other than a Commission appointed under section 3, set up under any resolution or order of the appropriate Government. If the Commission had been appointed under the Act by this resolution, it would not have been necessary to issue any notification under section 11 of the Act. The issue of this notification can be justified only on the basis that the Commission as originally appointed by the resolution dated August 22, 1970 was not a Commission appointed in exercise of powers under section 3 of the Act notwithstanding the reference therein to the Act. Therefore, it appears to us that the resolution dated August 22, 1970 cannot be said to be a resolution issued in exercise of power conferred by section 3 of the Act.
The argument then advanced is that the notification issued under section 11 of the Act cannot save the resolution dated August 22, 1970 which is bad and must be quashed leading to the result that no body survives to which all or any of the provisions of the Act can be applied in terms of section 11 of the Act. The argument is misconceived. It cannot be disputed that a Commission of Inquiry can be constituted dehors the Act in which case it will be an authority appointed in exercise of the executive powers of the Government and if such an authority has been or is set up under a resolution or order of the appropriate Government for the purpose of making inquiry into any definite matter of public importance, then upon the issue of a notification under section 11 of the Act this authority is to be deemed to be a Commission appointed under section 3 for the purposes of the Act. There is no question of such a resolution being bad for lack of authority which is liable to be quashed. The resolution is the expression given to the exercise of executive power by the Government in setting up such an authority which, by a fiction of law, is converted into a Commission appointed under section 3 for the purposes of the Act. The issue of the notification under section 11 of the Act would, therefore, result in the Commission appointed initially by the resolution dated August 22, 1970 becoming a Commission under the Act.
It is not correct to say that the Government had not specifically made up its mind about the definite matters of public importance to be inquired into because the resolution dated August 22, 1970 recites the terms of reference which have been quoted earlier. Generally speaking, it may be stated that the matters which are the subject matter of inquiry by the Commission relate to the Indian Refineries Limited subsequently merged into the Indian Oil Corporation, both public sector undertakings of considerable magnitude, with particular reference to the contracts entered into with Bechtels and Snam-Saipem, the excess payments alleged to have been made to them, the alleged irregularities in the contractual documents, the by-passing of the Board of Directors of the Indian Refineries Limited by the Managing Director in vital matters concerning the aforesaid two pipelines, the conduct and manner in which the General Manager and the Managing Director dealt with these matters, the circumstances in which the sanction for the total project cost of the Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur pipeline was made, the alleged carelessness and negligence of Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation officials over the laying of the pipeline over coal bearing areas in spite of objections raised by the West Bengal Government and Indian Mining Experts, the failure to call global tenders, alleged undue favours shown to Snam-Saipem, the alleged delay in the completion of the Haldia-Barauni-Kanpur pipeline project and other related issues. The commission was also asked to recommend further action that may be taken against particular officials and generally to report on any other matter that may be relevant.
It is contended by the petitioner that the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings had gone into the whole matter and had recommended disciplinary action against the delinquent officers/officials of the aforesaid undertakings and no definite matter of public importance survived to justify the appointment of the Commission. The petitioner gave us a digest of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings. It is as follows: —
“(1) Serial No. 3 page 192
“The Committee would like Government to verify whether payment in excess of their sanction was made, and if so, by whom and on what authority, and fix responsibility for the lapse.”
(2) Serial No. 16 page 210
“The Committee would like Government to pursue the matter to its logical conclusion and take up with all those concerned with the introduction of this party to the Pipeline projects and the undue favours which were shown to them at every stage as evidenced by the unusual provisions of the agreements. The Committee cannot help pointing out that the then Managing Director, IRL, who was signing the agreements on behalf of IRL showed more concern for the interests of the Bechtels than for the public money he was entrusted with.”
(3) Serial No. 11 page 199
“The Committee would like Government to take very serious notice of this lapse on the part of those who were entrusted with the negotiations and take suitable action against them”.
“The Committee would also like Government to issue standing instructions in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and the Comptroller & Auditor-General of India on the manner in which contemporaneous records of such negotiations should be kept for future reference. A copy of these instructions may also be furnished to the Committee for information.”
(4) Serial No. 12 page 200
“The Committee are amazed that the reduction of the throughput capacity of the pipeline could have been dealt with in such a casual and perfunctory manner. The Committee consider that the matter calls for thorough investigation for fixing responsibility on all those officials who were lax and casual in discharging their responsibilities.”
(5) Serial No. 18 page 202
“The Committee need hardly stress that the various other issues raised in the Audit Report should be thoroughly examined in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General and the responsibility for the loss suffered by the Undertaking Government fixed and deterrent action taken against all those who have shown laxity in the discharge of their responsibilities.”
(6) Serial No. 19 page 204
“The Committee also expect that while examining the question of according approval to revised estimates, Government would seriously consider its effects on the economics of the project. The Committee feel that where the economics of the projects are adversely affected as a result of revised estimate of expenditure, the matter should be specifically brought to the notice of Parliament without avoidable delay.”
(7) Serial No. 24 page 211
“The Committee regret that the indifference of IRL/Government went to the extent of ignoring to ask for a third set of independent opinion before accepting the defective advice. The Committee is convinced that such gross indifference and dereliction of duty of the officials of Government/IRL being inexcusable, impartial inquiry followed by severe punishment of guilty officials for the lapses is called for.”
(8) Serial No. 20 page 205
“The Committee recommend that the circumstances under which the Undertaking was allowed to spend money beyond 10 per cent of the sanctioned estimates without the approval of the Government should be investigated and the persons responsible both in the Undertakings and the Ministry should be proceeded against.”
(9) Serial No. 8 page 197
“The Committee would like Government to fully investigate the circumstances under which IRL and Government allowed themselves to be persuaded to hand over the construction contract to Snam-Saipem exclusively without putting it to sure and practical test of global tenders.”
(10) Serial No. 28 page 221
“The Committee would like Government to fully investigate the circumstances under which the Indian Refineries Ltd. and Govt. allowed themselves to be persuaded to hand over the construction contract to Snam-Saipem exclusively without putting it to sure and practical test of global tenders.”
(11) Serial No. 30 page 222
No specific recommendation. See para 9.13 at page 106 of the Main Report. —
“9.13 Another aspect which has greatly worried the Committee is the halting and somewhat contradictory manner in which the Govt./IOC have approached the probe into the affairs of the Pipelines in spite of the fact that the matter has been agitated on the floor of the House through questions including a Short Notice Question on 1st April 1970. It is on record that the then Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister had given orders as early as May, 1967 that a thorough investigation should be held into the wasteful expenditure which would be incurred on the project and that responsibility should be fixed on the officials concerned at all levels in the Pipeline Division and in the Ministry. It is pertinent to recall how the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner to hold the inquiry, the terms of his reference and finally entrusting Shri Rau even after his retirement as Chief Vigilance Commissioner with the task of inquiry, was allowed to be handled by an officer whose conduct, while holding earlier the appointment of Managing Director of Indian Refineries Ltd. was in question. It would evidently have been more appropriate if the entire question of referring issues raised by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister for investigation had been entrusted by Govt. the Cabinet Sectt. and necessary action taken in the matter by Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the Minister concerned and the Prime Minister's approval had been taken to entrust the inquiry to the Central Vigilance Commissioner. If these elementary precautions had been taken, the Committee would not have been compelled to record their fear that the whole investigation done so far has got vitiated in the circumstances and the objective underlying it has been defeated.
(12) Serial No. 37 page 227
“The Committee also feel compelled to record their feeling that instead of holding the Officers responsible for their lapses, there appears to have been a persistent effort to slur over their dereliction of duty and not to fix the responsibility though copious facts to substantiate such lapses have come on record. The Committee would, therefore, like Government to take immediate steps to bring to book the guilty officers on the basis of evidence that is already available. The least that could be done is to proceed departmentally without delay against the Officers concerned under the relevant Govt. Servants Conduct Rules. The Committee feel that Government, in the larger interests of the public sector, should not allow a feeling to go round that officers could commit such grave lapses and indulge in dereliction of duly with impunity and go unpunished.”
The affidavit dated January 15, 1972, filed by the Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals, before the Commission states the reasons why the Commission was appointed. It is stated that Government considered it necessary to determine beyond any doubt whether officials concerned with these projects have been guilty of lapses and to take suitable follow up action if negligence or other mala-fide motivation is substantiated; that the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings had not mentioned any particular officers other than the petitioner as being responsible for any particular default and the Government decided that the Commission be appointed to advise whether there had been any negligence or carelessness or mala fide motive on the part of any officers of the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation and their staff in the discharge of their duties and to recommend further action against them and that the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings having itself suggested at various places that the Government should hold thorough investigation, the Government was of the view that these matters were definite matters of public importance which should be referred to the Commission of Inquiry for thorough probe.
On a fair reading of the recommendations of the aforesaid Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings the conclusion is irresistible that no definite findings were given by this Committee and it only made a recommendation to the Government to verify and investigate the various matters referred to. It is true that in some parts of the Report recommendation has been made to take suitable action against the Managing Director and some other named and unnamed officers/officials of the Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation but it would be straining the language too much to say that even for this purpose no further inquiry or investigation by an independent body was called for. It is clear that aspersions were cast by the aforesaid Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings not only against certain officers/officials of the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation but also against the Government. In these circumstances, the Government were, in our opinion, not only justified but acted fairly in deciding that an inquiry into the matters referred to by the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings should be made not by the Government itself but by an independent body constituted under the Act to find the relevant facts which could be implemented by governmental action. Although it is true that on some aspects the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings did come to a conclusion about the conduct of the Managing Director of the Indian Refineries Limited but, in general, the recommendation is to make a further inquiry or investigation of the various matters referred to followed by severe punishment of those who may be found guilty. It cannot, therefore, be said that no definite matters of public importance survived after the report of the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings and in fact, as stated there was eminent justification for the appointment of an independent Commission under the Act to find facts with respect to these matters.
In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India as a counter to the petition, the Secretary in the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals has asserted that the Government had satisfied itself that there were definite matters of public importance and applied its mind and having come to that conclusion the Government thereafter issued the notification for the appointment of the present Commission of Inquiry. The terms of reference and the aforesaid averments are enough to show that the Government had specifically made up its mind about the definite matters of public importance to be inquired into. Concededly, the terms of reference contained in clauses (a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) are definite matters of public importance and it seems to us that the other terms of reference are incidental to these terms. Shortly stated, the matters which are the subject matter of reference involve large amount of public funds and contemplate lack of probity on the part of officers/officials of the Government and of the aforesaid two Undertakings. No matter could be more a definite matter of public importance than the matters which are the subject matter of the reference. On the material placed before us it is not possible for us to say that the Parliamentary Committee on Public undertakings had determined all the relevant facts in its possession. On the averments made, particularly in the counter affidavit of the Government, we have to come to the conclusion that in order to take further proceedings as recommended by the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings, the Government found it necessary to appoint a fact finding body as the Commission is. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention that the appointment of the Commission initially or the enlargement of the scope of the inquiry later was to indulge in a fishing inquiry and not to inquire into a definite matter of public importance.
In our opinion, no argument can be made by the petitioner to say that the terms of reference are vague and/or indefinite merely because some references were made by the Commission to the Government to elucidate or even add to the terms of reference. In fact, the statement of the Minister of Law and Justice and Petroleum and Chemicals made on May, 5, 1972 on the floor of the Lok Sabha (quoted in the petition) makes it clear that so far as the Government were concerned, the terms of reference were wide enough to cover all matters which were covered by the Sixty-Sixth Report of the aforesaid Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings but to facilitate the Commission, the Government was prepared on the Commission's recommendations to expand the terms of reference. This statement goes to show that there was an application of mind by the Government in the formulation of the original terms of reference and it was only because of some elucidation required by the Commission that the terms of reference were added to and not because the Government thought that the original terms of reference were vague and/or indefinite.
Equally without force is the contention that the conduct of an individual cannot possibly be a matter of public importance. Assuming that the dominant purpose of the terms of reference relates to the alleged misconduct of the officers of the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation in the matter of the aforesaid two contracts relating to the aforesaid two Pipelines as contended by the petitioner, we fail to see why such conduct cannot be a definite matter of public importance when as a result of such conduct public funds have been frittered away as alleged. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R Tendolkar & others (1959 Supreme Court Reports 279) (5) the contention that the conduct of an individual cannot possibly be a matter of public importance and far less a definite matter of that kind was not accepted by the Supreme Court and it was observed: —
“We see no warrant for the proposition that a definite matter of public importance must necessarily mean only some matter involving the public benefit or advantage in the abstract, e.g, public health, sanitation or the like or some public evil or prejudice, e.g floods, famine or pestilence or the like. Quite conceivably the conduct of an individual person or company or a group of individual persons or companies may assume such a dangerous proportion and may so prejudicially affect or threaten to affect the public well-being as to make such conduct a definite matter of public importance urgently calling for a full inquiry.”
The same view has been taken in P.V Jagananath Rao and others v. State of Orissa and others [1968 (3) Supreme Court Reports 789] (6), Krishna Ballabha Sahay and others v. Commission of Inquiry and others [1969 (1) Supreme Court Reports 387] (7) and The State of Jammu and Kashmir and others v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and another (A.I.R 1967 Supreme Court 122) (2).
A mere reading of the terms of reference shows that the definite matter of public importance contemplated is the working of the Indian Refineries Limited and the Indian Oil Corporation with particular reference to the aforesaid two contracts and the conduct of the officers of the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation in that connection is merely incidental because the inquiry into the main purpose cannot be complete without reference to the conduct of the officers concerned. As a matter of construction, the original terms of reference (a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) are definite matters of public importance relating as they do to the alleged acts of mis-management of two public sector undertakings resulting in huge losses to the Government while the other terms of reference barring term (i) are merely incidental thereto. Term (i) requires the Commission to recommend further action, if any, that must be taken against particular officials whose conduct is assessed as meriting this. This term is hit by the observations of the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R Tendolkar and others (supra).5 The relevant observation of the Supreme Court is as follows: —
“From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commission of Inquiry recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future. But seeing that the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective proprio vigore and the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry is, under s. 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal there can be no point in the Commission of Inquiry making recommendations for taking any action “as and by way of securing redress or punishment” which, in agreement with the High Court, we think, refers, in the context to wrongs already done or committed, for redress or punishment for such wrongs, if any, has to be imposed by a court of law properly constituted exercising its own discretion on the facts and circumstances of the case and without being in any way influenced by the view of any person or body, howsoever august or high powered it may be.”
We, therefore, hold that having regard to these considerations, the aforesaid term (i) cannot be said to be at all necessary for or ancillary for the purposes of the Commission and clearly goes outside the scope of the Act. We, therefore, direct the deletion of the aforesaid term (i) from the terms of reference.
It is then contended that the reference to the Commission is discriminatory because there are other recognised procedures for examining the conduct of Government servants. It is alleged that if the Government had felt it necessary to take any action against any officers of the aforesaid undertakings for their lapses and dereliction of duty, inquiries, preliminary and otherwise, could be held through the agency of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, and the Government Servants Discipline, Appeal and Control, Rules etc., and, therefore, the appointment of the Commission in exercise of the executive power and its investment with powers under the Act would, in the circumstances, be discriminatory. It is pointed out that while the inquiry under the Act is public, a disciplinary inquiry against an officer except under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, would not be open to public gaze; a lawyer has a right to appear before the Commission but not before the disciplinary authority; the public has no say before the disciplinary authority; no evidence has to be given by the officer in the preliminary inquiry in disciplinary proceedings while the defence is to be disclosed at the preliminary stage in proceedings before the Commission and the proceedings of a Commission are bound to be long drawn out. This contention may have had to be examined if we were of the opinion that the dominant purpose of appointing the Commission was to hold an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner and other Government officers. We have already held that the dominant purpose for which the Commission was appointed as appearing from the terms of reference was to examine, generally speaking, the alleged irregularities into the working of the two public sector undertakings in relation to the two contracts granted to Bechtels and Snam-Saipem and the investigation into the conduct of the officers of the two undertakings is only incidental and even necessary for the purpose of determining the alleged irregularities. There is, therefore, no question of discrimination by referring the aforesaid terms for investigation to the Commission which is only a fact finding body and whose findings have no effect proprio vigore (1959 Supreme Court Reports 279) (5).
The next contention is that section 3 of the Act requires the appropriate Government while making an order appointing a Commission to fix time within which the Commission has to make the inquiry and the time limit fixed initially cannot be extended. Alternatively, it is urged that the extension of time must be reasonable and that it was not so in the present case. In view of our finding that the initial appointment of the Commission by resolution dated August 22, 1970 was not under section 3 of the Act, this question does not arise for determination. But assuming that the Commission was initially appointed under section 3 of the Act, we do not see any warrant for the proposition that time initially fixed cannot be extended from time to time. The Commission was appointed on August 22, 1970 for a period of six months. Time was extended till August 31, 1971 on February 20, 1971; again till February 28, 1972 on August 26, 1971 and till August 31, 1972 on March 3, 1972. section 21 of the General Clauses Act provides that the power to issue includes the power, inter alia, to amend any notifications or orders etc. Therefore, the extension of time from time to time was in exercise of this power to amend. There is nothing in section 7 of the Act to curtail this power as contended by the petitioner. This section applies only if the appropriate Government is of the opinion that the continued existence of a Commission is unnecessary and, if it is of such opinion, it can declare that the Commission shall cease to exist from such date as may be specified in this behalf. It is nobody's case that the appropriate Government, in this case the Central Government, were of this opinion. In the absence of such opinion, section 7 will not apply and cannot be called in support of the argument that it contains a pointer to the exclusion of the application of the General Clauses Act. Reference to the case of The State of Bihar v. D.M Ganguly & others (1959 Supreme Court Reports 1191) (8) where various sections of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were examined to come to the conclusion that the application of section 21 of the General Clauses Act was excluded in support of the contention made before us is, therefore, misconceived.
We also do not find any substance in the contention that the various extensions given were either unjustifiable or mala fide. The Government considered the request of the Commission for extension of time from time to time and it was upon consideration of such request that the extensions were given. It may be that the prolongation of the inquiry may cause hardship to the persons appearing before it either voluntarily or in response to notices under section 8B of the Act. But such delays are inevitable in view of the nature of the terms of reference and the scope of the inquiry for which purpose, it is on record, the Commission has had to summon about four thousand files from the Ministry.
The next ground of attack against the appointment of the Commission is that on the facts and circumstances of the case the Government acted mala fide in making the reference to the Commission of the various matters stated earlier. First it is contended that the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings had asked the Government to take disciplinary proceedings against the officers/officials of the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation and instead of discharging its obligation to start the disciplinary proceedings, the Government had referred the matter to the Commission for doing the same thing as had been done by the aforesaid Parliamentary Committee. We have already extracted the recommendations of the aforesaid Parliamentary Committee earlier in this judgment. While the Parliamentary Committee has recommended disciplinary action against the officers, its main recommendation is for the Government to verify and make investigations into various matters. It is for this verification and investigation that, according to the Government, the Commission was constituted and it appears to us that unless such verification and investigation is made, institution of disciplinary proceedings forthwith against the officers concerned may be stultified by lack of material. The facts for taking disciplinary proceedings have to be found. The Government decided to have them found by an independent Commission because the involvement of the Government and its officers was alleged in the various activities of the aforesaid two undertakings in relation to the two contracts. In these circumstances we cannot say that the decision of the Government to constitute the Commission for making an inquiry into the facts was not proper much less mala fide. The admitted fact that Justice J.N Takru was consulted prior to his appointment with regard to definite matters of public importance cannot indicate either any mala fides of the Government or a non-application of mind. In its counter its has been stated by the Government that it has formed its opinion about the existence of the definite matters of public importance which necessitated the inquiry and having framed the terms of reference which it intend to the incorporated in the proposed notification, it sent the same to the Commission just prior to its appointment. In fact, the addition of certain terms of reference to the terms of reference initially referred indicates that there was application of such mind.
Then it is contended that the Government had no power to make a notification under section 11 of the Act as there were no surviving matters of public importance into which an inquiry was necessary. We have already held that finality which is sought to be given to the report of Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings does not attach to it because a perusal of its recommendations shows that some further inquiries and investigations were recommended by this Committee into the various matters dealt with by it which, as we have already held, were definite matters of public importance.
An argument was raised that the Commission through its Secretary and Choudhury seized certain documents from the Ministry and other offices without having the power to do so as no direction was issued by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act extending to it the application of the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (5) of this section relating to seizure etc. It may be stated that the alleged seizure is denied by the Government and it is stated that as soon as the demand was made by the Commission for the production of certain files, the demand was complied with and the files were supplied to the Commission. We are, therefore, satisfied that there was no seizure as alleged by the petitioner. In this situation it is unnecessary to decide whether by applying all the provisions of the Act by the notification under section 11, any separate and distinct directions as contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 5 were necessary to confer powers on the Commission of, inter alia, seizure.
It is equally unnecessary to consider the contention that all actions taken by the Commission under the Act before the issue of the notification under section 11 were illegal and without jurisdiction because even if they were, nothing would follow therefrom to entitle the petitioner to any relief.
Next it is urged that the appointment of the Commission by the aforesaid resolution dated August 22, 1970 in exercise of the power of the Government in effect to enquire into the correctness of the conclusions of the Parliamentary Committee was in excess and beyond the proper and legitimate ambit of such executive power. The argument pre-supposes that the effect of the terms of reference was to inquire into the correctness of the conclusions of the Parliamentary Committee. In our opinion, the Government did what the Parliamentary Committee wanted it to do, namely, to verify and investigate into the various matters which were dealt with by the Parliamentary Committee. The question, therefore, of the Government exceeding the limits of its executive power does not arise.
The petitioner then contends that he will be seriously prejudiced in his defence before the Commission because it will involve the frank discussion of the report of the Parliamentary Committee and that is likely to involve him in contempt of Parliament particularly when in-camera hearing had been refused by the Commission. Apart from making this bare assertion in this petition, no material has been supplied to us by the petitioner to enable us to say that such and such a defence of his is likely to involve him in the contempt of Parliament. Various passages were read to us from May's Parliamentary Practice but they would not help the petitioner unless he were to satisfy us, which he has not, that any defence of his is such as is likely to involve him in the contempt of Parliament. The mere fact that the Commission rejected the petitioner's prayer to hold its proceedings in-camera would not be a justification for saying that the Commission should be restrained from continuing its proceedings because in some remote and undisclosed contingencies something that may be said by a party before it may involve such party in contempt of Parliament.
The second part of the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that in conducting the inquiry the Commission has disclosed patent bias against the petitioner and undue favour to Choudhury.
The first element to establish the alleged bias of the Commission is that the Commission undertook a preliminary inquiry into the charges to be framed against the petitioner for the proposed departmental inquiry and this was done without jurisdiction. The subject matter of the terms of reference is stated to cover virtually the same ground as covered by the charges framed against the petitioner for the departmental inquiry.
The reason for entrusting the task of finalising the charges to the Commission is explained by the Government by stating that the Government had framed charges against the petitioner and sought advice, in accordance with the procedure in vigilance cases, of the Central Vigilance Commissioner but he declined to advise on the ground that his son-in-law, S.K Guha, had been Director-in-Charge of the Pipeline Commission at the relevant time. For this reason, it was considered at the highest level as to whose advice should be obtained in the matter and it was decided, —
“to refer the matters to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Takru considering the status of Shri J.N Takru as a retired High Court Judge who was considered to be a fit person to advise the Government.”
If the subject matter of the terms of reference to the Commission was the same as the subject matter of the preliminary inquiry against the petitioner, it may be possible to contend that the Commission would be biased and prejudiced in the future conduct of the Commission against the petitioner having come to a conclusion, even though prima facie, against him while holding the preliminary inquiry but the facts in this case appear to us to be different. We have looked into the report of the Commission in the matter of the preliminary inquiry against the petitioner in relation to the formulation of the charges which is Exhibit R. 5 in Civil Writ No. 350 of 1971 filed by the petitioner in this Court against the Union of India and others against this suspension from service. The manner in which the preliminary inquiry came to be entrusted to the Commission is stated as under: —
“By their D.O No. 28 (8) /70-OR, dated the 17th October, 1970, the Government of India, in the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals, entrusted me with the task of advising them, on (a) whether, and, if so, what prima facie charges lay against Shri P.R Nayak, in connection with the 66th Report of the Public Undertaking Committee, and (b) whether any other officers appeared to be involved in any of the charges which might be found as prima facie established, and if so, to let the Government have their names. Earlier, on the 26th September, 1970, Shri Mangat Rai, Special Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Petroleum & Chemicals, had handed over to me a copy of the Charge-Sheet, comprising of 9 charges, which had been drawn up against Shri P.R Nayak, by the concerned Ministry, and a copy of the Note recorded by him. Subsequently, by their D.O No. 28 (8) /70-OR dated the 7th of November, 1970, the Government of India intimated to me that my task was not limited to an examination of the charges handed over to me by Shri Mangat Rai on the 26th September, 1970, but was also to suggest to the Government, whether, as a result of my examination of the record, any other charge or charges appeared to be prima facie made out for departmental action against Shri P.R Nayak. Originally, the dead-line set for tendering the advice/report was the middle of February, 1971, but later it was advanced to the middle of January, 1971. I, accordingly, embarked upon this task right away, and as a result of my examination of the records, in the light of the 66th Report of the Public Undertaking Committee, and the report of Shri Nittor Sreenivasa Rao dated the 16th April, 1970, came to the conclusion that 14 charges existed for a prima facie enquiry against Shri P.R Nayak. Those charges, alongwith a statement of the Imputations of Mis-conduct, on which they were based, were therefore, sent to Shri P.R Nayak on the 16th November, 1970, giving him time till the 30th November, 1970 — later extended to the 7th December, 1970 at the request of Shri P.R Nayak — for submitting his written statement of defence in respect of those charges.
Shri P.R Nayak submitted his written statement on the 7th of December, 1970. As in the covering letter, which he sent along with his written statement, Shri P.R Nayak stated that his written statement was based on his recollection of events, and the information, which he had gathered from some of the contemporaneous records, that he had been successful in locating, and referring to, and that as there were probably other papers that were not available to him, which might further help to re-inforce the submissions made by him, he was given an opportunity to examine the records in the Commission's Office, and the Ministry, and to submit a supplementary written statement, if he so desired. Thereupon, Shri P.R Nayak examined the records, and submitted a supplementary written statement, dated the 19th/21st December, 1970. Shri P.R Nayak was also given an opportunity for making his submissions in person. He waived it at first but later changed his mind. He was, therefore, heard on the 4th January, 1971.
Having set out the background of the present enquiry, I shall now proceed to deal with the charges served on Shri P.R Nayak ad-seriatim.”
Although the Government has denied that the charges for the disciplinary proceedings and the terms of reference cover the same ground we will proceed on the assumption that they do because, in any event, there is undoubtedly some over-lapping.
The approach to the question whether a Tribunal is biased is laid down by the Supreme Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957 Supreme Court Report 575) (9) where it is observed: —
“It is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.”
It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the proceedings of the Commission are not quasi judicial but this contention cannot be accepted in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (Tatachari and Aggarwal JJ.) in Civil Writ No. 522 of 1972 decided on October 10, 1972 where with reference to this very Commission it was held that the proceedings before it were quasi judicial. The final decision of the Commission is yet to come and the case is not one where a final decision is challenged on the ground of bias but where the continuance of the Commission is sought to be restrained on the allegation that there is an apprehension of bias in the mind of the petitioner by reason of the fact that the Commission, in another capacity, has come to a finding, even though it is prima facie, of guilt while framing the charges for the disciplinary proceedings. In Gullapalli Mageswara Rao etc. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others (1960 (1) Supreme Court Reports 580) (10) it was held that two well settled principles of the doctrine of bias that applied equally to judicial as well as quasi judicial tribunals, were, — (1) that no man shall be a judge in his own cause and that (2) justice should not merely be done but must also appear to be done. It was further held that any kind of bias in a judicial authority, whether financial or other, for or against any party, or any position that might impute bias, must disqualify him as a judge. The same idea was expressed by the Supreme Court in The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad and another v. Sri Satyanarayana Transports (Private) Ltd., Guntur and others (A.I.R 1965 Supreme Court 1303) (11) as follows: —
“It is an elementary rule of natural justice that a person who tries a cause should be able to deal with the matter before him objectively, fairly, and impartially. . . In dealing with cases of bias, it is necessary to remember that ‘no one can act in a judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind.’ The broad principle which is universally accepted is that a person trying a cause even in quasi judicial proceedings, must not only act fairly, but must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness. The use of the word ‘bias’ should be confined to its sphere. Its proper significance is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi judicial office, such as an arbitrator.”
It is, therefore, clear that the question of bias has to be decided from the point of view of the person who alleges it and it is to be determined whether there is reasonable justification for such person to apprehend a biased approach by the authority concerned or that he will not get even-handed justice with an open mind.
The fact that the task of framing charges against the petitioner for the disciplinary inquiry was performed by the Commission, cannot by itself justifiably give rise to an apprehension of bias. What is contended is that the Commission, while performing the task of framing charges for the disciplinary inquiry, gave findings against the petitioner even though they were preliminary in nature and, therefore, when inquiry is made by the Commission with respect to the terms of reference, its findings will not be even-handed or with an open mind and the petitioner is, therefore, justified in apprehending bias on the part of the Commission.
The facts with reference to this matter are that the Government framed nine charges against the petitioner for holding a disciplinary inquiry and also furnished a statement of allegations which were the basis for the charges. These were sent to the Commission after the refusal of the Vigilance Commissioner and the Commission, while retaining the nine charges framed by the Government, framed five further charges. These with the statement of allegations were furnished to the petitioner for putting in his defence. The petitioner put in his defence. Thereafter, the Commission dealt with each of the charges framed giving the charge, the allegations in support thereof, the defence of the petitioner and its own “findings” on each charge. Though styled as “findings”, they do not contain any expression of opinion that any of the charges has been proved or not. The trend of the “findings” is that the Commission has taken into consideration the defence with reference to each of the charges and has stated that the defence of the petitioner requires proof and substantiation. We do not think it will be justifiable to assume that these “findings” determine the guilt of the petitioner or that they are such as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the Commission is biased against him or that he will not get even-handed justice with an open mind.
We may here notice another argument on behalf of the petitioner that the report of the Commission under the Act being itself in the nature of a preliminary inquiry, another preliminary inquiry for the purpose of framing charges against the petitioner could not be entrusted to the Commission. There is no legal basis for this submission. It may not be a normal or proper procedure to entrust the task of framing charges for a departmental inquiry against an official of the Government to the Commission which is inquiring into connected matters under the Act but the circumstances mentioned earlier may be a justification. Further, it is normal for judicial officers in criminal trials to frame charges after a preliminary inquiry and yet continue to try the charges without there being any possibility of any attack on the basis of bias or prejudice against such judicial officer. Much less so must it be in the case of a retired Judge of a High Court particularly when no trace of a finding of guilt or misconduct of the petitioner can be found in the preliminary report. In fact even the petitioner did not take up the plea of bias or prejudice against the Commission either in framing the charges or continuing the inquiry under the Act after the preliminary report was submitted on January 13, 1971 and it is for the first time that this plea has been raised in this petition which was filed on May 18, 1972.
Another element of bias alleged is that the Commission gave a finding in its order dated May 18, 1972 that the petitioner had misled L.N Mishra and K.G.R Iyer who were part-time Directors of the Indian Refineries Limited for some time between 1962 and 1964 and in that capacity had attended meetings of its Board of Directors. Notices under Section 8B of the Act had been issued to these two persons, amongst others. They applied to the Commission for discharging these notices. This application was disposed of by the order of the Commission dated May 18, 1972. The case of these applicants was that they themselves had no personal knowledge of the matter but had acted upon the statements made to them by the Managing Director (the petitioner) and as part-time Directors they were bound to accept these statements. The statements made in the application of these two persons were not controverted by any of the parties. In a detailed order, the Commission posed the question whether having regard to the uncontroverted averments made by these two persons in their affidavits, the notices issued to them under section 8B could be fruitfully pursued. The Commission found that it was the duty of Choudhury on the basis of whose allegations notices had been issued to these two persons “to establish his allegations, and he has failed to do so by not filing any counter affidavit to the applicants' affidavits, the Commission would not be justified in taking any further notice of these allegations.” Having said this, the Commission stated that it was fortified in its view because “in law a Director cannot be held to have acted negligently if he acts in reliance on the officers of the company whom he is entitled to trust and whose reports and statements have misled him.” It is the use of the word “misled” which has given rise to this argument by the petitioner. If the whole order of the Commission is read there would be no doubt that the Commission was not by any means holding that the petitioner had misled these two persons. The Commission was merely repeating a proposition of law and not discussing the factual aspect of the case in making the statement that it did. The main reason why the application of these two persons was allowed was that Choudhury had failed to establish his allegations against them. There is no discussion of any defence of the petitioner that might have been raised or the rejection of such defence. The argument of the petitioner, therefore, that in this order the Commission had given a finding that the petitioner had misled these two persons is without any basis.
It is then contended that the Commission decided matters of procedure which will have a bearing on the result of the inquiry merely on unsubstantiated allegations of Choudhury ignoring petitions and affidavits of other parties including the petitioner. In support of this point the averment in the petition is that “the Commission is not conducting the proceedings of the Commission in a just and fair manner is borne out by the deliberations and proceedings of the Commission hitherto”, that even bona fide and just submissions made by the petitioner have been rejected while vague, malicious and frivolous applications of Choudhury have been entertained and allowed and given weight by the Commission from time to time. In support of these allegations it is alleged that the Secretary of the Commission asked the petitioner to produce the passports which he held as Managing Director of the Indian Refineries Limited and as Secretary to the Government of India for journeys on tours abroad. Although, it was not clear as to how this information was relevant for the purpose of the inquiry, it was furnished. Then it is alleged that the Commission “is reported to have collected information about the official tours undertaken by the petitioner (and possibly others), though this information again appears to have no bearing on the Commission's terms of reference and is intended to be used for ulterior purposes.” As will be seen from the allegations, they are extremely vague and do not pin-point either any specific orders or proceedings of the Commission from which the alleged inference can be derived. It is true that in Choudhury's application a demand was made for production of the petitioner's pass-ports, amongst those of other officers of the Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation without giving any reasons disclosing their relevancy. But it appears that a detailed and reasoned order was passed by the Commission on June 6, 1971 on oral submissions made by the parties. The Commission construed term (h) of the terms of reference and stated that the correctness of the contention of Choudhury's counsel was, —
“so self-evident, that non of the learned counsel for the other parties seriously disputed it, and even Shri P.R Nayak, who appears to be the most directly concerned with it, conceded that term (h) was intended to cover cases of ‘malafide motive’ in its widest sense in relation to the foregoing terms which did not specifically contain that expression.”
and held that the pass-ports amongst other documents, were relevant to the inquiry. Now, this Court cannot be called upon to go into the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions of the Commission. The situation discloses that the Commission was not proceeding in an arbitrary manner and was making detailed and reasoned orders in the presence of all the parties concerned and this fact is conclusive to show that the allegation of bias on this account is unjustified. It is needless to go in detail into the other orders passed by the Commission from time to time or to state them. Suffice it to say that whether it be for the purpose of the proceedings or the production of documents or any other matter, the Commission was considering the respective contentions of the parties and passing orders which appeared to it to be just and proper in the circumstances of the case in the view that it took of the scope of the terms of reference.
Then there are allegations in the rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner that the Commission had assigned a privileged role to Choudhury, it relied upon his affidavits disregarding the affidavits of others and granted inordinate extension of time to Choudhury to file his statement. Then reference is made to the alleged search and seizure and summoning of documents at the instance of Choudhury. It is true that Choudhury moved an application for seizure of certain documents/files but it appears from the order of the Commission dated April 14, 1971 that copies of this application were given to the other parties and arguments of the parties were heard. The Commission states in its order, —
“After hearing arguments on this application, S/Shri Bhandare and Dadachanji, Advocates, made a statement that the Government (Deptt. of P & C) and the IOC would voluntarily supply those files/documents to the Secretary of the Commission, provided they were identifiable or were maintained and subject to the claim of privilege, if any, by Government.”
The Commission took notice of the argument that inspection of these files should not be allowed to Choudhury before he filed a fuller and detailed written statement and directed that the Secretary of the Commission should contact Joint Secretary of the Department of Petroleum & Chemicals and the Managing Director of the Indian Oil Corporation in connection with the production of the files/documents mentioned in Choudhury's application on April 15, 1971 and further directed that objections regarding inspection and the question of privilege would be heard on April 17, 1971. As to the other documents which were sought to be summoned by Choudhury, the Commission directed its Secretary to scrutinize what documents have since been obtained from the Government/Indian Oil Corporation and what remained to be summoned and to make a report at an early date. It is proved from the record that there was no search or seizure as is alleged by the petitioner and that the documents were agreed to be produced by the Department concerned subject to their claim for privilege and ultimately a detailed order was made by the Commission on May 13, 1971 stating how the documents and records have been received by the Commission. In this order, after recording the consent and assurance given by the counsel for the Government and the Indian Oil Corporation, the Commission states: —
“As S/Shri Dadachanji and Bhandare had given their undertakings, subject to the conditions regarding the existence and identity of the alleged files/documents, Shri Arun Roy Choudhury was allowed to accompany Shri Israni, and to assist him in case the existence or identity of any particular document/file was questioned. Shri Israni, accompanied by Shri Arun Roy Choudhury, then went to the concerned Ministry and the former brought some of the files/documents mentioned in paragraph 1, in a sealed cover with him. Subsequently, the other documents/files referred in paragraph 1 of Shri Arun Roy Choudhury's application were also received from the concerned Ministry.”
Then the Commission dealt with the claim of privilege and ordered, —
“all the files/documents, which do not contain any material, the disclosure of which may be detrimental to the public interest will be open to inspection by the parties.”
This order then contains the view of the Commission on the claim of privilege and the discussion of the relevant law and ultimately an order was passed for production of documents. Some of the objections raised by Choudhury were disallowed by the Commission as appears from this order. In this circumstances, the charge of any alleged search or seizure or fishing inquiry entirely fails because we find that in the matter of production of documents/files, the Commission had taken a view after recording its reasons. As to the inspection of these documents objection was raised on behalf of the Government and Indian Oil Corporation that Choudhury should not be allowed inspection. This objection was dealt with by the Commission in its order dated May 13, 1971 when it is stated that counsel for the Government and the Indian Oil Corporation, —
“withdrew their general objection to inspection by Shri Choudhury of the files/documents of the IOC and Government, reserving their right to take objection to inspection of any particular file/document so far produced or which would be produced in due course.”
and it was on this statement that Choudhury was allowed to inspect the files.
The allegation that Choudhury was given a privileged role also remains unsubstantiated. In fact, the complaint of Choudhury through his counsel, Mr. Santosh Chatterjee, at the bar before us was that the Commission had dismissed a large number of his applications without justification. A statement was filed before us indicating that in 1971, out of a total of 26 applications, 12 were rejected — some of them without hearing —, 9 were either kept pending after preliminary hearing or not heard at all, 4 were partially allowed and I was allowed and in 1972, out of a total of 29 applications filed by him either individually or jointly with the National Committee for assisting the pipeline inquiry, 14 were rejected, 8 were not heard, 3 were partially allowed, 2 were allowed and 2 were heard but no orders were passed thereon. We have not gone into the correctness of these figures but we have been taken through the various orders which are on this record and it is quite clear that some of the applications filed by Choudhury were dismissed. In the absence of any concrete instances we cannot accept the general allegation of the petitioner that a privileged role was given to Choudhury or that his statements were accepted as gospel. On the other hand what we find is that in the matters which were brought to our attention, the Commission has passed detailed and reasoned orders completely disproving this allegation of the petitioner.
It is no doubt true that Choudhury assisted the Commission and the Commission accepted his assistance. The reason probably was that upon the affidavits filed by the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation, the Commission found that if it were to rely merely on these affidavits, there will be hardly anything to inquire. The Commission was appointed to inquire into matters where allegations were made against the Government and the aforesaid two public undertakings in the matter of the aforesaid two contracts. The Government and the aforesaid two public undertakings were the persons against whom the inquiry had been directed. In this situation we are not surprised that the Commission accepted the assistance of Choudhury as a member of the public and as a representative of the National Committee constituted for the Pipeline Inquiry to bring out facts that will be relevant to the terms of reference. We do not find anything extraordinary in the mere fact that at some places the Commission has described Choudhury as amicus curiae.
The next ground under the heading of bias is that the Commission failed to perform its statutory functions in regard to the conduct of the inquiry by giving ex-parte hearings to Choudhury and others; by proceeding to seize documents and by issuing notices under section 8B of the Act without the relevancy and requirement for the same being first established. On the first count, the averment in the petition is merely that the Commission is giving Choudhury ex-parte access to it in an unreasonable manner and a prayer is made that this Court should issue a direction to the Commission, —
“not to accord the extraordinary status, privileges and access to records and ex-parte access to the Commission to Shri Arun Roy Choudhury, which the Commission is doing at present and till now.”
These allegations are denied by R.T Israni, Secretary of the Commission, in his counter affidavit. He states that various applications were made for the production and inspection of files/documents and after elaborate arguments, they were disposed of by the Commission by its orders passed on 6th, 9th and 16th June, 1971. Here again, no material has been placed by the petitioner in support of this allegation but it is said that this allegation stands proved by what Choudhury has stated in his counter affidavit. In this affidavit, Choudhury on the other hand has denied any ex-parte access to the Commission being allowed to him in an unreasonable manner. He further states that in the course of inspection of records, for the purpose of identification and scrutiny and preparation of lists of files, the Commission sought and had his assistance. In fact, he goes on to state that, —
“Ex-parte access to the Commission was available to all parties including Shri Nayak. One of the associates of Shri P.R Nayak, namely Shri N.N Kashyap, ICS even had a previous order of the Commission reviewed and altered in an ex-parte hearing. If any party can claim bona fide grievance against the performance of the Commission and its interpretation of the terms of the Inquiry and also the conduct of the inquiry, it is this deponent and the National Committee.”
It seems to us that vague allegations have been made by the petitioner without any basis and we cannot accept the allegation of ex-parte access of Choudhury to the Commission in the manner suggested. Another instance is stated to be that correspondence of the Commission with the Ministry was made available to Choudhury as is proved by the affidavit of Choudhury himself where he refers to this correspondence. But this argument fails on the further averment in Choudhury's affidavit that copies of these letters were obtained, —
“on personal inspection of the relevant file of the Commission by this deponent and Shri K.S Joshi, a representative of the National Committee for Assisting the Inquiry and appearing before the Commission. The inspections of these letters were allowed to the deponent when the deponent had alleged that the Commission was not doing anything in the matter of appointing of Investigators.”
We do not see how the inspection of this correspondence of the Commission with the Ministry would be indicative of any bias of the Commission against the petitioner. The basis of such bias against the petitioner may possibly have been laid if it had been alleged that while inspection was allowed to Choudhury of the correspondence of the Commission with the Ministry, such inspection was refused to the petitioner on application. This correspondence between the Commission and the Ministry and the Minister relates to the appointment of Investigators and the scope of their activities. If this correspondence were material in the proof of the terms of reference and if this correspondence had been allowed to be inspected by Choudhury we could have understood the application of the principles laid down in Payyavula Vengamma v. Payyavula Kesanna and others [1953 Supreme Court Reports 119] (12), Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [1955 (1) Supreme Court Reports 941] (13) and Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya [1955 (2) Supreme Court Reports 1] (14) which are cases which relate to arbitrators taking statements of a party behind the back of other party. In our opinion, this allegation has been made by the petitioner merely for the sake of making an allegation and the inspection allowed to Choudhury cannot by any stretch of imagination be indicative of any bias on the part of the Commission. We have already held that there was no seizure of documents or files which were produced by the Ministry and the Departments voluntarily even though the initial application was by Choudhury for summoning the documents and files. This ground of attack is also without substance.
Then it is contended that notices under section 8B were issued to various persons purely on the basis of the affidavits of Choudhury without determining their relevancy or the question required to be determined under this section. Section 8B states: —
“If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission, —
(a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person;
or
(b) is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry,
the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached.”
It is implicit in this section that notices thereunder have to be issued in the absence of the person whose conduct is being inquired into or the person whose reputation, in the opinion of the Commission, is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. The Commission has, therefore, to proceed on the basis of the material before it. At that stage the only material before the Commission was in the shape of affidavits filed by the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation and Choudhury amongst others. As we have stated already, the Commission was of the opinion that if the Government affidavits alone were to be taken into consideration, there will be hardly anything left to inquire. Therefore, the Commission was justified in taking into consideration the affidavit of Choudhury wherein allegations regarding the conduct of various persons were made. As a member of public he had appeared in response to the initial notice issued by the Commission and taken up the burden of adducing facts in relation to the terms of reference which involve an inquiry into the conduct and/or reputation of various persons. We do not see any reason why the Commission cannot be said to have been justified in taking the allegations in the affidavit of Choudhury as a basis for issuing these notices and this fact alone will not establish that there was no application of mind by the Commission before the issue of the notices under section 8B. This section incorporates and embodies the rule of natural justice not to condemn a person without affording him an opportunity of being heard. It is open to the person to whom a notice is issued not to avail of the opportunity afforded to him to appear and produce evidence in his defence in which case his conduct and reputation will be inquired into in his absence. The language of section 8B does not suggest that any detailed reasons have to be recorded other than such as have been recorded by the Commission before issuing these notices and the mere issue of these notices cannot establish any bias against the petitioner particularly when he himself had been participating in the proceedings of the Commission even before the issue of the section 8B notice to him.
Then it is alleged that reliance by the Commission on the affidavits of Choudhury and ignoring the affidavits of others when the admissibility of Choudhury's affidavits and the relevancy of the averments contained therein were seriously challenged without determining the same is indicative of bias of the Commission against the petitioner. It is averred in the petition that in his affidavit dated October 27, 1971 the petitioner had pointed out that the allegations of Choudhury against a large number of persons were wild, unsubstantiated, malicious, untrue and these allegations had been sworn by Choudhury in his affidavit without disclosing the basis of his knowledge. It is further averred that the petitioner required the Commission to require Choudhury to suitably amend his pleadings by omitting the objectionable portions. Support is also drawn from the affidavit filed on January 3, 1972 by the Indian Oil Corporation stating that Choudhury's affidavit contained numerous incorrect, baseless and malicious allegations which were contrary to facts and similar objections were raised by N.N Kashyap, (Chairman of the Indian Oil Corporation), in his statement dated January 2, 1972 and by the Government of India in their statement dated January 15, 1972 and yet the Commission turned, —
“a deaf ear to the several requests made for requiring Shri Choudhury to amend his Affidavits or for the Commission to strike out objectionable matter. On the contrary, the Commission has proceeded to make these affidavits the basis for considering the issue of notice to various parties under Section 8B of the Act.”
Similar averments were made by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit filed in this Court. Reliance is placed by the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K.K Nambiar v. Union of India (A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 652) (15) for the proposition that the importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for the allegations. It is contended that reliance upon the defective affidavits of Choudhury was in breach of Rules 2 and 3 of the Central Commissions of Inquiry (Procedure) Rules, 1960. These Rules provide for notice to persons for giving evidence. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 requires every statement furnished under sub-rule (1) to be accompanied by an affidavit in support of the facts set out in the statement sworn by the person furnishing the statement. No form of an affidavit or of its verification is prescribed by the Rules but proceeding on the basis that affidavits should be in the form contemplated by Order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, we cannot say that the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court render affidavits defectively verified to be outside the scope of consideration. The affidavits filed before the Commission were not by way of evidence. They were in the nature of allegations which were yet to be proved. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case was to say that, —
“in absence of proper verification, affidavits cannot be admitted in evidence.”
This case is no authority for the proposition that an affidavit defectively verified cannot be taken as the basis for making allegations for the purpose of the aforesaid Rules when such affidavits are not to be treated as evidence in the matter. Reliance on the aforesaid case is, therefore, misconceived.
Next it is contended that the Commission's bias is indicated by the inordinate extensions of lime given to Choudhury for filing the statements ignoring the mandatory provisions of the Act about the time limit and that too ex-parte. We do not think there is any mandatory provision of the Act about the time limit. Section 3 of the Act, no doubt, talks of the specification in the notification issued by the Government of the time within which the inquiry is to be made but as we have already held, the Government has the power to extend time from time to time by reason of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It is not possible to give a construction to section 3 of the Act so as to exclude extension of time because such a construction is likely, in many cases, to defeat the very object for which the Commission is constituted. Section 3 makes it obligatory upon the Government to appoint a Commission if a resolution in this behalf is passed by the House of the People or by the Legislative Assembly of the State. If the specification of time is to be construed as mandatory so that the time specified is not capable of extension, it will be open in a given case for the Government to defeat the resolution of the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of the State by specifying time within which the Commission cannot possibly complete the inquiry. The basis for this argument, therefore, is non-existent. As to the giving of inordinate extensions of time to Choudhury for filing his statement, only a general allegation has been made in the petition that, —
“the Commission acquiesced in these delays without demur, despite protests from some of the parties, including the petitioner, before the Commission about the unreasonable indulgence being shown to Shri Choudhury in this matter.”
and that no statement was filed by Choudhury on the new terms of reference by November 22, 1971 as directed by the Commission and the protests were made to the Commission against Choudhury's asking for time and that “the answer given was that Shri Choudhury requires time for the study of voluminous records received in the Commission's office and that the Commission will proceed shortly to fix a date for Shri Choudhury submitting his statement.” It is true that a protest was made on behalf of the Ministry also by their application dated July 3, 1972 protesting against permitting Choudhury to have an inspection of files as a preliminary to his filing a statement but we find that all the protests were taken into consideration by the Commission when it passed its order dated March 15, 1972. In this order, the Commission stated: —
“The instant grievance of Shri Nayak that Shri Choudhury is being accorded special treatment, as he has been given indefinite time to file his written statement on the new Terms of Reference, while all the other parties had had to file theirs long ago, is not well-founded. It is within the knowledge of Shri Nayak and the other parties that as many as four thousand odd IOC files, which might have an important bearing on the new terms, were received only about a month back, and their inspection and the filing of the written statement of Shri Choudhury which is dependent upon the result of their inspection, are inevitably bound to take time. However, the Commission at its last sitting made it clear that it shall, before long, fix a time-limit for the filing by Shri Choudhury of the written statement on the new terms of reference.”
It is to be remembered that Choudhury was appearing as a member of the public. He could not make any concrete statements in his written statement unless he knew what was contained in the relevant files and considering the number of the files, we are not in a position to criticise — even if we had the jurisdiction to do so — the grant of time to Choudhury for filing his statement.
Lastly it is contended that the Commission exercised powers under section 8B of the Act without prima facie satisfying itself about the necessity for issuing such notices, issuing notices without clarifying the points to be answered and issuing them in a discriminatory manner. It appears that by February 8, 1972 all but three of the parties to the inquiry had filed their written statements and, where necessary, replications in respect of the old terms of reference. It was, therefore, submitted on behalf of the Government that the stage referred to in section 8B of the Act had been reached and the persons, who were the subject matter of the allegations, should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in their defence. By its order dated February 8, 1972 the Commission accepted this submission and recorded, —
“what the Commission has to see at this stage is, whether there is any material before it to warrant the conclusion that it would be called upon to inquire into the conduct of any person and that the said material is such as would prejudicially affect the reputation of that person.”
The Commission then considered the averments on affidavits and rejected the submission that there was no material to justify the issuance of the notice under section 8B. It then recorded that the names of the persons to whom notices under section 8B of the Act have to be issued shall be announced after hearing the parties or their counsel in that regard. On February 17, 1972, the Commission made another order from which it appears that it considered names of the various persons/officials of the Government/Indian Refineries Limited/Indian Oil Corporation against whom allegations affecting their conduct and reputation had been made by Choudhury for the purpose of sending section 8B notices. It does not appear from this order that the petitioner objected to any of these names for any reason. It is, however, recorded that the petitioner “prayed that similar notices should also be sent to some more parties, besides those mentioned in Shri Choudhury's written statements or suggested by his learned counsel at today's sitting.” It is, therefore, clear that no objection was made by the petitioner before the Commission with regard to the issuance of section 8B notices to the persons mentioned in the affidavits of Choudhury because the only prayer made by him was that similar notices should also be sent to some more parties. It is further clear that the absence of any objection by the petitioner before the Commission indicates that even the petitioner considered that issue of section 8B notices to the persons named by Choudhury was justified on the allegations made by him in his affidavits. It is also recorded in this Order that counsel for Choudhury was directed (1) to supply a list of the remaining persons against whom similar allegations had been made in Choudhury's written statement along-with the reference to the paragraphs and pages of the same and (2) to make a categorical statement in writing as to the persons against whom Choudhury did not propose to press his allegations affecting their conduct and reputation. The Commission also stated that the official list shall be settled at the next meeting of the Commission on February 26, 1972. It appears that further meetings of the Commission were held on 8th March, 15th March and 7th April, 1972 and ultimately the list of persons was finalized on April 15, 1972. In these circumstances it cannot even be suggested that there was no consideration or satisfaction by the Commission as required by section 8B of the Act.
As to alleged discrimination, the stand of the petitioner is that his submission to issue section. 8B notices to the concerned Ministers was rejected by the Commission and, therefore, notices under section 8B were issued in a discriminatory manner. As to this also we find a reasoned order by the Commission dated April 7, 1972 wherein the Commission has observed: —
“After perusing the materials before it and hearing the learned counsel, the Commission is of the opinion that as no definite allegation affecting the conduct, or adversely affecting the reputation of any Minister has come to, or been brought to its notice, the Commission would not be justified in issuing a notice under section 8B to any of the concerned Ministers at this stage. As for the part-time or temporary Directors of the IRL/IOC, while it is no doubt true that no definite allegation attributing mala fide and improper motive to them has come, or been brought to the notice of the Commission, and that all that has been alleged against them is that they acted carelessly, negligently and without exercising reasonable care, in the discharge of their duties, yet as under term (k) the task of advising, whether there has been any negligence or carelessness on their part in the discharge of their duties, has also been entrusted to the Commission, and such allegations are likely to affect the conduct and adversely affect the reputation of these Directors, notices under Section 8B must be issued to them at this very stage.”
The Commission, therefore, was of the definite view that there were no allegations against the concerned Ministers as to their conduct or reputation. It is a reasoned opinion and it is not possible for us to say that there was any discriminatory treatment by the Commission in the manner of issuing the section 8B notices. The other part of this allegation that notices were issued without clarifying points to be answered is also without foundation because the points are in the affidavits of Choudhury and as to the part-time Directors in the affidavit of the petitioner himself. We, therefore, do not find any substance in this point which was argued before us although it was not specifically raised in the petition.
Generally speaking, we have found that whatever orders were passed by the Commission were detailed and reasoned orders. They do not disclose any bias against the petitioner. Whether the reasons given by the Commission were right or wrong is not for us to say.
For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition succeeds only in part, namely, to the extent that term (i) of the original terms of reference, —
“(i) arising out of (h); to recommend further action, if any, that must be taken against particular officials whose conduct is assessed as meriting this”
will be deleted from the terms of reference and we issue a mandamus directing the Commission not to make any recommendations as contemplated by the aforesaid term (i).
In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs of this petition.
Order accordingly.