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Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic
Legal Opinion Summary — V.S. Deshpande, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued on two stamped "hundis" (each bearing Rs. 500 stamps) dated 12th August, 1972, each in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 10,000.00 (total principal Rs. 20,000.00) and claimed Rs. 20,400.00 (the Rs. 20,000.00 plus interest at 1.00% per annum). The signatures on the two hundis were admitted to be those of the defendant.
The defendant's pleaded case admitted signing the papers but said he had signed blank hundis on stamped forms as collateral security for goods bought from a partnership in which the plaintiff was a partner; he asserted that he paid the price to the partnership on 11th August, 1972 and that nothing remained payable on the basis of the two hundis. The defendant applied for leave to appear and defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C.
The trial court granted unconditional leave to the defendant to defend, reasoning that the defence disclosed facts which would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration. The plaintiff filed a revision petition under section 115 C.P.C. challenging the grant of leave by the trial court. The High Court (V.S. Deshpande, J.) heard the revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court properly granted unconditional leave to the defendant to appear and defend the suit under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C. on the ground that the defence disclosed facts which would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration.
- Whether the plea that the defendant had signed the stamped hundis in blank shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove consideration, in light of section 20 and section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
- Whether the trial court's exercise of power in granting leave was without jurisdiction, or with jurisdiction but illegally or with material irregularity within the meaning of section 115 C.P.C., thus justifying interference by the revisional court.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant admitted signing the papers but said they were blank hundis executed on stamped forms as collateral security for goods supplied to him by a partnership firm in which the plaintiff is a partner.
- The defendant contended that the price was paid to the partnership on 11th August, 1972, and therefore nothing remained due on the hundis; on that basis he sought leave to appear and defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C.
Plaintiff-Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The plaintiff challenged the trial court's order by way of revision under section 115 C.P.C., asserting that the trial court had exercised its power either without jurisdiction or with illegal exercise of jurisdiction or with material irregularity.
- In the context of this challenge, the opinion observes that it is necessary for the plaintiff-petitioner to demonstrate that the trial court's order falls within the categories identified by the Supreme Court in Dhula-bahi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78) for interference under section 115 C.P.C.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dhula-bahi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78 | Sets out propositions describing circumstances in which an order of a statutory authority may be impugned in a civil court; non-compliance with fundamental statutory provisions may render proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction. | The court applied the principle a fortiori to the decision of a Court acting under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C., holding that an order contrary to fundamental statutory provisions may be impugned under section 115 C.P.C. |
| R.S. Atmaram Suri & Sons v. N.K. Textile Mills (FAO OS 6 of 1969), Division Bench decision (14 May 1970) | Relied upon in relation to cases concerning negotiable instruments (references made to earlier authorities such as Santosh Kumar). The opinion identifies this Division Bench decision as "such case" in the context of negotiable instrument disputes. | Used as precedent material to contrast the present case where section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applied to stamped hundis; the opinion notes reliance on this case in prior reasoning about similar issues. |
| Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh | Referenced as a prior decision relating to a cheque and earlier authorities on negotiable instruments and burden of proof. | Relied upon by the Division Bench in R.S. Atmaram; cited in the chain of authorities the court considered when addressing whether a plea of signing blank negotiable instruments shifts the burden to the plaintiff. |
| Milkhiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Chamanlal | Explains aspects of Santosh Kumar; described as a case relating to a promissory note (pre-note) and discussed in the context of negotiable instrument jurisprudence. | Referenced as further explanation of the precedential position concerning negotiable instruments and the consequences of particular pleadings; used in the court's survey of authority. |
| J.K. Shaha v. Dulah Meah (Full Bench) | Held that in view of sections 20 and 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the mere allegation that a promissory note stamped in accordance with the law was executed blank or incomplete does not amount to pleadings of facts that would shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff; execution once signature is proved shifts the burden and consideration is presumed. | The court relied on this Full Bench pronouncement to conclude that in the present case — where the hundis were stamped and execution was admitted — the defendant's plea did not shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff and therefore the trial court could not grant leave under the first limb of Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by restating the legal test in Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C.: leave to appear and defend may be granted where the defendant's affidavits disclose facts that would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration, or such other facts as the court may deem sufficient. The court emphasized that there are two distinct bases under Rule 3(1) and that, at the leave stage, the trial court must decide solely on the basis of the defendant's averments and admitted documents on record (assuming averments to be true for this limited purpose), without appreciating evidence or evaluating credibility.
The trial court granted unconditional leave solely on the first ground — that the defendant's plea would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration. The High Court reviewed that conclusion in the context of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, especially sections 20 and 118, and the relevant authorities.
The High Court analyzed the nature of the documents: the two hundis were stamped hundi papers covered by section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The opinion explains that where a document is stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instruments, section 20 contemplates signing a blank stamped document to enable the holder later to fill in words and amounts. However, when a negotiable instrument stamped according to law has the signature admitted, section 118's presumption of consideration applies and execution itself shifts the burden to the maker.
Applying the principles established in prior decisions (notably J.K. Shaha and earlier authorities), the High Court concluded that the defendant's allegation that he signed blank stamped hundis did not amount to pleadings that would shift the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff. Because the hundis were stamped and execution was admitted, the presumption of consideration applied; therefore the trial court's grant of leave under the first limb of Rule 3(1) was legally unsupportable.
The court further observed that the trial court did not consider the second alternative under Rule 3(1) — "such other facts as the court may deem sufficient" — and therefore the question whether leave could be granted under that second ground remained open and should be decided by the trial court in the first instance.
Finally, invoking the standard for revision under section 115 C.P.C. (as explained in Dhula-bahi), the High Court found that the trial court's finding in granting leave on the first ground was directly opposed to a fundamental provision of law and was therefore either without jurisdiction or an illegal exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of section 115 C.P.C.; accordingly, interference by revision was justified.
Holding and Implications
PETITION ALLOWED. The High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the order of the trial court granting unconditional leave to the defendant to appear and defend.
The court's direct orders and immediate consequences were:
- The order of the trial court dated "14th December, 19/2" was set aside.
- The defendant's application for leave to appear and defend is remitted to the trial court to be decided in the light of the second limb of Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C. ("such other facts as the Court may deem sufficient to support the application").
- The costs of the revision petition were ordered to abide the result of the suit.
- Parties were directed to appear before the trial court on 23rd April, 1973.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond its application to the facts: it reverses the trial court's order as contrary to established statutory principles (sections 20 and 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) C.P.C.) and remits the matter for reconsideration under the second ground of the rule.
V.S Deshpande, J.:— Order XXXVII rule 3 Civil Procedure Code read as follows:—
“3. Defendant showing defence on merits to have leave to appear—(1) The Court shall, upon application by the defendant, give leave to appear and to defend the suit upon affidavits which disclose such facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration, or such other facts as the Court may deem sufficient to support the application.
(2) Leave to defend may be given unconditionally or subject to such terms as to payment into Court, giving security, framing and recording issues or otherwise as the Court thinks fit.”
2. Rules 3 (1) lays down two sets of circumstances the existence of either of which would entitle the Court to give leave to appear and to defend the suit.
3. The defence must disclose either of these two circumstances, namely, (1) which would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration or (2) such other facts a? the Court may deem sufficient to support the application. If leave is to be granted for any of the above two reasons it may be either unconditional or conditional. But if any of the above to reasons ii not apparent from the defence pleaded by the defendant in the written statement and/or documents on record, then the leave has to be refused. At this stage only the averments of the defendants and other admitted documents on record have to be seen. The averments of the defendant maybe assumed to be true unless they are rebutted by other admitted facts on record. At this stage there is no question of appreciation of evidence or believing or disbelieving the averments of the parties.
4. The suit before the trial judge was based on two documents which are ‘hundis’ stamped with stamps of Rs. 500 each The document are stamped and are dated 12th August. 1972. Each of them is in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 10,000.00. Each of them is admitted to bear the signatures of the defendant. The plaintiff sues for the recovery of Rs. 20,400.00 being the consideration of the ‘hundis’ namely Rs. 20,000.00 plus interest at Rs. 1.00 per cent per annum. In defence the defendant stated that he had signed blank ‘hundis’ on the stamp forms. He said that this was as a collateral secuirty for the price of goods which the defendant was buying from a partnership firm of which the plaintiff was a partner. He said that the price was paid up by him to the partnership on 11th August, 1972 and nothing was therefore due to the plaintiff on the basis of these two ‘hundis’. He, therefore, sought the leave of the Court to appear and defend the suit under Order XXXVII rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure
5. The only question for decision before the trial court was whether leave should be granted (either unconditional or conditional) or whether it should be refused. As stated above the powers of the trial court in deciding this question had to be exercised solely in accor dance with the criteria laid down in Order XXXVII rule 3 (i) repro duced above. The trial court purported to grant unconditional leavt So defend the suit for the following reasons stated in its own words.
“Thus, it will be a case where the plaintiff will be required to prove consideration for the hundis which are alleged to have been signed by the defendant in blank as collateral security for the goods supplied by Messrs. Nav Bharat Conduits to the defendant.
Therefore, in any opinion, it is a fit case to grant unconditional leave to the defendant which is accordingly granted”
6. It will be seen that leave was granted by the trial court solely on the first ground stated in rule 3 (1), namely, that the defence had disclosed facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration. The trial court did not make any reference to the alternative reason laid down by rule 3 (1), namely, other facts as the court may deem sufficient to support the application.
7. For the success of this revision application under section 115 Civil Procedure Code, it is necessary for the plaintiff-petitioner to prove that the power of the trial Court in granting the leave Was exercised either without jurisdiction or with jurisdiction but illegally or with material irregularity within the meaning of section 115 in Dhula-bahi v. State of Madhya Pradesh . A.I.R 1969 S.C 78, a series of prepositions were laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 32 setting out the circumstances in which the order of a statutory authority may be impugned in a civil court. In the first preposition it is stated that even if a statute gives finality to the orders of a special tribunal it will not exclude from the jurisdiction of the civil court those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with.” In paragraph 24, a previous decision of the Court is relied upon to further explain this preposition. In that previous decision it was said that “non-compliance with the provisions of the statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be noncompliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction”. A fortiori this preposition would apply to the decision of the Court acting under Order XXXVII rule (3) 1 C.P.C
8. A defence that the signature of the defendant was made on the blank paper may relate to two kinds of documents, namely, (1) “the papers stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiation of instruments” within the meaning of section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; or (2) any other paper. The meaning of execution of a document ordinarily implies that a person making his signature by way of execution knew or should have known the nature of the document which he was signing. The defendant knew that he was signing a stamped ‘hundi’ paper. He knew that it was stamped Rs. 5.00 and therefore the plaintiff could later write words on it which would make the defendant liable for payment of a maximum sum of Rs. 10,000.00. In. the present case, therefore, the execution of these two documents must be taken to have been admitted by the defendant even though we may assume to be true the allegation that the documents were blank when he executed them If a document had been other than a document covered by section 24(1), the defendant may have been able to plead that he did not know the nature of the document which he was signing Such a plea would be one of non ect factum. In that event the defendant might have been able to show by pleading such circumstances as would have made it “incumbent or the holder to prove consideration” within the meaning of rule 3(1) of Order XXXVII Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, however, the pleading of the defendant did not amount to such a pleading. For section 20 expressly contemplates the signing of a blank stamped document with a view to enable the holder thereof to write she words and amount of liability thereon. This provision relates only to a document stamped in accordance with the law relating in Negotiable Instruments Act. Apparently, the legislature mads a distinction between such a document and other documents. The presamption that a negotiable instrument is executed for consideration raised by section 118 of the Negotiable instruments Act, 1831 applies to all negotiable instruments. Therefore if a negotiable instrument was not stamped according to law when it was executed, for instance when it was a cheque, it would be possible for the defendant to plead the facts which may make it incumbent to the holder of such negotiable instrument to prove consideration. F A O (O.S) 68 of 1969. R.S Atmaram Suri and sons v. N.K Textile Mills . FAO OS 6 of 1969. decided on 14th of May, 1970 by a Division Bench of this Court (Hardy and Deshpande, JJ) was such case. Reliance was placed therein on Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh Singh,3 fur-there explained in Milkhiram (India) Private Ltd. v. Chamanlal,4 The former was a case relating to a chaque; the latter was a case relating, to a pre note but in which section 20 of the Negotiable- Instruments Act does not seem to have come up for consideration. On the other hand in J.K Shaha v. Dulah Meah,5 a Full Bench held that in view of sections 20 and 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 the mere allegation in the deferce that a promissory note stamped in accordance with the law relate to negotiable instruments within the meaning of section 20 was executed either wholly blank or having written thereon an, incomplete negotiable instrument did'npt amount to the pleadings of facts which would shift the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff. On the contrary it was observed as follows:—
“Execution of the promissory note itself, once the signature is proved or admitted, shifts the burden to the maker. Consideration is presumed in the case of negotiable instruments and need not be proved independently.”
9. Previous decision were relied upon.
10. In view of the facts that the two stamped ‘hundi’ papers were covered by section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the defendant's plea that he had executed them in blank did not shift the burden of proof from ‘him to the plaintiff. The Court could not, therefore, grant leave to appear and defend to the defendant for the first reason stated in Order XXXVII rule, 3(1) Code of Civil Procedure. The finding of the Court to the contrary is, therefore, directly opposed to this fundamental provision of law and was, therefore, either without jurisdiction or in illegal exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of section 115 C.P.C As the court did not apply its mind to the second reason given in Order XXXVII rule 3(1) the question whether leave could be granted in the present case for the second cause is still left upon for the decision of the trial court. The revision petition is, therefore, allowed. The order of the trial court dated 14th December, 19/2 is set aside and the application of the defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit is left to be decided by the trial court in the light of the second reason laid down in order XXXVII rule 3(i) C.P.C The costs of this revision would abide by the result of the suit. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 23rd of April, 1973.
11. Petition allowed.
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