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Shrimati Bhagwanti And Another v. Haveli Ram .

Delhi High Court
Jan 14, 1972
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion by T.V.R. Tatachari, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal was brought by the alleged tenants, Shrimati Bhagwanti and Arjan Dass, against an order of the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi (Shri Mohan Lal Jain) dated 6 June 1968, which had dismissed their appeal as not maintainable. The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal on the ground that an earlier order of the Additional Controller (Shri A.P. Chowdhary) dated 3 May 1968 was only procedural and interlocutory and therefore not appealable under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Background facts (as stated in the opinion): - The landlord, Haveli Ram, filed an eviction petition dated 27 December 1965 (petition presented 3 January 1966) against three persons including Shrimati Bhagwanti and Arjan Dass under clauses (3) and (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. - In the landlord's application, under the particulars heading concerning notice (column 18(b)), he stated: "Notice given, although not required." - The alleged tenants filed their written statement on 8 March 1966 denying receipt of any notice and denying any landlord-tenant relationship (pleading that Bhagwanti was the owner and in possession). - On 27 December 1967, after a witness was examined, the tenants applied under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to amend their written statement to raise the absence of a notice terminating the tenancy (relying on the reported Supreme Court decision in Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prasad Roy Chowdhury). - The Additional Controller rejected that amendment application on 3 May 1968 for reasons including lateness, potential prejudice to the landlord, and that the notice alleged by the landlord was a Rent Control Act notice rather than a section 106 Transfer of Property Act notice; the Controller also held the amendment would introduce an inconsistent case. - The tenants appealed that interlocutory order to the Rent Control Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal as not maintainable on three grounds (waiver, inapplicability of section 106 because tenancy began prior to 1 December 1962, and non-appealability as interlocutory). The present second appeal challenges the Tribunal's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenants had waived their right to rely on absence of a notice terminating the tenancy by failing to raise that plea in their original written statement.
  2. Whether a notice terminating the contractual tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was required where the tenancy commenced prior to 1 December 1962 (the date the Transfer of Property Act was applied to the Union Territory of Delhi), or alternatively whether a reasonable notice was required in such cases.
  3. Whether the Additional Controller's order rejecting the tenants' application to amend their written statement was merely procedural and interlocutory and therefore not appealable under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, or whether it affected rights and was appealable.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenants' Arguments (as represented in the opinion)

  • The tenants (through Pandit Maharaj Kishan) contended that the three grounds relied on by the Tribunal were erroneous and contrary to law.
  • Specifically on waiver: they argued they were not aware of the legal requirement for service of a termination notice at the time they filed their written statement; the legal position became clear only after the Supreme Court's decision in Manujendra Dutt was reported, and they promptly sought amendment thereafter. Thus, there was no conscious waiver.
  • They sought to amend their written statement fairly soon after the relevant Supreme Court authority became available and before final disposal of the proceedings, so the amendment should have been permitted.

Landlord's Arguments (as represented in the opinion)

  • The landlord (Haveli Ram) opposed the amendment application, filing a reply (10 January 1968) contending that the Supreme Court decision cited by the tenants (Manujendra Dutt) was inapplicable and, in any event, that a valid notice terminating the tenancy had been issued by him but was refused by the tenants.
  • The landlord's counsel (Shri Chhatwal) relied on prior decisions (including Munilal v. Mandlal) to contend that the tenants' omission to raise the absence of a termination notice amounted to waiver and that the tenants' denial of any landlord-tenant relationship made the plea about absence of notice irrelevant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prasad Roy Chowdhury (AIR 1967 S.C. 1419) Held that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is essential to terminate a contractual tenancy before a landlord can institute eviction proceedings based on termination. The court treated this Supreme Court decision as establishing that where section 106 applies a termination notice is necessary; it formed a key basis for concluding that the tenants had a right to raise absence of notice and that the landlord's application for eviction (filed without termination notice) was vulnerable.
Batoo Mal v. Rameshwar Nath (1970 RCJ 635) Division Bench holding: where section 106 applies, an application under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act cannot be filed without service of a proper notice under section 106; even if tenancy commenced prior to 1 December 1962, a reasonable notice (about 15 days) is essential. The court relied on this Division Bench decision to conclude that even for tenancies commencing prior to 1 December 1962 a reasonable notice of termination was required; used to reject the Tribunal's second ground.
Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand (1966 2 DLT 262 H.C.; cited also as 1967 3 DLT 1 S.C.) The Supreme Court (as cited) held that an interlocutory order under section 37(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which requires controllers to follow so far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, is still an order under the Act and is appealable under section 38(1) if it affects the rights or liabilities of a party. The court applied this principle to conclude that the Additional Controller's order refusing the amendment was not merely procedural; because it affected the tenants' right to seek dismissal of the eviction petition as not maintainable, it was appealable under section 38. This undermined the Tribunal's third ground for dismissal.
Booia Ram v. Balmukand (1971 RCT 163) Cited in support of the proposition that a reasonable notice is required even where tenancy pre-dates the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act to Delhi. Used alongside Batoo Mal to reinforce the conclusion that a reasonable notice of termination is essential.
Munilal v. Mandlal (decision of P.N. Khanna J.) Held that where tenants did not raise the absence of a termination notice in earlier proceedings, their omission amounted to an admission that notice was not required or amounted to waiver; in that case the objection was first raised in the second appeal. The court distinguished Munilal on the facts: in the present case the tenants sought to raise the plea before the Additional Controller (not for the first time in the second appeal), and the court therefore did not treat Munilal as controlling.
R. Krishan Murty v. Parthasarathy (High Court of Madras view) A view of the High Court of Madras that the court in Manujendra Dutt later held was incorrect law regarding the need for notice under section 106. The Supreme Court's rejection of the Madras High Court view in Manujendra Dutt was noted; the present court relied on the Supreme Court's correction of that earlier view to treat notice under section 106 as essential where applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined each of the three grounds on which the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the tenants' appeal and found each ground legally erroneous on the facts and law as presented in the opinion.

1. Waiver (first ground)

  • The Tribunal treated the tenants' failure to raise the absence of service of a termination notice in their written statement (filed 8 March 1966) as a waiver of that right. The court analyzed waiver doctrine and the chronology of events.
  • The court observed that waiver presupposes knowledge of the right. The Supreme Court's decision in Manujendra Dutt (pronounced 22 September 1966) clarified that a termination notice is essential under section 106; that decision was reported late in 1967.
  • The tenants filed their written statement before that decision was pronounced and filed their application for amendment on 27 December 1967 after the report became available. Because they were not aware of the legal position when they originally filed the written statement, they could not be said to have waived the right: omission without knowledge is not waiver. The Tribunal did not consider these aspects.
  • The court therefore concluded that the tenants cannot be said to have waived their right to raise the absence-of-notice plea by omission in their written statement.

2. Applicability of section 106 / requirement of notice where tenancy began prior to 1 December 1962 (second ground)

  • The Tribunal held that because the tenancy predated 1 December 1962 (the date the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to Delhi), the strict provisions of section 106 did not apply. The court reviewed controlling authorities including the Division Bench in Batoo Mal and Booia Ram v. Balmukand.
  • The Division Bench in Batoo Mal had held that even if tenancy commenced prior to 1 December 1962, a reasonable notice of about fifteen days terminating the tenancy is essential prior to filing an eviction application under section 14.
  • On the facts, the landlord's purported notice (Ex. AW 3/2) was a demand for arrears and not a termination notice; the postal acknowledgment indicated refusal. Therefore, no notice terminating the contractual tenancy was served before the eviction application.
  • The court concluded that the Tribunal's second ground was contrary to law and that a reasonable notice was required even where tenancy commenced before the Transfer of Property Act's applicability to Delhi.

3. Appealability of the Additional Controller's Order (third ground)

  • The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the basis that the Additional Controller's order declining the amendment was only procedural and interlocutory and therefore not appealable under section 38.
  • The court reviewed the principle (citing Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand) that an interlocutory order under the Rent Control Act which affects rights or liabilities is appealable under section 38(1).
  • The court reasoned that the tenants' amendment sought to raise a plea (absence of a termination notice) which, if established, would go to the root of the matter and render the eviction petition not maintainable. Thus the amendment affected the tenants' substantive right to have the eviction petition dismissed and was not merely procedural.
  • Therefore, the Additional Controller's order rejecting the amendment was not merely procedural and interlocutory in a non-appealable sense; it affected rights and was appealable. The Tribunal's reliance on non-appealability was erroneous.

After addressing these three grounds, the court concluded that the Rent Control Tribunal's order was vitiated by substantial error of law and could not be sustained. The court therefore allowed the second appeal and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration according to law.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: Second appeal allowed; the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 6 June 1968 is set aside.

Direct consequences ordered by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The case is remanded to the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi.
  • The Tribunal is directed to restore Rent Control Appeal No. 475 of 1968 to its file and dispose of it afresh according to law.
  • The parties are directed to bear their own costs in the appeal before the Tribunal prior to remand and in this second appeal.
  • The parties were directed to appear before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, on 7 February 1972.

The opinion corrects the Rent Control Tribunal's legal conclusions on waiver, the necessity of notice of termination even for tenancies predating 1 December 1962, and the appealability of the Additional Controller's order. The opinion relies on and applies existing precedents; it does not announce any broader doctrinal innovation beyond applying those authorities to the facts before it.

Disposition stated in the opinion: Appeal allowed.

Show all summary ...

T.V.R Tatachari, J.:— This second appeal has been filed by the tenants, Shrtmati Bhagwanti and Arjan Dass, against an order of Shri Mohan Lal Jain, Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, dated 6th June, 1968, in Rent Control Appeal No. 475 of 1968, dismissing the said appeal as not being maintainable for the reason that the order of Shri A P. Chowdhary, Additional Controller, Delhi, dated 3rd May 1968, appealed from, was only procedural and interlocutory in nature and, as Such was not appealable under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1938.

2. Haveli Ram, claiming to be the landlord in respect of Quarter No. 13-14, Block No. 20, Moti Nagar New Delhi, filed a petition, dated 27th December 1965, on 3rd January, 1966, before Shri A.P Chowdhary, Additional Controller, Delhi, for eviction of three alleged tenants In respect of the said premises, viz. (1) Shrimati Bhagwanti, (2) Sander Dass son of Durga Dass and (3) Arjan Dass, under clauses (3) and (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In column 18(b) of the application, the heading of which was “whether notice required has been given and if so, particulars there of (copies of such notice and the tenants’ reply, if any, should be furnished)”, it was stated as under:—

“Natice given, although not required.”

3. The alleged tenanis filed their reply or written statement on 8th March, 1966 in opposition to the application for eviction. In reply co the allegation in paragraph 18(b), it. was stated in the written statement that “no notice had been received by the answering respondents.” The alleged tenants also denied that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and pleaded that Bhagwanti was the owner of the premises in dispute and was in possession of the same. On 27th December, 1967, the evidence of A.W.I was recorded, and at that stage the alleged tenants filed on the date, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that in a recent judgment reported in Mannjendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prasad Roy Chowdhury . AIR 1967 S.C 1419 it had been held by the Supreme Court that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Properey Act was essential to bring to an end the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant and the landlord could not sue for eviction without complying with the said requirement and that they should, therefore, be permitted to tike the plea of absence of a notice of termination, by amendment of their written statement. The said application was opposed by the landlord, Haveli Ram. He filed a reply, dated 10th January, 1968, stating that the decision of the Supreme Court was inapplicable, and that in any case a valid notice terminating the tenancy was issued by him. but that the same was refused by the alleged tenants. By his order, dated 3rd May, 1968, the Additional Controller rejected the said application on the grounds that it was made very late, that if the amendment was allowed the alleged landlord would be obliged to withdraw his application for eviction, that if the alleged tenants had raised the said objection either in the beginning or at an earlier date, the alleged landlord would have withdrawn his application for eviction and filed a fresh petition after serving the necessary notice, that an award of damages would not adequately compensate the alleged landlord as his petition would become unmaintainable, that the notice mentioned in column 18(b) of the pleadings was a notice required under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act and not a notice contemplated by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that since the alleged tenants had denied that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the amendment, if allowed, would amount co introduction of not only a new case, but also an inconsistent case.

4. Against the said order, Shrimati Bhagwanti and Arjan Diss preferred an appeal under section 38 of the Act to the court of Shri Mohan Lal Jain, Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi. Haveli Ram was implea ded as respondent No. 1, and Sunder Dass was impleaded as respondeat No. 2 in the appeal with a note that there Was no such person as Sunder Dass son of Durga Dass. By his order, dated 6th June, 1968, Shri Mohan Lal Jain observing that he felt inclined to agree with the reasoning adopted by the Additional Controller, held that once the alleged tenants waived the plea of requirement of service of notice terminating the tenancy, they were not entitled at a later stage to set up that plea, and that even otherwise, the counsel for the alleged tenants conceded before him that the tenancy in dispute was of a period prior to December, 1962, when the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, and it was thus obvious that the strict provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had no application. He further held that the impugned order of the Additional Controller, being only procedural and interlocutory, was not appealable, as decided in the Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand . 1966 2 DLT 262 H.C and that, considered from any angle, the appeal had no merit. He occordingly dismissed the appeal. It is against the said appellate order that the pre sent second appeal has been filed by Shrimati Bhagwanti and Arjan Dass. Sunder Dass was originally shown as second respondent in the memorandum of second appeal. Subsequently, the appellants moved an application, CM. No. 25-J of 1968 praying that the name of Sunder Dass, respondent No. 2. may be struck off from the memorandum of second appeal. The said application was allowed by S.N Shankar J. on 16th January, 1969. Thus, Haveli Ram is now the sole respondent in the second appeal.

5. As stated above, the Rent Control Tribunal based its order on three grounds, viz. (1) that when once the alleged tenants waived the plea of requirement of service of notice terminating the tenancy, they were not entitled to set up that plea again a a later stage; (2) that since the tenancy in the instant case had admittedly commenced prior to December, 1962, when the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, the provisions of section 106 of the said Act had no application; and (3) that the order of the Additional Controller was only procedural and interlocutory and it was not, therefore, appealable. Pandit Maharaj Kishan, learned counsel for the appellants tenants contended that the aforesaid three grounds were erroneous and contrary to law.

6. As regards the first” ground, it is now settled by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Batoo Mal v. Rameshwar Nath . 1970 RCJ 635 that in the case of a tenancy to which section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies, an application under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958, cannot Be filed without service of a proper notice under section 106 terminating the contractual tenancy, and that even when the tenancy commenced prior to 1st December 1962, the date from which the Transfer of Property Act was made applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, and section 106 is not, therefore, applicable, a reasonable notice of about fifteen days terminating the tenancy is essential (vide also Booia Ram v. Balmukand . 1971 RC.T 163.. In the present case, the tenancy admittedly commenced prior to 1st December, 1962 as stated in the order of the Tribunal., The application for eviction was filed on 3rd January, lb'66. In paragraph 18(b) of the application, the landlord stated that “notice given although not required.” The receipt of the said notice was denied by the tenants in their written statement. The landlord produced a copy of the notice. Ex. A.W 3/2, and the postal acknowledgment Ex. A. W.3/3. The acknowledgment bears an endorsement that the notice was refused. However, apersual of the notice, Ex. AW 3/2, shows that it purports to have been sent by the landlord's counsel, and it was only stated in it that the tenant should pay the arrears of rent due from him within two months of the receipt of the notice, failing which the counsel had instructions to file a petition for eviction against the tenants. It was thus only a notice of demand of arrears of rent and not a notice of termination of the contractual tenancy. It is, therefore, clear that no notice of termination of tenancy was served on the tenants before the filing of the application for eviction.

7. The written statement was filed by the tenants on 8th March, 1966. The plea of absence of service of a notice of termination of the tenancy was not raised in the written statement. It was sought to be raised by an application on 27th December, 1967, after a witness A.W 1/1, was examined on that day. It was stated in the application that in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prasad Roy Chowdhury, it had been held by the Supreme Court that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was essential before filing the application for eviction, and it was prayed that the said plea may be permitted to be raised by an amendment of the written statement. It was the omission to raise the plea in the written statement as originally filed that was considered by the Tribunal as amounting to a waiver of the plea by the tenants. Shri Maharaj Kishan contended that the tenants were not aware of the legal position as regards the necessity of service of a notice of termination of tenancy on the tenants prior to the filing of an application for eviction under the Rent Control Act when their written statement was filed, that the legal position came to be known when the decision of the Supreme Court was reported and an application for permission to raise the plea was filed shortly thereafter, and that in the circumstances there could be no question of any waiver on the part of the tenants. There is considerable force in the contention of the counsel. As pointed out by the Division Bench in Batto Mal's case (supra) at page 644, waiver implies that the person waiving his right is aware of the right, and if he did not know of the right at all, there could be no waiver of it by him. Again it was pointed out by the Division Bench in the same case at page 638 that the opinions of the Courts on the question whether an application for eviction could not be instituted before the contractual tenaney was terminated by a notice, were divided, and that no firm view had yet been expressed by this Court. That was why Hardayal Hardy J. (as his Lordship then was) when the case of Batoo Mai came initially before him, referted the same to a larger Bench. The legal position became certain when the decision of the Supreme Court in Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury (supra) was pronouced holding that the view of the High Court of Madras in R Krishan Murty v. Parthasarathy,5 was not correct law. The said decision of the Supreme Court, was pronounced on 22nd September, 1966. By that date, the tenants in the present case had already filed their written statement on 8th March, 1966. The decision of the Supreme Court appears to have been reported late in 1967, and the tenants filed the application before the Additional Controller for amendment of their written-statement on 27th December, 1967. Thus, the tenants cannot be said to have waived their right to raise the plea by reason of their omission to raise the same in their written statement. The Tribunal did not consider any of the above aspects.

8. Shri Chhatwal referred to the decision of P.N Khanna J. in Munilal v. Mandlal,6 on the question of waiver. In that case, the objection regarding the absence of service of a notice of termination of tenancy was raised by the tenants for the first time in the second appeal. The learned Judge held that a notice of termination of tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is deemed to be a term of the tenancy only in the absence of a contract, and as the tenants did not raise the plea in their written statements, their unwillingness to take shelter under a plea of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act amounted to an admission on their part that the notice was not required in the case of tenancy under which they were holding the premises, and in any case, it amounted to a clear waiver on their part. In the present case, the tenants sought to raise the plea in the court of the Additional Controller itself. The learned counsel, cannot, therefore, derive any assistance from the said decision.

9. Shri Chhatwal, learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord, also pointed out that the tenants denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between themselves and Haveli Ram, and there was, therefore, no point in their pleading that a notice of termination of tenancy was not served upon them before the petition for eviction was filed. There is no force in the argument. It is true that the tenants denied the relationship of landlord and tenant in their written statement. Bat, the plea of absence of service of notice of termination of the tenancy was only in the alternative, and, it was quite open to them to so plead in the alternative.

10. The second ground mentioned by the Tribunal was also contrary to law. As held by the Division Bench in Batoo Mal's case (supra), even if the tenancy had commenced prior to 1st December, 1962, a reasonable notice of termination of tenancy was essential prior to the filing of the application for eviction, and no such notice was given in the present case.

11. Coming to the third ground mentioned by the Tribunal, the said ground also was erroneous in law. The order of the Additional Controller dismissing the application filed by the tenants for amendment of their written statement was no doubt interlocutory, but was not merely procedural. As held by the Supreme Court in the Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand . 1967 3 DLT I SC., even an interlocutory order passed under section 37(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act which requires the Controller to follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, is an order under the Act, and is subject to appeal under section 38(1), provided it affects some right or liability of any party. By the application filed by the tenants before the Additional Controller, they sought to raise the plea of absence of service of a notice of termination of tenancy before the application for eviction was filed against them. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in Manujendra Dutt's case (supra) and the decision of the Division Bench in Batoo Mal's case (supra) a notice terminating the tenancy is essential, and an application for eviction cannot be filed by the landlord under the Rent Control Act without terminating the contractual tenancy by such a notice and getting a right to obtain possession of the premises. Where such a notice has not been served, the tenant has a valuable right to raise the plea of the absence of service of the notice. In the present case, the tenants sought to raise such a plea by amendment of their written statement. It cannot be generalised that all amendments of pleadings are of a procedural nature. It is quite conceivable that theremay be amendments which are purely of procedural nature, and there may be amendments which affect the rights and liabilities of any of the parties. Whether an amendment of a written statement is procedural or not has to be judged from the nature of the amendment sought to be made. In the present case, the amendment was for the purpose of raising the plea of the absence of a service of a notice terminating the tenancy prior to the filing of the application for eviction which, if established, would go to the root of the matter and entitle the tenants to claim the dismissal of the application for eviction as not maintainable. It cannot therefore, be said that the amendment of the written statement for raising such a plea is merely procedural. Though interlocutory and procedural, it affects the right of the tenants to claim a dismissal of the application for eviction. The order of the Additional Controller in the present case dismissing the application for amendment of the written statement was, therefore, not merely interlocutory and procedural, but was one which affected the right of the tenants As such, it was appealable under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The above discussion shows that the three reasons given by the Rent Control Tribunal were erroneous in law, and its order dismissing the appeal based on the said reasons was vitiated by substantial error of law. It cannot, therefore, be sustained.

12. For the foregoing reasons, the second, appeal is allowed, the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, dated 6th June; 1968 is set aside, and the case is remanded to the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi. The Tribunal should restore the appeal, R. C.A: No. 475 of 1968, to its file and dispose it of afresh according to law. The parties are, in the circumstances directed to bear their own costs in the appeal before the Tribunal prior to this remand, and in this second appeal. The parties are further directed to appear before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, on 7th February, 1972.

13. Appeal allowed.