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Sain Dass Berry v. Madan Lal Puri .

Delhi High Court
Dec 7, 1971
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-landlord owned a house in New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi. On the ground floor the landlord occupied three living rooms, kitchen, store, bath and latrine and two courtyards; the respondent-tenant occupied the first floor (three rooms, two verandahs, kitchen, latrine and bath and the barsati) at a monthly rent of Rs. 260 with effect from January 22, 1964.

On November 26, 1964 the landlord filed an eviction petition under clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, alleging (1) bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for residence of himself and family, and (2) unauthorised subletting by the tenant. The tenant denied the allegations.

The Controller dismissed the eviction petition, finding the landlord's claim not bona fide and that subletting was not substantiated. On appeal the Rent Control Tribunal affirmed the Controller's decision and dismissed the landlord's appeal. The landlord filed a second appeal to this Court.

At the first hearing before this Court the parties jointly requested remand because the Tribunal had not determined whether the premises available with the landlord were reasonably suitable for his residence within the meaning of section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The matter was remanded and the Tribunal produced a report after remand describing the accommodation available to the landlord and concluding it was not reasonably sufficient for his needs. The parties then addressed several legal contentions and procedural applications before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the landlord's claim of bona fide requirement for occupation of the disputed premises by himself and members of his family falls within section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and, if so, whether that requirement is genuine (bona fide) on the facts of this case.
  2. Whether the respondent-tenant had sublet part of the premises without the landlord's consent (as alleged under clause (c) of the proviso to section 14).
  3. Whether the findings of fact by the Controller and the Tribunal on bona fides are conclusive, or whether the High Court (and this Court in second appeal) can examine them as mixed questions of law and fact.
  4. Whether historical practice of re-letting vacancies at higher rents or the landlord's failure to anticipate future needs can, without more, demonstrate absence of bona fides.
  5. Whether the needs of a married adult son who normally lives with the landlord, though having an independent income, must be disregarded in assessing the landlord's bona fide requirement.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Landlord's) Position

  • The landlord petitioned for eviction under clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to section 14, alleging bona fide personal requirement of the premises for himself and members of his family, and alleging subletting by the tenant.
  • At the first hearing in this Court counsel for the parties jointly requested remand to the Tribunal for a finding on whether the premises available to the landlord were reasonably suitable for his residence under section 14(1)(e).
  • The landlord maintained the claim of bona fide requirement on the evidence, including the configuration and sufficiency of rooms available to him, the presence of family members living with him (including a married son and other children), and his social needs as an elderly person.
  • The landlord opposed the respondent's applications to dismiss the appeal with costs and to amend the written statement on the basis that a later notice (dated December 7, 1967) did not alter the rights under the eviction proceedings begun in 1964.

Respondent's (Tenant's) Position

  • The respondent contended the second appeal did not raise any substantial question of law and therefore the second appeal did not lie; the bona fides of the landlord was a question of fact and the Tribunal's finding on fact was conclusive.
  • The respondent advanced three principal factual/contention-based arguments for doubting the landlord's bona fides: (a) the landlord must have anticipated his requirements when he let out the premises and therefore the later claim is mala fide; (b) the landlord had repeatedly let vacant portions in the past and obtained increased rent, suggesting an oblique motive to re-let at higher rent; and (c) the married son who would occupy the accommodation had independent income and therefore his needs should not be taken into account when determining the landlord's bona fide requirement.
  • The respondent also relied on an assertion at the Bar that there had been a further increase in prevailing rents between the letting to the respondent and filing of the eviction petition; the Tribunal relied upon that assertion in its reasoning.
  • Separately, during pendency of the appeal the respondent applied (i) to dismiss the landlord's appeal with costs on the ground that the landlord had issued a notice under section 106, Transfer of Property Act and thereby acted inconsistently, and (ii) to amend the written statement to add an allegation that the tenancy was not terminated because no valid notice had been served. The respondent advanced these procedural arguments before this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Ram Kali v. Vijay Gopal Stivastava Determination of landlord's bona fide requirement under section 14(1)(e) is not purely a factual finding but a mixed question of law and fact; conclusions based on inferences from proved facts are open to challenge if based on irrelevant or no evidence. The Court relied on this decision to hold that the Tribunal's inference that the landlord's requirement was not bona fide was not conclusive and could be examined in the appeal for errors of law arising from conclusions drawn from the evidence.
Smt. Kamla Soni v. Roop Lal Mehra (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court's observation that an inference that a landlord's requirement is bona fide cannot be treated as conclusive and may be subject to review. Adopted by reference (via Smt. Ram Kali) to support the proposition that appellate interference is permissible where a finding is an inference not grounded on proper evidence.
Inder Sain Seengal v. J.E. Compose It is not permissible to read into the statute an obligation on the landlord to decide his future residence requirements at the time of letting; a landlord need not have finally decided three months prior to a date of change whether he will reside in the house. Used to reject the respondent's contention that the landlord should have anticipated his needs when he let out accommodation, and to hold that inability to foresee future needs does not render a subsequent eviction claim mala fide.
Jai Gopal v. Ramesh Lal Interpretation of "a residence for himself" in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1): "himself" includes a person living with his family; the needs of family members with whom the landlord is normally accustomed to live cannot be ignored even if those family members have independent incomes. The Court relied extensively on this decision to hold that the landlord's married son (who normally lived with him) could properly be considered in assessing bona fide requirement, and that the landlord need not be deprived of the company of family members simply because they have independent incomes.
T.C. Rekki v. Usha Gajral Cited as supporting authority for the view that family members' needs and customary living arrangements are relevant when considering landlord's bona fide requirement. Cited by the Court as one of several cases supporting the proposition that the needs of family members normally living with the landlord may be considered when assessing bona fides.
P.D. Sharma v. Ram Lubhaya Cited as supporting authority for consideration of family needs in bona fide assessment. Relied on as part of the body of decisions that support the Court's approach to interpreting "himself" and to include family needs in the bona fide inquiry.
J.L. Mehta v. Hira Devi Cited as supporting authority for the same general proposition regarding family needs and bona fides (text cites it among supporting decisions). Used as part of the cluster of authorities the Court invoked to justify considering family living arrangements and social usages in deciding bona fides.
Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Dass Held that social customs, conventions, habits and usages of society are relevant considerations in determining landlord's requirement; factors such as family members coming to stay cannot be ignored. The Court cited this authority to reinforce the proposition that social practices and family visitation patterns are relevant to genuine need and to support the finding that temporary accommodation for visiting children is bona fide.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first summarising the findings of the Controller and the Tribunal: both had doubted the landlord's bona fides on the basis that (a) the landlord was in possession of the whole house when he let out the first-floor portion and therefore must have anticipated his requirements for the ensuing months; (b) historically the landlord had let out vacant portions and secured increases in rent; and (c) the landlord's married son earned an independent income and thus his needs could be ignored.

After remand the Tribunal described the accommodation available to the landlord (three rooms — two 10'×12' and one small 10'3"×6'9" — plus pantry, store, bath, latrine and courtyards) and concluded the landlord had insufficient accommodation for his family; the Tribunal considered that the married son with his family needed a separate room, leaving the landlord short of reasonably sufficient space.

The Court then examined each of the respondent's principal contentions and addressed them as follows:

  1. On the contention that the landlord should have anticipated his requirements at the time of letting: the Court rejected this as a legal requirement. Relying on Inder Sain Seengal, the Court held there is no legal obligation to decide final residential plans at the time of letting and inability to foresee future needs does not render a subsequent eviction claim mala fide.
  2. On the contention that past lettings at higher rents imply mala fides: the Court found no evidence of any increase in rent between the date of letting to the respondent and the filing of the eviction petition; the Tribunal had relied on a bare assertion at the Bar. The Court held past lettings alone cannot be determinative of present bona fides.
  3. On the contention that the married son's independent income precludes considering his needs: the Court held this approach erroneous. Relying principally on Jai Gopal v. Ramesh Lal and other authorities, the Court interpreted "a residence for himself" to include the landlord as a person who normally lives with family; where the landlord normally resides with family members, their needs cannot be ignored even if they have independent incomes. The Court emphasised that the phrase "or for any member of his family dependent on him" serves a different purpose and does not limit the consideration of family members who normally live with the landlord.

The Court additionally observed that social customs and the landlord's age and need for care (the remand report recorded his age and living circumstances) justified considering temporary accommodation for visiting children and relatives as bona fide requirements, relying on Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Dass.

On the respondent's procedural applications (to dismiss the appeal with costs on the basis of a subsequent notice under section 106, Transfer of Property Act, and to amend the written statement), the Court found that (a) the parties had treated the earlier position (that no notice was required) as unchanged through the litigation; (b) the issued notice dated December 7, 1967 had not been treated by the parties as altering rights; and (c) even if the notice had some effect it would not change the result because it would have terminated any revived tenancy by its language. The Court therefore dismissed both applications as futile and without merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The Court explicitly set aside the orders of the Rent Control Tribunal and of the Controller and directed recovery of possession in favour of the appellant-landlord against the respondent-tenant. The Court imposed a stay of six months before possession could be recovered and ordered that the respondent should bear the appellant's costs.

Core Ruling: The orders of the Tribunal and Controller are set aside and an order for recovery of possession is made in favour of the appellant-landlord; possession is not to be taken before the expiration of six months from the date of the order, and the respondent must pay the appellant's costs.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by reversing the dismissal of the eviction petition and granting the landlord possession after six months with costs awarded to him. The Court's reasoning clarifies several legal propositions applied in this dispute: (a) bona fide requirement under section 14(1)(e) is a question capable of being treated as a mixed question of law and fact and thus amenable to appellate scrutiny where conclusions are not justified by evidence; (b) a landlord is not required by law to have conclusively decided residence plans at the time of letting; (c) prior lettings at higher rents are not by themselves decisive of mala fides; and (d) the needs of family members who normally live with the landlord must be considered in assessing bona fide requirement even if those family members have independent incomes. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Court, but it applies and synthesises existing authorities to reach its conclusion.

Show all summary ...

P.N Khanna, J.:— This second appeal is directed against the judgenent dated January 25, 1933 of the learned Rent Control Tribanal, who dismissing the laodlord's appeal, affirmed the judgenent of the Controller whereby he had dismissed the eviction application of the landlord against the respondent-tenant. The appellant-landlord is the owner of a house situated in New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi, and is in occapatioa of three living rooms, besides, kitchen, store, bath and latrine on its ground floor with two courtyards on both sides. The respondent-tenant has been in occupation of the first floor consisting of three rooms, two verandahs, kitchen, latrine and bath and the barsati of the said house, at Rs. 260/- per month as rent, with effect from January 22, 1964.

2. On November 26, 1964, the appellant-landlord filed a petition for the respondent's eviction under clause (b) and (c) of the proviso to section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act on the allegations that the required bona fide the premises in suit for occupation as a residence for himself and his family members; and that the respondent tenant had sublet a part of the premises without his consent. The tenant denied the appellant's allegations and contended the petition.

3. The learned Controller found that the land-lord appellant was it possession of the whole house on January 22, 1864, when he let out the parting in dispute to the respondent. He must have at that time anticipated his requirements for a further priced of six mentis. The finding of the eviction petition after about eleven months on November 26, 1964 itself was a clear indication that he did not, in fact require the premises and his allegations lacked bona fides. The appellant's son was earning Rs. 325/- per month; and the son's wife was earning Rs. 225/- per month. The learned Controller, therefore refused to believe that the son was dependent on the landlord, as with that much of income he could easily set up a small home of his own. The second son was employed in Calcutta, while the third son was working in Nahan. The fourth son, who was studying in some College, lived with him, while his daughter was in some boarding house. He, therefore, held that the appellant's claim was not genuine and bona fide Subletting by the respondent-tenant was also held not substantiated. It was under these circumstances that the petition was dismissed

4. In appeal, the learned Kent Control 1 Tribunal concurred with the reasons given in the judgment of the Controller, and observed that there had been three letting by the appellant during the last few years. With each letting the appellant had secured an increase in rent, The respondent's counsel had stated at the Bar that there had been a further increase in the prevailing rents during the period that elapsed between the letting of the premises to the respondent and the filing of the ejectment application. The learned Tribunal also noticed that the son was studying in the College and the daughter was about to complete her M.B.B.S course as a lady doctor. Knowing full well the needs of there two children, the appellant had let out the premises to the respondent. The learned Tribunal felt reluctant, therefore, to force on the landlord more comfortable and liberal standards of living, which he himself was not prepared to adopt. The requirements of the appellant's other married son, who was living with him were ignored as he was considered to be in a position to set up an independent home It was under these circumstances that the appeal was dismised with costs. The appellant-landlord has come up in second appeal to this court

5. When the appeal came up for hearing for the first time the learned counsel for the parties made a statement that the Tribunal had not given a finding on the question whether the premises with the landlord were reasonably suitable for his residence within the meaning of section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. They, therefore, made a joint request that the case be remanded to the Tribunal for a finding on this question alone on the evidence already on record. It was under these circumstances that the learned Judge remanded the case back to the Tribunal According to the Tribunal's report after remand the landlord was in possess on of three rooms two masuring 10′×12′ each and the third measuring 10.3×6′9″, besides a pantry, store, bath, latrine and open courtyards on both sides. The third room on the back side was small and was considered just sufficient for being used as a dining room Out of the remaining two rooms, one was required by the landlord for being used as a drawing room. The landord was thus left with only on room which was considered in-sufficient for the entire famly. The learned Tribunal considered that the married son with his family needed a separate room for himself. It was under these circumstances that the existing accommodation with the landlord was considered not reasonably sufficient for him.

6. The leuned counsel for the respondent contended at the outset, that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law and, therefore did not lie The question of the bona tides of the landlord when he stead that he required the premises for occupation as a residence for himself and for the members of his family, was, according to him a question of fact, the finding on which by the Tribunal, was conclusive. In Smt. Ram Kali v. Vijay Gopal Stivastava,1 a similar argument was addressed on behalf of the respondent-tenant. Adapting the observations of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kamla Soni v. Roop Lal Mehra . 1069 R.C R. 1017., it was held that the determination of the requirements of the landlord as bona fide within the meaning of section 14(1)(e) of Act, on the facts proved, was not a finding purely of fact. It was a mixed question of law and fact. The Supreme Court had held that an inference that the requirement of the landlord in a given case was bona fide could not be regarded as conclusive. In other words, the High Court could interfere in a finding based on such inference It was observed in Smt. Ram Kali's case (supra):—It has. therefore, to be seen whether the finding that the petition of the appellant is male fide, is based on any proved facts and if the finding is based on irrelevant or no evidence, then certainly it is case, where the tribunal has grossly erred in its conclusion. And then; the question would be whether the conclusion drawn from the evidence is justified, especially in the light of numerous decisions on the subject If the conclusion is not so justified, it would amount to a substantial error of law.” The inference drawn from proved facts by the learned Tribanal in the present case that the requirement of the appellant was not bona tide, therefore, could not be regarded as conclusive. More so, when the facts of the case are examined in the light of the findings of the learned Tribunal in its report after remand referred to above.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent, then raised the same three contentions on the basis of which the learned Kent Control Tribunal had declined to grant the appellant's prayer, viz. that the landlord-appellant could have easily anticipated his requirement or eleven months before the filing of his eviction petition, that on previous occasions after every vacation of the premises by a tenant the Same had been let out at an increased rent; and that the needs of the married son of the appellant, who was having an independent income could not be taken into consideration, while considering the bona fide requirements of the appellant-landlord. The ground of subletting was not agitated.

8. The bona fides of the landlord in regard to his requirements for the disputed premises, have, therefore, to be determined. The word “bona fide” has come up for consideration in number of cases and the courts have repeatedly expressed their views in the matter. No hard and fast rules can be laid and every case has to be adjudged on its own merits. Broad principles car, however, be gathered from the numerous decided cases. In plain language, “bom fide” means good faith sincerity of purpose or the absence of my deaire to deceive on derive an undue advantage. If the demand of the landlord conveys an impression of sincerty and absence of any oblique motive or collateral purpose, and cannot be said to be inspired by a mere fanciful whim, it has to be regarded as bona fide. The facts of the present case, therefore, have to be examined in the light of these general principles.

9. The first contention of the respondent's learned counsel cannot be accepted, as there is nothing in law, which requires the landlord to finally decide about his requirements at the time when he lets out any accommodation to a tenant. His requirements may change from time to time He may not be clever enough to anticipate things. His inability to do so cannot deprive him of his rights, which he derives under the Act. Reference may be made in this connection to Inder Sain Seengal v. J.E Compose . 1970 R.C J. 1., where it was observed: “to impose on the landlord an obligation to decide finally three months prior to his date of retirement whether or not he would be shifting and living in his own house three months later, and if he was so desirous then of declining to lease the vacant portion of his house is to read in the statutory provisions more than what is clearly discrenable therein.” It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the landlord mast anticipate his needs at the time when the lets out any accommodation to a tenant and that his failure to do so would render his subsequent demand for eviction of his tenant mala fide

10. The second contention of the respondent is equally devoid of force. Merely letting out some time in the past, accommodation, which fell vacant then, may be at an increased rent, can be no ground for holding that he is likely to let out the accommodation which would now fall vacant, if his demand for eviction is accepted. In this case, there is no evidence to show that there has been an increase in the rent from the date when the premises were let to the respondent-tenant, up to the date when the eviction petition was filed. The manner in which the learned Tribunal reached its conclusions of a far reaching character on a bare assertion at the Bar by the respandent's counsel, cannot be appreciated. Lettings in the past cannot always afford a ground for doubting the bona fides of the landlord when he claims eviction of a tenant.

11. Regarding the needs of the married son, the approach of the learned Rent Control Tribunal in the judgment under appeal, is quite erroneous. It is established in this case that the married son alongwith his family has been living with his father, the landlord, from the very beginning. His needs are not being stressed now in order just to provide a sort of screen of bona fide requirements to cover an oblique motive or some other collateral purposes In Jai Gopal v. Ramesh Lal . SAO 401 of 1968., decided’ on February 5, 1970 while interpreting the phrase a residence for himself occurring in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act, I had the occasion to observe that it “cannot mean a residence for the landlord living in isolation. “Himself” has to be interpreted as a reference to a perron living with his family with whom he is normally accustomed to live. Merely because the wife of the landlord in a given case is, eaming her independent living and, therefore, is not dependent on him, cannot mean that while considering the needs of the landlord the needs of his wife have to be ignored. Likewise the needs of the adult independent son, who normally is accustomed to live with his father, cannot be ignored, when considering the needs of the father. The words “for himself” have to be interpreted to mean “for himself as living along with his family members, with whom he is normally accustomed to live.” This interpretation has to be adopted when there is nothing to cast any doubt on the bona fides of the landlord, when he makes such a claim. The phrase “or for any member of his family dependent on him”, occurring in the clause is designed to meet an alltogether different objective. If the landlord himself is not to reside in the premises, as for instance, when he lives outside Delhi, he still is entitled to claim ejectment of his tenant, if the premises are required “for any member of his family dependent on him or “for whose benefit the premises are held”. Ejectment in such a case may not be claimed, if the requirement is for a family member, who is not dependent on the landlord; or the premises are not being held for his benefit. But in this case, when the premises are required by the landlord as a residence for himself then the needs of his wife and other family members cannot be ignored, if normally he is accustomed to reside in their company even if they are not dependent on him. Another way of looking at this very problem would be to recognise that there is nothing to prevent the landlord from giving free accommodation to his near and dear ones who may normally be accustomed to live with him even though they may not be otherwise dependent on him. The right of the appellant, in the present case, to provide accommodation to members of his family, who are not dependent on him. but who narmally reside with him cannot be questioned. If the accommodation, now available with the appellant is sufficient for his son. son's wife and child his two minor children and his wife, then he stil needs an extra room for himself. In order to satisfy this needs of his, he can either turn out his son or seek eviction of the tenant occupying the adjoining room. His bona fides cannot be challenged if he prefers to retain the company of his son and seeks the ejectment of the respondent instead.” The above view finds further support from a number of decided cases vide. T.C Rekki v. Usha Gajral,5 P.D Sharma v. Ram Lubhaya . 1978 RCJ 160.. J.L Mehta… v. Hira Devi…. Devi.7

12. Apart from the married son, and the unmarried son, both of whom are living with the appellant, he has two sons, who at present work outside Delhi and a married daughter who lives with her husband. They would, however, visit the appellant off and on; and the appellant would be in need of some accommodation to provide, temparary shelter for them. This again would be a bona fide need. For looking to the needs of the landlord, he is to be taken as a social being. He cannot refuse shelter to his own sons living outside Delhi, or his daughter when they are visiting him at times. If one or two rooms already with the appellant are just sufficient for his own needs and needs of the sons, who are presently living with him, he still may need some more accommodation for the use of any of his other children when they visit him. It was held in Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Dass . 1964 68 PLR 1214.. “And then social customs, conventions, and habits, usages and practices of the society and other similar considerations also cannot be completely ignored as irrelevant while determining the question of requirement of the landlord. The learned appellate authority was, in my opinion, not justified in taking a purely legalistic view that if the married daughter or her children do frequently come to stay with her widowed mother because of her old age and illness, then this factor cannot be taken into account for considering the bona fide requirement of the owners. I respectfully agree with the above reasoning, which appears to be in consonance with the objects of the Act. The Tribunal in Its report after remand had mentioned that the appellant was 61 years of age in March, 1965. He would now be 66 years old. He would, therefore, require as an old man, somebody to look after him. Taking this view also, the requirement of his married son living with him, is almost essential and, therefore, genuine. If, therefore, the present accommodation with the landlord is not sufficient, his desire to have extra accommodation, which is occupied by the respondent-tenant, cannot be said to be mala fide. The challenge to his bona fides, therefore, has no substance and it must be held that the requirements of the landlord for the accommodation in dispute for the purpose of his occupation and the occupation of the members of his family is genuine and bona fide. The learned counsel for the respondent then referred to his two applications, the first dated 2nd September, 1970, being C. M. 1274-J of 1970, under Order 7 Rule 11, and section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, praying that the appeal of the landlord-appellant be dismissed with costs, on the allegation that during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant filed another eviction petition against the respondent on the ground of personal bona fide requirement, after issuing notice to him under section 106, Transfer of Property Act, alleging therein that the respondent was a tenant and that his tenancy was being terminated by the said notice with effect from December 31, 1967; and the second, dated October 6, 1970, being CM 1269-J of 1970, under Order 6 Rule 17, read with section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, for amending the written statement, by adding the allegation that the tenancy still subsisted and had not been terminated as no notice of termination was served on the tenant. It will be noticed that the eviction application was filed on November 26, 1964 wherein it was stated on behalf of the landlord that no notice was required to be given. In his answer, it was pleadrd by the respondent-tenant, that this needed no reply. It was therefore, the admitted case of the parties at that time that no notice was required. It was on that basis that the litigation was fought between the parties for several years. The present second appeal was filed on May 27, 1966. The notice which was sent on behalf of the appellant-landlord is dated December 7, 1967. The second eviction petition was filed somewhere In 1968 on an entirely different cause of action. The said petition has been dismissed. But the parties never took the said notice or the second eviction proceedings, as having any effect on the present appeal. On March 26, 1970, when this appeal came up for hearing for the first time, the counsel for the respondent did not raise any objection about the tenancy having not been terminated of it having been revived as a result of the notice dated December 7, 1967. On the other hand, both the counsel made a statement in court that the case be remanded to the Rent Control Tribunal for determining the question, which they said had been left undecided by the Rent Control Tribunal. This clearly shows that the parties did not think that the notice dated December 7, 1967 had in any way effected any change in the rights of the parties. The fact the landlord-appellant continued with unabated keenness, the prosecution of the present appeal with regard to ejectment of the respondent-tenant, irrespective of the notice in question and the further fact of the respondent not having ever raised an objection, clearly establishes that the tenancy was neither revived nor was the stand of the parties that no notice was required for the termination of the tenancy, changed. It may further be noticed that even if the said notice, as a subsequent event, could be said to have revived the tenancy, which in any case, it did not do, it definitely, terminated the tenancy so revived, by its very language. The said notice, therefore, has not brought about any change in the situation. No purpose, therefore, would be served in allowing the amendment, which the respondent seeks to introduce. It is an accepted principle that the courts would not allow a futile amendment, which would serve no purpose what so ever. Both the applications therefore, have no merits and are dismissed.

13. This appeal, in the result, succeeds. The orders of the Tribunal and of the Controller cannot be maintained and the same are set aside. An order for the recovery of possession of the premises in dispute is made in favour of the appellant landlord against the respondent tenant. The appellant shall, however, not be entitled to recover possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of this order. The respondent shall also bear the appellant's costs.

14. Appeal allowed.