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Commissioner Of Income-Tax Petitioner v. M/S Ganga Sugar Corp.
Judgment Summary — H.R. Khanna, C.J. (Income-tax References Nos. 1 & 17 of 1967)
Factual and Procedural Background
Two identical questions referred under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, arising from decisions of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at the instance of the Revenue, were disposed of together. The question was whether Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. was entitled to exemption under section 15C of the Act in respect of profits derived from plant and machinery installed at a cost of Rs. 1,10,00,000.
Facts (as dealt with in Reference No. 1, assessment year 1959-60, and covering the other years by agreement): The assessee, carrying on sugar manufacture, originally installed a plant in 1934 (400 tons/day, steam-driven) and over the years expanded capacity to 1,050 tons/day. In assessment year 1957-58 the assessee installed a new electric-driven plant with 4,000 tons/day capacity, at a cost of approximately Rs. 1,10,00,000. Old factory material/scrap was reused to an extent disputed: assessee said Rs. 72,617; Revenue said Rs. 1,56,352. Both old and new units ran simultaneously in 1957-58; the old unit was scrapped in 1958-59.
Procedural history: The Income-tax Officer disallowed the section 15C claim, treating the new works largely as replacement/expansion. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed. The Tribunal reversed, holding that the new unit was a distinct industrial undertaking and entitled to section 15C exemption. The Revenue referred the question to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the assessee company is entitled to exemption under section 15C of the Income-tax Act, 1922, in respect of profits or gains derived from plant and machinery installed at a cost of Rs. 1,10,00,000.
- Whether the new industrial unit was "formed by the reconstruction of business already in existence" within clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 15C, thereby disqualifying it from exemption.
- Whether the new unit was "formed by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in any other business" (the concluding words of clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 15C), thereby disqualifying it from exemption.
Arguments of the Parties
Revenue (Mr. Sharma)
- Admitted that most conditions of section 15C were satisfied but argued that clause (i) of sub-section (2) was not met.
- Contended that the new unit was formed by the "reconstruction of business already in existence" — i.e., the new installation represented a reconstruction rather than a distinct undertaking.
- In the alternative, argued the new unit was formed "by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in any other business" because parts/scrap from the old factory were used in the new plant (Revenue alleged parts worth Rs. 1,56,352 were used).
Assessee (Mr. Chagla)
- Contended that the new unit was a new and distinct industrial undertaking, not a reconstruction of the existing business and not constituted by transfer of previously used plant/machinery in a manner contemplated by clause (i) of sub‑section (2).
- Pointed to the substantial differences between old and new units — vastly greater crushing capacity (4,000 vs. 1,050 tons/day) and electricity operation versus steam — and the fact that both ran simultaneously for a period, indicating distinctness.
- Contended that the value of reused scrap/material was small relative to total cost (assessee's figure Rs. 72,617), and therefore did not amount to transfer that would attract clause (i)'s disqualification.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re South African Supply & Cold Storage Co., (1904) 2 Ch. D. 268 (Buckley J.) | Buckley J.'s articulation of the meaning of "reconstruction": substantially the same business carried on by substantially the same persons; involves continuation in altered form rather than a new, independent undertaking. | The Court quoted Buckley J.'s definition to explain what constitutes a reconstruction of a business and used it to assess whether the new unit here represented a reconstruction. The Court emphasized that reconstruction implies continuity and preservation of the old undertaking. |
| Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City v. Gaekwar Foam and Rubber Co. Ltd., 35 I.T.R. 662 | Application of Buckley J.'s company reconstruction observations to reconstruction of a business: reconstruction implies continuation of the same undertaking; changes must be constructive (not destructive); substantial continuity of business and persons is required. | The Court relied on this Division Bench decision to support the proposition that reconstruction of business requires continuity of identity and activities; used the reasoning to distinguish the present facts (setting up of a separate industrial unit) from reconstruction. |
| The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi v. Naya Sahitya (ITR No. 5 (2) of 1967) | Held that merely beginning to perform a function previously outsourced (printing in one's own press) did not amount to a newly established industrial undertaking for section 15C purposes; treated as continuation rather than a new independent undertaking. | The Court considered the decision but distinguished it on the facts: in Naya Sahitya the only change was internalizing a previously outsourced service; the present case involved an entirely new, larger unit running concurrently with the old unit, so Naya Sahitya did not assist the Revenue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by reproducing sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 15C and noting that clause (i) of sub-section (2) disqualifies industrial undertakings formed by (a) splitting up, (b) reconstruction of existing business, or (c) transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in any other business.
On the reconstruction point:
- The Court analysed the concept of "reconstruction" by reference to company law authorities (Buckley J.'s definition and the Bombay High Court decision in Gaekwar Foam and Rubber). It emphasized that reconstruction implies continuity and preservation of the old undertaking in an altered form; substantially the same business must be carried on by substantially the same persons. Reconstruction involves an altered form but not destruction of identity.
- The Court held that the concept of reconstruction of business would not be attracted where a company already running one industrial unit sets up another industrial unit: the new unit retains a separate and independent identity even if set up by the same company.
- The Court also observed the legislative purpose of section 15C — to incentivise new industries and accelerate industrialisation — and noted that the Legislature did not intend to confine benefit to those without prior experience of running similar undertakings.
Application of the reconstruction analysis to the facts:
- The Court found salient factual differences between the old and new units: original (up to 1,050 tons/day, steam) versus new (4,000 tons/day, electricity), and both units ran simultaneously in 1957-58 before the old unit was later scrapped. These features led the Court to conclude the new unit was distinct and separate, not a continuation of the old unit.
On the contention of transfer of previously used plant/machinery:
- The Court examined the asserted use of old materials in the new plant. It accepted the assessee's and Tribunal's factual finding that the value of reused scrap/material was small (assessee's stated Rs. 72,617; Revenue claimed higher). The Court treated the value of the reused material as about 1% of the cost of the new unit and concluded that such minor use did not bring the case within the concluding words of clause (i).
- The Court articulated a general principle: in deciding whether an undertaking has been formed by transfer of previously used building/machinery/plant, the Court should consider the value of transferred items vis-à-vis total cost of the new undertaking. If the transferred value is only a small fraction, the undertaking will not be treated as formed by such transfer; if the transferred value is substantial in comparison, clause (i) would apply.
- The Court noted that later legislation (sub-section (6) of section 80J of the Income Tax Act, 1961) specified a 20% benchmark, but emphasised that while no percentage was fixed in section 15C (1922 Act), the relative quantum of transferred assets is a material consideration.
On authority cited by Revenue (Naya Sahitya), the Court found that case distinguishable because there the only change was internalizing previously outsourced printing; by contrast, the present case involved a large, new, separate plant with different capacity and power source.
Based on the factual findings (size, method of operation, simultaneous running, and small percentage value of reused material) and the legal analysis, the Court concluded the new unit was neither a "reconstruction of business already in existence" nor a unit "formed by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in any other business" within clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 15C.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The question referred was answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee. The Court held that the assessee company was entitled to exemption from tax on the profits or gains derived from the new industrial undertaking under section 15C of the Income-tax Act, 1922.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The assessee (Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd.) is entitled to the section 15C exemption for the profits from the new plant and machinery costing approximately Rs. 1,10,00,000. The parties were left to bear their own costs.
- Scope and precedent: The Court clarified the legal test for "reconstruction" under clause (i) of section 15C(2) by adopting and applying established company-law/ business-reconstruction principles (as articulated by Buckley J. and applied in Gaekwar). The judgment emphasises that a distinct new industrial unit set up by an existing industrial company is not necessarily a reconstruction and may retain a separate identity for section 15C purposes. The Court did not state that it was creating an abstract new rule beyond applying and adapting existing authorities; it primarily applied those principles to the present facts. The opinion distinguished a contrary factual decision (Naya Sahitya) and explained why it did not assist the Revenue in this case.
Reference answered accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs.
H.R Khanna, C.J:— This judgment would dispose of two Income-tax References Nos. 1 and 17 of 1967 in each of which the following identical question has been referred to this Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) at the instance of the Revenue: —
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee company is entitled to exemption from tax on the profits or gains derived from the plant and machinery installed by it at a cost of Rs. 1,10,00,000/- under section 15C of the Income-tax Act, 1922 ?”
Reference No. 1 relates to assessment year 1959-60 whereas Reference No. 17 pertains to assessment years 1960-61, 1961-62 and 1957-58. The assessee in these References is Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. and the learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the decision in Reference No. 1 of 1967 would also cover the question which is the subject matter of the other Reference. In the circumstances, we may deal with the facts as given in Reference No. 1.
The assessee company carles on the business of manufacturing sugar. At the time of its incorporation in 1934 it installed a complete plant for manufacturing sugar, having a daily crushing capacity of 400 tons of sugar-cane. The said plant was operated by steam engine. During the course of the years the assessee company made additions and alterations in the said plant, as a result of which the crushing capacity was increased to 1050 tons of sugar-cane per day by 1955. In the assessment year 1957-58, the assessee company installed a new plant for manufacturing sugar with a daily crushing capacity of 4000 tons of sugar-cane. The new plant is operated by electricity. The total cost of the installation of this plant and machinery was of the order of Rs. 1,10,00,000/-. The old building was completely over-hauled and new buildings were constructed for housing this plant. The land on which the new plant was set up had been acquired by the assessee company in 1934. According to the assessee company, scrap and old material worth Rs. 72,617/- out of the old factory were used in the construction of the new factory As against that, according to the Revenue articles worth Rs. 1,56,352/- out of the old factory were used in the new factory. Both the old and the new factories were run simultaneously in the assessment year 1957-58. In the assessment year 1958-59, the old factory was completely scrapped off and only the new factory was run.
The assessee company claimed the benefit of partial exemption of its income from tax under section 15C of the Act in the assessment year in question. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim of the assessee in this respect on the ground that what the assessee had done was to expand its factory by installing new machinery, most of which, he held, was in replacement of the old machinery. It was observed that as the assessee company had not dismantled scrap of the old, machinery and that as the business had continued without break since 1948, the assessee company was not entitled to the exemption from tax under section 15C of the Act. The order of the income-tax Officer was affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The assessee company preferred further appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that in order to claim the benefit of section 15C of the Act, it was not essential to show that the industrial undertaking had been newly established.
The Tribunal referred to the facts of the case and pointed out that the old unit had not been touched at all and entirely a new and self-contained unit run by electricity had been set up. Reference was also made to the fact that both the units had run simultaneously for some time, whereafter, the old unit had been scrapped off.
On consideration of the facts the Tribunal held that it was a case of new and distinct industrial undertaking having been established by the assessee company in 1956-57. Reference was, thereafter, made by the Tribunal to the assets of the old units, such as machinery, railway siding, workshop tools and implements of the total value of Rs. 3,62,853/-, which were stated to have been used for the benefit of the new unit also. The Tribunal held that the common use of certain articles by two distinct industrial undertakings did not deprive them of their distinct identity. As regards the contention of the Revenue that parts worth Rs. 1,56,352/- of the old factory had been used in the construction of the new unit, the Tribunal held that the use of some parts of the old unit in the construction of the new unit would not bring the case within the ambit of clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 15 C of the Act. The assessee company was held entitled by the Tribunal to the benefit of the exemption under section 15 C of the Act.
At the instance of the Revenue, the question re-produced above was thereafter referred to this court.
Before dealing with the contention advanced, in this case, it may be pertinent to re-produce sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 15 C of the Act: —
Sub-section (1)
“Save as otherwise hereinafter provided, the tax shall not be payable by an assessee on so much of the profits or gains derived from any industrial undertaking (or hotel) to which this section applies as do not exceed six per cent. per annum on the capital employed in the undertaking (or hotel), computed in accordance with such rules as may be made in this behalf by the Central Board of Revenue.
Sub-section (2).
This section applies to any industrial undertaking which —
(i) is not formed by the splitting up, or the reconstruction of, business already in existence or by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant (previously used in any other business);
(ii) has begun or begins to manufacture or produce articles in (any part of the taxable territories) at any time within a period of (eighteen) years from the 1st day of April, 1948, or such further period as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify with reference to any particular industrial undertaking;
(iii) employs ten or more workers in a manufacturing process carried on with the aid of power, or employs twenty or more workers in a manufacturing process carried on without the aid of power.
Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the exemption conferred by this section shall not apply to any particular industrial undertaking.”
Mr. Sharma, on behalf of the Revenue, concedes that the case of the assessee company is covered by the above provision of law except in one particular, to which reference would be made hereafter. It is urged that the assessee company does not answer to the description given in clause (i) of sub-section (2) reproduced above. Even so far as the above clause is concerned, Mr. Sharma does not dispute that the assessee company's new unit was not formed by the splitting up of business already in existence. But he contends that the new unit was an industrial undertaking which was formed by “the reconstruction of business already in existence”. In the alternative it is-argued that the new unit was an industrial undertaking which was formed “by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in any other business”. The above contentions have been controverted by Mr. Chagla on behalf of the assessee company and we are of the opinion that they are not well-founded. It cannot be disputed that all the conditions and requirements of clause (i) of sub-section (2) must be satisfied before the benefit of the exemption can be claimed by an industrial undertaking. The subsection would not apply and the exemption cannot be claimed by art assessee if the industrial undertaking is formed (a) by the splitting up of its business already in existence or (b) by reconstruction of business already in existence or (c) by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in any other business. As stated above, it is nobody's case that there has been any splitting up of the business already in existence so as to attract clause (a). The important question which arises for determination is whether the industrial undertaking in question was formed by the reconstruction of business already in existence, as contended by the Revenue. The word ‘reconstruction’ is a commercial term used in Company law and has been distinguished from ‘amalgamation’. By a reconstruction a company transfers its assets to a new company in consideration of the issue of the hew company's shares to the first company's members, and if the first company's debentures are not paid off, in further consideration of the new company issuing debentures to the first company's debenture holders. The result of the transaction is that the new company has the same assets, members and debenture holders as the old one, and the old company has no undertaking to manage and is therefore wound up. Reconstructions were far commoner at the end of the last century and the beginning of this than they are today. (See Company Law by Pennington, 1967 Edition, page 727). It has been further observed on that page: —
“In form, an amalgamation is merely the reconstruction of several companies by which all of them transfer their respective assets to one of their number or to a new company formed for the purpose, in consideration of the allotment of the transferee company's share or debentures to their members and debenture holders in agreed propositions. The economic result of an amalgamation and a reconstruction differs vastly, however.”
In re South African Supply & Cold Storage Co., (1904) 2 Ch. D. 268, Buckley J., while dealing with the word ‘reconstruction’ observed: —
“What does ‘reconstruction’ mean ? To my mind it means this. An undertaking of some definite kind is being carried on, and the conclusion is arrived at that it is not desirable to kill that undertaking, but that it is desirable to -preserve it in some form, and to do so, not by selling it to an outsider who shall carry it on — that would be a mere sale — but in some altered form to continue the undertaking in such a manner as that the persons now carrying it on will substantially continue to carry it on. It involves, I think, that substantially the same business shall be carried on and substantially the same person shall carry it on. But it does not involve that all the assets shall pass to the new company or resuscitated company, or that all the shareholders of the old company shall be shareholders in the new company or resuscitated company. Substantially the business and the persons interested must be the same. Does it make any difference that the new company or resuscitated company does or does not take over the liabilities ? I think not. I think it is none the less a reconstruction because from the assets taken over some part is excepted provided that substantially the business is taken, and it is immaterial whether the liabilities are taken over by the new or resuscitated company or are provided for by excepting from the scheme of reconstruction a sufficient amount to answer them. It is not, therefore, vital that either the whole assets should be taken over or that the liabilities should be taken over. You have to see whether substantially the same persons carry on the same business; and if they do, that, I conceive, is a reconstruction.”
The above observations, as already pointed out, were in the context of a reconstruction of a company while the words used in clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 15C of the Act relate to reconstruction of business. A Division Bench (S.T Desai and K.T Desai JJ.) of the Bombay High Court held in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City 1 v. Gaekwar Foam and Rubber Co. Ltd., 35 I.T.R 662, (1) that though the above observations of Buckley J. were in the context of reconstruction of a company, they were equally illuminating for determining the scope of reconstruction of a business already in existence. The learned Judges further observed: —
“The reconstruction of a business or an industrial undertaking must necessarily involve the concept that the original business or undertaking is not to cease functioning, and its identity is not to be lost or abandoned. The concept essentially rests on changes but the changes must be constructive and not destructive. There must be something positive about the whole matter as opposed to negative. The underlying idea of a reconstruction evidently must be — and this is brought out by the section itself — of a ‘business already in existence’. There must be a continuation of the activities and business of the same industrial undertaking. The undertaking must continue to carry on the same business though in some altered or varied form. If the alterations and changes are substantial, there would be little scope for describing what emerges as a reconstruction of the business. Thus for instance if the ownership of a business or an undertaking changes hands not ostensibly but in reality and effectively, that would not be reconstruction or if the very nature of the business is changed, that again would not be reconstruction. On the other hand, reorganization of the business on sounder lines or alterations in the mode or method or scope of the activities of the business or in its personnel or infusion of new blood in the management or control of the business which may even be by some changes in the constitution of persons interested in the undertaking would certainly be no more than reconstruction of the business if it is substantially the same business carried on by substantially the same persons.”
We have given the matter our earnest consideration and are of the view that in the reconstruction of a business, as in the reconstruction of a company, there is an element of transfer of assets and of some change, however partial or restricted it may be, of ownership of the assets. The transfer however need not be of all the assets. It is non-the-less imperative that there should be continuity and preservation of the old undertaking though in an altered form. The concept of reconstruction of business would not be attracted when a company which is already running one industrial unit sets up another industrial unit. The new industrial unit would not lose its separate and independent identity even though it has been set up by a company which is already running an industrial unit before the setting up of the new unit. The object of section 15C of the Act is to provide an incentive for setting up of new industries so as to accelerate the process of industrialisation. It does not appear to have been the intention of the Legislature, as envisaged by section 15C of the Act, that the benefit of the said section would be confined to the industrial undertaking of those parties who had not already set up such undertakings in the past but would not be extended to parties who have past experience of running similar undertaking.
Coming to the facts of the present case, we find that the total cost of the installation of the new unit by the assessee company was of the order of Rs. 1,10,00,000/-. The old unit of the assessee company had a crushing capacity of 1050 tons of sugar-cane per day and it was operated by a steam engine. The new unit had a daily crushing capacity of 4000 tons of sugar-cane and it was operated by electricity. In the assessment year 1957-58 both the old as well as the new unit were running simultaneously. In the circumstances, the new unit should, in our opinion, be held to be distinct and separate from the old unit and not a continuation of the old unit. The fact that scrap and material out of the old unit was used in the construction of the new factory, in our opinion, would not make any material difference because the value of such scrap and material was only about 1% of the cost of the new unit. It cannot, on the facts of the present case, be said that the industrial undertaking represented by the new unit of the assessee company was formed by the reconstruction of the business already in existence.
So far as the second contention of the Revenue is concerned that the new unit was an industrial undertaking which was formed by the transfer to the new business of building, machinery of plant previously used in another business, we have already pointed out above that the value of such material was about 1% of the expenditure involved in the setting up of the new plant. The use of the aforesaid scrap and material of the old unit would not, in our opinion, attract the concluding words of clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 15C of the Act to the present case. In order to hold that an industrial undertaking has been formed by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in any other business, the Court should take into account the value of the transferred building, machinery or plant vis-a-vis the total cost involved in the setting up of the new industrial undertaking. If in the context of the total cost involved in the setting up of the new industrial undertaking the value of transferred building, machinery or plant constitutes only a small fraction, the new industrial undertaking would not be held to have been formed by the transfer to new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in another business. As against that, if, however, the value of the transferred building, machinery or plant is substantial when compared to the total cost involved in the setting up of the new industrial undertaking, the said undertaking would be hit by the concluding words of clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 15c. It may be stated that in sub-section (6) of section 80J of the Income Tax Act of 1961, the Legislature has specified that the total value of the building, machinery or plant so transferred should not exceed 20% of the total value of building, machinery plant used in the business of a new industrial undertaking. Although no such percentage was fixed in section 15C (2) (1) of the Act of 1922, the extent and quantum of the value of the transferred building, machinery or plant vis-a-vis the total cost involved in the setting up of the new industrial undertaking was, in our view, a relevant and material factor the importance of which cannot be lost sight of. In the light of all the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that the new industrial undertaking in the present case cannot be said to have been formed by the transfer to a new business of building, machinery or plant previously used in another business.
Reference has been made on behalf of the Revenue to a decision of this Court in The The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Delhi… v. Naya Sahitya, Delhi…, I.T.R No. 5 (2) of 1967, decided on March 15, 1971. The assessee in that case was carrying on business of publishing books. Prior to 1961-62 the assessee got its books printed in some other printing press. During the assessment year 1961-62 the assessee started printing books in its own printing press. The question referred to the Court was whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee's business of printing and publishing books was a newly established industrial undertaking entitled to exemption under section 15C of the Act. A Division Bench of this Court (Hardy and Ansari JJ.) took note of the fact that the only change that took place in the assessment year in question was that instead of getting its books printed in some other printing press the assessee got the books printed in its own printing press. The Court held it was not altogether a new business and the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of section 15C of the Act. In our opinion, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable and as such the Revenue cannot derive much assistance from it.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that the assessee company was entitled to exemption from tax on the profits or gain derived from the new industrial undertaking under section 15C of the Act. The question referred to this Court is consequently decided in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Reference answered accordingly.
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