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Mahant Prem Dass Chela Mahant Bhola Dass v. Joti Pershad

Delhi High Court
Feb 26, 1971
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Judicial Opinion Summary — S.N. Andley, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant appealed against a judgment dated 6 June 1962 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, which affirmed the trial Court's finding that the appellant's suit was barred by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, due to a prior judgment dated 12 July 1947 in Suit No. 17 of 1947 of the Subordinate Judge First Class, Delhi.

The dispute concerns a house in Mohalla Dassan, Delhi, leased by Mahant Bhola Das to the respondent from 19 December 1935 for ten years (expiring 18 December 1945). Mahant Bhola Das died on 11 November 1939. After his death Uma Shankar Shastri filed a suit in the Civil Judge, Meerut, claiming succession; the appellant was a defendant in that Meerut suit. On 11 October 1944 the Civil Judge, Meerut, decreed that Uma Shankar Shastri was the Gaddi Nashin (successor/chela) of Mahant Bhola Das and rejected the appellant's claim to be such successor. The appellant appealed to the High Court of Allahabad.

Without awaiting the High Court's decision, on 7 January 1947 the appellant filed a suit in Delhi for ejectment of the respondent. Two material issues in that earlier suit were (1) whether the respondent was the appellant's tenant and (5) the effect of the Meerut judgment. The Subordinate Judge in the earlier suit held the appellant had not produced the alleged will, had not collected rent, and, relying on the Meerut judgment that Uma Shankar Shastri was the Chela and successor, held the appellant failed to prove landlord status and had no locus standi to sue.

In the present suit (the subject of the appeal) the appellant again claimed to be successor of Mahant Bhola Das and sought ejectment and Rs. 600 for use and occupation (value for ejectment fixed at Rs. 100). The appellant stated the cause of action arose on 2 August 1954, when the Allahabad High Court allowed his appeal in the Meerut succession matter. The trial Court and first appellate court disposed of the present suit on the preliminary ground of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and did not adjudicate afresh the succession question.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present ejectment suit is barred by res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the identical issue—whether the respondent is a tenant under the appellant—was directly and substantially in issue and decided in the earlier suit in Delhi (Suit No. 17 of 1947) and/or in the Meerut proceedings.
  2. Whether the appellant should be permitted to amend the plaint (by application C.M. 2986-D of 1964) to assert a will and legal representative status, thereby converting the ejectment claim into a claim for possession, notwithstanding that allowing such an amendment would deprive the respondent of a limitation defence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the earlier Delhi suit's decision rested more on Issue No. 5 — that the appellant had no locus standi — than on Issue No. 1 (whether the respondent was tenant), and therefore the question of landlord-tenant relationship (Issue No. 1) was not finally decided and did not operate as res judicata.
  • The appellant relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court (A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 125; Laxaman Shivshankar Kumbhar v. Saraswati) where a learned Single Judge treated a previous suit as decided on prematurity rather than on status, meaning the status issue was not finally decided and could be re-agitated.
  • By application C.M. 2986-D of 1964 the appellant sought permission to amend the plaint to plead a will executed by Mahant Bhola Das in his favour and assert legal representative status, effectively converting the ejectment claim into a possession claim.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent strongly opposed the amendment application, arguing that allowing the amendment would cause the respondent to lose a valuable right to plead limitation (i.e., the amendment would deprive the respondent of a limitation defence).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 125 — Laxaman Shivshankar Kumbhar v. Saraswati daughter of Chanbasappa and another The principle that where a previous suit is decided more on a preliminary ground (e.g., prematurity) than on a substantive status issue, the substantive issue may not have been finally decided and can be re-agitated. The Court considered and rejected the broad proposition advanced in that decision for the facts of the present case, holding that Section 11 precludes retrial of any issue directly and substantially in issue and that there are "no degrees of importance" of issues; thus the appellant's reliance on that decision failed.
A.I.R. 1963 Punjab 178 — Jaljodhan Singh and another v. Kirpa Singh and others That cryptic or brief statements by a court (for example of an executing court) cannot necessarily be elevated to an adjudication on merits or to a matter "directly and substantially in issue" under Section 11. The Court observed that this case did not have bearing on the present facts; it noted the distinction but held the present case did contain an issue which was directly and substantially in issue previously.
1963 S.C. 385 — Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v. Shikandarkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai Where a final decision is based on more than one point and each point is sufficient for the ultimate decision, the decision on each of those points operates as res judicata between the parties. The Court relied on this principle to support the proposition that even if the earlier decision rested on multiple grounds, each ground which contributed to the final decision can operate as res judicata; this supported dismissal of the appellant's plea that the earlier decision did not finally decide the landlord-tenant issue.
A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 357 — L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. and another v. Messrs. Jardine Skinner and Co. Courts will as a rule decline to allow amendments that would effectively require the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit that is already barred by limitation; but this is a discretionary factor and does not strip the court of power to allow amendment if required in the interest of justice. The Court cited this as part of the legal background on amendment and limitation but applied the discretion to refuse the appellant's amendment application because allowing it would prejudice the respondent's limitation defence.
A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 363 — Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and others Adopts the doctrine that amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had originally been correct; main test is whether the amendment can be allowed without injustice to the other side. The Court applied this test and concluded that the proposed amendment would cause injustice to the respondent (by depriving a limitation defence), and therefore refused to allow the amendment.
I.L.R. (33) Bombay 644 — (Batchelor J.) Doctrine that an amendment should be refused where it would set up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which has become barred by limitation since institution of suit — the defendant would suffer an injury that could not be compensated by costs. The Court accepted this principle (as adopted in Pirgonda) and used it in the exercise of discretion to refuse the appellant's amendment application, on the ground that the respondent would suffer an uncompensable injury.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main strands of analysis: (A) whether the present suit is barred by res judicata (Section 11, CPC), and (B) whether the proposed amendment to the plaint should be permitted.

(A) Res judicata under Section 11 — analysis

  1. The Court identified the central substantive question in the present suit as whether the respondent stood in a landlord-tenant relationship to the appellant — i.e., whether the respondent was a tenant under the appellant.
  2. The Court observed that the same question had been "directly and substantially in issue" in the earlier Delhi suit (Suit No. 17 of 1947) where the Subordinate Judge had, relying on the Meerut judgment, held the appellant had failed to prove landlord status and had no locus standi. Thus, the identical issue had been previously tried.
  3. The appellant's contention that the earlier decision rested more on Issue No. 5 (locus standi) than on Issue No. 1 (landlord-tenant relationship) was addressed. The appellant relied on a Bombay decision to argue that where a previous suit is decided on a preliminary ground, the substantive issue may not have been finally decided. The Court rejected that general proposition as too broad for the present facts.
  4. The Court emphasized the text and scope of Section 11 CPC: the prohibition applies not only to subsequent suits but also to issues which were directly and substantially in issue between the same parties in an earlier suit — there are "no degrees of importance" among issues, and an issue once tried cannot be retried.
  5. The Court applied the principle from Vithal Y. Jathar that where a final decision rests on more than one point, each such point that contributed to the decision operates as res judicata. Therefore, even if multiple grounds supported the earlier judgment, the finding on the landlord-tenant issue operates as res judicata.
  6. The Court treated the Meerut judgment as a piece of evidence relied upon by the Subordinate Judge in the earlier Delhi suit; it was part of the material leading to the Delhi Court's conclusion that there was no landlord-tenant relationship. Thus, the earlier Delhi adjudication on the relationship issue was final for Section 11 purposes.
  7. On these bases, the Court concluded the present suit was barred by res judicata under Section 11 CPC.

(B) Application to amend the plaint — analysis

  1. The appellant sought leave to amend the plaint to add a claim based on a will and to assert legal representative status, thereby converting the ejectment claim into a possession suit. The Court noted that if the amendment were allowed, the respondent's valuable right to plead limitation would be lost.
  2. The Court surveyed authorities that govern amendments where limitation may be relevant (L.J. Leach & Co.; Pirgonda Patil; Batchelor J.'s observations). The applicable test is whether the amendment can be permitted without injustice to the opposite party or whether it would cause the opposite party an injury that could not be compensated in costs.
  3. Applying that test, the Court found that allowing the proposed amendment would cause injustice to the respondent by depriving them of a limitation defence. Consequently, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, the application to amend (C.M. 2986-D of 1964) was dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeal and refused the application to amend the plaint. The final disposition was APPEAL DISMISSED and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct legal effect is that the present suit is barred by res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the identical issue—whether the respondent was a tenant of the appellant—had been directly and substantially in issue and decided in the earlier Delhi proceedings.
  • The appellant's attempt to amend the plaint to assert a will and convert the claim into a possession suit was refused because allowing that amendment would cause prejudice to the respondent by eliminating a limitation defence; the Court applied established principles on amendment and limitation and exercised its discretion accordingly.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applies established res judicata principles and established tests for allowing amendments where limitation is implicated. The decision's practical consequence is the dismissal of the appellant's suit and the refusal of the amendment that would revive a time-barred claim for the appellant.

This summary is prepared solely on the basis of the provided judicial opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those contained in that text.

Show all summary ...

S.N Andley, J.:— The appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment dated June 6, 1962 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, whereby the finding of the trial Court that the present suit filed by the appellant was barred under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reason of the judgment dated July 12, 1947, in Suit No. 17 of 1947, of the Subordinate Judge Ist Class, Delhi, has been affirmed.

The house in dispute which is situate in Mohalla Dassan, Delhi, was leased out to the respondent with effect from December 18, 1935 by a registered deed of lease by Mahant Bhola Das who was the last Mahant in respect of the temple and Thakurdwara of Charan Dassi which had been founded by one Swami Rup Ram. The lease was for a period of 10 years with effect from December 19, 1935 and expiring on December 18, 1945. Mahant Bhola Das died on November 11, 1939 and upon his death one Uma Shankar Shastri filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Meerut claiming succession to Mahant Bhola Das. The appellant was one of the defendants in the said suit. The Civil Judge, Meerut, gave a judgment on October 11, 1944 decreeing the suit and holding that Uma Shankar Shastri was the Gaddi Nashin of Mahant Bhola Das and repelling the appellant's claim to be such Gaddi Nashin. The appellant filed an appeal from the said judgment in the High Court of Allahabad.
Without waiting for the result of the appeal, the appellant filed a suit on January 7, 1947 against the respondent claiming the latter's ejectment. The two material Issues in this suit were Issues Nos. 1 and 5. Issue No. 1 was whether the respondent herein was a tenant of the appellant herein and Issue No. 5 was as to the effect of the decision of Civil Judge Meerut in the aforesaid suit which had been filed by Uma Shankar Shastri against the present appellant. On the first Issue, the Subordinate Judge held that the appellant had not produced the alleged will of Mahant Bhola Das which had been alleged to have been filed in Allahabad High Court nor had he realised any rent from the respondent. Relying upon the judgment of the Civil Judge, Meerut, that Uma Shankar Shastri was the Chela of Mahant Bhola Das, the Subordinate Judge held that he appellant had failed to prove the Issue. On Issue No. 5 the Subordinate Judge held that the said Uma Shankar Shastri had been declared as the Chela and Successor of Mahant Bhola Das and, therefore, the appellant could not be the landlord of the respondent and the appellant had, therefore, no locus standi to file the suit. The Subordinate Judge in this case was concerned only with the question whether the respondent was a tenant under the appellant and that question was decided against the appellant for the reasons that the appellant had failed to prove the will of Mahant Bhola Das and that it had been held by the Civil Judge, Meerut, that Uma Shankar Shastri and not the appellant was the Chela and successor of Mahant Bhola Das.
In so far as the suit out of which the present appeal arises is concerned, the trial Court and the first Appellate Court have not gone into the question as to whether the appellant is the successor of Mahant Bhola Das or not because the suit has been disposed of merely on the preliminary issue as to whether it was barred by res judicata. In the present suit which was also a suit for ejectment and damages for use and occupation, the appellant had stated, inter alia, that the appellant being the successor of Mahant Bhola Das was by operation of law entitled to eject the respondent. The claim in the suit is for Rs. 600/- for use and occupation and for ejectment of the respondent. The value of the suit for purposes of ejectment has been fixed at Rs. 100/- being one year's rental value. It is stated in the plaint that the cause of action for the present suit arose on August 2, 1954, which was the date when the High Court of Allahabad allowed the appeal which had been filed by the appellant against the order of the Civil Judge, Meerut.
It cannot be disputed that the pleas which were raised by the appellant in the present suit are the same as were raised by him in the earlier suit because in this suit also he is claiming to be the landlord of the respondent on the ground that he is the successor of Mahant Bhola Das and was in possession of his Gaddi. Directly and substantially, therefore, the issue in the present case would be whether there is any relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant and the respondent or, in other words, whether the respondent is a tenant under the appellant. This identical issue was decided in the earlier suit filed by the appellant in Delhi and this suit or the trial of the aforesaid issue as to the relationship between the parties being that of landlord and tenant would be barred under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The only argument urged on behalf of the appellant is that the earlier suit had been decided more on Issue No. 5 where the Subordinate Judge had held that the appellant had no locus standi to file that suit than on the ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In other words, the contention is that the decision of the earlier suit could have rested on the decision of Issue No. 5 and, therefore, the decision of Issue No. 1 would not be res judicata. Reliance has been placed on the decision in A.I.R 1959 Bombay 125 in re Laxaman Shivshankar Kumbhar v. Saraswati daughter of Chanbasappa and another, (1) where a learned Single Judge of that Court had treated the earlier suit to have been decided more on the ground of being premature than on the ground of status. The learned Single Judge has observed: —
“Though the issue whether C was joint with D at the time of his death in regard to suit property was directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit it could not be said that the decision thereon was a final decision so as to operate as res judicata in the 1952 suit. It would not be proper to infer, merely from the fact that an issue has been numbered as issue number one and tried first from out of the several issues raised in the trial Court that it was necessarily the principal issue and that the decision on it was a final decision, nor could it be said from the position occupied by an issue that the party had invited the Court to give its decision on that issue first. Having regard to the practice prevailing in this State, namely, that the trial Courts in this State give their decision on all points in spite of the fact that the suit can be decided on a preliminary point, each case has got to be answered with reference to its own facts, and one of the tests which is to be applied for determining this question is to find out whether the Court, which adjudged the issue, considered the issue to be material and essential. Having regard to the facts of the present case, and having regard to the observations made by the Court in 1950 suit, the issue regarding heirship was one which was regarded by the determining Court as essential and which went to the root of the plaintiff's case, and the moment an adverse finding was reached on that issue, the suit became premature. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the previous litigation must be taken to have been decided more on the ground that the suit of S was premature, and, consequently, the issue regarding the status of C vis. a vis. the suit property was not finally decided and the same can be re-agitated by the plaintiff S over again.”
With respect to the learned Judge, I find it difficult to accept the broad proposition laid down by him. Section 11 of the Code contains a prohibition not only against the trial of a suit subsequently filed but also of an issue which had been directly and substantially in issue between the same parties in an earlier suit. There are no degrees of importance of any issue. The principle of res judicata is that if an issue has been tried in a suit it shall not be retried in a subsequently instituted suit. Another case on which reliance has been placed by the appellant is reported in A.I.R 1963 Punjab 178 in re: . . Jaljodhan Singh and another v. Kirpa Singh and others, (2) which does not appear to me to have any bearing on the matter. In that case there was no plea or issue and the Court remarked that “the cryptic words of the executing Court, that this cannot be done in law, cannot be raised to the status of an adjudication on merits or one which was directly and substantially in issue within the contemplation of section 11. . .” In the present case it cannot be doubted that the question as to the relationship of landlord and tenant which is raised in this suit was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit filed by the appellant in Delhi. If is needless to multiply authorities and it will be quite enough to refer to the decision reported in 1963 S.C 385 in re: Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v. Shikandarkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai, (3) where it has been observed that where the final decision in any matter at issue between the parties is based by a Court on the decisions on more than one point, each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision, the decision on each of these points operates as res judicata between the parties.
It is then argued that the Subordinate Judge in the earlier suit had merely decided the effect of the judgment of the Civil Judge, Meerut. This judgment to my mind was a piece of evidence in the case on the basis of which the Subordinate Judge in the earlier Delhi suit had come to the conclusion that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is as if the parties in the earlier Delhi suit had led evidence on the question whether the appellant was a Chela of Mahant Bhola Das and as such was entitled to sue for ejectment. In considering the applicability of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court in the subsequent suit has to see the matter which was directly and substantially in issue between the parties and the earlier decision on that issue. From this point of view there cannot be any doubt that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the present suit is the same as was the matter directly and substantially in issue in the earlier Delhi suit, namely, whether the respondent was a tenant under the appellant. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the present suit is barred under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
After filing the present appeal, the appellant filed an application, C.M 2986-D of 1964 for amendment of the plaint and by this application the appellant wants an opportunity to urge that Mahant Bhola Das had executed a will in his favour; that he is the legal representative of Mahant Bhola Das and was, therefore, entitled to the possession of the property in question. The attempt, therefore, is to convert the suit for eviction into a suit for possession. This application is strongly opposed. If this application is allowed, a valuable right to the respondent to plead limitation would be lost. In A.I.R 1957 Supreme Court 357 in re: L.J Leach and Co. Ltd. and another v. Messrs. Jardine Skinner and Co. (4) it has been observed that “Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should he ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interest of justice.” To the same effect are the observations in the case reported A.I.R 1957 Supreme Court 363 in re: Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and others, (5) where the observations of Batchelor J. in I.L.R (33) Bombay 644 have been accepted, the observations being: —
“That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same: can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not ?”
Applying these principles, I have no hesitation in dismissing the civil miscellaneous petition.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.