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J.M Banerjee v. Sohan Lal Bhargava

Delhi High Court
Dec 24, 1970
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a landlord's second appeal against the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi's judgment dated December 29, 1967, which dismissed his appeal and confirmed the Additional Controller's dismissal of his eviction petition under clause (e) of section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The landlord sought eviction of the respondent on the ground that the premises were bona fide required by him for his own residence and that of his dependent family members, asserting he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

The premises were let to the respondent in November 1960 under a lease deed (marked ‘C’), which included a clause restricting use to residential and clinic purposes and prohibiting subletting or assignment. The landlord alleged that due to family circumstances, including temporary absence from Delhi and the return of his son from abroad requiring accommodation, he needed the premises for residence. The respondent denied mala fide intentions, asserting the premises were used as residence and clinic as per the rent note dated November 2, 1960.

The Additional Controller found the premises were let for residential-cum-clinic purposes and concluded the eviction petition was not maintainable under the relevant provision, dismissing the landlord's petition. The Rent Control Tribunal upheld this decision, dismissing the landlord's appeal with costs. The landlord then filed this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lease deed, being unregistered, could be admitted in evidence to prove the purpose for which the premises were let.
  2. Whether the respondent's use of the premises for professional purposes excludes the applicability of clause (e) of section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction.
  3. Whether the appellant-landlord was entitled to eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal residence under the said clause.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The lease deed marked ‘C’ was not registered as required under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 17 of the Registration Act, and therefore could not be admitted as evidence for proving the letting purpose.
  • The purpose for which the property was let is inseparable from the lease itself; thus, an unregistered lease cannot be used to prove the letting purpose.
  • Reliance on precedents such as Martin v. Shea Ram Lal and Gurunath Shriniyas Desai v. Chanhassppa to argue that important clauses in an unregistered lease cannot be separated and used as evidence.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The lease deed, although unregistered, is admissible in evidence for collateral purposes, including proving the admission contained therein about the use of the premises.
  • Reliance on cases like G. Balakishtiah v. B. Ranga Reddy and Om Parkash v. Additional Commissioner to support admissibility of unregistered documents for collateral purposes such as tenancy nature and possession.
  • The premises were used by the respondent for both residence and professional purposes from the inception of tenancy, negating the landlord's eviction claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Martin v. Shea Ram Lal, ILR 4 Allahabad 232 (1882) Unregistered lease cannot be received as evidence to prove lessor's liability. Rejected appellant's contention that unregistered lease cannot be used to prove letting purpose; distinguished as collateral purpose.
Gurunath Shriniyas Desai v. Chanhassppa, ILR 18 Bombay 745 (1893) Clauses inseparable from unregistered lease are inadmissible. Distinguished; court held purpose clause was collateral and admissible.
Sachindra Mohan Ghose v. Ramjash Aggarwala, AIR 1932 Patna 97 Using document to prove an important clause in lease is not necessarily a collateral purpose. Supported view that clause 8 of lease deed admissible for collateral purpose.
G. Balakishtiah v. B. Ranga Reddy, AIR 1960 AP 112 ‘Kabuliat’ though unregistered is admissible for collateral admissions. Supported respondent's reliance on lease deed for collateral purpose.
Om Parkash v. Additional Commissioner, AIR 1956 Patna 305 Non-registration should not bar evidence to establish tenancy period or nature. Supported admissibility of unregistered documents for tenancy nature.
Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v. Mohd. Multani & Another, AIR 1963 SC 70 Unregistered endorsement inadmissible except to prove collateral facts like possession character. Illustrated principle of collateral admissibility of unregistered documents.
Rama Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Ratiram, C.A No. 460 of 1966 Unregistered lease inadmissible to prove transaction but admissible for collateral facts. Held clause 8 admissible to prove nature of possession and use of premises.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the question of admissibility of the unregistered lease deed and distinguished between the lease as a transfer of interest in immovable property and the collateral purpose of proving the use of the premises. It held that while the unregistered lease deed cannot be used to prove the lease itself, its contents, specifically clause 8, could be examined to determine the nature of the tenant's possession and the purpose of use, which is collateral to the lease.

The court found that from the inception of tenancy, the respondent had used the premises both as residence and clinic, supported by oral evidence and inspection reports. This dual use placed the case outside the scope of eviction under clause (e) of section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

The court also noted that the appellant-landlord's claim of bona fide requirement was undermined by evidence of his residence and employment in Calcutta and his son's employment in Bangkok, rendering the eviction petition mala fide. It declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the Additional Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appellant-landlord's second appeal, thereby upholding the dismissal of the eviction petition.

The direct consequence is that the respondent-tenant is entitled to continue possession of the premises, which have been used both for residence and professional purposes. The decision does not set any new precedent but affirms the principle that unregistered lease deeds may be examined for collateral purposes such as determining the use of premises, and that bona fide requirement claims must be supported by credible evidence of actual need and residence.

Show all summary ...

P.N Khanna, J.:— This is a landlord's second appeal directed against the judgment dated December 29, 1967 of the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, dismissing his appeal and confirming the Additional Controller's judgment dismissing his eviction petition under clause (e) of section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming the respondent's eviction on the ground that the premises in dispute were required bona fide by him for his own residence and the residence of the members of his family dependent on him, as being the owner thereof, he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

The premises in dispute were let out to the respondent in November, 1960. A deed of lease Marked ‘C’ was duly executed and admittedly signed by the parties, clause 8 of which reads as follows :—

“That the said premises shall be used for residential and clinic purpose and the tenant in no way will sublet, assign or part with possession of the same or a part thereof.”

The appellant alleged that due to certain family circumstances, he had to leave Delhi temporarily and to go Calcutta, when the premises were let to the respondent. His only son Ajit Banerjee had left for United States in September, 1960 for further studies. He returned after two years and wanted to stay in Delhi. The appellant also returned to Delhi in the later part of 1962. He, his wife and his son were, accordingly without accommodation. Appellant's wife could no longer live in Calcutta due to the damp and humid climate of that place, which did not suit her. The appellant also intended to marry his son which he could not do for want of accommodation. In reply the respondent stated, that the eviction petition was mala fide. The premises had been let out to him for residence and professional purposes, and had been used as such from the very inception of the tenancy. The respondent specifically mentioned and referred to the contents of the rent note dated November 2, 1960 executed between the parties. The eviction application, therefore, it was asserted, was not maintainable and the same was prayed to be dismissed. In the replication the appellant-landlord denied having let out the premises for residential as well as professional purposes. Contents of the rent note were not denied, although it was stated that there was no ‘legal, valid and binding rent note’. The rent note dated November 2, 1960 was said to be illegal and not admissible in evidence as the same was neither engrossed on a proper stamp paper nor registered according to law.

The Additional Controller came to the conclusion that the non-registration of the lease deed would not prevent the same from being looked into for the purposes of ascertaining the purpose for which the premises had been let out. According to its clause 8, the premises were let for the respondents residence-cum-clinic. From an appraisal of the oral evidence and the examination of the inspection report of the local commissioner appointed for the purpose, he concluded that it left no manner of doubt that ever since the creation of the tenancy the respondent-tenant had been using part of the premises as a clinic for professional purposes. It was under these circumstances that he found the case taken outside the provisions of clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. He was not impressed by the appellant's plea that he bona fide required the premises for his own residence, as the appellant was in service in an educational institution in Calcutta, where he had been living. The appellant's eviction petition was, therefore, dismissed.

In appeal, the learned Rent Control Tribunal noticed that despite respondent-tenant's specific reliance on the lease deed for proving the letting purpose of the premises as residential-cum-professional the appellant landlord took no exception to the correctness of its contents Clause 8 of the lease-deed, according to the Tribunal, was not an essential ingredient of the lease and as such could be looked into and relied upon as an admission made by the appellant-landlord for a collateral purpose. It further held that even though the respondent had his clinic in Chandni Chowk, Delhi, it did not prevent him from using the premises in dispute also as a clinic during the hours other than the hours at Chandni Chowk. The Tribunal was not impressed by the bona fides of the appellant-landlord. He, therefore, upheld the judgment of the Controller and dismissed the appeal with costs. Hence this second appeal by the appellant-landlord.

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the lease deed marked ‘C’ could not be looked into as it was not registered, although it was required by section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, and section 17 of the Registration Act, to be compulsorily registered. It could not be received in evidence for proving the letting purpose. It cannot be gainsaid that a lease deed is required to be registered under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 17 of the Registration Act. The deed marked ‘C’, being an unregistered document cannot be used to prove the existence of the lease, which is a transfer of the right to enjoy such property for certain time for consideration. Under the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document affecting the immovable property and required to be registered may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. According to the appellant's learned counsel, clause (c) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, requires the lessee to use the property for the purpose for which it was leased and not for any other purpose. This duty of the lessee was inherent in the lease itself and was, therefore, a part of the lease. The use to which the property can be put is not a collateral purpose, said the learned counsel, and if the document cannot be received in evidence of the transaction of lease, affecting the immovable property it cannot be relied upon to prove the purpose for which the property was leased, because the two are inseparable. This contention, however, is not well founded.

Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee and govern their relations inter se, in the absence of any contract or local usage to the contrary. It does not mean that the purpose for which the property is let is the lease itself, or that without specifying the purpose, the lease would not come into effect. The lease under section 105 of the Transfer for Property Act is a transfer of a right to enjoy property for a certain time or in perpetuity for certain consideration. The purpose for which it is created is something different from its creation itself. The lease otherwise valid, would not become ineffective, if the clause dealing with the purpose of the lease is missing. The purpose for which the premises were let, therefore, is collateral and not dependent upon the lease, nor does the lease depend upon it. The absence of registration would not prevent the admitted contents of clause 8 of the lease deed being seen for determining the purpose for which the property was let, which is a collateral transaction.

The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Martin v. Shea Ram Lal, ILR 4 Allahabad 232 (1882)(1), where it was held that the lease being unregistered, could not be received as evidence even for proving the lessor's liability thereunder. In Gurunath Shriniyas Desai v. Chanhassppa, ILR 18 Bombay 745(1893)(2), it was held that the clause by which the lessor agreed to indemnify the lessee in case he should incur any loss in consequence of the disputes between the lessor and his kinsmen could not be separated from the unregistered lease itself and the plaintiff's claim based thereon must, therefore, be rejected. In Sachindra Mohan Ghose v. Ramjash Aggarwala, AIR 1932 Patna 97(3), it was held that “to use the document for the purpose of proving an important clause in the lease is not using it for a collateral purpose.”

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on G. Balakishtiah v. B. Ranga Reddy, AIR 1960 AP 112,(4) where it was held that a ‘Kabuliat’ though unregistered is admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose of proving the admission contained therein. In Om Parkash v. Additional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna, AIR 1956 Patna 305,(5) it was held that the non-registration of the deed of agreement should not debar the petitioner from establishing the period for which the tenancy was created. In other words, it was held to be admissible to determine the nature of the tenancy, whether it was from month to month or for a specified period.

In Padma Vithoba Chakkayya v. Mohd. Multani & Another, AIR 1963 SC 70(6), a registered sale deed had an endorsement of cancellation on its back which however, was not registered. The Supreme Court held that the said endorsement of cancellation did not extinguish the vendee's title and was inadmissible in evidence, except to prove the character of the possession of the second vendee from the vendor, the second vendee having purchased after the said unregistered endorsement of cancellation of the first sale. There was no retransfer of title and the first transferees would in consequence continue to be the owners, but the endorsement taken along with the sale deed was admissible in evidence to show the character of possession, which was clearly adverse to the owners.

In Rama Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Ratiram, C.A No. 460 of 1966, decided on 28th June, 1969, (7) and reported in the Unreported Judgments (SC) 21 (1969), the Supreme Court again held that the defendant, in order to support his plea that his possession was that of a tenant, was entitled to rely on recitals contained in the unregistered agreement of lease, which otherwise was inadmissible to support his plea of a lease for 15 years. Shah J. speaking for the court observed: “A document required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property, but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts, or for any collateral purpose, that is for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property.”

In this case, the lease deed is not admissible in evidence to prove the lease or for showing the creation, declaration, assignment, limiting or the extinguishing of a right to immovable property; but it provides good evidence to prove the nature of the respondent-tenant's possession, that he is in possession of the premises in dispute for purposes of having his residence and carrying on his profession there. Clause 8 of the said deed, therefore, can be looked into for this purpose, which is only a collateral purpose.

The Additional Controller even after appraisal of the oral evidence came to the conclusion that from the very beginning of the lease, the tenant had been using the premises for residence and professional purposes. This conclusion was not varied by the Rent Control Tribunal. This is a concurrent finding of fact and this court would not interfere with the same. This would show that the premises were meant to be used both for residence and for the purposes of the respondent's clinic. The use of premises for professional purpose would take the case outside the provisions of clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appellant-landlord, therefore, is not entitled to rely on the ground specified in the said clause for claiming eviction of the respondent.

In view of the above, it is not necessary to go into the bona fides of the claim of the appellant-landlord for the premises for his personal residence or the residence of his son. But the inference in this regard as drawn by the Additional Controller and the Tribunal, appears to be correct on the basis of the appellant-landlord having accepted service in some educational institution in Calcutta where he is normally required to live and the appellant-landlord's son having accepted service in Bangkok. It was under these circumstances that the claim of the appellant-landlord was considered to be mala fide. The conclusions of the Tribunal are not unjustified. Under these circumstances, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

A.N.K Appeal dismissed.