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Jagan Nath v. Smt. Tribeni Devi

Delhi High Court
Mar 20, 1970
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (as contained in the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal was filed by the tenant, Jagan Nath, against the Rent Control Tribunal's judgment and order dated 6 March 1969 (Rent Control Appeal No. 691 of 1968) which reversed an earlier order of the Additional Rent Controller and directed eviction of the tenant under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Facts (as stated in the opinion): The disputed premises consist of three small rooms on the ground floor of House No. 504, Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. The property originally belonged to Shri Mukh Ram (purchased in 1937). Before his death he made a will (Exhibit A-3) leaving a limited estate to his wife, Shrimati Tribeni Devi, with full rights of ownership conferred on his grandsons. Tribeni Devi obtained Letters of Administration (Exhibits A-1, A-2).

The tenant executed a rent deed (Exhibit A-7) on 15 July 1942 in favour of Shri Mukh Ram and tenancy commenced from that date. In 1957 Tribeni Devi filed suit No. 156 of 1957 under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act seeking eviction alleging bona fide requirement by her and family, arrears of rent and water charges, and production of permission from the competent authority (Slum Areas). The tenant disputed the need for accommodation, claimed rent and water payments particulars, contended the petition was a partial eviction and otherwise challenged the petition.

Procedural history: - Additional Rent Controller (order dated 30 July 1968) held the landlady was owner in presenti and could sue, but dismissed the eviction on bona fide requirement ground while providing for recovery of arrears (tenant to pay arrears within one month or decree deemed passed). - The landlady appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal which, by order dated 6 March 1969, allowed the appeal and directed eviction under clause (e) of the proviso to s.14(1). - The tenant filed this second appeal to the High Court. A preliminary objection on limitation was raised and decided before the merits. The appeal was eventually dismissed on merits by the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second appeal was barred by limitation given the Tribunal's order dated 6 March 1969, the date the certified copy became available and the High Court's summer vacation — i.e., whether section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act applied when the High Court's notification kept its offices open during the vacation.
  2. Whether the Rent Control Tribunal was correct in holding that the landlady (Smt. Tribeni Devi) and members of her family bona fide required the premises in dispute for their personal occupation under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Tenant) — principal arguments recorded in the opinion

  • Limitation: Shri S.P. Aggarwal (for the appellant) argued that because the High Court was closed for summer vacation, the period of limitation which expired during that closure should be extended under section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act and the appeal could be filed on the date the Court re-opened (the Court re-opened on 12 July 1969). He also pointed out that the second appeal was in fact filed on 3 July 1969 (during vacation) and should therefore be treated as timely.
  • Merits: The tenant contended (in written statement) that the landlady had 11 living rooms and therefore did not genuinely require the rooms; that rent had been paid up to 31 December 1965; that the petition was for partial eviction and therefore incompetent; and that the petition was a device to increase rent.
  • On the specific substantive point the appellant argued that the actual purpose for which the landlady sought possession was not specified in the notice (Exhibit A-11) and there was no evidence that the family were accustomed to having drawing and dining rooms.

Respondent (Landlady) and other contested positions recorded in the opinion

  • Limitation: Shri S.L. Sethi (for the respondent) argued that because the High Court offices were kept open during the vacation (per the Court's notification), the Court could not be regarded as “closed” for purposes of section 4 of the Limitation Act; therefore the appeal should have been filed by 14 June 1969 and the second appeal was time-barred.
  • Merits (as advanced to and accepted by the Tribunal): The landlady asserted bona fide requirement of the premises for occupation by herself and family, supported by evidence describing the household composition, the existing accommodation and the lack of separate drawing/dining/study accommodation for family members and children.
  • Additional Rent Controller's view (as recorded): The Controller took the view that existing accommodation was sufficient; that two ground-floor rooms in disrepair could be renovated to meet needs; that Ramesh Chand (an Advocate) was not an income-tax assessee and that Beni Pershad's earnings were low (Rs. 200/month), suggesting the family did not need further accommodation.
  • Tribunal's counter: The Tribunal rejected the Controller's inferences about status and need, held the family’s requirement bona fide and found the asserted purposes reasonable in the context of the family’s circumstances and status.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tata Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Abdul Husain Hakim Ji, A.I.R. 1924 Bombay 144, 147 Cited in the context of authorities addressing whether a Court is "closed" for purposes of section 4 of the Limitation Act when its offices remain open during vacation. Referred to as one of several decisions taking a view relevant to the interpretation of closure under section 4; the Court noted conflicting precedents and did not adopt all of them but relied on the language of the local notification in this case.
Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Occhavlal Hagovindas Shah, A.I.R. 1927 Bombay 480 Cited regarding the same closure/section 4 issue. Noted as part of the body of conflicting authority; the Court declined to follow these precedents as determinative, preferring to interpret the local notification directly.
Bachivappa Modali v. Ayyasami Ayyar, I.L.R. 5 Madras 189 Cited on the “Court closed vs offices open” question under section 4 of the Limitation Act. Listed among decisions with differing views; the Court held that the particular language of the High Court notification governed the result in the present case.
British India Steam Navigation Co. v. H.M. Sharafally Marchand, A.I.R. 1923 Madras 435 Cited on the same point (closure under section 4). Included in the compilation of authorities; the Court emphasized resolving the issue by interpreting the notification text rather than resolving the inter-authority conflict exhaustively.
Ramani Raji Mohli v. Todapouri Maniah, A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 103 Cited in the discussion of section 4 of the Limitation Act and the effect of court vacation notices. Referred to as an authority in the wider debate; the Court’s decision did not turn on reconciling all such authorities but on the specific wording of the notification before it.
Petloh Muhammad v. Chothu Ram, A.I.R. 1921 Lahore 237 Cited regarding closure/section 4 analysis. Referred to as part of a group of cases reflecting divergent approaches; used to show there is precedent on both sides of the question.
Hira Lal v. Sojan Chand, A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 239 Cited in the same context (closure for limitation purposes). Placed among earlier decisions; the Court focused on the notification's language rather than resolving the line of authorities.
Babu Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Babu Girdhari Lal, A.I.R. 1939 Patna 667 Cited on the question whether a Court is 'closed' when offices are open. Noted as part of conflicting authorities; the Court relied on its own notification's words to decide the preliminary point.
Kishan Lal v. Tansukh Rai, A.I.R. 1941 Nagpur 261 Cited in discussion of closure under section 4. Referenced as one of the authorities with relevant views; the Court affirmed that the answer depends on the language used in the particular notification.
Akhtari Bibi v. Raj Laxmi Debi, 59 C.W.N. 684 Cited among cases on the closure/limitation question. Included in the list illustrating differing judicial approaches; the Court followed an interpretation of its notification that allowed section 4 to apply here.
Rambir Narhargir Gosai v. Prabhakar Bhaskar Gadhaway & Ors., A.I.R. 1955 Nagpur 300 Cited in the closure/limitation discussion. Mentioned as part of the authorities; the Court observed that decisions differ and resolved the matter by construing its own notification.
Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Chaman Dass (Unreported Division Bench, Criminal Appeal No.125 of 1967, pronounced 16 Aug 1969) Referred to in the debate about whether offices being open prevents the court from being 'closed' for limitation purposes. Referred to; the Court treated it as one among authorities and proceeded to interpret the notification specifically before it.
Kamla Soni v. Roop Lal, Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966 (pronounced 26 Sep 1969) Stated for the proposition that the question whether a landlady requires premises bona fide is a mixed question of law and fact. The Court relied on this proposition to frame the standard of review: the bona fide requirement is a mixed issue and must be decided on the facts of each case.
Vasdev Dhawan v. Triloki Nath, LXIX (1967) P.L.R. 261 (Delhi Section) Cited for the test of 'bona fide' requirement — whether the landlord genuinely desires possession, intends to occupy, and lacks collateral motive. Adopted as a guiding test; the Court applied the test to the facts and accepted the Tribunal's finding of bona fide requirement.
Om Parkash Singal v. Roshan Lal Khanna, 1969 D.L.T. 366 Quoted for the interpretation of “bona fide” in proviso (e): meaning genuine good faith and absence of intent to deceive; landlord's assessment to be considered in context. Used to support the conclusion that bona fide requirement should be tested against the landlord's status and circumstances and that such findings are ordinarily to be upheld.
Panju Mal v. Smt. S.L. Keshwari, 1969 D.L.T. 264 Cited for the proposition that the phrase “bona fide requires” must be assessed by reference to relevant facts, status and circumstances; bona fides is crucial and broadly a question of fact. Applied to emphasize the Court's deferential approach to factual findings about bona fide requirement and to uphold the Tribunal's conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two main stages of legal analysis: (A) the limitation (preliminary) issue, and (B) the merits concerning bona fide requirement under clause (e) of the proviso to s.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

A. Limitation / Preliminary Objection (section 4, Limitation Act)

  1. The Tribunal's order was pronounced on 6 March 1969. The certified copy was obtained by the appellant after applying on 17 March 1969 and was ready on 26 April 1969. The statutory period for filing a second appeal under section 39 of the Rent Control Act was 60 days; the last day to file was 14 June 1969.
  2. The second appeal was actually filed on 3 July 1969. The High Court had issued a Notification that it would be closed for summer vacation from 2 June 1969 to 11 July 1969 (both days inclusive) and would resume sittings from 14 July 1969; the offices of the Court, however, would remain open to receive petitions and other filings "as they may choose to present."
  3. Counsel for the appellant relied on section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act which allows suits, appeals or applications whose prescribed period expires on a date when the Court is closed to be instituted on the date the Court re-opens. Counsel contended that the High Court was closed for vacation until 11 July and re-opened on 12 July, so filings could be made on reopening without being time-barred.
  4. Counsel for the respondent argued that the offices remained open and therefore the Court could not be regarded as "closed" for purposes of section 4; thus the appeal should have been filed by 14 June 1969.
  5. The Court interpreted the Notification: the first paragraph plainly stated the High Court was closed for summer vacation from 2 June to 11 July 1969. The second paragraph that the offices would remain open and accept filings used the words "as they may choose" which the Court read as leaving the choice to parties to file during the vacation if they wished, but not negating the vacation closure for the purpose of section 4.
  6. The Court concluded that the High Court was "closed" within the meaning of section 4 of the Limitation Act during the stated period, and that suits, appeals or applications whose period expired during that period could be instituted on the date the Court reopened (the Court determined that date to be 12 July 1969 for the purposes of limitation). On that basis the preliminary objection was rejected and the second appeal was held to have been filed within time.
  7. The Court reviewed authorities with divergent views on the effect of offices being open but decided the question in the present case by construing the specific language of its own notification rather than resolving the conflict of authorities at large.

B. Merits — Bona fide requirement under clause (e) proviso to s.14(1) Delhi Rent Control Act

  1. The Court identified the sole substantive issue as whether the Tribunal was correct in finding that Smt. Tribeni Devi and her family bona fide required the small room and two kothas occupied by the tenant.
  2. The Court set out the material family facts from the evidence: occupants living in the house at the time of application included Tribeni Devi (about 70 years old), Beni Pershad (wife and three children), and Ramesh Chand (wife and one child). Roshan Lal was missing and two other children lived away. The house plan (Exhibit A-10) and allocations of rooms were recorded: the tenant occupied a small room and two kothas on the ground floor; one room and one kotha were in disrepair; Ramesh Chand used two ground-floor rooms as an office; other floor allocations were described in detail.
  3. The Additional Rent Controller had found accommodation sufficient and suggested that dis-repaired rooms could be renovated; also drew attention to Ramesh Chand not paying income-tax and Beni Pershad's modest income. On that basis the Controller denied bona fide requirement.
  4. The Tribunal, however, found that the Controller's inferences were unsound: an Advocate does not lose status merely because not an income-tax assessee; renovation of dis-repaired rooms was not a satisfactory solution; evidence showed the family was respectable, lacked separate drawing/dining/study accommodation and had school-going children without separate study rooms; the landlady was aged and had previously vacated portions and not re-let them — all consistent with a genuine desire to occupy the disputed portions.
  5. The Court articulated the legal standards invoked: it accepted that the question of bona fide requirement is a mixed question of law and fact (citing Kamla Soni v. Roop Lal) and repeated the Vasdev Dhawan test — the Controller must determine whether the landlord genuinely desires possession, intends to occupy, and lacks any collateral or ulterior motive or device.
  6. The Court evaluated the Tribunal's findings against those legal standards and the evidence. It concluded the Tribunal's finding that the requirement was bona fide was supported by evidence and was not fanciful, unreasonable or a device. The Court therefore held that the Tribunal's factual finding did not call for interference in a second appeal under section 39 of the Rent Control Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is dismissed. The High Court upheld the Rent Control Tribunal's order directing eviction of the tenant on the ground that the landlady and members of her family bona fide required the premises.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Tribunal's order directing eviction under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act stands.
  • However, the landlady is not entitled to obtain possession of the portion in the occupation of the appellant before 20 September 1970, pursuant to sub-section (7) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (as stated in the opinion).
  • The parties were directed to bear their own costs in this second appeal.

No suggestion is made in the provided opinion that the Court intended to lay down any new general precedent; the decision applies established principles to the facts and upholds the Tribunal's factual finding on bona fide requirement.


Source: Summary constructed strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or legal propositions beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion have been invented or inferred.

Show all summary ...

T.V.R Tatachari, J.:— This Second Appeal has been filed by Jagan Nath, a tenant, against the judgment and order of Shri M.L Jain, Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, dated 6th March, 1969, in Rent Control Appeal No. 691 of 1968, whereby the Tribunal reversed the order of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, and directed the eviction of the appellant from the premises in dispute under the provision in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

The premises in dispute consists of 3 small rooms on the ground floor of House No. 504 situate in Katra Neel, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, which originally belonged to one Shri Mukh Ram. It was purchased by Shri Mukh Ram in the year 1937. Before his death, Shri Mukh Ram made a will, a copy of which is Exhibit A-3, whereby the house in question, along with other properties, was bequeathed to his wife, Shrimati Tribeni Devi, as a limited estate, while full rights of ownership were conferred on his grandsons. Shrimati Tribeni Devi obtained Letters of Administration on the basis of the will. It was provided in the will that Shrimati Tribeni Devi should be the owner in possession of the property, that she would not be entitled to dispose of it, that after the death of Shrimati Tribeni Devi all the four sons of the testator would be co-owners in equal shares, but they would also not be entitled to sell or mortgage or dispose it of in any other way, and that the grandsons of the testator should have the right of disposal over the property. The order granting the Letters of Administration is Exhibit A-1, dated 13th October, 1947, and a copy of the Letters of Administration is Exhibit A-2.
The appellant, Jagan Nath, executed a rent deed (Exhibit A-7) in respect of the three rooms in dispute on 15th July, 1942, in favour of Shri Mukh Ram, and the tenancy thus commenced from that date. Shrimati Tribeni Devi filed a petition, registered as suit No. 156 of 1957, in the Court of Shri D.C Aggarwal, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act praying for the eviction of the appellant from the said rooms. It was stated in the application that the rent was Rs. 5 per month. It was alleged that the premises were required bona fide for occupation by her and the members of her family, that the appellant had not paid rent from Ashar Badi 1 Samwat 2021, that water charges were also in arrears, that a total sum of Rs. 438.79 paise was due from the appellant and that permission from the Competant Authority (Slum Areas) had been obtained. The appellant filed a written statement in which he pleaded that the rent was Rs. 5 per month, that the water charges were being paid at Rs. 2.50 paise per month, that the premises were not required by the landlady or the members of her family inasmuch as she had 11 living rooms with her, that rent up to 31st December, 1965, had been paid, that the petition was for a partial eviction and as such was not competent, and that the petition was filed in order to invent an excuse for increasing the rent, and may be rejected.
The Additional Rent Controller, by his order, dated 30th July, 1968, held that Shrimati Tribeni Devi was the owner “in presenti” and could, therefore, institute the petition for eviction, that the accommodation already in possession of Shrimati Tribeni Devi and the members of her family was quite sufficient for a family of their status in society, and that the prayer for eviction could not be granted on the ground of bona fide requirement for occupation by Shrimati Tribeni Devi and the members of her family under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. As regards the arrears of rent, the Additional Rent Controller held that the landlady was entitled to recover rent with effect from Ashar Badi Ekam Samwat 2021 and the appellant herein should pay the balance of the rent within one month from the date of the order failing which a decree under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act would be deemed to have been passed against him. He rejected the plea of the tenant that the petition for eviction as for partial eviction. In the result, while holding that the eviction petition failed on the ground of personal requirement, the Additional Rent Controller passed an order that in case the appellant herein pays the balance of the rent within one month, the petition for eviction would be deemed to have been dismissed wholly, and that otherwise an order of eviction would be deemed to have been passed against him under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Rent Control Act.
Against that order, Shrimati Tribeni Devi preferred an appeal, Rent Control Appeal No. 691 of 1968, to the Court of Shri M.L Jain, Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi. It appears that the arrears of rent were paid by the tenant as required by the order of the Additional Rent Controller. So, the only question that remained to be considered was as regards the bona fide requirement of the landlady. The Tribunal, by an order, dated 6th March, 1969, held that the landlady was in bona fide requirement of the rooms in dispute, and the appellant herein was, therefore, liable to be evicted from the same under clause (e) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act. The Tribunal accordingly allowed the appeal and directed the eviction of the appellant herein from the rooms in question. It is against that order that the present second Appeal has been preferred to this Court by the tenant, Jagan Nath.
Shri S.L Sethi, learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the second appeal was barred by limitation. For a proper appreciation of the objection, a few dates have to be mentioned. The order of the Tribunal was pronounced on 6th March, 1969. The appellant filed an application for a certified copy of the judgment and order of the Tribunal on 17th March, 1969, and the certified copy was ready on 26th April, 1969. The period of limitation for filing a second appeal under section 39 of the Rent Control Act was 60 days, and it is common ground that the last date on which the second appeal was to be filed was 14th June, 1969. The second appeal was filed on 3rd July, 1969. The High Court was closed from 2nd June, 1969, for summer vacation and was re-opened on 12th July, 1969. According to Shri S.P Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellant, since the last date for filing the second appeal fell during the vacation, the second appeal could be filed on 12th July, 1969, the date on which the High Court re-opened, and in fact the second appeal was filed even on 3rd July, 1969 i.e, during the vacation itself, and therefore the second appeal should be held to have been filed within time. On the other hand, according to Shri Sethi, although the High Court was stated to have been closed for summer vacation, the office of the High Court was kept open for filing of appeals etc., and therefore there was nothing standing in the way of the appellant for filing his appeal, and the second appeal should have been filed on 14th June, 1969, itself. Shri Sethi referred to the notification which was issued regarding the closure of the High Court for summer vacation. It runs as follows :—
“High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.
Notification
No. 92.Genl./III, A3 dated, New Delhi, the 16th November, 1968.
It is hereby notified for general information that the High Court of Delhi shall remain closed for summer vacation from Monday the 2nd June, 1969, to Friday the 11th July, 1969, both days inclusive. The Court will resume its sittings from Monday the 14th July, 1969.
The offices of the Court will remain open during the period and will receive from parties or persons such petitions and other filings as they may choose to present. All petitions and applications falling under the Civil Jurisdiction of the Court, as cannot be disposed of at once, will be posted on a date after the re-opening of the court. Criminal appeal applications etc. shall continue to be heard during this period.
By Order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice
and Judges of the Court.
Sd./- Guru Datta,
Registrar.”
The first paragraph in the Notification stated that the High Court of Delhi would remain closed from Monday the 2nd June 1969 to Friday the 11th July, 1969, both days inclusive, and that it would resume its sittings from Monday the 14th July, 1969. The High Court was thus “Closed” from 2nd June, 1969, and it was re-opened on Saturday, the 12th July, 1969. The reference to the resumption of the sittings from Monday the 14th July 1969, was made to indicate that the actual sittings of the High Court would be resumed from Monday the 14th July, 1969, as the High Court does not sit for hearing cases on Saturday. Shri Aggarwal, therefore, contended that for purposes of limitation the High Court should be regarded to have been closed till 11th July, 1969, and to have been re-opened on 12th July, 1969, and that by virtue of the provision in section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963, the second appeal could be filed even on 12th July, 1969, without any bar of limitation. The said section provides as follows :—
“Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the date when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted preferred or made on the date when the Court re-opens.”
Shri Aggarwal submitted that the second paragraph in the Notification, however, stated that the “offices” of the Court would remain open during the period of vacation and would receive from parties or persons such petitions and other filings as they may choose to present, and that was why the second appeal was filed on 3rd July, 1969, even though it could be filed on 12th July, 1969. On the other hand, Shri Sethi argued that since the offices of the Court were open throughout the period of vacation, the High Court cannot be said to have been closed within the meaning of section 4 of the Limitation Act, and no party or person who wanted to institute, prefer or make any suit appeal or application could claim the benefit of section 4 of the Act and postpone the institution etc. till the date of the re-opening of the High Court, if the period of limitation for such suit etc. had expired on an earlier date during the vacation. According to him, if the last date of limitation for the institution etc. of any suit, appeal or application fell within the period of the vacation, the institution should have been made on that date and could not be postponed till the date of the re-opening of the High Court. The contention of Shri Sethi cannot be accepted. The first paragraph of the notification clearly states that the High Court was closed during the period from 2nd June, 1969 to 11th July, 1969. No doubt, the second paragraph of the notification states that the offices of the High Court would remain open and would receive from parties or persons such petitions and other filings as they may choose to present. Reading the two paragraphs together, it is clear that while the High Court was closed for summer vacation from 2nd June, 1969, to 11th July, 1969 both days inclusive it was open to parties or persons who wanted to file any suit or appeal or application to do so during the vacation, if they so choose. The words “as they may choose” used in the second paragraph are significant. The said words left the choice to the parties to file any suit or appeal or application during the period of the vacation. Apparently, the idea was to provide facilities to parties or persons who wished to file any suit, appeal or application during the vacation either for obtaining urgent orders or for avoiding the risk involved in waiting till the date of reopening or for the sake of convenience. In my opinion, [the effect of the Notification was that the High Court was closed within the meaning of section 4 of the Limitation Act from 2nd June, 1969, to 11th July, 1969, and any suit, appeal or application for which the prescribed period of limitation expired on a date during this period could be instituted, preferred or made on the date on which the High Court reopened i.e on 12th July, 1969] Reference was made by Shri Sethi to Tata Industrial Bank Limited v. Abdul Husain Hakim Ji, A.I.R 1924 Bombay, 144, 147,(1) Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Occhavlal Hagovindas Shah, A.I.R 1927 Bombay 480(2), Bachivappa Modali v. Ayyasami Ayyar, I.L.R 5 Madras 189, 193 (3). The British India Steam Navigation Co. v. H.M Sharafally Marchand, A.I.R 1923 Madras 435(4), Ramani Raji Mohli v. Todapouri Maniah A.I.R 1959 A.P 103(5), Petloh Muhammad v. Chothu Ram, A.I.R 1921 Lahore 237, 238 (6), Hira Lal v. Sojan Chand, A.I.R 1933 Lahore 239(7), Babu Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Babu Girdhari Lal, A.I.R 1939 Patna 667(8), Kishan Lal v. Tansukh Rai, A.I.R, 1941 Nagpur 261 (9), Akhtari Bibi v. Raj Laxmi, Debi, 59 C.W.N 684(10), and Rambir Narhargir Gosai v. Prabhakar Bhaskar Gadhaway and others, A.I.R 1955 Nagpur 300.(11). An un-reported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court (Hardayal Hardy and Jagjit Singh, JJ.) in Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Chaman Dass, Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1967(12), pronounced on 16th August, 1969, was also referred to by Mr. Sethi. In some of the decisions, the view was taken that if the “offices” of the Court remained opened during the relevant period, the “Court” could not be regarded as closed for purposes of section 4 of the Limitation Act. A different view was taken in the other decisions. Whether a Court is closed or not for the purposes of section 4 of the Limitation Act has to be decided in each case according to the language used in the Notification issued by the High Court. It is not necessary to consider the above decisions in detail in the view taken by me regarding the interpretation of the Notification issued by this Court in the present case, that the words “as they may choose” meant that the Court would be closed during the period mentioned in the Notification for all purposes including that of limitation but that the offices of the Court would, however, remain open to receive petitions and other filings, so as to enable parties to file petitions etc. if they so choose for any reason. The preliminary objection is, therefore, rejected, the second appeal is held to have been filed within the period of limitation.
Coming now to the merits of the case, the only question which arises for consideration in this second appeal, as already stated, is as to whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the premises in dispute was bona fide required by Smt. Tribeni Devi and the members of her family for their occupation. It appears from the evidence that Smt. Tribeni Devi has four sons, namely, Beni Pershad, Ramesh Chand, Roshan Lal and Daya Krishan, and a daughter named Maya Devi. Beni Pershad has his wife and three children. Ramesh Chand has his wife and one child. It appear that Roshan Lal has been missing since 1958 and nothing has been heard of his since then. Daya Krishan is employed in Banaras University. Maya Devi was married and has been living in Banaras. Thus the persons in the house-hold of Smt. Tribeni Devi who were residing in the house No. 504 on the date of her application for eviction were Tribeni Devi, Beni Pershad, his wife and three children, and Ramesh Chand his wife and one child. A plan of the house has been filed as Exhibit A-10. It shows that there are three rooms, one small room and three kothas on the ground floor, three rooms and four kothas on the first floor, and one room and two kothas on the second floor. Out of the rooms and kothas on the ground floor, the appellant, Jagan Nath, has been in occupation of the small room and two kothas. One room and one kotha are stated to have been in a state of dis-repair and unfit for being used for residential purposes. Shri Ramesh Chand, who is an Advocate has been using the remaining two rooms on the ground floor as his office. As regards the first floor, Shri Ramesh Chand, his wife and child have been using one room and one kotha, while Shri Beni Pershad, his wife and three children have been using the remaining two rooms and three kothas. As regards the second floor, Smt. Tribeni Devi has been using the room and the two kothas on the second floor. The Additional Rent Controller took the view that the accommodation which was already in the possession of Smt. Tribeni Devi and the members of her family was quite sufficient for them, and they were not in genuine need of any further accommodation. It appears to have been argued before him that the family had no drawing and dining rooms, and that the small room and the two kothas which the appellant has been in occupation could be converted into and used by the family as a drawing-cum-dining room. The Additional Rent Controller observed that if the two rooms, marked as ‘P’ and ‘Q’, on the ground floor which have been in a state of disrepair are got repaired and renovated, they could be used for the purpose for which the family need accommodation. He also added that Shri Ramesh Chand was not paying any income-tax, while his brother Shri Beni Pershad was earning only Rs. 200/- per month, and that a family of their status did not need any further accommodation. On the other hand, the Tribunal took the view that an Advocate does not lose his status of being a respectable person merely because he is not an income-tax assessee and that the suggestion of the Additional Rent Controller that if the room and the kotha which have been in a state of dis-repair are renovated they could be used by the family for the purpose for which they wanted further accommodation was not correct. The Tribunal, on a consideration of the circumstances and the evidence in the case come to the conclusion that Smt. Tribeni Devi and the members of her family required bona fide further accommodation. The question as to whether the landlady required bona fide further accommodation for occupation by her and the members of her family is no doubt a mixed question of law and fact as observed by the Supreme Court in Kamla Soni v. Roop Lal, Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966, pronounced on 26th September 1969. But, the question has to be considered and decided according to the facts in each case. It is true that the need of the landlady and the members of her family is not to be unreasonable or fanciful. But, in the present case the requirement of further accommodation by Smt. Tribeni Devi and the members of her family for their personal occupation cannot be regarded as either fanciful or unreasonable. Shri Aggarwal argued that the actual purpose was not specified in the notice (Ex. A-11) issued to the appellant by the landlady, and that there was no evidence to show that the landlady and members of her family were accustomed to having a dining room and a drawing room. The argument has no force. There is no legal requirement that the actual purpose for which the landlady would use or utilise the portion in the occupation of the tenant should be specified in the notice issued by her. Nor is it reasonable to suggest that because the family was not accustomed to being a dining room and a drawing room previously, they should continue with their old habit and should not cultivate a new habit of setting apart a portion of the house for using the same as drawing and dining room or rooms. Shri Ramesh Chand is an Advocate and, as pointed out by the Tribunal, his status and respectability cannot be regarded as any the less merely because he was not an income-tax assessee. The desire of the landlady and the members of her family to have a drawing room and a dining room cannot be said to be an unreasonable or whimsical or capricious desire. It is in the evidence of A.W.3 and A.W.7 that the family is a respectable family, and that the members of the family have no separate drawing room and dining room, and they require the portion in dispute as the accommodation is not sufficient. Further, the landlady is stated to be aged about 70 years, and it is admitted by R.W.1 that she comes down from the second floor when it is hot. It is also in the evidence of A.W.1, A.W.3 and A.W.7 that the children of Shri Beni Pershad are school-going children and have no separate study room. Thus, the plea of the landlady that the portion in the occupation of the appellant is required by her and the members of her family for their occupation cannot be regarded as not bona fide. This is also borne out by the fact that she got vacated three portions earlier, and did not let them out again.
As pointed out by me in Vasdev Dhawan v. Triloki Nath, LXIX (1967) P.L.R 261 (Delhi Section).(13).
“In deciding the question as regards the bona fide nature of the requirement of the landlord, the Controller has to see whether the landlord, in fact, desires possession and genuinely intends to occupy the premises in question, whether there is no collateral or ulterior object in getting the premises vacated, and whether the alleged requirement is not a device or a subterfuge.”
In Om Parkash Singal v. Roshan Lal Khanna, 1969 D.L.T 366(14) I.D Dua, CJ, observed as follows :—
“The word “bona fide” as used in proviso (e) has been considered judiciously in a number of decisions and this interpretation is no longer in controversy. It means, genuinely or in good faith and it conveys an idea of absence of intent to deceive. If the owner-landlord is not considered to be seeking eviction on false pretext of acquiring additional accommodation with some collateral purpose or oblique motive and his requirement cannot be considered to be inspired by a pure fanciful whim, the plea of bona fide requirement put forth by the landlord-owner deserves ordinarily to be upheld. As a broad workable rule, the landlord must be left to assess his requirements in the background of his position, circumstances, status in life and social and other responsibilities and other relevant factors.”
Again, in Panju Mal v. Smt. S.L Keshwari, 1969 D.L.T 264(15) I.D Dua, CJ, held as follows :—
“The expression “bona fide requires” has been used designedly. Neither the word “desires” nor the word “needs” has been used and this should negative the two extreme views which are not infrequently canvassed in cases arising under this clause. Mere desire or absolute need or necessity are both erroneous approaches on the plain language of this provision. For the purpose of finding the bona fide requirement of the landlord, all relevant facts and circumstances including his status, position, social obligations, etc. have to be taken into account as reasonably influencing the individual landlord's requirements. It is neither feasible nor desirable, and indeed I find it highly impracticable to exhaustively enumerate such facts and circumstances as may apply to all cases, serving as a straight jacket because each individual landlord has his own problems and requirements. His bona fides seems to me to be the crucial test and this, broadly speaking, must be a question of fact in each case.”
The Tribunal has found that Smt. Tribeni Devi and the members of her family required bona fide the small room and the two kothas in the occupation of the appellant for their personal occupation. The said finding cannot be regarded as one which calls for interference by this Court in second appeal under section 39 of the Rent Control Act. The second appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The landlady, however, shall not be entitled to obtain possession of the portion of the premises in the occupation of the appellant before 20th September. 1970, as provided in sub-section (7) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this second appeal.
A.B.S Appeal dismissed.