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B.D Sethi & Another Petitioners v. V.P Dewan & State S

Delhi High Court
Nov 12, 1970
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (V.D. Misra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

V.P. Dewan filed a complaint under section 500, Indian Penal Code, against Banarasi Dass Sethi and Raj Kumar Sethi. The Magistrate issued process. On 13 February 1967, the complainant was absent; the Magistrate dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, recording that the case was dismissed as it was compoundable and non-cognizable. Shortly after that order the complainant appeared and applied for restoration; the Magistrate accepted the application and passed an ex parte order reviving the case and directing that the accused be summoned for 3-3-1967.

The accused filed a revision petition against the revival order to the Court of Session. The learned Additional Sessions Judge recommended that the ex parte order reviving the complaint and summoning the accused be set aside. Because of conflicting opinions among various High Courts on the legal question, the matter was brought before the present Bench for authoritative pronouncement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Magistrate has jurisdiction to revive a complaint, dismissed for default of appearance of the complainant, and to re-summon an accused who has been discharged under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  2. Whether an order dismissing a complaint and discharging an accused under section 259 Cr.P.C. amounts to a "judgment" within Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and hence whether the Magistrate becomes functus officio after making such an order).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • After pronouncing the order dismissing the complaint and discharging the accused, the Magistrate became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to review or revive that order.
  • Once the Magistrate had pronounced the judgment (as contended), he could only correct clerical errors; he could not re-open the matter. The only remedy open to the complainant would be to file a fresh complaint and proceed from section 200 Cr.P.C. onwards.

State's Arguments

  • The order dismissing the complaint and discharging the accused under section 259 Cr.P.C. was not a "judgment" within the meaning of Chapter XXVI and therefore the Magistrate retained jurisdiction to revive the complaint and re-summon the accused.
  • Reference was made to Chapter XXVI provisions (sections 366–370, particularly section 367 and section 369) to show what a judgment should contain (points for determination, decision, reasons) and that the protective rule against alteration of signed judgments (section 369) applies to judgments in the Chapter, not to every order passed by a Magistrate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 43 Held that "judgment in a criminal case means a judgment of conviction or acquittal." Relied on to support the view that a judgment denotes final determination (conviction/acquittal) and thus orders of discharge/dismissal are not "judgments" under Chapter XXVI.
Emperor v. China Kaliappa Goundon, (1906) 28 Mad. 126 Earlier Madras High Court authority on what amounts to a judgment (approved in Dr. Hori Ram Singh). Noted as approved authority forming part of the reasoning that judgment implies final order of conviction or acquittal.
Emperor v. Maheshwara Kondaya, (1908) 31 Mad. 543 Another Madras decision on the meaning of "judgment" (approved in Dr. Hori Ram Singh). Used as supporting precedent for the same proposition that "judgment" indicates final order terminating in conviction/acquittal.
Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1 Held that "judgment" is a judicial decision on the merits and cannot cover preliminary or interlocutory orders. Adopted to distinguish interlocutory or summary orders from judgments signed under Chapter XXVI.
Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni Madhab, I.L.R. 28 Cal. 652 (Full Bench) Held that an order of discharge is not a "judgment" within Chapter XXVI; judgment implies final determination (conviction/acquittal). Relied upon as a direct authority for treating orders of discharge/dismissal as not amounting to a judgment.
Raghubans Prasad & another v. State, A.I.R. 1961 Patna 397 Held that not every order of a Magistrate is a "judgment" under section 369; summary/discharge orders passed without full consideration of merits do not amount to judgment. Adopted to support the conclusion that an order of discharge is not final and therefore not a "judgment."
Harbai v. Raya Premji and another, A.I.R. 1939 Sind 193 (Full Bench) Followed the view that an order of discharge did not amount to judgment. Noted as part of the line of authorities supporting the non-judgment character of discharge orders.
Rayappa and others v. Shivamma, A.I.R. 1964 Mysore 1 Held similarly that the order of discharge did not amount to judgment. Included among authorities relied on to conclude discharge orders are not judgments.
State v. Prakash Chandra Agarwalla, A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 171 Followed decisions that an order of discharge is not a judgment. Used as consistent authority supporting the Court's view.
Bajrang Singh v. Ram Kishan & another, A.I.R. 1967 Pb. 361 Held (Single Bench, Punjab) that a Magistrate has no power to revive a complaint dismissed in default under section 259 Cr.P.C. Considered by the Court but distinguished: the judgment did not discuss the broader authorities and did not address whether the dismissal under section 259 amounted to a "judgment". The present Court found it not determinative.
Babu Ram v. Ramji Lal & others, A.I.R. 1964 Pb. 444 Related to proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C.; held a Magistrate had no jurisdiction to review the dismissal for absence in that context (per that Single Bench). Distinguished: involved section 145 proceedings and did not settle the broader question under section 259 Cr.P.C.
Shakuntla Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1208 Held that a Sessions Judge was not competent to alter or review his judgment once signed except to correct a clerical error (section 369 cited). Referred to by prior Single Bench in Punjab decisions; the present Court noted the distinction between judgments signed under Chapter XXVI and interlocutory or summary orders.
Bhagwan Sahai v. Moti Lal, A.I.R. 1953 All. 402 Referenced in earlier decisions but did not decide whether discharge under section 259 Cr.P.C. amounts to a judgment. Noted that the authority did not address the crucial question on section 259, hence of limited help.
Keshav Lal v. Gaveria, A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 50 Involved restoration of proceedings but did not concern discharge under section 259 Cr.P.C. Held to be of no assistance on the specific question before the Court.
Ava Singh v. Arjan Dass, Criminal Revision No. 33 of 1968 (unreported, decided 19-2-1968) Involved dismissal in a summons-case governed by Chapter XX (section 247); dismissal there resulted in acquittal under section 247. Distinguished: the decision was not directly on section 259 and the observations regarding section 259 were treated as obiter dicta; thus not helpful to petitioners.
Mirza Mohd. Afzal Beg & others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, A.I.R. 1960 J. & K. 1 (Full Bench) Held that interlocutory orders are not absolutely binding and a Magistrate may pass a different order later; the principle applicable to judgments does not apply to interlocutory matters. Relied on to support the proposition that Magistrates may reconsider interlocutory or non-final orders (such as discharge under section 259) and pass a different order subsequently.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure (sections 366–370, especially section 367 and section 369) as the statutory context for the meaning and effect of a "judgment." Section 367 prescribes the contents of a judgment (points for determination, decision on those points, reasons) and section 369 bars alteration or review of a signed judgment except to correct clerical errors.

Interpreting those provisions, the Court observed that the Code does not expressly define "judgment," but section 367's content requirements indicate that a judgment must record a judicial decision on the merits that results in either conviction or acquittal. The Court relied on Federal Court and High Court authorities (including Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor and Kuppuswami Rao v. The King) to support the proposition that "judgment" in a criminal case ordinarily denotes a final order of conviction or acquittal and does not include preliminary or interlocutory orders.

The Court then examined a line of High Court decisions (Dwarka Nath Mondul, Raghubans Prasad, and others) which held that an order of discharge or dismissal of complaint does not constitute a "judgment" under Chapter XXVI. The Court noted several decisions and identified those that followed the view that discharge orders are not final judgments, as well as earlier Single Bench decisions that took the contrary view (e.g., Bajrang Singh and Babu Ram). The Court analyzed these contrary decisions and found that some did not discuss the authorities that define "judgment" or were decided in different statutory contexts (for example, Babu Ram involved section 145 proceedings and was not directly on point with section 259).

The Court emphasized that so long as an order is not a "judgment" or final order, nothing in the Code prohibits the Magistrate from reconsidering it or from entertaining a fresh application seeking the same relief on the same facts. Magistrates routinely make interlocutory orders (e.g., exempting presence, refusing bail, summoning witnesses) which may be revisited as proceedings evolve. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Mirza Mohd. Afzal Beg (J. & K.) for the proposition that interlocutory orders are not immutable and may be altered at a later stage by the Magistrate.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that an order discharging an accused under section 259 Cr.P.C. does not amount to a "judgment" under Chapter XXVI. Therefore, the Magistrate retained jurisdiction to set aside the discharge, revive the complaint, and re-summon the accused.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that an order of discharge under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not amount to a "judgment" under Chapter XXVI. Consequently, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to revive a complaint dismissed for the complainant's default and to re-summon an accused after setting aside the order of discharge.

Implications and practical consequences:

  • The recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge to set aside the Magistrate's revival order was rejected by this Court.
  • The immediate, direct effect ordered by the Court was that the parties appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 30th November, 1970.
  • The opinion resolves the specific dispute by treating dismissal/discharge under section 259 as non-final/interlocutory for the purpose of Chapter XXVI protections on judgments; it thus permits Magistrates to revisit and, where appropriate, revive such proceedings.

The opinion does not explicitly state that it establishes a broader, new precedent beyond the Court's authoritative conclusion in this matter; it primarily resolves the question presented and directs further proceedings before the Magistrate.

Order: Recommendations of the Additional Sessions Judge are not accepted. Parties to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 30th November, 1970. — A.N.K. "Order accordingly."
Show all summary ...

V.D Misra, J.:— The short question to be decided in this case is has the Magistrate jurisdiction to revive the complaint which has been dismissed for default of appearance of the complaint and resummon the accused who has been discharged under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ?

V.P Dewan complainant had filed a complaint under section 500, Indian Penal Code, against Banarasi Dass Sethi and Raj Kumar Sethi and the Magistrate issued process against the accused. On February 13, 1967, which was one of the dates of hearing before the Magistrate, the the complainant was absent with the result that the Magistrate dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and passed the following short order :

“Accused with counsel present. Complainant has not appeared despite repeated calls. It is now 2-15 P.M The case is under section 500, Indian Penal Code, which is compoundable and non-cognizable. The case is dismissed under section 259, Criminal Procedure Code. Accused are discharged.”

Shortly after the order had been passed the complainant appeared and made an application for restoration of the case, which was accepted and the following ex parte order was passed :—

“The case is revived. Let the accused be summoned for 3-3-1967.”

The accused filed a revision petition against the order reviving the complaint to the Court of session. The learned Additional Sessions Judge made a recommendation to this Court that the said ex parte order reviving the complaint and summoning the accused be set aside.

When this matter came up before one of us it was found that there was a conflict of opinion on this question between various High Courts and it was desirable that pronouncement by larger Bench of this Court be had on this question. It is in these circumstances that the matter has come up before us.

The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Magistrate, after he had pronounced his judgment dismissing the complaint and discharging the accused, had no jurisdiction to review the same and revive the complaint. According to the learned counsel, the Magistrate had become functus officio after pronouncing the judgment and could not review the same and could correct clerical errors only. It is thus contended that the only remedy open to the complainant was to make a fresh complaint and request the Magistrate for fresh proceedings under section 200 onwards of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The learned counsel for the State contends that the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint and discharging the accused under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not a “judgment’ and thus the Court had jurisdiction to revive the complaint and resummon the accused. Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with “judgment”. section 366 of the code deals with the mode of delivering judgment by a Criminal Court. Section 367 of the Code deals with the language of the judgment and contents of the same. It lays down that unless otherwise expressly provided by this Code, the judgment will contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision and shall also be signed and dated by the Presiding Officer in open Court at the time of pronouncing it. section 368 of the code deals with the sentence of death. section 369 of the code lays down that no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical error. The rest of the sections in this Chapter are not relevant for our purposes.

The Code of Criminal Procedure does not anywhere define what judgment is. However, section 367 of the code lays down as to what shall be the contents of a judgment. According to this section, the judgment should contain the point or points for determination in the case before the Court and the decision on those points. The Court is also required to give reasons why it has reached a particular conclusion. It is only when these requirements are fulfilled that a particular order may be called a judgment. section 370 of the code makes a special provision for the judgments of the Presidency Magistrate's Court and lays down in detail what has to be recorded by him. These provisions show that before it can be said that a particular order amounts to a judgment of a Criminal Court, it must contain the points for determination, the decision of the Court on those points and reasons for coming to that decision. In other words, it must result in either acquittal or conviction of the accused person. In Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R 1939 F.C 43,(1) the Federal Court had an occasion to consider as to what amounts to a judgment under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held “judgment in a criminal case means a judgment of conviction or acquittal”. It approved the decisions of the Madras High Court reported in Emperor v. China Kaliappa Goundon, (1906) 28 Mad. 126,(2) and Emperor v. Maheshwara Kondaya, (1908) 31 Mad. 543,(3) holding that “a judgment is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused”. In Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, A.I.R 1949 F.C 1,(4) the Federal Court after referring to their previous decision in Dr. Hori Ram Singh's case,(1), held—

“In our opion, the term ‘judgment’ itself indicates a judicial decision given on the merits of the dispute brought before the Court. In a criminal case it cannot cover a preliminary or interlocutory order.”

A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni Madhab, I.L.R 28 Cal. 652,(5) while discussing the question whether an order of discharge amounted to a judgment or not observed as under :—

“Now, here I would state that in my opinion such an order is not a judgment within the terms of Chapter XXVI. Section 367 explains what constitutes a judgment and it clearly indicates to my mind that a judgment within that Chapter is only a judgment of acquittal or of conviction. In the case of an order of discharge, or in the case of an order dismissing a complaint, it is expressly required by the law that the Magistrate shall state his reasons, and I therefore take it that, if it had not been so required, it would have been unnecessary for a Magistrate to state any reason for his order. Consequently in this point of view, the order would not constitute a judgment. And it seems to me, also, that the expression ‘judgment’ itself indicates some final determination of the case which would end it once for all, such as an order of conviction or acquittal.”

The Patna High Court in Raghubans Prasad and another v. State, A.I.R 1961 Patna 397,(6) held as under :—

“An examination of the various provisions of the Code will show that every order passed by the Magistrate under the Code “is not a judgment within the meaning of section 369. In order to constitute judgement there must be an investigation of the merits of the case on evidence and after hearing the arguments. Where, however, the order is passed summarily without consideration of the entire evidence as in the case of the order of discharge, it will not obviously amount to a judgment.”

It was also held that the order of discharge could not be regarded as the final pronouncement of the Magistrate because a fresh complaint might be made on the same facts notwithstanding the order of discharge. In Mr. Harbai v. Raya Premji and another, A.I.R 1939 Sind 193 (F.B)(7), Rayappa and others v. Shivamma, A.I.R 1964, Mysore 1(8) and State v. Prakash Chandra Agarwalla, A.I.R 1970 Orissa 171(9) the above decisions were followed and it was held that an order of discharge did not amount to judgement.

On behalf of the petitioners reliance has been placed on a Single Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Bajrang Singh v. Ram Kishan and another, A.I.R 1967 Pb. 361(10) The learned Judge without discussing the above-mentioned authorities and placing reliance on an earlier Single Bench decision of the same High Court reported in Babu Ram v. Ramji Lal and others, A.I.R 1964 Pb. 444, (11) held—

“The view of this Court is, and has been consistent that a Magistrate has no power of reviving a complaint dismissed in default under section 259 of the Criminal Procedure Code.”

In Babu Ram's case(11) the learned Judge was dealing with proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Because of the absence of Babu Ram, his application under section 145 of the code was dismissed. Babu Ram filed another similar application which was proceeded with and decided against him. Thereafter he challenged the second order in revision on the ground that the dismissal of his previous application was illegal and the original proceedings remained pending, and so the order passed on the second application was not valid. The learned Judge, while agreeing that the dismissal of previous application due to absence of the applicant was not valid, held that that order could be set aside only if that had been challenged in revision, and that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to review that order and set it aside. Shakuntla Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R 1962 S.C 1208,(12) which held that the Sessions Judge was not competent to alter or review his judgment once signed, except for correcting a clerical error, was referred to. section 369 of the code was also quoted. There was no reference to the question whether the impugned order amounted to judgment and the various afore-mentioned authorities. This judgment also did not relate to the order passed under section 259 of the code. Another authority referred to by the learned Judge in Bajrang Singh's case(10) is Bhagwan Sahai v. Moti Lal, A.I.R 1953 All. 402.(13) Again in this judgment there is no decision of the question whether the order of discharge under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure amounts to a judgment or not. In Keshav Lal v. Gaveria, A.I.R 1952 Raj. 50,(14) there was no question of any order of discharge under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Here a learned Single Judge of that Court had dismissed a revision petition in the absence of the petitioner and a question had arisen whether it could be restored. This case is of no help to either party.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to an unreported judgment of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 33 of 1968 (Ava Singh v. Arjan Dass) decided on 19th February, 1968.(15) The petitioners cannot derive any help from this decision. In this case the complaint was in respect of an offence for which the procedure laid down under Chapter XX of the Code for the trial of summons-cases had to be followed. section 247 of the code, which forms part of this Chapter, lays down that if the complainant does not appear the Magistrate shall acquit the accused unless or for reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. Under these circumstances the dismissal of the complaint, though expressed to be under section 259 of the Code, was in fact under section 247 and the result was that the accused stood acquitted. The observations made about section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were, therefore, obiter dicta.

As long as the order of the Magistrate does not amount to a “judgment” or a “final order”, there is nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting the Magistrate from entertaining a fresh application asking for the same relief on the same facts or from reconsidering that order. During the course of proceedings a Magistrate has to pass various interlocutory orders and it will not be correct to say that he has no jurisdiction to re-consider them. For example the orders exempting the presence of the accused. refusing bail to the accused, summoning a witness etc. can be reconsidered since these are neither judgments nor final orders. A Full Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mirza Mohd. Afzal Beg and others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R 1960 J. & K. 1,(16) held that it was not valid to contend that the Magistrate was absolutely bound by an order on an interlocutory matter and had no right to pass a different order unless his earlier order was set aside by a superior Court in appropriate proceedings since the principle applicable to judgment does not apply to interlocutory orders and the Magistrate was entitled to pass a different order at a later stage.

We are in respectful agreement with the view holding that the order of discharge of an accused under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not amount to a judgment under the Code. The Magistrate thus will be competent to revive the complaint and re-summon the accused after setting aside the order of discharge.

The result is that the recommendations made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge are not accepted. The parties are directed to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 30th November, 1970.

A.N.K Order accordingly.